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Abstract                                                                                     Alan Gaukroger 
   
The Director of Financial Enquiries.  A Study of the Treasury Career of R. G. Hawtrey, 
1919-39.
 
In 1904 Ralph George Hawtrey, a Cambridge Mathematics graduate, entered the 
Treasury as Second Class Clerk.  Apart from one year of secondment he was to remain 
employed by the Treasury until 1947.  His career progress was modest.  He never 
achieved a position of high administrative responsibility.  Only in 1919, at the age of 
forty, did he achieve the grade of Assistant Secretary.  In this position, as Director of 
Financial Enquiries within the Finance Division of the Treasury, he had no administrative 
responsibility, but was required to prepare reports on matters of his own choosing or as 
directed by his Treasury superiors.  In his remaining 28 years at the Treasury he made 
no further career progress.  As such, his was an unremarkable career. 
    His career was only remarkable because, after entering the Treasury, he took up an 
interest in the subject of Economics – he became a self-taught economist.  Having 
developed his economic understanding through his experiences within the Treasury, it 
owed little to any previously existing ‘school’.  Thus, in 1913, in his first book Good and 
Bad Trade, he was able to produce the first complete monetary explanation of the trade 
cycle.  His standing as an economist rose even as his civil service career halted.  In 1919 
he produced a book Currency and Credit which became a standard university text on 
monetary economics for over a decade.  He was appointed visiting Professor of 
Economics at Harvard for 1928-9, was elected to a fellowship of the British Academy in 
1935, appointed Professor of International Economics at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs in 1947, knighted (for ‘services to Economics’) in 1956, and elected 
to an Honorary Fellowship of Trinity College, Cambridge in 1959.  As an economist of 
standing he used his position in the Treasury to criticise the policy-making authorities.     
    The Financial Enquiries Branch, for which Hawtrey was responsible, has commonly 
been described as a ‘backwater’ – removed from centre of economic decision-making.  
Likewise, within studies of the Treasury, there has been a tendency to deprecate 
Hawtrey as a figure of fun; partly on account of personal inefficiencies and 
eccentricities, and partly on account of a certain ‘unworldliness’, with his views being 
tied too closely to his economic theory and divorced from the traditional culture within 
which the Treasury and the Bank of England had been accustomed to operate.   
     This thesis will examine the way in which, as an economist, Hawtrey used his 
position within the Treasury to criticise, and attempt to change, policy.  It will 
concentrate on his differences with the advice of other economists and his differences 
with the policies of the Treasury and the Bank of England. 
    The findings of this study are that while much of the criticism of Hawtrey’s career 
may be true, there were times when Hawtrey was both persuasive and influential.  Much 
of his influence stemmed from his relationship with senior members of the Treasury 
administration, and whilst there were times when senior staff respected his judgement, 
there were times when his views ran contrary to the ethos of the Treasury and were 
ignored.  However, even when he was ignored, as he often was, Hawtrey’s criticisms 
drew attention to the wider implications of policy in such a way that he can be seen as 
acting as the Treasury’s ‘conscience’.  As such, his influence was often not directly on 
policy but, more subtly, upon the way in which the Treasury’s perception of its 
responsibilities changed. 
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                                      Preface and Acknowledgments   
 
Prefaces are where writers make excuses for their words.  This one cannot claim 
to be an exception.  Thus it begins with a description of the unusually circuitous 
route by which this thesis came to be undertaken.   
    A student presenting a Ph.D. thesis in Economic History might be expected to 
possess certain essential building blocks; the minimum foundation might be 
regarded as A-levels in History and Economics with a first degree in one or other 
of these subjects.  This work is presented with no such underpinning.   
    A degree in Physics, taken in the early 1960s, served as passport to a career, 
teaching physics and mathematics, in laboratories and classrooms in secondary 
schools and sixth-form colleges in the West Midlands, Cheshire and West 
Yorkshire.  The intellectual giants bestriding this former life of mine were not 
Smith, Ricardo, Mill or Keynes, but Archimedes, Galileo, Newton and Einstein.   
    Retirement offered the possibility of widening academic horizons.  Initial steps 
in this venture were towards the Open University and a degree in English 
Literature.  Attempting to follow this up I sought, in vain, for a specialist in 
colonial and post-colonial literatures at my local university, the University of 
Huddersfield, to supervise a research project on the work of the St. Lucian poet, 
Derek Walcott.  Unable to find anybody there, or anywhere else, with time to 
share my enthusiasm for Walcott’s work, I re-directed my academic efforts by 
enrolling for the degree of M.A. in History at Huddersfield. 
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    The context for the awakening of a new interest was a study, with Professor 
David Taylor, of poverty in Victorian London.  In Henry Mayhew’s writings on 
poverty amongst nineteenth century silk-weavers in the London area of 
Spittlefields, he observed that the silk-workers who managed to survive, being 
underpaid, were being forced into excessively long hours of work in order to 
subsist, in the course of which they were driving other weavers out of work.  
Interviewing the silk-workers, he found that they blamed their condition on the 
repressive effects of ‘the free market in goods’, in particular the competition from 
goods made in France where, the workers believed, the tax regime was more 
lenient.  Mayhew took up the cause of the silk-workers, increasingly directing his 
anger at the Political Economists whom he held responsible for the dominant 
free-market ideology, which he accepted as the cause of the poverty he was 
witnessing.  He regarded the message of the Political Economists as grossly 
immoral: 
 
Do your neighbour as your neighbour would do you.1
                   [The underlining, but not the italics, are mine] 
     
Moreover, he believed their ideas were not founded upon observations of things 
happening in the real world. 
 
                                                 
1 H. Mayhew, ‘Answers to Correspondents’ [No. 20, 26 April 1851] in B.O.Taithe, The 
Essential Mayhew (London, Rivers Oram, 1996), p.136. 
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Economists from Adam Smith down . . . have shown the same 
aversion to collect facts as mad dogs have to touch water.  It is 
so much easier to ensconce themselves in some smug corner 
and there remain all day, like big-bottomed spiders, spinning 
cobweb theories amid heaps of rubbish.2
 
As a physicist with a fascination for models and theories, it was inevitable that 
‘cobweb theories’ would entice me into their trap, and there I have remained, 
entrapped, ever since.   
    Early stages of this confinement were spent reading about the nineteenth 
century economists from Smith to Marshall.  The smooth progress of self-tuition 
came to an end with the advent of Keynes, much as my understanding of physics 
had stumbled as the certainties of Newtonian processes gave way to the 
relativistic mechanics of Einstein.  Both The General Theory of Employment 
Interest and Money, and The General Theory of Relativity, for me, had eel-like 
qualities; no sooner did I feel that I had intuitively grasped their ideas than some 
doubt would cause that tenuous grasp to fail - my sense of understanding would 
slither away, and the process of retrieval would have to begin all over again. 
    Keynes’s ideas were produced out of the experiences of the unemployment of 
the inter-war period.  To improve my understanding of Keynes I approached 
Keith Laybourn, Professor of History at the University of Huddersfield, with a 
view to completing my M.A. course by writing a dissertation on Keynes’s political 
                                                 
 
2 H. Mayhew, ‘Answers to Correspondents’ [No. 34, 2 August 1851] in B.O.Taithe, The 
Essential Mayhew (London, Rivers Oram, 1996), p.179. 
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activities during the early inter-war period.  The dissertation covered Keynes’s 
involvement with the Lloyd-George wing of the Liberal Party, their Summer 
Schools which produced the Liberal Yellow Book ‘Britain’s Industrial Future’, his 
collaboration with Hubert Henderson in supporting Lloyd-George’s claim that the 
Liberals could ‘conquer unemployment’, his alliance with Ernest Bevin within the 
confines of the Macmillan Committee, and his cautious, guarded support for 
Oswald Mosley’s ‘Manifesto’.  Whilst researching for this dissertation a shadowy 
figure kept appearing and disappearing; a figure, apparently, kept in captivity, 
deep in the bowels of the Treasury.3  The name of the shadowy figure was Ralph 
Hawtrey.   
    My recollection of the first encounter with the name is very clear.  It took 
place whilst reading Alan Booth’s book British Economic Policy 1931-49.4  Booth, 
in discussing the generally accepted historiography of inter-war depression, 
suggested that it usually rested on two dubious propositions:  first, that inter-war 
unemployment arose from the application of obsolete economic theories, and 
secondly, that whilst Keynes understood the appropriate remedies to counter 
unemployment, Treasury officials did not. 
                                                 
 
3 A reference to Churchill’s request to Treasury officials that he [Churchill] be allowed 
time to discuss economics with Hawtrey.  The quotation is repeated in several books 
and is drawn from P.J.Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement (London, Jonathan Cape, 1948) 
p.82 – [Churchill requested that] ‘the learned man should be released from the dungeon 
. . . have his chains struck off and the straw brushed from his hair and clothes and be 
admitted to the light and warmth of an argument in the Treasury board room with the 
greatest living master of argument’.  
 
4 A.Booth, British Economic Policy 1931-49: Was there a Keynesian Revolution? (Hemel 
Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989). 
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 Typically, Ralph Hawtrey is identified as the main source of 
outdated, orthodox economics within the Treasury . . . . He 
regarded the trade cycle as a purely monetary phenomenon, to 
be regulated by monetary measures rather than by public 
expenditure. . . . By the mid-1930s, however, Treasury officials, 
by direct exposure to Keynes’s arguments, had been re-educated 
away from ‘outmoded economics’.5
    
Booth is here, of course, echoing conventional historiography.  The reason why 
that first encounter with the name of ‘Hawtrey’ remains clear in my memory is 
because it was so strongly reinforced by my second encounter – an encounter 
which, at the time, startled me by its apparent incongruity.  Reading through 
Keynes’s great work, my concentration level started to flag.  I turned idly to the 
preface of the book where Keynes acknowledged his debts.  Only four academics 
were deemed worthy of acknowledgement. 
 
. . . I have depended on the constant advice and constructive 
criticism of Mr. R. F. Khan. . . . I have also had much help from 
Mrs. Joan Robinson, Mr. R. G. Hawtrey and Mr. R. F. Harrod, 
who have read the whole of the proof-sheets.6
     
                                                 
 
5 Ibid., pp.23-4. 
 
6 J.M.Keynes, The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (London, 
Macmillan, 1957), p.viii. 
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It seemed less than credible that the man who, however mistakenly, had been 
‘identified as the main source of outdated, orthodox economics within the 
Treasury’ could be the same man who had given ‘much help’ and ‘read the whole 
of the proof sheets’ in the process of the production of Keynes’s revolutionary 
text.   
    Similar dichotomies regarding Hawtrey were to arise throughout Peter Clarke’s 
book The Keynesian Revolution in the Making 1924-1936.7  Referring to 
suggestions that the Keynesian multiplier had originated from Hawtrey’s work, 
yet Hawtrey had been ‘if not the architect, at least the structural engineer of the 
Treasury View’, Clarke posed the question as to how it could be possible for one 
man to be ‘at once anti-Keynesian and proto-Keynesian’.8   
    References to Hawtrey continued to intrigue.  As the Second World War 
approached, and senior Treasury officials were still suggesting that government 
works, without reflationary finance, would merely replace private works without 
any beneficial effect on employment, Clarke made the pertinent point that 
‘perhaps Hawtrey’s long years in the dungeon . . . had, in the end given him a 
more subtly insidious influence in the 1930s than has usually been supposed’.9  
By contrast, Roger Middleton in his study of the relationship between economic 
theory and policy, Charlatans or Saviours? Economists and the British Economy 
                                                 
 
7 P. Clarke, The Keynesian Revolution in the Making 1924-36 (Oxford, O.U.P., 1988) 
 
8 Ibid., p.143. 
 
9 Ibid., p.319. 
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from Marshall to Meade, has suggested that under the influence of Sir Richard 
Hopkins the Treasury was ‘quietly’ professionalised during the 1930s in such a 
way as to marginalise Hawtrey. 
 
Hawtrey[‘s] . . . major influence was if anything to convince his 
generalist colleagues that economic theory posed no great 
intellectual challenge nor had any real relevance to the 
administrative tasks facing the department . . . . it is not difficult 
to see that he would not be a key player in the education and 
professionalisation of the Treasury . . .10   
 
Looking at the literature relating economics and economists to policy, Middleton 
noted that there was a relative paucity of material on the role of economists in 
government departments prior to the Second World War.  A small number of 
career civil servants had published autobiographies, and there was, he noted, ‘a 
study of Hawtrey, the one economist in the Treasury before the Second World 
War, but [it] had little to say about his official career.’11  This observation can be 
taken as cue for the present study, which was undertaken in the hope of, in 
some small measure, filling the intimated void. 
    The beginning of any project involves a certain amount of dithering and 
uncertainty of direction before aims become clearer and fruitful ways of working 
                                                 
 
10 R. Middleton, Charlatans or Saviours?  Economists and the British Economy from 
Marshall to Meade (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1998), p.199. 
 
11 Ibid., p.385.  The study referred to was Deutscher, P., R.G.Hawtrey and the 
Development of Macroeconomics (London, Macmillan, 1990). 
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established.  Again, this project was no exception.  Part of the problem was 
Hawtrey’s immense output.  Black’s obituary of Hawtrey appended a bibliography 
of 99 published pieces of work: either books or articles in learned journals.12  
They ranged from an article on the speed of warships, written whilst he was still 
a schoolboy and published in Fortnightly Review, to an article on stopping 
inflation, published in Bankers’ Magazine in his 92nd year.  Many of these 
publications were invaluable in clarifying Hawtrey’s thinking and the economic 
model which he brought to bear upon his work.     
    Vast though Hawtrey’s output was, it gave only small guidance as to the 
nature of his work in his Treasury post (although some of his published articles 
and sections of his books are quite clearly revisions and re-workings of his 
Treasury memoranda).  Churchill College in Cambridge houses a large, well-
ordered collection of Hawtrey’s papers.  Several visits to Churchill unearthed 
much fascinating material, but little which gave any real feeling for Hawtrey’s 
role in the dynamics of the Treasury.  A ‘Treasury’ section of the Churchill 
collection has 67 files and includes lengthy memoranda on economic conditions 
in America, Germany and India.  Again, these memoranda gave little indication 
of the contexts within which they were produced, and no sense of Treasury 
dynamics.  A further discouragement was that Hawtrey could never be concise.  
His typed memoranda seem interminable; his hand-written notes, in a large, 
heavily-stylised, looping hand manage (especially as he grew older) no more 
                                                 
 
12 Black, R.D.C., ‘R.G.Hawtrey’, Proc. Brit. Acad., 63(1977), 363-407. 
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than two or three words per line and, although decipherable, are virtually 
unreadable for the purpose of extracting meaning.  Much of the material in the 
Churchill collection relates to work he produced after 1939 – his Treasury History 
of the Second World War, his time as Henry Price Professor International 
Economics at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, and papers relating to 
the Radcliffe Committee on the working of the monetary system, of which he 
was very critical.   
    Early visits to the National Archives at Kew proved little more encouraging 
than the visits to Churchill College.  T 208, the papers of the Financial Enquiries 
Branch (usually referred to as the ‘Hawtrey Papers’) seemed to replicate much of 
what I had already encountered within the ‘Treasury’ File at Churchill.  Again, it 
is an extremely well-ordered collection of some 206 files containing memoranda, 
reports and figures; most of which were produced during Hawtrey’s time as 
Director of the Financial Enquiries Branch.    
    Judging by the quality of the paper, most of the papers in T 208 (‘Hawtrey 
Papers’) are ‘bottom copies’; probably the fourth or fifth carbon copy of 
memoranda.  As such they were ‘bare’ copies, devoid of any comment, and 
retained only for record purposes by the Financial Enquiries Branch itself.  I 
wanted to get some feel for what was going on inside the Treasury, and what 
role Hawtrey was playing.  These files were not helping me.  After many months 
during which I made several visits to the Hawtrey Archives in Cambridge, made a 
number of visits to the National Archives at Kew, read much of Hawtrey’s 
 12
writings and even prepared a few preliminary chapters of the thesis, I felt to be 
getting no nearer to what I felt should be the real business of the project.  I 
finally turned to the archive files of some of its senior figures.  Here, at last, I 
began to find what I needed – Hawtrey’s work set in the context of a living, 
dynamic institution.  At this point, after the best part of a year of frustration, the 
project finally ‘took off’.    
     
    The process of research and writing has served up joys and pleasures, as well 
as a few trials and tribulations.  There have been many times when I have 
questioned the wisdom of attempting to produce a thesis from the kitchen table 
of a small cottage high in the Pennine hills when most of my primary evidence 
lay in the busy metropolis some 200 miles further south.  Indeed, both time and 
expense have imposed a great limitation on the extent to which I have been able 
to interrogate Treasury files.  Even so, the route south to the National Archives, 
via M1 (I now know the names of all its service stations off by heart), M25 and 
M4 has become all too familiar, if not tiresome.  One attempt to spend 
successive days at the National Archives by sleeping overnight at a London Youth 
Hostel was a disastrous experiment which I have not sought to repeat.   
    Similarly, the jargon employed in financial discourse used to confuse; now it 
jars.  Whilst the logic of the operation may be quite simple, I still find it 
impossible to glide easily over a phrase such as ‘the discounting of bills drawn on 
London’ without having to pause, re-enact the process in my own mind in terms 
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of seller, buyer, borrower, lender and dealer, and then think of Sir Ernest 
Gower’s book Plain Words. 
    The joys have come in a number of ways.  Understanding of my new science, 
Economics, has progressed hand-in–hand with the writing of the thesis.  As with 
my old science, Physics, I will probably never rise above mediocrity, but the 
pleasure lies in the small steps of progress.   
    I have discovered a rich vein amongst the writers of economic history.  Alan 
Booth, Alec Cairncross, Peter Clarke, Barry Eichengreen, Roy Harrod, Susan 
Howson, Roger Middleton, Donald Moggridge, George Peden, Robert Skidelsky, 
Jim Tomlinson and Donald Winch will all receive acknowledgements in footnotes, 
but at times when I have wearied of Hawtrey I have still continued to read, and 
enjoy, their writings even when that reading delivered no return to the thesis. 
     The style of the research has not always been to my taste, but even the 
process of ploughing through the memoranda of civil servants has yielded 
occasional moments of pleasure.  Treasury memoranda are not the lightest of 
reading, but hand-written marginal comments (where legible) often provided 
relief and amusement, as well as insight.  In fact, the possibility of unearthing 
some gem within the margin proved to be a necessary stimulus for maintaining 
interest when the spirit wearied of the task.  My favourite aside remains a hand-
written note by Frederick Leith-Ross, attached to one of Hawtrey’s memoranda, 
as he passed it on to his superior, Sir Otto Niemeyer.  The memorandum in 
question was one of Hawtrey’s more notable ones in which, in late 1925, he 
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deplored the raising of Bank rate to 5 per cent some seven months after the 
restoration of the Gold Standard, a move which he described as ‘nothing less 
than a national disaster’.13  Passing the memorandum to Niemeyer, Leith-Ross 
attached a short note - ‘This is almost pure Havenstein and I kept a copy for 
you.’14  I was convinced that this note spoke volumes, but being ignorant of 
Havenstein I couldn’t be sure of its meaning.  A little delving revealed Rudolf 
Havenstein to have been the President of the Reichsbank, who, at the height of 
German hyperinflation brought in strike-breakers to prevent striking printers from 
halting the flow of currency notes.  More than any formal note, this aside 
indicated the extent to which the Treasury was terrified of the prospect of 
inflation, and deeply mistrusted the advice of economists – even its own! 
    The greatest of the joys has been the involvement with the dedicated staff of 
the History Department and the Business Studies Department of the University of 
Huddersfield, and I hope that they will take this acknowledgement as words of 
sincere thanks for their efforts on my behalf.  My interest stems from a lecture 
course on Victorian poverty delivered by Professor David Taylor, who readily 
agreed to be one of my supervisors despite, at the time, carrying out the 
onerous task of Faculty Dean.  Dr. Vince Fitzsimons from Huddersfield University 
Business School agreed to oversee the thesis from the perspective of an 
                                                 
 
13 Treasury Papers T 176/13.  ‘The Niemeyer Papers’.  ‘The Credit Situation’, by 
R.G.Hawtrey, 5 December 1925. 
 
14 Ibid., Note appended by F. Leith-Ross to ‘The Credit Situation’ by R.G.Hawtrey, 5 
December 1925. 
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economist.  He has been unfailing in his help whenever I needed to discuss 
aspects of economic theory.  My greatest good fortune has been to have been 
under the wing of my principal supervisor, Professor Keith Laybourn.  Keith’s 
enthusiasm is infectious.  His generosity lies in his willingness to share that 
enthusiasm with everybody.  Having shared his enthusiasm for History, my 
greatest fear would have been to let him down by producing work which failed to 
meet his standards.  His encouragement throughout the past few years has been 
unfailing and I hope that he is not too disappointed with my efforts.   
    My final, and greatest, thanks must go to a lady who will probably never read 
a word of this.  Whilst generally disliking dedications in books, I have begun to 
understand the sense of guilt which prompts them.  Writing, whether history or 
fiction, takes the writer away from the immediate present into different places 
and different times, and having to live with someone who is only present in body 
must be very trying.  So, to Jill - much love and many thanks – perhaps next 
year I will live a little more in 2008, and rather less in 1928. 
 
Postscript to the preface
Visitors to our cottage in Scholes have not usually been steeped in the history of 
economic thought.  Consequently, when informed that the various papers 
untidily scattered around the kitchen were to assist me in writing about the 
career of a man called ‘Hawtrey’, it has been difficult to prevent the conversation 
converging to a discussion about ‘Carry On’ films.  I would like to have been 
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more informative about any link.  This suddenly seemed a possibility when 
reading, in E. G. Davis’s brief account of Hawtrey’s life, that ‘[Hawtrey’s] father 
left teaching to follow a famous brother, Charles Hawtrey, to the stage.  He then 
failed in this attempt to earn a living as an actor’.15  Here, I thought, must be a 
link.  Noting ages, I deduced that the father of the economist and the 
grandfather of the comedy actor could well have been brothers.  Establishing 
this, I decided, would be a most useful piece of research.  Sadly, it was not to 
be.  The actor, who camped his way through the interminable series of films was 
born ‘Hatree’ and changed his name to ‘Hawtrey’ for stage purposes.  
 
     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
                
                
 
 
            
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 
15  E. G. Davies, ‘R.G.Hawtrey, 1879-1975’ in D.P.O’Brien and John R. Presley (ed.), 
Pioneers of Modern Economics in Britain (London, Macmillan, 1981), p.203. 
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                                Introduction 
 
 
 
The warm and generous obituary to Sir Ralph George Hawtrey by R. D. Collison 
Black in the 1977 edition of the Proceedings of the British Academy outlined a 
man of great intelligence, breadth, humanity and generosity of spirit who lived a 
remarkably long, rich and (despite the length of his Treasury employment) varied 
life.16  Born in Slough in 1879, the son of a preparatory school assistant master, 
Hawtrey entered Eton as a King’s Scholar in 1893.  His early academic successes 
included winning, in 1896, the Tomline Prize, Eton’s highest mathematical award.  
He continued to win mathematical prizes, and a First Class Honours Degree, after 
gaining a scholarship to read Mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge.  In 
1903 he embarked upon a life-long career as a civil servant.  Almost 
paradoxically, his life continued to be marked by the academic distinctions which 
flowed his way.  He took up the position of Visiting Professor of Economics at 
Harvard University in 1928-29, was elected to a Fellowship of the British 
Academy in 1935, had conferred the honorary degree of D.Sc. (Econ.) by London 
University in 1939, and was elected President of the Royal Economic Society for 
the years 1946-48.  From 1947 to 1952 Hawtrey served as Henry Price Professor 
of International Economics at the Royal Institute of International Affairs at 
                                                 
16 R. D. Collison Black, ‘Ralph George Hawtrey’ Proceedings of the British Academy 63 
(1977), pp. 362-397.  R.D.Collison Black was visiting Professor of Economics at Yale 
1964-5, and appointed Professor of Economics at Queen’s University, Belfast in 1962.  
He was made a Fellow of the British Academy in 1974.  
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Chatham House.  He was knighted in 1956 and elected to an Honorary 
Fellowship of Trinity College Cambridge in 1959.      
    Hawtrey’s social life seems to have been no less rich or varied, and even his 
private life had a touch of the exotic.  Whilst at Cambridge he came to be 
influenced by the ethics and teachings of the philosopher G. E. Moore.  Moore 
regarded ‘goodness’ as a matter for direct judgement rather than for reference 
to any external religious or social code of behaviour (a cloak – no doubt – for the 
unconventional lifestyles of future members of Bloomsbury).  Cambridge 
undergraduates were eligible for election to an elite discussion group whose 
members regarded themselves as disciples of Moore – the ‘Apostles’.  Hawtrey’s 
election as an Apostle enabled him to move in an exalted literary circle which 
included E. M. Forster, Lytton Strachey and Leonard Woolf. In 1903 he was 
instrumental in proposing and seeing the election to the Apostles of John 
Maynard Keynes.  Keynes was to remain a life-long friend despite differences 
over economic theory and policy which involved them, at times, in bouts of quite 
severe mutual criticism. Another friendship which commenced during this period 
was that with Bertrand Russell who, in 1908, after they had left Cambridge, 
corresponded with Hawtrey concerning proofs of various theorems with which 
Russell was struggling with whilst writing, with Whitehead, his Principia 
Mathematica.17
                                                 
 
17 Ibid., p.365. 
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    The Cambridge Apostles formed the basis of the Bloomsbury Group, London’s 
self-selected literary elite, and Hawtrey continued his association with the 
members of this group whilst working in London.  The letters of Virginia 
(Stephens) Woolf record Hawtrey as staying with the Stephens family at their 
cottage in Carbis Bay, Cornwall.18  Woolf records Hawtrey as a rather shy young 
man who irritated her by making frequent comments, in Latin, to the male 
company of the household.  It was through his Bloomsbury connections that he 
met Emilia d’Aranyi, great-niece of the renowned Hungarian violinist Joseph 
Joachim; she herself enjoyed a reputation as a concert pianist, being one of 
three talented musical sisters. They were married in 1915.19  Shortly after their 
marriage Virginia Woolf wrote to Keynes’s lover, Duncan Grant, that Emilia 
d’Aranyi was ‘a practically barbaric Pole . . . with ungoverned passions and the 
brain of a yellow cockatoo’.20  There appear to have been no children from the 
marriage but Hawtrey remained devoted to her until her death, following a long 
illness, in 1953.21
                                                 
 
18 V. Woolf,   The Flight of the Mind.  The Letters of Virginia Woolf. Vol. I: 1888-1912   
(Virginia Stephen), ed. Nigel Nicholson, (London, Hogarth Press, 1975),  p.207. 
 
19 J. Macleod,  The Sisters D’Aranyi  (London, Allen & Unwin, 1969).  This account of the 
lives of three exceptionally talented musical sisters is one of the few sources for insights 
into the private life of Hawtrey. 
 
20 V. Woolf,  The Question of Things Happening.  The Letters of Virginia Woolf. Vol. II: 
1912-1922,   ed. Nigel Nicholson, (London, Hogarth Press, 1976), p.145. 
 
21 Black, ‘Ralph Hawtrey’, p. 366. 
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    Despite being a career civil servant from 1903 to 1947 (interrupted only by his 
year’s secondment at Harvard) Hawtrey was an academic economist of 
significance.  Between 1920 and 1939 he was the fifth most frequently cited 
macroeconomist from articles included in the Index of Economic Journals – 
below Keynes, but above von Hayek, Marshall, and Joan Robinson.22  His 1919 
publication, Currency and Credit, was used as a textbook during the 1930s at the 
Universities of Chicago, Harvard, Cambridge and Melbourne.23    
    After his final retirement, in 1952 at the age of seventy-three, from the 
research chair at the Royal Institute of International Affairs he continued to 
publish books on economics and ethics, to write articles for learned journals and 
the press, and to encourage young researchers into economics and economic 
history.  To the end of his life, in 1975 at the age of ninety-five, he retained a 
lively interest in world affairs.  When the Bank of England’s historian, Professor 
Richard Sayers, visited Hawtrey on the occasion of the latter’s ninety-fifth 
birthday, he remarked how he found him ‘still the same charming and interesting 
man’ he had first met some forty-two years previously.24
    Despite this roll of prizes, honours, and acclaim, there are two dark clouds 
over Hawtrey’s life which might lead to the assessment that his legacy is one of 
failure.  First, for the last forty years of his life he was to see his economic 
model, with attendant policy prescriptions, discredited by the Keynesian 
                                                 
22 Deutscher, R.G. Hawtrey and the Development of Macroeconomics, p. 193. 
 
23 Ibid., p. 5. 
 
24 Black, ‘Ralph Hawtrey’, p.369. 
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hegemony.  Secondly, his career as a civil servant has often been judged as 
disappointing and even irrelevant.   
    Recent studies have led to a measure of rehabilitation.  The breakdown of the 
post-war Butskillian policy consensus amidst both unemployment and inflation 
has shaken confidence in Keynesian prescriptions, and the advent of more 
avowedly monetarist policies has led to some revival of interest in Hawtrey’s 
work - nearly all by economists.  One work, R.G. Hawtrey and the Development 
of Macroeconomics by Patrick Deutscher (1990), at the University of Michigan, 
has been devoted entirely to an analysis of Hawtrey’s theoretical output. Davis 
(1980) has written on the extensive correspondence between Hawtrey and 
Keynes during the preparation of Keynes’s Treatise on Money.25  Laidler (1993, 
1998a, 1998b) has attempted to link Hawtrey’s period as visiting Professor of 
Economics at Harvard with the origins of the Chicago School of monetarist 
economics which spawned Milton Friedman, economics guru to Margaret 
Thatcher and Ronald Reagan.26  Davis (1981) has contributed a chapter on 
Hawtrey to an anthology of British economists.27  
                                                 
 
25 E.G. Davis, ‘The Correspondence between R.G. Hawtrey and J.M.Keynes on the 
Treatise: The Genesis of Output Adjustment Models’ Canadian Journal of Economics, 13 
(1980), 716-724.   
 
26 D. Laidler,  ‘Hawtrey, Harvard and the origins of the Chicago Tradition’ Journal of 
Political Economy 101 (Dec. 1993) 1068-1103; ‘More on Hawtrey, Harvard and Chicago’ 
Journal of Economic Studies 25, (1998a) 1:  4-16;  ‘Hawtrey, Harvard and Chicago: a 
final comment’ Journal of Economic Studies 25, (1998b) 1: 22-24. 
 
27 E. G. Davis, ‘Ralph Hawtrey’ in O’Brien, D.P., and Presley, J.R., Pioneers of Modern 
Economics in Britain (London, Macmillan, 1981).   
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       There is little which I would be capable of adding on the subject of 
Hawtreyan economics to the writings of these economists.  However, as part of 
this thesis I have set myself the task of setting out, as clearly and simply as 
possible, the structure of Hawtrey’s model of the economy.  I have done this not 
for the purpose of assessing its merit, but for the purpose of appraising the 
extent to which Hawtrey’s Treasury memoranda, which often contained criticisms 
of Government, Bank, and Treasury policy, flowed logically from his own 
theoretical model.    
    Just as Hawtreyan economics has come under reappraisal since the 1960s, so 
there has been a degree of reappraisal of the Treasury’s stance between the 
wars.  The aspect of inter-war economic policy most closely associated with 
Hawtrey is probably the ‘Treasury View’ (Hawtrey, in later life, claimed that 
Keynes attacked the ‘Treasury View’ because it was his view)28.  The nature of 
the ‘Treasury View’ changed over the years and it is still a matter of some 
dispute.  Essentially, it was a view which justified the Treasury’s reluctance to 
sponsor a general ‘Public Works’ programme as a means of relieving 
unemployment, since it claimed that the provision of such works was, in itself, 
incapable of providing extra employment.  Hawtrey (see above) may have 
claimed ownership of the ‘Treasury View’, but his particular contribution to it is 
generally recognised as being an argument, logically derived from his own 
theory, that if conditions were created which were favourable for the extension 
                                                 
 
28 Hawtrey interview with Sir Alec Cairncross, 1966.  HTRY 13/5. 
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of credit, then the credit expansion, by itself, would create extra employment 
without recourse to ‘Public Works’; the provision of ‘Public Works’ would be ‘mere 
ritual’ serving only to boost the egos of politicians desirous to be seen to be 
‘doing something’.29  Treasury officials found this argument particularly useful up 
to 1931.  After 1931 they may have continued to believe the argument, and 
there is some evidence to suggest that they did but Keynes’s, and Denis 
Robertson’s, assaults upon it caused them to proclaim it less confidently and so 
they shifted their stance towards ‘administrative difficulties’.  By the 1950s and 
1960s the ‘Treasury View’, in whatever form, was thoroughly discredited, and 
Joan Robinson, one-time protégé of Keynes, but by then Professor of Economics 
at Cambridge, described Hawtrey’s theoretical justification for the view as 
‘laughable’.30  Recent studies have tended to take a more charitable view of the 
way in which the Treasury responded to the inter-war slump. 
    A recently unpublished thesis by M.M.M. Luthje of Cambridge University has 
argued that, between 1927 and 1933, Hawtrey was instrumental in moving the 
Treasury towards a monetary solution to the world-wide economic downturn.31  
Whilst the evidence of the current thesis leads to the view that this somewhat 
                                                 
 
29 R. G. Hawtrey, ‘Public Expenditure and the Demand for Labour’, Economica, V (1925), 
pp. 38-48. 
 
30 J. Robinson, Economic Philosophy (1962), p.73. 
 
31 M.M.M. Luthje, ‘The Politics of Monetary Policy in Britain from the First World War to 
the World Economic Conference of 1933’;  unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of 
Cambridge, 2002. 
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overstates Hawtrey’s role, it does show that Hawtrey was, arguably, at his most 
influential in the years immediately following the retreat from the Gold Standard.   
    This study aims to shed light on the historical figure of Hawtrey, the Civil 
Servant.    It will look at his economic philosophy, the economic model which 
guided him in his work, and the way in which his economic model directed his 
policy advice.  It will attempt to assess his influence on colleagues and outside 
agencies.  It will look at the quality of his relationships with colleagues and how 
these relationships affected his effectiveness.  It will examine his responses to 
criticisms of the Treasury made in the press (more often than not by Keynes), 
and the extent to which the Treasury took cognisance of his opinions.  It will also 
try to consider the way in which his role changed over the inter-war period in 
response to changing institutions and changing economic conditions. 
    A reading of the few studies to have been done on policy advice in the inter-
war period could lead to the summary conclusion that Hawtrey’s Treasury career 
was largely irrelevant.  Collison Black would have yielded to no one in his 
admiration of the character of Hawtrey.  Concluding his obituarial essay he 
likened Hawtrey to a certain ‘Cambridge type’: 
 
It is a type unworldly without being saintly, unambitious without 
being inactive, warm-hearted without being sentimental.  
Through good report and ill such men work on, following the 
light of truth as they see it; able to be sceptical without being 
paralysed; content to know what is knowable and to reserve 
judgement on what is not.  The world could never be driven by 
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such men, for the springs of action lie deep in ignorance and 
madness.  But it is they who are the beacon in the tempest, and 
they are more, not less, needed now than ever before.32
 
‘Unworldly’ Hawtrey might have been, but not so unworldly as to admit to Sir 
Alec Cairncross that he decided to enter the Civil Service at Eton on hearing that 
it was possible, as a civil servant, ‘to earn one thousand pounds a year at the 
age of forty - and come out with a pension at the end!’33  However, despite the 
warmth of Black’s admiration for Hawtrey, he had, at an earlier point in the 
essay, this to say about Hawtrey’s Treasury career. 
 
. . . Hawtrey drew up many and varied reports and memoranda 
on economic and financial matters which are now to be found 
among the papers of senior Treasury officials of that period, but 
the impression prevails that they did not receive much attention, 
and that the Financial Enquiries Branch under Hawtrey was 
something of a backwater.34
 
In reference to Hawtrey’s work, the same term was used, in 1930, by Keynes 
whilst he was persuading Hubert Henderson to take up the position of Secretary 
to the newly-formed Economic Advisory Council rather than the professorship he 
                                                 
 
32 Black, ‘Ralph George Hawtrey’.  Black is using words which Lowes Dickinson applied to 
C.P.Stanger. 
 
33 Interview with Sir Alec Cairncross in 1966.  Hawtrey Papers, HTRY 13/5. 
 
34 Black, ‘Ralph George Hawtrey’, p.379. 
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had been offered at the London School of Economics.  Keynes promised 
Henderson that he ‘really would be at the centre of things and not in a sort of 
Hawtrey backwater’.35  By successfully persuading Henderson to take up the 
position with the Economic Advisory Council, Keynes effectively left the door 
open for one of his future censors, Friedrich August von Hayek, to enter the 
London School of Economics. 
          Regarding views that the Financial Enquiries Branch was a neglected 
‘backwater’, much the same interpretation can be made from Churchill’s remark 
to his senior officials that ‘the learned man should be released from the dungeon 
. . . have his chains struck off and the straw brushed from his hair and clothes, 
and be admitted to the light and warmth of an argument in the Treasury 
Boardroom’.36 Churchill was probably implying that the Treasury were culpably 
ignoring the expert advice which Hawtrey might provide. 
    Susan Howson has concluded that Hawtrey had been influential in the early 
1920s when other economists were not [my italics], but lost in influence in the 
1930s – predominantly as a result of the content of his economic analysis and 
policy recommendations.  Howson is generally sympathetic to the idea that 
Keynes’s ideas gradually took control of the Treasury during the thirties.  This 
contrasts with Peter Clarke’s suspicion that Hawtrey might have had a ‘more 
insidious’ influence on Treasury officials throughout the thirties by keeping alive 
                                                 
 
35 S. Howson and D. Winch, The Economic Advisory Council 1930-39: a Study in 
Economic Advice during Depression and Recovery (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1977), p.25. 
 
36 P. J. Grigg, Prejudice and Judgement (1948), p.82. 
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the ‘Treasury View’ with its original ‘crowding out’ rationale.37  Roger Middleton’s 
is far more dismissive, regarding Hawtrey’s influence being ‘if anything’ [my 
italics] to persuade his Treasury colleagues of the ‘irrelevance of economic 
theory to their task’.38
        As indicated in the Preface, apart from secondary sources and Hawtrey’s 
own published writings, my main source of evidence in trying to come to an 
opinion on these and other matters has been the files of senior Treasury Officials 
to be found within the National Archives.      
    Within the archive files of senior Treasury staff can be found the places where 
Hawtrey’s advice was subjected to scrutiny.  They are the places where his 
memoranda were contested, and it is within these files that I have sought the 
evidence with which to build up some kind of a picture of the pattern of his 
career.   Marginal comments on his memoranda often indicated where Hawtrey’s 
views differed from those of senior Treasury colleagues.  The position in the file 
usually gave some indication of whether alternative advice was sought, and 
pencilled comments could sometimes indicate the value attached to advice from 
different sources. 
    Booth and Glynn have questioned the usefulness of Public Record Office 
papers to the historian.39  They give some endorsement to C. L. Mowat’s view 
                                                 
 
37 Clarke, The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, p. 319.  
 
38 Middleton, Charlatan’s or Saviours, p. 199. 
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that ‘there are few secrets in government’ and that ‘the Official Secret Act exists 
to conceal the fact that the cupboard is bare’.40  They make the following 
observations regarding Cabinet papers.  Firstly, that they are written, not 
primarily as a true and accurate record, but as a means of fulfilling two separate 
requirements: the need to give clear direction to administrators, and the need to 
find satisfactory words to accommodate conflicting viewpoints.  Secondly, they 
point to lacunae, whether by error or design, by which it is impossible for official 
records to give an adequate account of the motives behind decisions. 
    Booth and Glynn also point out that the sheer volume of P.R.O. material 
deflects attention away from other material and results in a concentration on the 
processes of policy making to the neglect of the reasons for policy and the 
outcomes of policy.  Such concentration of effort, they claim, leads to histories 
which exaggerate the importance of policy processes, and perpetuate the 
Establishment’s own reading of problems. 
    The present study relies heavily on the papers in the Public Records Office.  In 
that one of its principal aims is to uncover the extent to which one particular 
individual took part in the processes of the inter-war Treasury, it escapes the 
stricture of dwelling too heavily on the processes of policy.  The “chat in the 
corridor” may have been where truly important business took place but, in the 
absence of diaries or witnesses, memoranda will have to suffice.  In the case of 
                                                                                                                                                 
39 A. E. Booth and S. Glynn, ‘The public records and recent British historiography’, in Economic 
History Review, 32(3), pp.303-15.  
 
40 Ibid., p.303. 
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Hawtrey, who was to some extent an outsider to the very small and closely knit 
group of influential policy makers, the written memorandum was his method of 
attempting to break into, and influence, the powerful central group. 
    The plain memorandum may, indeed, reveal very little.  This was my 
experience after many months of looking at the Hawtrey papers in Cambridge 
and the papers of the Financial Enquiries Branch in the Public Records Office.  
Much more is revealed when a memorandum has been circulated and is replete 
with underlinings, exclamation marks, question marks, and the occasional 
expletive.  The proximity of a paper to those of others, its position in the time 
sequence or its promptness as a response all give indications of the dynamics 
within an organisation. 
    Throughout the years 1919-1939, the period of Hawtrey’s effective tenure of 
the office of Director of Financial Enquiries (he nominally held the title until 1947, 
but after 1 January 1940 he had no responsibility other than compiling the 
Treasury’s Second World War records) the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury 
was Sir Warren Fisher.  Fisher regarded his position as that of ‘Head of the Civil 
Service’ and co-ordinator of all Civil Service departments.  His role in offering 
financial advice was minimal, and consequently his archive file has largely been 
ignored.  The civil servants with responsibility for advising the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer were the Treasury Controller of Finance and his Deputy.  In 1919 
these were Sir Basil Blackett and Sir Otto Niemeyer.  Through the mid-twenties 
they were Sir Otto Niemeyer and Sir Frederick Leith-Ross.  From the late 
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twenties until the outbreak of the Second World War they were Sir Richard 
Hopkins and Sir Frederick Phillips.  The titles of the offices may have changed 
slightly over the years, and there was some overlap in the changes of pairings, 
but these were the ‘Treasury Knights’ in whose files I looked for evidence of the 
results of Hawtrey’s work. 
    Many of Hawtrey’s memoranda were unsolicited.  He produced them because 
he was critical of some aspect of Government policy.  In some of these 
memoranda there is a marked tone of anger.  This was particularly apparent 
during the late 1920s when the United Kingdom had returned to the Gold 
Standard and Hawtrey believed that the Bank of England was pursuing a foolish 
and unnecessarily high interest rate policy.  At this time, his memoranda, critical 
of Bank or even Treasury policy, could, for such a mild-mannered man, be quite 
savage in tone.  Often, his memoranda were produced as a result of a specific 
request.  On a very small number of occasions they were produced as a result of 
a direct request for guidance, or information, from the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.  At other times Hawtrey prepared a memorandum as a result of a 
Parliamentary Question.  Often a senior colleague wanted support in preparing a 
memorandum and would seek to use Hawtrey’s expertise, particularly with 
regard to currency and foreign exchange.  Hawtrey would invariably write an 
unsolicited memorandum after press criticism of Treasury Policy. 
    The period chosen for the study, 1919-1939, does not precisely coincide with 
the period of Hawtrey’s tenure of the post of Director of Financial Enquiries.  He 
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was, for sure, appointed to the position in 1919.  There is an element of mystery 
surrounding his appointment.  In Hawtrey’s Treasury Career File there are letters 
relating to his initial appointment to the Treasury in 1904, and to his transfer to 
the First (Finance) Division as acting First Class Clerk, and subsequently First 
Class Clerk, in 1910-11.  There is a great deal of correspondence concerning the 
status of his year’s secondment at Harvard for pension purposes, and about his 
retirement and subsequent re-employment for the purposes of recording 
Treasury activities during the Second World War.  There is nothing in his career 
file, nor does there seem to be documentary evidence elsewhere, relating to his 
appointment as Director of the Financial Enquiries Branch.   
    It is possible to surmise that the post was created (or more accurately, re-
created) for Hawtrey because of his limited capabilities as an administrator.  The 
evidence for this is somewhat circumstantial and to some extent dependent on 
comments from secondary sources.  First, regarding his incompetence, Hawtrey 
himself admitted, in his interview with Cairncross, that he was an indifferent 
Personal Private Secretary to Lloyd-George as Chancellor of the Exchequer since 
he [Hawtrey] ‘constantly omitted things and forgot things’.41  Peden refers to 
Hawtrey regularly amusing and frustrating his colleagues by ‘personal 
eccentricities including a tendency to mislay files’.42 Clarke has referred to 
                                                 
 
41 Interview with Sir Alec Cairncross in 1966.  Hawtrey Papers, HTRY 13/5. 
 
42 Peden, Keynes and his Critics, p.17.  Peden’s source for this information is a series of 
talks with Treasury officials in the 1970s (e-mails from Professor G.Peden). 
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Hawtrey being ‘patronised’ by his colleagues because of his lack of administrative 
ability.   
    There does some to have been a degree of ineptitude on Hawtrey’s part – 
sufficient to query why, in 1919, he was offered a responsible post within the 
Treasury.  Again, there must be a degree of conjecture about this.  In 1919 the 
Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury was Sir John Bradbury and the 
Controller of Finance was Sir Basil Blackett; these were the two most influential 
men in the Treasury.  Hawtrey admired both these men; later referring to 
Blackett as ‘a good friend’ and to Bradbury as the most capable man he had ever 
met within the Civil Service.43  In return, Bradbury and Blackett, whilst being 
aware of his shortcomings, probably recognised in Hawtrey the qualities of 
intelligence and high intellect together with an academic leaning and acute 
inquiring mind which fitted him for a post in the Treasury outside the 
conventional administrative ladder.   
    Such a post, Director of Financial Enquiries, had been created during the war, 
in 1915.  It was a post designed to enhance the war effort by providing the 
Government with information on the state of enemy and allied finances – its 
terms of reference being ‘to provide economic intelligence on matters such as 
foreign exchange, currency, banking, international movements of capital and the 
public expenditure and the borrowing and other financial operations of foreign 
governments; to prepare reports from time to time both on its own initiative and 
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also upon any question which may be specifically referred to it by the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer’.44  The appointee was Hartley Withers, a former economic 
journalist who resigned a year after his appointment in order to return to 
journalism, leaving the post vacant for the remainder of the war.   
    The appointments of Withers and Hawtrey were somewhat unusual, since 
they were specialists appointed to give advice of an economic nature to 
governments which still largely abided by the precepts of Laissez-Faire, but there 
was a precedent.  Before the Great War Sir George Paish had been drafted into 
Government departments to give specialist advice.  Paish had become the joint 
editor of the economic journal The Statist in 1900.  As a result of expertise 
acquired in the statistics of the railway industry he was appointed adviser to the 
Board of Trade between 1906 and 1908.  His knowledge of investments in 
foreign railway systems led to him being regarded as an authority on Britain’s 
oversees investments.  From 1909 Paish acted as unofficial advisor to David 
Lloyd George when the latter was Chancellor of the Exchequer.  Paish’s forecasts 
for the national economy became an essential component in Budget planning.  
He accompanied Sir Basil Blackett to America in November 1914 in an attempt to 
obtain financial support for Britain’s war effort.  In 1915, as his health declined, 
he withdrew from government work and returned to writing articles for The 
Statist.45
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45 Dictionary of National Biography.  Biographical note by R. Middleton. 
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    Hawtrey’s appointment to the post of Director of Financial Enquiries was 
under quite different circumstances to those of Withers.  Surprisingly, on his 
appointment in 1919, Hawtrey believed the post to have been newly created and 
was not aware, at the time, of any previous appointment, nor did he make any 
effort to contact Withers during the time he held the appointment.46      
    The Financial Enquiries Branch was disbanded with Hawtrey’s retirement in 
1947, but it effectively ceased to be a department which the Treasury called on 
for reports and recommendations after the end of 1939.  Hence the period 1919-
39 has been chosen for the purpose of limiting the study. 
    As befits a History thesis, it has been written in a way which is largely 
chronological.  Most chapters cover a specific time period, and the emphasis 
within each chapter is on the issue, or issues, with which Hawtrey was most 
closely involved.  After the ‘Prelude’ dealing with Hawtrey’s economic model, 
Chapter 1 covers the period 1919-1925 when much economic policy was directed 
towards the return to the Gold Standard.  Within this period Hawtrey played a 
significant role with the British Delegation at the International Economics 
Conference at Genoa in April 1922. 
    In chapter 2, the return to the Gold Standard merits a section of its own since 
Hawtrey was more heavily involved than usual in the policy process, being one of 
the officials required to take part in ‘Mr. Churchill’s Exercise’.  Chapter 3 covers 
credit policy over the years 1925-31, the years on the Gold Standard which led 
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into the Great Depression.  These were years which saw Hawtrey being angrily 
critical of the authorities’ high Bank rate, even going to the extent of being 
critical of his own agency, the Treasury, for failing to exercise what he argued to 
be its statutory supervisory responsibilities over the Bank.  They were also years 
when unemployment developed into a much bigger political issue.   
    The Lloyd-George wing of the Liberal Party took up the cause of the 
unemployed with proposals far more radical than those of the other parties.  The 
Lloyd-George fund sponsored a series of Summer Schools in the 1920s in which 
politicians met with leading academics to develop new approaches to economic 
issues.  Keynes was in regular attendance at these Summer Schools, and he was 
influential in steering the Liberal Party towards promising a programme of 
Government funded public works in its 1929 election manifesto, We Can Conquer 
Unemployment.  Chapter 4 looks at the Treasury’s response to this programme 
and, in some detail, at a memorandum of Hawtrey’s in which he put forward his 
own scheme  – his ‘Bill Famine’ plan – by which the necessary finance might be 
made available to support economic expansion. 
    Chapter 5 is devoted to the Treasury’s involvement with the Macmillan 
Committee on Finance and Industry which sat between 1929 and 1931.  The 
Macmillan Committee was a huge undertaking.  It sat for two years, taking 
evidence from the Bank of England, the Treasury, commercial bankers, 
stockbrokers, industrialists, trade unionists and economists.  The importance of 
the committee’s findings seems to have been inversely related to the weight of 
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its deliberations.  Its Majority Report, reflecting the predominant influence of 
Banks and the City, supported continuation of the principles of ‘sound finance’; 
the Gold Standard, balanced budgets and use of Bank Rate to maintain the 
external value of sterling.  The Minority Report calling for public works and 
import restrictions as means of helping employment was signed by, amongst 
others, Keynes and Bevin.  Only Bevin, his views reinforced by Keynes’s tutorials, 
seriously suggested leaving the Gold Standard.  Leaving the Gold Standard in 
1931 caused much of the committee’s deliberations to lose their relevance.  The 
Minutes of Evidence of the Macmillan Committee are of special value to economic 
historians because they contain a verbatim account of academics explaining their 
views, and the monetary authorities explaining their responsibilities, before a 
critical lay panel.  The proceedings were dominated by Keynes who invariably 
produced the most perceptive questioning. 
    Both Hawtrey and Sir Richard Hopkins were summoned before the Committee 
in 1930, with each man being questioned for two days; Hawtrey as an 
economist, Hopkins as Head of the Treasury’s Finance Division.  Deutscher has 
dealt at length with the confrontation between Keynes and Hawtrey over each 
others technical terms.47  I have dealt only very briefly with the theoretical 
dispute and focussed almost entirely on Keynes’s questioning of Hawtrey’s policy 
prescription.  Keynes’s interrogation of Sir Richard Hopkins afforded valuable 
insights into the way the ‘Treasury View’ on public works was metamorphosing 
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into something no longer dependent on Hawtrey’s economics.  At times, the 
proceedings of the Macmillan Committee offered compelling theatre.  I have tried 
to convey that sense of theatre by including extended, but edited, excerpts of 
dialogue.   
    Chapter 6 deals with the deliberations about future exchange-rate policy after 
Britain had been forced off the Gold Standard in 1931.  This, again, was a set of 
deliberations in which Hawtrey was more heavily involved than usual.  Hawtrey’s 
advice was strongly disparaged by Hubert Henderson, causing him to mount a 
spirited reply.  Given the extent of disagreement, and subsequent debate 
between the participants, the debate on future exchange-rate policy after the 
Gold Standard has been given a separate chapter. 
     The 1931 discussions on exchange-rate policy saw Hawtrey’s star in the 
ascendancy.  He maintained a consistent view during the discussions, and that 
view eventually prevailed.  The result was a period, between 1931 and 1933, 
when Hawtrey, working with Sir Frederick Phillips, was arguably at his most 
influential, as the Treasury sought to stabilise world currency exchanges.  
Chapter 7 takes the story up to the World Economic Conference in London in 
1933.  At this conference Hawtrey gave his support to the Kisch proposals for the 
redistribution of the world’s gold supplies.  This was yet one more occasion 
where Hawtrey found himself opposed to Keynes and Henderson, who had 
prepared their own joint plan for an international note issue.  Hawtrey’s influence 
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eventually dwindled as he repeatedly called for international inter-bank co-
operation to co-ordinate interest rate policy. 
    Following chapter 7 there was to have been a Theoretical Interlude.  Susan 
Howson has given one hint as to why the Financial Enquiries Branch might have 
gone unusually quiet during the mid-thirties: Hawtrey became embroiled in a 
series of disputes over economic theory with Keynes, Harrod, Kaldor, Robertson, 
von Hayek and Pigou.48  It is difficult to discover the extent to which the 
correspondences by which these disputes were pursued were written during 
‘office hours’, but it is quite possible to regard Hawtrey’s engagement in these 
disputes as legitimate Treasury business, since one of his responsibilities was to 
interpret the work of other economists for the benefit of senior Treasury staff, 
and Sir Frederick Phillips was to later pay tribute to Hawtrey’s value in this role.  
Being matters of general economic theory, these disputes do not properly belong 
to this study.  However, intermissionary status was to have been given to just 
two lengthy Treasury memoranda which Hawtrey produced, in 1931 and 1936, 
after the publication of Keynes’s two major works.  They were written for the 
benefit of his Treasury colleagues and their purpose was to help the Treasury 
understand the implications which might be drawn from Keynes’s two volumes, A 
Treatise on Money and General Theory of Employment Interest and Money.  As 
usual, Hawtrey’s inclination was to turn these memoranda into justifications of 
his own model at the expense of that of Keynes, and there is no evidence that 
                                                 
 
48 Howson, ‘Hawtrey and the Real World’, p. 176. 
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anyone within the Treasury paid much attention to them.  The plan to include 
this section after chapter 7 ran into problems when the section outgrew its status 
as an interlude, distorted the narrative, and extended the thesis beyond its 
acceptable length.  I have, in consequence, abridged and appended it.   
   Chapters 8 and 9 complete the story up to the end of 1939.  They cover the 
period of Hawtrey’s advice on rearmament and war finance, and some of the 
details surrounding the circumstances of his retirement; a retirement which did 
not actually come into effect until 1947 despite him having no advisory role for 
the last seven years. 
    The result of focussing on those issues in which Hawtrey showed the greatest 
interest has been a rather lumpy, uneven treatment of Treasury policy during the 
wars.  For example, the most significant event within the Treasury during the 
early thirties after the 1931 crisis was arguably the fiscal advantage it gained in 
1932 by conversion of 5 per cent War Loan 1929/47 to 3.5 per cent War Loan 
1952.  This event seems to have passed without comment from Hawtrey.  
Similarly there is nothing within the thesis regarding the Treasury’s 
implementation of the recommendations of the Geddes Committee or the May 
Committee since Hawtrey seems to have chosen not to make any significant 
comment on their findings. 
    Latterly, Sir Alec Cairncross, an economist with considerable experience of 
advising governments in the period after the Second World War, has written 
extensively on the relationship between economists and administrators of 
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economic policy.  In 1985, as part of a study of the history of economic advice, 
Cairncross conducted three hour-long interviews with Hawtrey.49 Generally, he 
tended to express surprise at the lack of feedback which Hawtrey received as a 
result of his many memoranda.  Hawtrey’s career will be considered against 
Cairncross’s deliberations on the relationship between economic theory and 
economic policy, which will be revisited in the concluding chapter of this thesis.      
          
                   
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49 Hawtrey Archives, Churchill College, Cambridge.  HTRY 13/5.  
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                                          Prelude 
 
 
             Hawtrey’s Monetary Model of the Trade Cycle 
 
                   “The Trade Cycle is a Purely Monetary Phenomenon” 
                                                                                          Hawtrey (1923)50
 
I have adhered consistently to my fundamental ideas since 1913 and 
in so far as they have developed and grown, the process has been 
continuous since then.  There has not been a departure followed by a 
relapse.  I do not think this conservatism is a merit; indeed I should 
rather like to go in for something novel and extravagant if I could be 
convinced of it. 
                           Letter from Hawtrey to Keynes, (9 May 1937).51
 
The work of Marshall . . . contribut[ed] to the understanding of 
certain characteristics of the upswing and downswing of the 
cycle, and the monetary elements at work in them . . [but] . . it 
was Ralph Hawtrey, educated at Cambridge to be sure but not 
really of the Cambridge School, who, in pre-World War I Britain, 
who produced a complete and purely monetary theory of the 
cycle. . . . a most original construction. 
                                                                  Laidler (1991)52
                                                 
 
50 This is probably the best-known of the very few quotable remarks attributed to 
Hawtrey.  It is to be first found in: R.G.Hawtrey, Monetary Reconstruction, (London, 
Longmans, 1923), p.141. 
 
51 D. Moggridge (ed.), The Collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes vol. X1V 
(Cambridge, Macmillan, 1973) p.55. 
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 In a 1963 letter to Claude Guillebaud . . . [Hawtrey] claimed that 
the source of much of his analysis was conventional wisdom 
circulating in the City . . .  
                                                                     Laidler (1991)53
                   ------------------------------------------------------------ 
The memoranda in which Hawtrey offered advice, and which this thesis will focus 
upon, were often unsolicited.  They were produced because he was critical of 
either the Bank of England or the Treasury and, as such, they made 
uncomfortable reading for these agencies, and gave rise to annoyance with 
Hawtrey.  In general, they urged these bodies to look wider than their traditional 
narrow objectives and consider the wider issues of the state of trade, and of 
employment.  They were always based upon a monetary model of the trade 
cycle which Hawtrey had developed before the First World War. 
        
Early Influences 
 
Hawtrey’s model may have contained elements of those of other economists, but 
it seems to have been developed in isolation from them.  He had not read 
economics as a student, and prior to the publishing of his first book he claimed 
not to have read the works of Marshall, Pigou or other prominent academic 
economists of the time.  From time to time Hawtrey has been cast as a 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 D.Laidler, The Golden Age of the Quantity Theory  (Hemel Hempstead, Philip Allan, 
1991), p.101. 
 
53 Ibid., p.116. 
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Marshallian economist.54  He had never been a pupil of Marshall, and always 
adamantly denied any direct influence from Marshall.  He admitted to having 
read John Stuart Mill’s Principles whilst at Eton.55  He had also read a book on 
banking and credit by an obscure nineteenth century economics writer, Henry 
Dunning Macleod, largely, it seems, because Macleod had dedicated the book to 
Hawtrey’s great-great-grandfather who had been his mathematics teacher.56  In 
addition, he acknowledged a debt to the financial writings of the mid-nineteenth 
century editor of the Economist, Walter Bagehot.57       
    It has been suggested that not the least of the similarities between Hawtrey 
and another Cambridge economist, Malthus, was that they each came to the 
central idea of their economics through arguing with their respective fathers.58   
 
. . . George Hawtrey was apparently convinced by the arguments of 
the tariff reformers while his son Ralph was equally on the side of free 
trade.  The latter was thus led to study . . . the speeches of the 
leading politicians of the time and was particularly struck by a point 
                                                 
 
54 D. Winch, Economics and Policy: a Historical Study (London, Hodder and Stoughton, 
1969), p.147.  Winch wrongly classes Hawtrey, along with Robertson and Pigou, as 
pupils of Marshall. 
 
55 Deutscher, R.G.Hawtrey and the Development of Macroeconomics, p.8. 
 
56 S.Howson, ‘Hawtrey and the Real World’, in G.C.Harcourt (ed.) Keynes and his 
Contemporaries (London, Macmillan, 1985), p.181. 
 
57 Black, ‘Ralph George Hawtrey’, p. 371. 
 
58 Ibid., p.370. 
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made by Joseph Chamberlain in 1903, to the effect that British 
exports had not increased over the preceding thirty years.  On looking 
into this he realised that Chamberlain’s figures related to the value of 
exports . . . and that the volume of those exports had actually 
increased substantially.  Hence the significance of changes in the 
general price level came to Hawtrey . . .59
 
In 1909 Hawtrey was promoted to the First (Finance) Division of the Treasury as 
acting First Class Clerk.60  It was in the same year as his promotion to First Class 
Clerk that he began writing his first book.  Again, the spur was his fascination 
with the problems associated with changes in the price level.  
 
I began writing this book in March 1909 when the depression 
which followed the American crisis of 1907 was still unrelieved . . 
. .  It struck me that the extinction of profit in a depression could 
be explained if the price level fell in the interval between the 
incurring of costs and the sale of the product.  And if traders 
borrowed at interest to finance profit-making business, they 
could pay a higher rate of interest when prices were rising and a 
lower rate when prices were falling . . . .  Here, I thought, was a 
discovery, but I was disillusioned . . . that the principle was one 
already recognised in Irving Fisher’s work . . . .  But I was not 
                                                 
59 Ibid. 
 
60 Ibid., pp. 366-367. 
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discouraged, for . . . its application to the explanation of the 
trade cycle would be new.61  
     
Hawtrey’s economic model of the trade cycle was quite idiosyncratic in its 
emphases.  He claimed that it was derived from his observations of the workings 
of the city, but it probably also owed a great deal to his interest in nineteenth-
century banking, finance and prices.  David Laidler has described Hawtrey’s first 
book, Good and Bad Trade, ‘a most original construction’ (see quote above), but 
perhaps even more remarkable than the original model is that over the course of 
the next 50 years, during which time Hawtrey entered into extensive 
correspondence with all the major economists of the period, he continued to 
remain faithful to his early model.  Black notes that most of the key ideas in his 
first book, Good and Bad Trade (1913), can still be found, fifty-four years later, 
in his last book, Incomes and Money (1967).62   
    Moreover, Hawtrey remained faithful not only to his original model, but to his 
own earliest terminologies and concepts - and, whilst continuing to use these 
concepts, he entered into dialogue with other economists using their, quite 
different, concepts and terminologies.  Reviewing Hawtrey’s Capital and 
Employment in 1938, Nicholas Kaldor wrote that: 
 
                                                 
61 R.G.Hawtrey, Good and Bad Trade: An Enquiry into the Causes of Trade Fluctuations 
(London, Constable, 1913), p.vii.  The passage appears in the ‘Foreword’ to the Kelley 
reprint and is quoted in  Howson, ‘Hawtrey and the Real World’, p.144. 
 
62 Black ‘Ralph George Hawtrey’, p. 370. 
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[t]he second part [of Capital and Employment] consists of an 
extensive review of the theories of Mr. Keynes, Professor Hayek, 
Major Douglas, Professor Pigou and Mr. Harrod.  This is in 
accordance with the tradition Mr. Hawtrey has made peculiarly 
his own, of attempting to bridge differences between economists 
through an extensive and sympathetic review of every important 
new contribution to his subject.  As always, Mr. Hawtrey’s 
criticisms of his contemporaries are a model of patience and 
fairness; and in his willingness to master other people’s 
terminologies, while adhering consistently to his own, Mr. 
Hawtrey is surely unique.63  
  
Good and Bad Trade: an Enquiry into the Causes of Trade Fluctuations, was 
written in the period 1909-1913 whilst he was private secretary to the Chancellor 
of the Exchequer, David Lloyd George.  He was also subordinate to Sir John 
(later Lord) Bradbury, who later became Joint Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury in 1913.  Hawtrey admired Bradbury’s abilities and his knowledge and 
understanding of the City and its workings.  Given that ‘city wisdom’ was the 
stated basis for Hawtrey’s economic model (see Hawtrey’s note to Guillebaud, 
quoted above), it seems very likely that Bradbury might have been the fount of 
much of that wisdom.  Certainly, Hawtrey was always of the opinion that the 
theory of money had evolved from within banking practice, and not from the 
‘academic community’.64  If Marshall did have any influence on Hawtrey then it 
                                                 
 
63 N. Kaldor, ‘Mr. Hawtrey on Short and Long Term Investment’, Economica, New Series, 
Vol. 5, No. 20. (Nov., 1938), pp. 461-467. 
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was probably indirectly through the activities of Cambridge-educated economists 
working in the city.  Absence of academic references within Hawtrey’s first book 
led Pigou to dismiss it as an ‘ordinary book’ – as opposed to an academic 
treatise.  Collison Black makes it clear that, in his view, the absence of references 
was because ‘Hawtrey arrived at the basic ideas of his system in almost complete 
independence of other economists’.65  Deutscher, too, begins his review of 
Hawtrey’s work by suggesting that when Hawtrey made his initial forays into the 
economics of money and cycles ‘he was not well acquainted with the existing 
literature’.66     
 
Nineteenth-Century Theories of the Trade Cycle  
Until the second half of the nineteenth century the theory of the ‘trade cycle’ was 
of little interest.  In a semi-agricultural society with cottage industries and small 
family businesses the fluctuation between good and bad harvests was regarded 
as of greater importance than business booms and slumps.  Generally, every 
willing worker was found occupation – with varying degrees of profit.   
    Industrialisation drew attention to the trade cycle because of the sharp 
distinction between employment and unemployment.  Marx, in the 1850s, had 
constructed a model of the trade cycle.  In the Marxist model good times, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 Hawtrey Papers, HTRY 13/5. Interview with Sir Alec Cairncross, 1985. 
 
65 Black, ‘Ralph George Hawtrey’, p.371. 
 
66 Deutscher, R.G.Hawtrey and the Development of Macroeconomics, p.8. 
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competition, forced firms to invest in capital equipment to become more 
efficient.  Machinery enabled employers to lay off labour, and the unemployed 
pool of willing workers allowed the wages of retained workers to be forced lower.  
Reduced spending power entailed losses and the laying off of more workers in a 
self-reinforcing downward spiral.  This tide finally turned when surviving firms 
were able to buy up the capital equipment of distressed firms at such bargain 
prices that operating them became, once more, profitable.  Marx identified a 
source of instability within the capitalist industrial system, but the quantity of 
available money played no part in his analysis. 
    Discounting Jevons’s theory of sun-spots (Jevons, a serious economist who 
did pioneering work on marginal utility, divined great meaning in the almost 
identical length of the trade cycle and the sun-spot cycle) most theories of the 
trade cycle in existence at the beginning of the twentieth century regarded it as 
the result of an imbalance, at any given time, between the demand for consumer 
goods and the demand for investment goods – the goods needed to manufacture 
the consumer goods.  Although theories of trade fluctuation at the turn of the 
century recognised that the output of investment goods was considerably more 
volatile than that of consumer goods, it was not until 1917 (after the publication 
of Hawtrey’s first book) that John Maurice Clark first gave it clarity through his 
‘accelerator mechanism’.  Money entered into this ‘imbalance’ explanation of the 
trade cycle, especially at the turning-points of the cycle.  During the period of 
expansion, the manufacture of investment goods was stimulated by the 
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availability of credit.  The credit expansion forced the banks to raise their interest 
rates in order to stem the growth of lending and maintain their liquidity ratios.  
The high rates at the top of the boom led to cut-backs in investment, this 
reduced the incomes from the manufacture of investment goods and, eventually, 
caused descent into depression.  Correspondingly, at the bottom of the cycle, 
low interest rates encouraged borrowing to enable cheap equipment from 
distressed firms to be purchased – and this played its part in the eventual 
upswing.  Thus, monetary factors were regarded as amplifying industrial 
instability, but that instability was not regarded as being due to the instability of 
credit.  To Hawtrey the roots of instability lay endogenously within the monetary 
system itself. 
     An early alternative model of the trade cycle was provided by Denis Robertson 
in his publication A Study of Industrial Fluctuation (1915).  Robertson was raised 
in the Cambridge school of Marshall and Pigou, and during the preparation of his 
book Pigou urged him to uncover the ‘real’ forces contributing towards 
fluctuation rather than accept Hawtrey’s monetary causes.  Robertson placed 
stress upon the fluctuation of demand for investment goods.  At the top of the 
cycle a ‘glutability of wants’ (later explained by Robertson as a saturation of the 
desire for consumer goods) caused a drop in the demand for additional 
investment goods, and the ensuing fall in incomes from the manufacture of 
investment goods marked the upward turning point of the cycle.   
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    Robertson found the marking of the upturn at the bottom of the cycle more 
problematic.  His study of the history of upturns led him to believe that they 
were marked by situations where it became profitable to acquire extra capital 
goods.  Thus the purchase of new capital goods could be prompted by an 
abundant harvest (aligning him, to some extent, with Jevons’s theory of 
sunspots) or the development of some new invention such as the railways or 
electrical power.  Robertson was initially sceptical about the ‘accelerator’ 
principle, since he believed the initial spur to increased demand for capital goods 
lay outside any cyclical demand for consumer goods – the latter, in any case 
being responsive to changes in the demand for capital goods.  However, in his 
later work he made increasing use of the accelerator principle.67   
 
Good and Bad Trade  
In Good and Bad Trade (1913), Hawtrey’s first book, he did not use the concepts 
of ‘Consumers Income’ or ‘Consumers’ Outlay’ - concepts which became central 
to his later analyses.  These concepts were more fully developed in his 
publications between the wars, and thus there is an element of immaturity about 
Good and Bad Trade.  The book did, however, develop a complete theory of the 
trade cycle as caused by monetary instability.  Hawtrey’s method was to start 
with an abstract case of a country without a banking system, isolated, and using 
paper money - and then to consider the consequences of a ‘sudden shock’ in the 
                                                 
67  D. P. O’Brien, The Foundations of Business Cycle Theory (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 
1997). 
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size of the stock of money.  Step-by-step, the exercise was repeated with the 
constraints gradually removed; a banking system was introduced, then an 
international dimension, and finally an international gold standard.  His 
‘Introductory’ outlined his purpose.   
 
The general result up to which I hope to work is that the 
fluctuations are due to disturbances in the available stock of 
‘money’  - the term ‘money’ being taken to cover every species 
of purchasing power available for immediate use, both legal 
tender money and credit money, whether in the form of coin, 
note or deposits at banks.68
 
That he was conscious of the peculiarity of his own monetary approach to trade 
fluctuations can be seen in his Introductory’s closing paragraph: 
 
. . . at one time economists were so anxious to guard themselves 
from the fallacy of identifying money and wealth that they 
slipped into pedantic disregard of the influence of money in 
economic phenomena.69  
 
He warned against the prejudice ‘which would condemn as superficial any theory 
claiming primary importance for purely monetary influences’, stressing at the 
outset the importance of regarding money as more than simply a medium for 
                                                 
68 Hawtrey, Good and Bad Trade, p.3. 
 
69 Ibid., p.5. 
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facilitating exchange (a fault which he suggested classical economists were 
prone to make), but as an essential store of value.70   
 
. . . a man . . . will probably be paid at regular intervals . . . a 
sum which must last to the end of the interval . . . [therefore] he 
will find it prudent to always have a moderate sum in hand to 
provide against unforeseen contingencies . . . . Thus every man 
has to keep a greater or less reserve of money, or ‘working 
balance’.71
 
Hawtrey then, in effect, posed two questions: ‘What is the appropriate quantity 
of money required to maintain an economy?’, and ‘Does the quantity of money in 
the economy make any difference to the level of economic activity?’  He 
answered these questions by considering the places, where, at any one moment 
of time, the country’s stock of money might be. 
 
The payment of a note is only a momentary transaction . . . . [it] 
spends the greater part of its life reposing in someone’s pocket 
or purse, or in someone’s till or cash-box or strong-room.72
 
                                                 
70 Ibid.. 
 
71 Ibid., pp.10-11. 
 
72 Ibid., p.10. 
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Whilst ‘reposing’ in these places the note would, of course, be part of the 
essential cash balance which each individual, or company, or bank, felt it prudent 
to retain as a balance.  This largely answered Hawtrey’s first question.  The 
required stock of money would be that which satisfied the sum of the required 
cash-balances of millions of individuals and companies – the sum of millions of 
individual decisions, with each individual acting upon what he or she considered 
to be a prudent reserve of money.   
    Yet, would changing this quantity of money affect the nation’s economy in any 
way?  Hawtrey conducted a little ‘thought experiment’, imagining the face value 
of each note, overnight, to be doubled, thereby doubling the country’s stock of 
money, and naturally concluded that if all adjustments could simultaneously be 
made then economic life would progress exactly as before with the nominal 
value of earnings, prices, expenditure and cash-balances doubled.  Such 
instantaneous adjustments being impossible, Hawtrey then used cash-balance 
mechanics to illustrate how a disturbance to equilibrium by, first of all, a 
reduction of the money supply (in this instance, by an increase in taxation with 
no increased Government expenditure) might transmit itself into a reduction in 
aggregate money expenditure.  
 
Before the withdrawal of money from circulation, every member 
of the community may be assumed to have adjusted his working 
balance of money in hand so as to fit the income he was 
accustomed to receive and the expenditure he was accustomed 
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to incur.  After the withdrawal, therefore, some at any rate of 
the members of the community, having had to pay more taxes 
than usual, will find that they are in danger of a shortage.  In the 
absence (as assumed) of a banking system, it will be necessary 
for them to restrict expenditure for a time in order to replenish 
their balances. 
    But though anyone may replenish his balance by economising, 
it is clear that no transfers of money from one individual to 
another can replenish all the balances . . . . A new equilibrium 
can only be found by a change in incomes and expenditures 
which will make a reduced scale of balances sufficient.73
 
At this stage of his argument there was still nothing to suggest that reducing the 
supply of money could not have led to a new equilibrium with lower cash 
balances, lower wages and lower prices – life as before, but with the value of 
each unit of currency reduced by a proportion.  He first suggested this as a 
possibility: 
 
. . . there is . . .  no remedy (to the loss of orders caused by a 
cut in the money supply) but the reduction of money wages to 
the point which will enable producers to resume their former 
activities and dispose of the output without incurring a loss.  This 
reduction of money wages does not involve a proportional 
reduction in real wages, for it is accompanied by an all-round 
reduction in prices.74  
                                                 
73 Ibid., p.38. 
 
74 Ibid., p.42. 
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 Then, however, he acknowledged the real problems which prevented the 
appropriate adjustments being made. 
 
If customary wages and customary prices resist the change, the 
adjustment, which is bound to come sooner or later, will only be 
forced on the people by pressure of distress. . . . The time taken 
in reaching the new position of equilibrium will probably depend 
on the willingness of employees to accept the reduced wages 
[my italics].75
 
‘Wage stickiness’, the reluctance of unionised workers to accept wage reductions 
in the event of a money-supply cut, was identified as the prime cause of the 
inability of employers to enact price cuts and restore the previous state of 
equilibrium at lower monetary values.  The inability of producers to 
proportionately cut their wage bills prevented them from proportionately cutting 
their prices and maintaining their volumes of sales.  Therefore, being forced to 
cut their volumes of sales they were forced into reducing their costs in other 
ways available to them.  One other way available to them was the cutting of the 
quantity of labour which they employed.  Equilibrium would then, however, 
eventually be restored at lower monetary levels.  
 
                                                 
 
75 Ibid., pp. 42-43. 
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In the remaining stages the pressure of distress due to lack of 
employment drives the working class to accept lower wages.  As 
wages fall, prices fall, output increases, and employment 
improves, until at last all money values have completed a fall 
proportional to the original diminution of the stock of money and 
equilibrium is restored.76
   
Hawtrey analysed the case of a monetary ‘shock’ which entailed an expansion of 
currency in precisely the same manner. 
 
People find themselves one day with more money in hand than 
they expected.  Each proceeds to spend his surplus. . . . retailers 
give increased orders to the producers, who in turn take what 
measures they can to increase their output.77
 
These measures would have a bearing on employment –  
 
If market conditions have hitherto been stable . . . there will be 
no large reserve of unemployed labour. . . there will be . . . 
temporary unemployed . . . inefficient men . . . veterans . . . 
youths who are hardly old enough to begin . . . overtime . . . but 
. . . the possible extension of the productive capacity of the 
community would not be very great. . . . Businesses . . . will 
                                                 
 
76 Ibid., p.94. 
 
77 Ibid., p.49. 
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have to compete . . . to provide themselves with labour.  Here is 
an influence tending to increase the rate of wages.78
 
There would also be a tendency for prices to rise: ‘retailers being unable to 
obtain . . . their orders for new goods . . . would be prepared to pay increased 
wholesale prices to the producers.’79
    The outcome of this preliminary, unrealistic, part of the investigation was 
simply that - whether the initial ‘shock’ to the system was a contraction or an 
expansion of currency - equilibrium would, in time, be restored with changed 
nominal values of costs, prices, profits and cash-balances.  However, during the 
period of restoration of equilibrium, a contraction of currency would be 
associated with the characteristics of trade depression whilst an expansion of 
currency would be associated with the characteristics of a trade boom.  
    Up to this point in Hawtrey’s analysis there was no tendency for business 
activity to move into a cyclical pattern; only for a monetary shock – of either kind 
– to lead to distortions in the pattern of wages and prices, with temporary 
conditions of depression or boom, before restoration of equilibrium.  He then 
moved the analysis forward by adding a banking system.     
    With a banking system, when the stock of currency was reduced, individuals 
would look to the banks to restore their cash-balances. 
 
                                                 
 
78 Ibid., pp. 49-51. 
 
79 Ibid., p.50. 
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The first effect of the contraction of the currency is that the 
working balance of cash in the hands of individual members of 
the community will be diminished. . . . those who have banking 
accounts will quickly draw out enough cash to restore their 
working balances.80
 
In restoring their cash balances, people would lower the cash reserves of the 
banks.   The banks, in their turn, would need to protect their reserve-ratios by 
raising their interest rates to attract money, and stem withdrawals.  The high 
bank rate would then start to have an effect through its action on dealers’ 
stocks.  Dealers and wholesalers, Hawtrey suggested, were able to exercise far 
greater flexibility in adjusting their levels of stocks than producers and 
manufacturers were able to exercise in adjusting their levels of capital 
equipment.  Consequently, the responses of dealers were far more sensitive to 
changes in interest rates.  Rising rates would be an added expense to the 
dealers, who would attempt to mitigate their extra expenses by reducing their 
levels of stocks. 
 
[The dealer] can reduce his indebtedness if he can reduce his 
stocks of goods, and he can reduce his stocks of goods by 
merely delaying replenishment when they are sold. . . . 
Consequently the manufacturers will find that they are receiving 
fewer and smaller orders . . . . [they] experience a slackening of 
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demand, and in order to relieve the resulting restriction of output 
[they] lower prices . . .81   
 
Other consequences followed.  The extinguishing of the dealers’ indebtedness to 
their bankers implied a reduction in the overall level of credit and, thus, a 
reduction in both the purchasing power in the hands of the public and the 
superstructure of incomes based upon that purchasing power (a central theme 
running through all Hawtrey’s economics).  The fall in incomes, hence demand, 
would reduce the dealers’ sales - they would be forced to reduce even further 
their orders to producers and the decline would continue.  Manufacturers, too, 
would reduce their demand for credit from the banks, a process which would 
further reduce the level of demand in the economy.  Hawtrey regarded the 
effects at this stage to be only slightly different from those outlined in the first 
stage of the argument. 
 
The process differs from that described in the last chapter chiefly 
in being more gradual.  The diminution in the stock of money, 
instead of occurring suddenly, is caused progressively by the 
action of the trading world under the influence of the high 
interest rate.82
 
                                                 
81 Ibid., pp. 62-3. 
 
82 Ibid., p.64. 
 
 60
High rates of interest would come to an end when the bankers had restored their 
reserve ratios – during which period those pressures of distress associated with 
depression would be observed.  Hawtrey then seemed to suggest that it might 
be possible, even with a banking system, for equilibrium to be re-established 
with full employment at lower levels of prices and wages: 
 
The bankers have restored their reserves and are satisfied. . . . 
[t]he aggregate of purchasing power is on the reduced scale 
corresponding to the reduced stock of money; the productive 
resources of the community will not be fully employed until the 
level of prices is reduced in the same proportion; prices cannot 
be reduced until the cost of production is sufficiently reduced; 
and the cost of production can only be reduced as wages are 
reduced.83
 
Interest rate adjustments by bankers, however, gave rise to instability – and the 
trade cycle resulted.  Equilibrium, Hawtrey suggested, was maintained when the 
interest rate of the banks (the market rate) was the same as the average rate of 
return on capital throughout business (the profit rate).84   Under such conditions 
there would be no tendency for businesses to seek to increase or decrease the 
                                                 
83 Ibid., p.65. 
 
84 On pp. 65-7 of Good and Bad Trade Hawtrey introduced three different rates of 
interest: the ‘natural rate’, being the annual saving on labour per unit initial cost of 
investment goods; the ‘profit rate’, being the profit per unit initial cost of investment 
goods; and the ‘market rate’, being, in fact, the bankers’ rate.  The following analysis is 
somewhat simplified and uses only the last two rates of interest, but is adequate for 
demonstrating Hawtrey’s thesis that the creation of credit is inherently unstable. 
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size of their loans.  If businesses, through a sudden increase in the stock of 
money or for some other exogenous reason (possibly increased efficiency or 
technological innovation) were able to make themselves more profitable, then 
there would be an increased demand for credit at the prevailing rate of interest 
(if, say by innovation, a business is enabled to earn 10 per cent rather than 5 per 
cent on its capital investments whilst paying only 5 per cent to the banks for the 
loans by which it purchases extra equipment, then it will tend to expand its 
investment).  Higher credit levels, leading to increased purchasing power would, 
in turn, lead to increased demand and make business still more profitable – 
increasing still further the divergence between the profit rate and the market 
rate.  The point that Hawtrey sought to stress was, that any initial movement 
away from equality between the two rates of interest would, in the early stages, 
tend to be amplified.  In the case of the profit rate moving higher than the 
market rate, the extension of credit would, eventually, cause concern over the 
banks’ reserve ratios, leading them to increase the market rate until, eventually, 
they would stabilise borrowing at a point where the market rate was equal to 
the, now considerably enhanced, profit rate.   
    However, as the market rate rose, dealers and wholesalers (as argued above) 
would cut back on their orders to producers.  This would initially act as a drag on 
the increase of the profit rate, but, as market rate was lifted to reach the level of 
the profit rate, cut-backs in orders by wholesalers would begin to reduce profits 
to the point where the profit rate would eventually turn down below that of the 
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market rate.  Thus, it can be seen that Hawtrey saw two distinct movements, 
with a time-lag or phase-lag between them.  As the market rate of interest rate 
rose, but remained below the profit rate, there would be tendency for 
manufacturers to take on more credit.  The higher interest rates which ensued 
would cause dealers and wholesalers to reign back on credit.  This situation can 
be modelled in the mechanics of moving bodies by a system subjected to two 
opposing, but fluctuating, impulses between which there is a time lag.   The 
result is instability and an induced oscillatory motion (forced harmonic motion) – 
in this case, the oscillatory motion was the trade cycle induced by the instability 
of credit.  Hawtrey was aware of the mechanical analogy. 
 
A flag in a steady breeze could . . . remain in equilibrium if it 
were spread out flat in the exact direction of the breeze.  But it 
can be shown mathematically that the position is unstable, that if 
the flag deviates from it to any extent, however small, it will, 
initially, tend to deviate further.  Consequently the flag flaps.85
 
Hawtrey then extended his analysis to take account of international trade – first 
with the simplifying assumption of no gold standard, but inconvertible paper 
currencies.86  The initial international response – on the assumption that the 
initial ‘shock’ was a restriction of currency in Britain – would be for foreign 
investors to want to take advantage of the higher interest rates which the banks 
                                                 
85 Hawtrey, Good and Bad Trade, pp. 76-77. 
 
86 Ibid., pp. 89-101. 
 63
would impose as they attempted to restore their cash ratios (see above).  The 
initial demand for sterling – for investment - would cause its value to appreciate 
on the exchanges.  Hawtrey saw this appreciation of sterling as a means of 
enabling foreign manufacturers, exporting goods to Britain, to undercut British 
prices - forcing down the British price level and hastening the speed of the initial 
movement, in the cycle of wages and prices, down towards the equilibrium 
position.87  Perhaps more importantly, the consequent appreciation of sterling 
acted as a means of isolating the rest of the world from the effects of the 
depression in Britain, since its effect was to negate the benefits of the greater 
interest rates for foreign investors – they may have been able to earn more 
interest, but each (inflated) pound would cost them more in their local 
currencies. Had this appreciation of sterling not occurred, then foreign banks 
would have had to increase their interest rates to stem the outflow of reserves, 
and the consequent fall in the level of worldwide credit would have diminished 
foreign incomes and demand, leading to worldwide trade depression.  Overall, 
Hawtrey did not consider the international dimension, in the absence of a 
metallic standard, made any great difference to his analysis. 
 
Indeed the only important consequence . . . of a contraction [of 
currency] in [one country] is the tendency of [other countries] to 
                                                 
 
87 Ibid., p.98. 
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lend money to the [first country] in order to get the higher rate 
of interest.88   
 
However, where two countries currencies were linked by the gold standard then, 
Hawtrey argued, the effect of a monetary ‘shock’ in one country could be more 
far-reaching.89  Assuming a sudden contraction of currency in Britain then the 
consequences of such a ‘shock’ would, as we have seen, been a diminution of 
bankers’ reserves, a lifting of interest rates, the attraction of deposits from 
abroad, a tendency for sterling to rise against foreign currencies – with the rise 
in sterling acting as a brake on further inward investment, and removing the 
need for foreign banks to have to safeguard their reserves by raising their 
interest rates.  But, under the gold standard, were there any tendency for a 
foreign currency to fall below its lower specie point, investors from abroad had 
the option of directly transferring gold as a means of acquiring the sterling – in 
effect, there was no means by which currency adjustments might stem the flow 
of funds seeking higher interest rates.  The outflow of currency or gold from 
                                                 
 
88 Ibid., p.99 
 
89 Ibid., p.103.  Hawtrey, despite much of his often dry and turgid prose, was not 
without a mischievous sense of humour.  In introducing the topic of a monetary 
disturbance with a common metallic medium of exchange, he suggested that under such 
conditions the sudden effect of a currency contraction would be equivalent to the step of 
suddenly withdrawing from circulation a large quantity of gold, adding – ‘[i]t does not 
matter precisely what the step is.  If the reader desires a concrete illustration he may 
suppose that the gold is melted down and made into a calf for the people to worship’. 
   
 65
countries abroad could only be stemmed by their bankers raising their interest 
rates.   
 
The foreign bankers must in turn protect their reserves by 
putting up the rate of interest in their respective countries.  Thus 
the contraction of the currency at once tends to spread itself 
over the whole of the gold-using world.  The consequent 
depression is by this means alleviated in the area of stringency, 
but only at the cost of being extended in some degree to all the 
other countries.90
  
The link between interest rates and incomes was, as ever for Hawtrey, the need 
for cheap credit to be available for companies to bridge the gap between taking 
on extra workers and the time when they were able to sell the finished products.  
Thus, Hawtrey argued, the international nature of the trade cycle which had 
been observed since the 1870’s had been caused, in large part, by the operation 
of the international Gold Standard.  
    Hawtrey felt that the working classes lost out in both ‘good’ and ‘bad’ trade – 
the ‘good’ trade phase being that period of expansion when the profit rate of 
industry ran ahead of the market rate of the banks.  The point being that ‘bad’ 
trade dealt them unemployment, whilst ‘good’ trade eroded their living standards 
through inflation.  Both needed to be avoided.91   
                                                 
90 Ibid., p.105. 
 
91 Ibid., p.255. 
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    As for remedies, Hawtrey held out little hope.  The imposition (or removal) of 
tariffs was one means of initiating Hawtrey’s disturbance in the stock of money, 
and these might, theoretically, be used to counter the effects of the instability of 
credit, but to be effective they would need to be continually changed – a 
situation with which ‘traders would not acquiesce for a moment’.92  Irving 
Fisher’s had proposed that paper currency be convertible into an amount of gold 
which was periodically to counter the effects of fluctuating credit.  Such 
adjustments would have helped stabilise the prices of commodities, but Hawtrey 
regarded them as ‘hardly . . . within the realm of practical politics’.93   
    The Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission, issued in 1909 (and 
including Professor Pigou amongst its signatories), had recommended its 
preferred remedy.  In recognition of the cyclical nature of trade, it suggested 
that a portion of the annual national expenditure on building (up to £4 million 
per annum) should be withheld, and only sanctioned when employment 
exceeded a specific level.  This would have provided for up to £40 million per 
decade, obtainable through loans, with which to relieve unemployment during 
periods of depression.  Hawtrey’s response to such suggestions, in 1913, was 
hardly to change in the course of the next thirty years. 
 
                                                 
 
92 Ibid., p.256. 
 
93 Ibid., p.256.   
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. . . the writers of the Minority Report appear to have overlooked 
the fact that the Government by the very fact of borrowing for 
this expenditure is withdrawing from the investment market 
savings which would otherwise be applied to the creation of 
capital. . . . If savings . . . are diverted . . . the money to be 
spent by private individuals on the construction of fixed capital is 
correspondingly diminished . . .94
 
Hawtrey made only one small concession; that a portion of the savings used to 
finance Government construction might be diverted from foreign investment.  
Yet he did not consider this to be wholly beneficial since much foreign 
investment took the form of exported capital goods.  There would be a 
diminution of demand for these capital goods at a time when demand was 
already low.   
    Having dismissed tariffs and government spending as ineffective, and 
tampering with the gold standard as politically unacceptable, Hawtrey turned, 
albeit pessimistically, to one possible, realistic, hope for the mitigation of the 
cycle.   
 
If the great central banks of the world . . . could agree together 
to draw the reins a little tighter at times when an expansion of 
trade is in progress, they might prevent the inflation of credit 
money reaching the dangerous point.  To carry this policy 
through successfully, they would have to realise that, when the 
                                                 
 
94 Ibid., p.260. 
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supply of credit money is being increased, future demands for 
cash are being set in motion, and that a margin of reserve ought 
to be kept in hand to meet those demands when they 
materialise.  And on the other hand, when the supply of credit 
money is being diminished the banks ought to be in a position to 
release a sufficient amount of cash to provide for the payment of 
wage bills on a scale more than proportionate to the aggregate 
of credit money, since the rate of wages will ultimately fall and 
they will then get back the extra cash into their vaults.95
 
Essentially, Hawtrey was asking central banks to increase their rates more 
rapidly at the onset of a boom, thus maintaining a higher proportion of cash 
reserves as trade expanded, and to lower rates more rapidly at the onset of a 
slump, thereby reducing their proportion of cash reserves during periods of 
depression.  Such actions would have acted as a damping mechanism on the 
oscillations of credit – shock absorbers reducing the motion of the springs after 
the car had hit the ramp.  Hawtrey never lost his faith in the power of frequent 
adjustments of Bank rate.  His pessimism in making these proposals lay in the 
absence of any central bank in the United States, whose 20,000 banks continued 
‘blindly building up vast inflations of credit money, only to land themselves every 
few years in a crisis accompanied by the suspension of cash payments and 
followed by a collapse of industry’.96   
                                                 
 
95 Ibid., p.263. 
 
96 Ibid., pp. 264-5. 
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   In his review of Good and Bad Trade, in The Economic Journal, Professor 
Pigou criticized Hawtrey for his assumption that monetary fluctuations were the 
cause of trade fluctuations – ‘[s]uch a point of view is exceedingly superficial’.97  
His criticisms may be taken as representative of the general view of the 
economics profession at the time.  Pigou regarded monetary fluctuation as being 
part of the symptoms of the trade cycle rather than its cause, with ‘waves of 
confidence or depression in the outlook of the business community’ playing as 
important a role in the cycle as monetary factors.  He thought that Hawtrey had 
missed an opportunity of exploring the way in which monetary mechanisms 
augmented the causes of trade fluctuation which operated from outside the 
monetary system.  In the face of all criticisms, Hawtrey defended his initial 
economic viewpoint for the rest of his life.  Later work may have added 
refinement, but the basic structure of his economic model was laid out in Good 
and Bad Trade, and it was this model that was to form the basis of all his 
economic policy comment.   
 
                      OTHER ASPECTS OF HAWTREY’S ECONOMICS 
 
1. Dealers, Wholesalers and Middlemen 
                                                 
 
97 A. C. Pigou, ‘Review of Good and Bad Trade: An Enquiry into the Causes of Trade 
Fluctuations. By R.G.Hawtrey’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 23, No. 92. (Dec., 1913), p. 
582. 
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As Hawtrey moved from Good and Bad Trade (1913) to Currency and Credit 
(1919) the most significant development of his analysis of the trade cycle was 
the increasingly pivotal position accorded to the dealer – in particular, the 
wholesale dealer.  The position of the dealer in determining the level of 
economic activity was accorded greater significance than either the producer or 
the consumer.   
 
The wholesale merchants fill a very important place in the 
trading system.  They judge demand and regulate supply.  The 
outlook of the retailer is limited and local . . . and he cannot 
make a comprehensive survey of the prospects of demand.  It 
devolves therefore on the wholesale merchant to set the 
machinery of production at work by giving orders to producers, 
and incidentally to start the machinery of credit.98
 
In comparison to dealers the range of options to producers and consumers was 
limited. The flexibility of producers was limited by the fixed capital they had tied 
up in plant, and their need to operate that particular plant, as near as possible, 
to maximum capacity.  Consumers were restricted to allocating income to those 
goods and services which retailers chose to supply.  The wholesale dealers, 
however, had the greatest flexibility in responding to changing market 
conditions; they were in possession of the intelligence, through the dealer 
                                                 
 
98 R.G.Hawtrey, Currency and Credit  (London, Longman’s Green, 2nd. edition, 1923) p. 
8. 
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network, that equalised the prices of particular goods by informing potential 
traders of the conditions of supply and demand and thus effectively ‘clearing’ 
supply and demand.   
    Dealers were involved in two types of activity: first, holding stocks of goods; 
secondly transferring goods from places of excess supply to those of excess 
demand.  Maintaining ‘large’ holdings of stocks enabled dealers to take 
advantage of economies of scale (in transport, for example) and maintain 
continuous supplies to retailers when production might be irregular (dependency 
on harvests, for example).  Large stocks cushioned transitory surges of demand, 
which may, because of their transitory nature, not have been signals for the 
dealer to raise his prices, but if a dealer interpreted a change in demand as 
being sustainable then, to maintain his stocks, he would either have had to raise 
his prices to reduce demand or increase his orders to the producer – or possibly 
both.  To take such steps when a demand surge was merely transitory would 
involve the dealer in loss of business or extra storage costs, therefore correct 
interpretation of market signals and forecasting of market conditions was 
important to him.  A similar set of arguments was, of course, applicable to any 
loss of demand for a dealer’s stocks. 
    The response of a producer to increased orders would be either to step up 
production using spare capacity, or, if that were not available, to lengthen 
delivery dates or quote higher prices.   Long-term investments to increase output 
would require substantial planning and would only be made after a prolonged 
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period of consideration of future prospects, not on the basis of short-term data 
obtained from dealers.  It was the dealer’s antennae which were important in 
relating the demand of consumers to the supply of the producers. 
    The observation at the core of Hawtrey’s analysis was that, since dealers did 
not wish to be holding large ‘idle’ balances of cash when holdings of stock fell 
temporarily below their maximum requirements, stocks tended to be financed by 
bank advances.  The interest payable on these advances tended to be the largest 
element of the cost of holding stocks.  Thus changes in short-term bank rates 
implied a substantial change in the cost of holding stocks.  Moreover, since the 
cost of holding stocks was the most flexible of all the costs in the dealer’s 
operations, his first action when faced with a need to reduce costs would be to 
reduce his indebtedness to the banks by running down his stocks. 
 
It is the dealer in goods who is deterred by high interest.  His 
capital is not composed, like that of a manufacturer, of a costly 
fixed plant; it is mainly working capital in the form of stocks of 
goods.  The stock of goods appropriate to a given amount of 
sales is not a fixed quantity. . . if the cost of holding a stock of 
goods is increased. . . it is very easy for the trader to reduce the 
average quantity of goods held in stock, and so his indebtedness 
to the banker.99
 
                                                 
 
99 Ibid., pp. 69-70. 
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This contraction of stocks as a result of changes in short-term interest charges, 
Hawtrey argued, tended to be greater with manufactured products since, with 
agricultural products, farmers were more willing to reduce prices to induce 
dealers to transfer the cost of storage from themselves to the dealers, and with 
primary raw materials the variations in price in speculative markets outweighed 
the effects of interest changes.   
    A decision to run down stocks would lead to a decline in orders from 
producers which, since producers tend to be filling a backlog of orders extending 
into the future, only led to a decline in manufactured output after a time-lag.  
The eventual fall in production could be only partially mitigated by reducing 
prices because of the fixed costs of the manufacturer, and so this would lead to 
loss of employment and an overall reduction in consumers’ incomes.  The 
reduction in income would be only partially compensated for by consumers 
depleting their cash-balances, and so the consequent reduction in consumers’ 
outlay would lead dealers’ stocks being at higher levels than intended – a level 
originally designed to reduce their indebtedness to the banks.  A further 
reduction in orders to producers would be prompted, and the economy would fall 
into a ‘vicious circle of deflation’ – or, in the event of a short-term interest 
reduction, a ‘vicious circle of inflation’. 
    The reduction of rates would, of course, encourage dealers to hold higher 
stock levels.  But there would be a limit to the quantity of stocks which it would 
be convenient for a dealer to hold – storage capacity being the simplest way of 
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illustrating this limit.  Thus, below a certain level, the reduction of interest rates 
would not entice any greater holding of stocks.  Hawtrey termed this a ‘credit 
deadlock’.  This represented a limitation of the extent to which reductions of 
interest rate might stimulate the economy.  Hawtrey seems to have inserted this 
qualification as a way of explaining Keynes’s concept of the ‘liquidity trap’ – his 
contention that in a recession low interest rates would not stimulate business 
investment since they would have the effect of ‘pushing against a piece of 
string’. 
    Variation of Bank rate had traditionally been the Bank of England’s method of 
maintaining an adequate level of gold reserve.  By raising the rate it was 
intended to restrict the volume of lending, and thus the demand for both home-
produced goods and the imported goods which were causing the drain of gold.  
If there was a rationale for the move, it was based upon a simple form of the 
quantity theory that there was a direct relationship between the volume of 
transactions and the quantity of money in circulation.  Hawtrey’s emphasis upon, 
and elaboration of, the role of the trader provided a more developed 
transmission mechanism by which changes in bank rate manifested themselves 
in changes of output and prices.    Even in old age Hawtrey remained convinced 
that ‘Keynes was always unsound on interest rates – he totally failed to 
understand its effect on dealers’ stocks’.100
     
                                                 
 
100 Hawtrey Papers.  HTRY 13/5.  Interview with Sir Alec Cairncross, 1985. 
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2. The ‘Consumers’ Income’ and the ‘Consumers’ Outlay’ 
On 1 October 1931, Hawtrey received a personal letter from Keynes’s 
Bloomsbury address.101
 
My Dear Ralph 
   . . . I have worked through your paper on the definitions of 
Consumers’ Income and Outlay. . . .  
    As I understand your definitions, if a private person invites a 
builder to build a house in accordance with an estimate . . . and 
the value of the house is more than what it cost . . . the profit is 
a capital profit which has nothing to do with income.  But if the 
builder [builds it], then sells it for an enhanced price to the 
private person, the profit would be part of the consumers’ 
income.  Is this right? 
    . . . suppose that prices fall below the cost of production . . . 
the entrepreneur makes a loss . . . he restores his cash . . . from 
some member of the public who has been saving.  This 
represents on your definition . . . a reduction in consumers’ 
income . . . . If, on the other hand . . . he makes no loss . . . but 
incurs a capital expense . . . made up by a loan from someone’s 
savings . . . there would be no reduction in consumers’ income. 
    I could further re-express my theory in your language by 
saying that when saving exceeds investment consumers’ income 
is reduced below normal by an equal amount, and when 
investment exceeds saving then consumers’ income is increased 
above normal by an equal amount. . . .  
                                                 
 
101 Hawtrey Papers.  HTRY 10/80.  Letter from J.M.Keynes to R.G.Hawtrey 1 October 
1931. 
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    Will you think this over? 
                                                                         Yours ever 
                                                                               JMK 
 
Hawtrey’s idiosyncratic definitions were the source of much confusion between 
himself and other economists.102  Deutscher has described the somewhat testy 
confrontation over definitions between Hawtrey and Keynes within the 
proceedings of the Macmillan Committee on 10 April 1930.103   
    It might be tempting to attribute misunderstandings between Hawtrey and 
Keynes to them both being, to a certain extent, self-taught economists.  It is true 
that neither Hawtrey nor Keynes sat a university examination in economics.  But 
although Keynes, like Hawtrey, took a degree in mathematics, he was tutored by 
Marshall at Cambridge prior to being offered a position to teach economics within 
Marshall’s department.  He had been a teacher within the Cambridge faculty 
before entering the Treasury at the beginning of the Great War, and thus it can 
be claimed that he developed his understanding of economics within the great 
Marshallian tradition. 
    Hawtrey had no such background.  Within Hawtrey’s monetary model of the 
economy is a prescription for stabilising the wealth value of the economy – 
                                                 
102 Hawtrey was atypical in that he built a model of trade fluctuations, not from a study 
of previous contributions to the academic subject of ‘Economics’, but from observation 
of banking practices within the City of London.  His ‘idiosyncracy’ arises from the 
development of constructs within his model which did not correspond to those 
developed in Marshall’s economics. 
 
103 Deutscher, R.G.Hawtrey and the Development of Macroeconomics, pp. 85-6.  
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something which he considered should be the highest objective of the banking 
system.  It was Hawtrey’s emphasis upon measures to stabilise sterling (which 
he did not regard as self-stabilising) which Sir John Hicks has suggested was the 
origin of Keynes’s revolutionary thinking.104   
    Much of the correspondence between Hawtrey and Denis Robertson arose 
from confusions over definitions.  Hawtrey persisted, against all other recognized 
economists, in using the terms Consumers’ Income and Consumers’ Outlay. 
    Consumers’ Income was defined as ‘the total of incomes expressed in 
money’.105  It included wages, salaries, interest, rent and dividends.  To 
Hawtrey, this was a much more useful construct than ‘national income’ since, for 
the purpose of analysis ‘it would apply . . . for any group, whether it be a nation 
or something larger or smaller or different’.106  Consumers’ Outlay was ‘the total 
spending out of income’.107  The Consumers’ Outlay was divided into that part 
spent on goods and services, and that part used to purchase investment 
products such as shares and bonds.  In terming this second part as ‘investment’, 
he used the word in a quite different way from Keynes, who used the word to 
mean the creation, by companies, of tangible assets such as buildings and 
machinery.  The amount by which the Consumers’ Income exceeded the 
                                                 
104  J. Hicks, ‘Automatists, Hawtreyans, and Keynesians’, Journal of Money, Credit and 
Banking, Vol. 1, No. 3, Conference of University Professors.  (Aug., 1969),  p. 308. 
 
105 R.G.Hawtrey, The Art of Central Banking (London, Longmans, 1932), p.84. 
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Consumers’ Outlay led to an ‘unspent margin’ (which could be negative) through 
which individuals maintained their essential cash-balances at an appropriate 
level.  Any event which triggered a negative ‘unspent margin’ – releasing cash 
into the community – acted as the source of a process of cumulative expansion. 
 
3. Banking 
Hawtrey exhorted his readers to think of banks as ‘dealers in debt’ rather than 
receivers and lenders of ‘the medium of exchange’, since he believed that this 
was the only way to come to a proper understanding of the role of money in an 
advanced society.   
 
If we turn to the actual institutions by which the money of a 
civilized country is governed, we shall find that the foundation is 
always a law prescribing by what means a debt may legally be 
discharged [Hawtrey’s italics].  The law never says what may or 
must be used as a medium of exchange.  The idea of money is 
derived from the idea of debt.108
 
Two of the modern definitions of money are as ‘a medium of exchange’ and as a 
‘unit of account’.  Hawtrey generally wished to emphasize its latter role, and to 
do this, in many of his writings, he encouraged his readers to visualize a society 
lacking any medium of exchange, where all purchases were settled by the 
                                                 
 
108 Hawtrey, The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice, p.2. 
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transfer of debts between bank deposits.  A bank deposit, which represented a 
debt of the bank to the depositor, could in part be transferred from the 
purchaser to the seller of any goods or services.  A diligent and successful seller 
of goods or services might build up a sizeable deposit.  On the other hand, a 
stroke of the pen upon a ledger might also create a new deposit - upon which a 
person would be entitled to draw for goods and services.  This process could be 
profitable to the bank if were to charge a rate of interest to the person for whom 
the deposit had been created.  In such a situation the only limitation upon the 
extent of the creation of new deposits would be the ability of new deposit 
holders to repay, with interest, their deposits in such a way as to maintain the 
profitability of the bank.  A high rate of interest would, naturally, inhibit the 
formation of such deposits.  In the real world, such creation of deposits would 
also be limited by depositors seeking to use their deposits to claim some medium 
other than the bank’s own debt (i.e. cash).  This restraint would constrain the 
bank to limit its deposits and maintain an adequate reserve of cash – and in such 
cases the interest rate would be the tool of limitation.   
     Hawtrey did not regard an increase in credit as leading to an increase in cash 
balances since any money borrowed would not be hoarded but spent.  The spent 
money would enhance the incomes of its recipients.  It was thus axiomatic for 
Hawtrey that credit creation fed directly into an enhanced consumers’ income.  
Thus, given that Hawtrey regarded trade depression as entirely being due to a 
compression of the consumers’ income, it followed that adjustment of the level 
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of credit by manipulation of short-term interest rates held the key the control of 
both unemployment and inflation.  Reviewing the series of essays which Hawtrey 
compiled into his Monetary Reconstruction in 1923 – a time when unemployment 
was not the overriding concern that it was to later become, Denis Robertson 
wrote: 
 
. . . a single dominant thought gives unity to the whole series: 
the pearls are strung on a single thread – the conviction that the 
general level of prices can and ought to be controlled by the 
manipulation of the rate of discount.109
 
The same reviewer’s comments, when reviewing Hawtrey’s A Century of Bank 
Rate some sixteen years later, indicate how Hawtrey’s faith in the power of Bank 
rate had been unshaken by two decades of economic depression. 
 
. . . Mr. Hawtrey marshals his rich knowledge of financial history 
. . . in support of his well-known thesis that the manipulation of 
Bank rate, working through the decisions of merchants to alter 
the size of their stocks, can be an almost completely effective 
instrument for controlling the level of economic activity.110
 
                                                 
 
109 D. H. Robertson ‘Review of Monetary Reconstruction by R.G.Hawtrey’, The Economic 
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110 D.H. Robertson ‘Review of A Century of Bank Rate by R.G.Hawtrey’, The Economic 
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4. The Demand for Money 
Individuals would tend to collect money at fairly widely-spaced intervals such as 
pay days, or periodic visits to the bank, or, at even more widely spaced intervals 
such as dividend payment days.  Demands on the individual’s cash would be 
virtually continuous.  For this reason cash balances were needed.  The greater a 
person’s income the greater would be his overall level of expenditure, and 
therefore the greater his average cash balance would need to be.  Unforeseen 
contingencies, and accumulation of funds to purchase investment vehicles were 
other motives for holding cash, but Hawtrey regarded the level of cash-balance 
to be directly related to anticipated outlay, and thus to income.   
    When consumers, as a result of increased incomes, anticipated an increased 
outlay, suggested Hawtrey, they would tend to increase their cash balances by 
drawing on their bank deposits – a process which would cause the banks’ 
reserves to fall.  Given the tendency, in an expanding economy, for wage rises to 
lag behind price rises, Hawtrey argued that the depletion of bank reserves was a 
lagging indicator – the last event in a series which ran through rising prices, 
rising wages, greater anticipated outlay, the demand for greater cash balances 
and finally bank withdrawals.111  Consequently, using the state of the banks’ 
reserves as the basis for adjustments in interest rates was to apply the stabilizing 
                                                 
111 F.H.Capie and G.E.Wood, ‘Money in the Economy, 1870-1939’ in R.C.Floud and 
D.N.McCloskey (eds.), The Economic History of Britain since 1700, (Vol. 2, 1860-1939), 
(Cambridge, C.U.P., 1994). 
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corrections too late in the cycle - with the result that the correction had to be 
applied more severely than would otherwise have been required.  This, he 
suggested, exaggerated the cyclical swings.  If central banks were prepared to 
look further than the state of their reserves – particularly into movements of 
price indices – and make prompt, frequent adjustments of their discount rates, 
then Hawtrey believed that worst effects of the trade cycle could be mitigated.   
  
5. Investment and the Trade Cycle 
In reviewing Hawtrey’s theory of the cycle Laidler was of the opinion that open-
economy, international considerations were not at the heart of Hawtrey’s 
analysis since his ‘treatment of these issues is markedly inferior to that of [John 
Stuart Mill]; for he does not consider the possibility that an external drain of 
(gold) might trigger the upper turning point of the cycle’.112  Laidler also 
suggests that the phase difference between production for consumption goods 
and production for investment goods did not play a significant role in Hawtrey’s 
analysis.113  However, towards the end of Good and Bad Trade, whilst discussing 
the reasons for financial crises, Hawtrey noted that ‘industries engaged in the 
production of fixed capital are peculiarly sensitive to fluctuations in the general 
state of trade . . . and the consequences are to be seen both in the high 
unemployment rates in the industries during periods of depression and the high 
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prices which rule in them during periods of activity’.114  Within such industries he 
included ‘building and shipbuilding trades, the construction of roads and railways, 
and to a great extent the manufacture of machinery and vehicles . . . iron and 
steel trades, and brick-making and quarrying’.115  He used a numerical example 
to illustrate the effect on the capital goods industry of changes in demand for 
consumer goods – 
     
For example, it may be taken that in a particular industry the 
output increases . . . at an average rate of 1% p.a. and that 
fixed capital requires renewal after 20 years use.  Then 5% of 
the capital requires renewal each year and [with] the demand for 
[increased] plant the demand for new plant will be 6% of the 
total amount of plant.  But if there is an expansion of trade 
which increases the output of this industry in a particular year by 
4% . . . the new plant needed will be 9% of the existing plant . . 
. 50% more than the average.116
 
Here, in embryo form, was the accelerator principle which was to be worked out 
more fully by John Clark some four years later.  Hawtrey did not seem to attempt 
to integrate this idea into his analysis as a means of explaining the trade cycle’s 
self-generating nature.  For him, it was a peculiarity of the trade cycle which 
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required explanation, rather than a mechanism which drove the cycle.  Prior to 
this short analysis he had asserted that ‘[the capital] industries really depend 
ultimately for the demand for their products upon the rate at which savings are 
accumulating’.117  Hawtrey is, here, equating investment with savings as the 
difference between income and consumption.  Savings led to investment – 
without which the capital industries could not prosper.  Given this belief in the 
importance of savings for the capital industries it is unsurprising that he 
continued to argue against the feasibility of public works expenditures as a 
means of stabilising the capital industries.  This argument underpinned the 
‘Treasury View’ which cautioned against financing public works on borrowed 
money as a means of reducing the unemployment count. 
  
6. The Gold Standard 
Susan Howson concluded that Hawtrey’s role in the framing the Genoa 
Resolutions for the reintroduction of an international gold standard, in 1922, was 
the ‘high point of his official career’.118  Nothing came of Hawtrey’s Genoa 
Resolutions, but in terms of the level of his profile, this assessment is probably 
true.  The Genoa Resolutions set out to establish an improved gold standard, 
since Hawtrey regarded the failure of the traditional gold standard to stabilise the 
value of money as a means of account – i.e. in terms of the generalised value of 
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other commodities – as its major weakness.  Fluctuations in the value of gold 
were the result of fluctuations in demand, and since the gold holdings of central 
banks formed the basis for expansion of credit – to Hawtrey, the necessary 
condition for the expansion of the consumers’ income – he regarded it as vital 
that central banks took measures to stabilise the demand for gold.   
    With central banks acting independently of each other, one central bank 
restricting credit, stemming its imports and thus accumulating gold, would 
commit other banks to take similar measures to preserve their gold.  Credit 
restriction and collapse of consumers’ incomes would become a worldwide 
phenomenon.  Such a process could be initiated by a general increase in the 
demand for gold.  Hawtrey regarded a gold standard managed by international 
cooperation in response to world economic conditions as a necessity for 
preventing such fluctuations.  World economic depression demanded an 
agreement for all central banks to expand credit in such a way that fear of loss 
of gold would be reduced.  Similarly, any general deficiency in gold could be 
countered by a general agreement between central banks to adjust their gold 
reserve ratios – again, with co-operation reducing the fear of loss of gold - in 
such a way that the demand for gold remained steady and its value did not 
fluctuate.  During the 1920s, as a means of both economising on gold and 
stabilizing its value, Hawtrey urged acceptance of a Gold Exchange Standard, 
whereby central banks’ holdings of a limited quantity of gold-equivalent foreign 
reserve would be regarded as part of their essential reserve for creating credit. 
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    In the 1930s, with Britain off the gold standard, Hawtrey recommended 
‘competitive devaluation’ of currencies as a means of restoring world trade (see 
chapter 8).  Generally, however, his preference was for a managed gold standard 
with fixed, rather than floating, exchange rates since stability encouraged 
international trade and benefited the City of London as a centre for financing 
world trade. 
 
7. International Trade 
Hawtrey’s analysis of international trade relied upon two more of his idiosyncratic 
constructs – ‘home trade products’ and ‘foreign trade products’ - ‘home trade 
products’ were those incapable of being internationally tradeable, whereas 
‘foreign trade products’ were those products, whether produced at home or 
abroad, which were capable of being traded internationally.  The essential 
distinction between these two types of good being that whereas prices of ‘home 
trade products’ were largely responsive to domestic demand, the price of ‘foreign 
trade products’ was largely determined internationally – changes in demand in a 
single country having little effect on the international price.  Conversely changes 
in the currency exchange-rate had little effect on the price of ‘home trade 
products’ whilst affecting the price paid for ‘foreign trade products’.  A 
depreciation of the pound would have raised the price of imported ‘foreign trade 
products’, and this would have given some scope for domestic producers of 
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‘foreign trade products’ to raise their prices – an important element in Hawtrey’s 
arguments for overcoming trade depression during the nineteen-thirties. 
    International securities were regarded as roughly comparable with ‘foreign 
trade products’ in that they had an international price.  Hawtrey viewed 
investment in foreign securities as evidence of insufficient outlets for investment 
at home; something likely to arise during depressions.  He was, by 1938, 
prepared to concede that there would be one benefit of government-sponsored 
public works in that: 
 
[t]he private enterprise displaced by Government borrowing may 
be the export of capital.  A very substantial relief may be secured 
at a time of depression by a capital-exporting country in this 
way, in so far, at any rate, as the Government expenditure is 
directed at home and neither to the acquisition of imported 
products nor to the diversion of goods from export. . . . There is 
a favourable effect upon the balance of payments, which, with a 
given foreign exchange value of the currency unit, permits of an 
enlargement of the consumers’ income.119
 
There was considerable reservation attached to Hawtrey’s recognition of the 
validity of public works, since he viewed the measure as one which would 
intensify depression in those countries which had previously been importing 
capital.  Public works were no answer to conditions of world depression. 
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8. The Schedule of interest Rates 
 Any review of Hawtrey’s economic model must attend to the issue which arose 
with Keynes over the role of long-term and short-term interest rates, and the 
inter-relationship between these rates.    This was an issue which came to divide 
Hawtrey and Keynes even more sharply than their differences over the efficacy 
of loan-financed public works as a means of alleviating unemployment. 
    In his earliest writings Hawtrey did not differentiate between loans taken out 
for different periods of time, or differences in rates for different-term loans.  By 
‘interest rate’ he usually implied the prevailing Bank of England discount rate, 
whose value influenced the short-term lending rates of the commercial banks 
(Hawtrey noted that Keynes often failed to specify the term of the interest rate; 
referring to ‘the complex of the various rates of interest current’)120.  The 
important transmission mechanism, for Hawtrey, was very simply that 
movements in the short-term interest rate influenced dealers to increase, or 
decrease, their stock levels, and the changes in the size of orders given by 
traders to manufacturers was responsible for fluctuating levels of industrial 
activity.   
    Hawtrey’s views received little consideration from other economists of the 
time, and since he relished in responding to criticism, he expressed 
disappointment that, apart from Keynes, economists had not even troubled to 
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reject his theory.121  Keynes emphatically rejected the transmission mechanism 
of Hawtrey which related the trade cycle, via adjustments in dealers’ stocks, to 
variations in the short-term rate of interest.   
    Sir John Hicks has expressed the view that large parts of Keynes’s Treatise 
were a reply to the points in Hawtrey’s Currency and Credit with which he 
differed.122  Hicks also drew attention to the large areas of agreement between 
Hawtrey and Keynes.  Both agreed, largely against the received wisdom of the 
time, that the monetary system had no automatic stabilisers.  (Hicks, 
incidentally, expressed the opinion that Hawtrey’s model of a free-market system 
that was not automatically self-righting, as outlined in Currency and Credit, was 
the origin of the Keynesian Revolution).123 Both agreed that the system needed 
to be stabilised by a policy devised by the monetary and fiscal authorities.  Both 
agreed that interest rates, directly or indirectly set by a central bank, were an 
important element in the process of stabilisation.  They strongly disagreed on the 
relative importance of long and short-term interest rates. 
    Hawtrey, as we have seen believed in the short-term interest rate, as set by 
the Bank of England’s discount rate, as the means of controlling production 
through its effect on dealers’ holdings of stocks.  Keynes looked to fixed-capital 
investment for long-term production as the key to economic expansion and 
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recovery; to the businessman’s anticipated profit from an investment over the 
course of its life set against the long-term rate of interest used to finance that 
investment.  Thus, to him, long-term interest rates were the important ones, and 
the only relevance of the short-term discount rate was the extent to which short-
term rates influenced long-term rates – as he believed they did.  Keynes believed 
that any additional costs imposed upon a dealer by an increase in short-term 
interest rates was as nothing compared to the prospect of his enhanced profit 
through rising prices in a period of expansion – the holding of liquid goods by 
dealers and middlemen were nowhere near as sensitive to changes in Bank rate 
as Hawtrey would have it. 
    Hawtrey’s response to Keynes’s criticisms in The Treatise and the General 
Theory came in his 1938 publication, A Century of Bank Rate.  Hicks’s opinion 
was that this was a ‘demolition of the Keynesian mechanism’.124  In asserting 
that changes in Bank rate (the cost of short-term loans) worked through into 
long-term rates, Keynes had used data from the 1920s only.  Hawtrey used the 
data on short and long-term rates over the previous hundred years to show that 
Keynes’s hypothesis was not supported by the evidence.  Moreover, Hawtrey 
suggested there was little of substance in the weight which Keynes put on the 
value of the long-term rate of interest, since ‘[m]ost of the industrial projects 
offered for exploitation at any time promise yields ever so far above the rate of 
interest  . . . [that] the rate of interest calculated on money raised will probably 
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be no more than a very moderate deduction from profit’.125  Two highly-rated 
economists supplying two powerful arguments against the effectiveness of either 
short or long-term rates; it was hardly surprising that Hicks, in his review of 
Hawtrey’s work, should come to the provisional conclusion that ‘Tweedledum and 
Tweedledee had both fallen flat, and the way was cleared for the Age of Fiscal 
Policy’.126    
    Hawtrey, however, was not content to let the matter rest there, and took the 
matter up with Hicks; insisting that his work was not simply a demolition of 
Keynes’s argument but a positive re-statement of his own position.  He drew 
Hicks’s attention to a section of his book which underlined the psychological 
importance attached to changes in the Bank of England’s rediscount rate.  In a 
section entitled ‘Psychological Reactions’ Hawtrey suggested that in (for 
example) raising its discount rate, the Bank of England was not merely making it 
more expensive for dealers to hold stock, but sending out a message of intent. 
 
When Bank rate went up from 3 to 4 per cent., a trader would 
reason that this was intended to have a restrictive effect on 
markets, and that, if the effect was not brought about, the rate 
would simply go higher and higher until it was . . . . Those who 
took that view would restrict their purchases and demand would 
fall off, and so the 4 per cent. rate might be found potent 
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enough, even though, if unsupported by traders’ anticipations, a 
6 or 7 per cent. rate might have been necessary.127
 
On having his attention drawn to this, Hicks re-assessed Hawtrey’s position, and 
concluded that the ‘psychological’ element in Hawtrey’s model was ‘distinctly 
superior’ to the ‘psychological’ element within Keynes’s which depended upon a 
somewhat vague long-term expectation of profit.128  In awarding pride of place, 
in this respect, to Hawtrey’s model, Hicks drew upon a phrase of A.C. Pigou’s – 
announcement effect.  Hicks used the term announcement effect to indicate the 
way in which the announcement of a policy decision gives rise to people 
reconsidering their behaviour before the enacting of policy.  Hawtrey’s model 
relied upon the powerful announcement effect of changes in Bank rate.  
However, regarding its true effectiveness, Hicks (writing in 1969) had this to 
add: 
 
. . . on Hawtrey’s analysis . . . it should be possible . . . for the 
Central Bank to take decisive action.   There is a world of 
difference . . . between action which is determinedly directed to 
imposing restraint . . . and identically the same action which 
does not engender the same expectations.  Identically the same 
action may be indecisive, if it appears to be no more than an 
adjustment to existing market conditions; or if the impression is 
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given that it is the most that is politically possible.  If conditions 
are such that gentle pressure can be exerted in a decisive 
manner, no more than gentle pressure will as a rule be required.  
But as soon as there is doubt about decisiveness, gentle 
pressure is useless . . . . From this point of view . . . the 
nationalisation of the Bank of England was a death-blow to the 
Hawtrey system. . . . .for it made the Bank constitutionally 
incapable of arousing the expectations on which it had hitherto 
relied.129       
 
The Bank of England may, still, be nationalised, but in 1997 it was granted 
operational independence to set its rate to meet a set inflation target.  In that its 
target was a pre-determined rate of inflation rather than a broad remit to 
achieve economic stability, its task lay very close to what Hawtrey had called for 
– the frequent adjustment of Bank rate with purpose of maintaining the wealth 
value of the currency.  We now have a situation which Hawtrey would surely 
have endorsed.       
    By the act of publishing A Century of Bank Rate Hawtrey was appealing to 
empirical evidence to justify the superiority of his theory of interest-rate 
schedules over that of Keynes.  His appeal was not to the superior logical 
internal consistency of his model but to the evidence provided by history.  This 
raises the question of whether appeals to historical data – corresponding in some 
ways to the physical or biological scientist’s appeal to experimental data – are a 
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legitimate means of advancing economic theory.  The works by Backhouse, and 
those edited by De Marchi and Blaug, use epistemological studies to try to locate 
economics within the spectrum of the sciences.130   
    Backhouse pursues the questions of the extent to which the concepts of ‘truth’ 
and ‘progress’ are relevant to economic theories, and, if so, the ways in which 
‘truth’ and ‘progress’ might be established.   
    The idea of ‘progress’ in economic theory implies that new theories are an 
‘advance’ on older theories.  To make this claim, Backhouse suggests, is to 
oppose a modernist or post-modernist view of economic science.  This view 
would liken the idea of unidirectional ‘progress’ in economic theory to a Whig 
interpretation of history which judges a period of history by standards and 
conditions pertaining today, and the extent to which the period moved towards 
today’s conditions .  The post-modernist would argue that all theories contain a 
particular discourse which is only relevant to the time in which they were 
produced.  Whilst agreeing that the science of economics could never meet the 
standards of empirical proof demanded by Karl Popper, Backhouse argues for the 
ideas of progress and truth in economics, and argues that ‘[i]n economics, 
theory is comparatively over-developed relative to empirical evidence’.131  He 
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argues for the establishment of empirical generalisations capable of acting as 
constraints on theorising.    
    Generally Backhouse steers a course between that of Frank Hahn and Mark 
Blaug.  Hahn has dismissed the importance of methodology in economic 
theorising, arguing that a good theory, independent of empirical data, aids 
understanding and acts as an analytical tool.  Blaug has been critical of 
economists’ methodology, arguing that it is essential that empirical progress 
advances alongside theoretical progress. 
    Backhouse is generally approving of the approach of Milton Friedman whose 
theoretical advances sprung from his historical study with Anna Schwartz.132  
Friedman believed that, in the absence of controlled experiments, historical 
episodes provided the economist with much relevant data.  It seems likely that 
both Backhouse and Friedman would have supported Hawtrey’s recourse to 
historical evidence in his dispute with Keynes over the relative importance of 
long- and short-term interest rates. 
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                                     Chapter 1 
 
                   Paving the Way for the Return of Gold 
 
                                      1919-1924 
 
   
By 1922 the post-war boom was well and truly over.  An anti-waste campaign in 
the popular press, targeting two mythical civil servants ‘Dilly and Dally’, took hold 
of public opinion.133  Lloyd George’s Coalition Government responded by 
appointing a committee, chaired by Sir Eric Geddes, to recommend cuts in public 
expenditures.      McDonald has argued that campaigns by the Daily Mail and the 
Daily Express marked the beginning of a new phase in British politics whereby, 
because of the recent enlargement of the franchise, politicians were required to 
respond to public opinion as it was perceived through the pages of the popular 
press.  The idea of the Geddes Committee was Lloyd George’s; ever the populist 
politician.134   
    The Treasury, whilst wanting to reign in the costs of the spending Ministries, 
feared that the Geddes Committee would upset its own model of expenditure 
control.  The Finance section of the Treasury had set great store by the ‘return 
to gold’ providing the necessary discipline  to control expenditure but feared that 
the enlarged franchise had made monetary stability more difficult to achieve; the 
Treasury wanted reduced spending for the redemption of debt, the Geddes 
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Committee wanted reduced business taxes.  The broad alliance of objectives 
forced the Treasury and the Geddes Committee to work together in an uneasy 
relationship. 135
    The execution of this committee’s recommendations, the ‘Geddes Axe’, was 
probably the most notable series of fiscal measures undertaken by the Treasury 
during the period 1919-24.  Hawtrey seems to have played no part in the 
process.  The Financial Enquiries Branch produced no memoranda commenting 
upon the cuts, nor was Hawtrey involved in any discussions relating to cuts in 
expenditure.136   
    In Hawtrey’s 1966 interview with Sir Alec Cairncross, Cairncross was 
concerned to understand the way in which the inter-war Treasury operated; 
whether it had regular chaired, and minuted, meetings, or whether special 
Treasury meetings were convened to discuss the implications of Geddes, or May.  
Hawtrey could not recall being present at any such meetings, nor was he aware 
of any such meetings taking place - lack of recall was improbably due to failing 
memory, since Hawtrey could well remember crossing Horse Guards Parade in 
1919, to dine and discuss the leaving of the Gold Standard with Sir John 
Bradbury and Sir Basil Blackett.137  If, in fact, Hawtrey’s memory had failed him, 
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it was probably because fiscal detail had always held less interest for him than 
the vicissitudes of gold. 
    Maintenance of the wealth value of the currency unit was of central ethical, as 
well as economic, importance to Hawtrey.  He believed that the Gold Standard, 
whilst incapable of guaranteeing the stability of sterling by itself, could be part of 
a more complex mechanism whereby values could be preserved.  This chapter 
will consider Hawtrey’s role in the process of preparing to return to the Gold 
Standard in the years 1919-24.   
    The 1914-18 war had been marked by price inflation, a growth of the money 
supply which included the printing of bank notes by the Treasury as well as the 
issuing of notes by the Bank of England in excess of its normal fiduciary limits, 
and the propping of the pound at close to its pre-war value by dollar loans.   
    Under normal peace-time conditions the receipts of government from taxation 
are often irregular compared to the regular outward flows arising from 
government expenditure.  Under such conditions, it is perfectly normal and 
proper for governments to raise money, to cover periods of low receipts, by 
selling three-month Treasury Bills.  These bills are later re-purchased, with 
interest paid, by using subsequent incoming taxation.  During the First World 
War the sums that could be raised through taxation and long-term loans were 
insignificant compared to the demands of fighting the war.  The British 
Government resorted to the selling of Treasury Bills to raise money without 
having any hope of being able to settle these bills through the proceeds of 
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taxation.  Ultimately they were repaid by the Government resorting to Ways and 
Means loans from the Bank of England.  The subsequent enlargement of the 
money supply was the main source of the war-time inflation. 
    Given the financial demands of war on their governments, France, Germany, 
Russia and Austria-Hungary abandoned the Gold Standard at the beginning of 
the 1914-18 war - Britain, despite a commonly-held view, did not.138  Remaining 
on the Gold Standard did, for a time, stave off the depreciation of the currency 
which would be expected to follow inflationary finance.  Throughout the war it 
was still possible to present a pound note and demand a given measure of gold.  
Under normal circumstances, with a country’s note issue inflating, much of the 
inflated currency would have been used to demand gold, and much of that gold 
would have been exported (in effect, as Hawtrey pointed out, the Government 
would have been financing itself by the sale of its gold).139  Under the normal 
mechanism of the gold standard the loss of gold through exportation would have 
forced the authorities to suppress the note issue (or, possibly, raise taxation to 
the extent that it would have been capable of financing the issue of Treasury 
Bills).  The circumstances of war forbade the easy shipment of gold abroad, and 
as a result, the British monetary authorities were shielded from the 
consequences of the mushrooming of currency notes.  The mechanisms of the 
gold standard had failed, and Britain was enabled to nominally remain on the 
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standard without having to comply with its disciplines.  Additionally, most of the 
belligerent governments paid for their war supplies by selling off their supplies of 
gold (much of it to America); the gold-receiving nations were swamped with 
more gold than they needed.  The price of gold fell in relation to other 
commodities, and gold-denominated currencies, such as sterling, were worth less 
for the purpose of buying commodities on the international markets.  The effect 
was to exacerbate British inflation.  As the United States entered the war in 1917 
it prohibited the free movement of gold and, for the time being, destroyed any 
semblance of a world gold market.140     
    After the war it once again became possible to ship gold abroad without it 
being endangered.  America withdrew its prohibition on gold movements in 
1919, and thereafter it was no longer possible for Britain to maintain the 
pretence of the pre-war parity under a gold standard.  To have continued to do 
so would have resulted in the total loss of gold reserves and so the Prohibition of 
the Export of Gold Order, on 1 April 1919, effectively removed Britain from the 
Gold Standard.  It was to remain outside the standard until 1925. 
   Post-war reconstruction and capital investment for peace-time produced a 
boom which lasted, according to Susan Howson, from April 1919 to April 1920.141  
During this period, the director of one bank recollected, ‘we ladled out money; 
we did it because everybody said they were making and were going to make 
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large profits’.142  Charles Feinstein has estimated that the Consumer Price Index 
rose from 222.9 in 1919 to 257.2 in 1920;143 the pound’s exchange rate with the 
dollar fell from its war-time pegging of $4.765, on 20 March 1919, to $3.40 in 
February 1920.144  In the middle of this price boom and currency collapse the 
British Government, somewhat uncomfortably, accepted a report from a 
committee which had been instituted at the very end of the war.  
   In 1918 the Treasury and the Ministry of Reconstruction had set up a 
‘Committee on Currency and Foreign Exchanges after the War’ – the Cunliffe 
Committee.  Its report had stated that before the war ‘the country possessed a 
complete and effective Gold Standard [which] operated effectively to correct 
unfavourable exchanges and to check undue expansion of credit’.145  Cunliffe 
provided the classical justification for the Gold Standard, describing it as a 
‘jewelled’ mechanism - a piece of exquisite, self-correcting engineering; as 
precise as any clock’s pendulum or any steam engine’s governor.  The Gold 
Standard would have imposed its disciplines upon the market for credit in such a 
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way as to stabilise the external value of the pound, and thus provide a basis for 
restoration of international trade. 
    The Cunliffe Committee’s First Interim Report in August 1918 had reflected 
the desires of its in-built majority of bankers when recommending: 
 
[i]n our opinion it is imperative that after the war the conditions 
necessary to the maintenance of an effective Gold Standard 
should be restored without delay.146
 
The report set out three pre-requisites for the restoration of an effective Gold 
Standard: the cessation of government borrowing, the raising of ‘the Bank of 
England discount rate’ to check ‘a foreign drain of gold and the speculative 
expansion of credit in this country’, and that the of issue of bank-notes not 
backed by gold be limited by law.147  No mention had been made of an exchange 
rate; only a presumption that the pre-war rate would be restored.  In August 
1918, when the First Interim Report was published, the pound was still pegged 
at its war-time level of $4.765, the extent of the deflation which might be 
necessary to achieve a rate of $4.87 was not envisaged, and the mechanism by 
which it might be brought about only vaguely understood.  However, given that 
the Cunliffe Report received the virtually unanimous support of the committee of 
highly respected advisors and financiers, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen 
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Chamberlain, had little option but to urge its acceptance upon Lloyd-George’s 
Cabinet.  Cabinet acceptance was confirmed to parliament in December 1919.   
By February 1920, with the pound at $3.40, a depreciation of some thirty per 
cent from its pre-war value, the extent of the deflation that would be necessary 
if the Gold Standard was to be restored to its previous level became 
uncomfortably clear. 
    Hawtrey’s involvements in the years leading up to the restoration of the Gold 
Standard were in two distinct areas.  First, on the nature of the Gold Standard 
itself; he believed that the pre-war Gold Standard had defects which made it 
incapable, without modification, of preserving the wealth value of the monetary 
unit.  He had views on ways in which the Gold Standard might be improved; 
views which were eventually to be put before, and accepted by, the Supreme 
Council of the Allies’ Genoa Conference of April 1922.  Secondly, he had strong 
and somewhat unorthodox views about the most appropriate credit policy by 
which the United Kingdom monetary authorities might, without inflicting trade 
depression on Britain or the rest of the world, restore the pound to its pre-war 
exchange value with dollar.  At the risk of losing chronological continuity, these 
two issues will be dealt with separately, beginning with Hawtrey’s views 
regarding the structure of the Gold Standard. 
    Shortly before his appointment as Director of Financial Enquiries, on 12 
September 1919, Hawtrey addressed the Economic Section of the British 
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Association on the subject of the ‘The Gold Standard’.148  He noted that, a year 
after cessation of hostilities, America was showing the first signs of re-
establishing a Gold Standard, but having accumulated gold during the war she 
was now ‘saturated’ with gold.  In consequence, the value of its gold had fallen 
in relation to other commodities. 
 
This decline in the purchasing power of gold has disclosed a 
weakness in the Gold Standard.  The stability in the value of gold 
depends on the accumulated stocks being large in proportion to 
the annual supply. . . . The demand for gold as currency, by 
withdrawing this large quantity from other uses, tends to keep 
the value of gold up.149
 
Here, Hawtrey began to underline the fact that widespread restoration of the 
Gold Standard involved dealing with two distinct problems: firstly, nearly all 
monetary units had depreciated, to different degrees, against their nominal gold 
parities, and secondly, gold itself had lost its value against a range of other 
commodities.   
    In Britain, in order to restore pre-war parities – that is, the value of the 
monetary unit to the fixed weight of gold to which it equated before the war - a 
modest degree of deflation in money prices would be necessary to bring the 
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value of the monetary unit (the pound) back in line with its nominal gold value.  
This would involve a reduction in the money price of all commodities including 
the commodity of labour.  Hawtrey acknowledged this as being a painful process.  
Within his model of the economy it would involve raising short-term interest 
rates.  The usual consequences would flow from this: the higher interest rates 
would deter traders from holding stocks bought using credit, and would 
encourage them to reduce their indebtedness.  To do this they would have to 
reduce the prices of their goods in order to sell off their stocks more rapidly, and 
they would reduce their orders to manufacturers.  Eventually, after a process 
involving some unemployment, this would lead to a new equilibrium at lower 
prices and wages.  But – and this is the crux of Hawtrey’s argument – the 
general restoration of the Gold Standard in its pre-war form, by a large group of 
countries, would cause such a surge in the demand for gold by the various 
central banks, that the price of gold would be driven up in relation to other 
commodities.  Since the value of monetary units would be tied to gold this 
implied that the real value of a fixed monetary wage would be driven up.  In 
consequence, the monetary deflation of wages, in Britain, would have to be 
correspondingly greater in order to restore the equilibrium between the value of 
wages and that of other commodities.  Under such circumstances restoring the 
Gold Standard would require even greater deflationary measures than the 
already overvalued pound demanded, since the actual process of a general 
return to gold would drive up the value of the pound even further. 
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    Nevertheless, despite the problems and dangers associated with the return to 
a Gold Standard Hawtrey felt it was the only practical way in which trust in the 
currency could be restored and maintained.   
 
Distrust of the unit shows itself in a general desire to get rid of 
balances of money . . . in exchange for commodities . . . . So the 
distrust accentuates the depreciation and, of course, the 
depreciation accentuates the distrust.  It is in such conditions 
that trade is brought to a standstill by the sheer want of any 
tolerable medium in which debts can be measured.  For the last 
two years we have seen communities starving, not because 
there was no food, but because the peasants and farmers would 
not sell food for paper money.150
 
In the light of the problems associated with any return to gold, Hawtrey, in 
looking for a monetary system which economised on the use of gold, and 
prevented the world’s banking systems from distorting its value by their 
fluctuating demands for it, was led to extol the virtues of a Gold Exchange 
Standard.  Such a system, by permitting central banks to use gold-related 
currency as fully equivalent to gold in their reserves, would have economised on 
the use of gold, and, by suitable management, ironed out the currency 
instability.  
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    Within his envisaged ‘Gold Exchange’ system the world’s central banks would, 
in addition to holding stocks of gold, hold reserves of paper money of all the 
other gold-standard currencies.  These paper monies would be ‘gold equivalent’, 
freely available for exchange for notes of any other currency, and acceptable as 
payment for imported goods ‘on terms just favourable enough to compete 
successfully with . . . gold’.151   
    The system would require safeguards – merely substituting foreign currency 
for gold offered no security from an almost indefinite expansion of paper money 
with a fixed substructure of gold reserves.  There was no clear indication of how 
this could be done.  One of Hawtrey’s suggestions seemed to foreshadow the 
current mode of operation of the Bank of England’s Monetary Policy Committee 
in setting the Bank’s base rate. 
 
The scientific economist will be tempted to look for a solution in 
the regulation of currencies by index numbers of prices. . . . 
[but] the index number will be rather to give guidance, along 
with other data, in the administrative control of currency, than to 
play a part in the mechanical rigidity of a statutory system.152
 
Hawtrey also felt that some international agreement was necessary by which 
countries agreed, by law, to limit the quantity of paper money which was not 
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backed by gold.  In operating the gold exchange standard it was important that 
foreign currencies be treated as equivalent to gold only for the purpose of 
settling foreign debts, not as a basis for the printing of paper currency – this 
must only be done on the basis of the possession of metallic gold.  According to 
Hawtrey, under these rules, if any country indulged in inflation and allowed its 
currency to devalue (despite, apparently, abiding by the rules of the exchange 
standard in limiting its fiduciary issue) then it would find ‘more and more of its 
paper money locked up in the exchange reserves and withdrawn from 
circulation.  This would operate like the export of gold’.153     
    Whilst the operation of the gold exchange standard under these rules might 
serve to control inflation and currency devaluation occurring through excessive 
printing of paper money, Hawtrey noted that the principal means of payment in 
business was credit, and that any system designed to maintain the value of the 
currency should have an effective means of controlling credit.  Since possessors 
of credit were free to draw cash from the banks, the running down of the 
commercial banks’ cash levels should be an indication that credit was being 
granted too freely.  It was, however, a lagging indicator. 
 
If we rely on the limitation of paper money, and the bankers do 
not succeed in keeping control of credit, the inevitable result will 
be that, when the bank reserves in some or all countries 
                                                 
 
153 Ibid., p.62. 
 109
threaten to melt away to nothing, the limitation of paper money 
will be suspended.154
 
For the purposes of controlling credit Hawtrey returned to the use of an index 
number of prices. 
 
The rise in prices precedes the drain of legal tender money into 
circulation.  It will be the function of the principal banks . . . to 
watch the index of world prices, and to put the brake on by 
raising the rate of interest as soon as a material rise is recorded.  
But . . . a rise in prices may be due not to credit expansion but 
to a scarcity of one or two important commodities. . . . The 
banking authorities must take into account not only the statistical 
data, such as index numbers, but also all that they can learn 
about the state of business from their relations with traders.155
 
Hawtrey had faith in an Anglo-American hegemony to control the world’s gold 
supplies: such a hegemony, he believed, would coerce other countries into 
adopting similar practices.  If these two countries were to reach agreement on 
limiting their uncovered paper monies to an amount determined by their gold 
holdings, operate an external payment system on a gold-exchange basis using 
gold-equivalent currency rather than pure gold, and control credit with a view to 
keeping the value of gold in line with an index-number evaluation of 
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commodities, then he believed the rest of the world would follow.156  This, he 
believed, would restore the gold standard as a more trustworthy standard than it 
had been in the past, and enable the restoration to be carried out with minimal 
deflation. 
    The first joint effort to restore the International Gold Standard was the 
International Financial Conference in Brussels called by the Council of the League 
of Nations in September-October 1920.  In an attempt to prevent the discussions 
becoming mired in recriminations over reparations, the League of Nations 
resolved to exclude from discussion all ‘the questions which are the subject of 
the present negotiations between the Allies and Germany’.157  It may, in a strict 
sense, have been successful in this move but an air of mistrust, linked to war 
reparations, hung over the conference.  Judging by the personnel appointed to 
represent Britain at the conference, a retired Governor of the Bank of England 
and a retired Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury (Cokayne, by then Lord 
Cullen, and Chalmers), the Brussels meeting was to be treated as a diplomatic 
rather than a financial exercise.  No progress was made on the question of gold.   
                                                 
156 Hawtrey frequently called for the maintenance of prices with reference to an index 
number, and discussed the construction of index numbers at some length in his book 
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production’. 
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    Hawtrey was not directly involved with the Brussels conference.  Five leading 
economists, including Pigou, had prepared a joint statement which set out the 
agenda for the conference.158  The gist of their analysis was that exchange rates 
could only be stabilised by subduing inflation; inflation could be subdued only by 
countries eliminating budget deficits; budget deficits could only be eliminated by 
the resumption of economic growth; the principal barrier to the resumption of 
economic growth was the shortage of capital, and international financial 
institutions found it impossible to raise the necessary capital because of the 
instability of exchange rates.  Given such circularity of analysis, entrenched 
attitudes over reparations, and concern over the deflationary implications of the 
proposals, it is unsurprising that nothing came of them.159   
    The next attempt at international co-operation over monetary stabilisation 
was at Genoa in April 1922 when the Supreme Council of the Allies convened its 
International Economic Conference.  Hawtrey was a member of the British 
Delegation, and his ideas were to provide the focus for discussion.  The 
Treasury’s Controller of Finance at the time of the run-up to the Genoa 
negotiations was Sir Basil Blackett.  Blackett had been a close friend and 
colleague of Hawtrey for a number of years, and over the course of those years 
they had had many discussions together over policy ideas.160  The Genoa 
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Conference seemed to be an ideal venue for Hawtrey to present his ideas 
relating to a gold-exchange standard, and Blackett encouraged him to frame his 
ideas into the form of a series of resolutions for discussion. 
    Hawtrey consulted with the Bank of England in framing his resolutions.161  As 
a later part of this chapter will describe, there were, in the period 1920-22, 
tensions between the Bank of England and the Treasury over the level of interest 
rates.  Initially, Hawtrey gave his support to the Bank of England’s desire to 
impose higher interest rates as a means of quelling the post-war boom, and as a 
result he, for a short time, established a good relationship with the Bank’s 
Governor, Montagu Norman.  The discussions with Norman were, therefore, 
cordial.   
    Hawtrey framed his ideas into twelve resolutions.  Resolutions 1, 4, 5, 6 and 8 
stated that economic reconstruction depended upon stability, that stability 
required currencies to be based on a common standard, and that since gold was 
the only standard upon which agreement was possible, then establishment of a 
Gold Standard and a programme for its implementation should be agreed on - 
each country individually should decide whether its currency should revert to its 
pre-war value, or whether a new parity was more appropriate    Resolutions 2, 3 
and 12 stated that all countries should have a central bank of issue which was 
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free from political interference, and that an early meeting of these banks should 
be convened by the Bank of England to establish an agreed policy for regulating 
credit.  Resolution 7 called on all participating countries to balance their budgets.  
Resolution 9 stated that any new Gold Standard should embody some means, 
such as maintaining reserves in the form of foreign currency, for economising on 
the use of gold.  Resolution 10 called for co-ordination of policy between Europe 
and the United States, and Resolution 11 set out a series of proposals which 
would form the basis for the discussions at the meeting which it was intended 
that the Bank of England should convene.  The important proposal under 
Resolution 11, which is pencil-marked and arrowed in the Treasury’s own copy of 
the ‘Resolutions’, stated that – 
 
‘[c]redit will be regulated, not only with a view to maintaining 
the currencies at par with one another, but also with a view to 
preventing undue fluctuations in the purchasing power of gold.  
It is not contemplated, however, that the discretion of the 
central banks should be fettered by any definite rules framed for 
this purpose, but that their collaboration will have been assured 
in matters outside the province of the participating countries.162    
 
Immediately before being taken to Genoa, the ‘Resolutions’ were submitted to, 
and almost completely accepted by, expert representatives from different 
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countries who met in London.  Resolution no. 11, providing a detailed scheme for 
a Convention was felt to be too detailed to be taken forward to the Conference.  
At Genoa Sir Robert Horne, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, presided over the 
Financial Commission, and Sir Basil Blackett chaired the committee of experts.  
The experts adopted all Hawtrey’s resolutions and reintroduced the detailed 
proposals for an international conference that had been dropped by the 
committee of experts in London.163  The whole scheme was then taken back to, 
and adopted by, the Financial Commission.  On the question of the 
reintroduction of Resolution no. 11, Hawtrey, in a later interview with Professor 
Spreng, recalled that ‘. . . after the day’s proceedings . . . someone pointed out 
that it was desirable that this proposal . . . should be made in more detail . . . . it 
was passed on to me prepare more extended proposals.  Of course I simply 
copied out those that I originally made to the committee in London.  And they 
received no further criticism . . .’164  
    Hawtrey’s Resolutions succeeded in making the Genoa Conference more 
focussed than that at Brussels.  Delegates did not hope for ambitious schemes 
for international recovery, but concentrated upon the restoration of exchange 
rate stabilities; a move which it considered to be the first important condition to 
be satisfied before world economic recovery could take place.165   
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    One dilemma of the delegates to the Genoa conference was between 
stabilising exchange rates at current parities and stabilising them at their 
traditional rates.  To stabilise them at the prevailing rates ran the risk of 
undermining confidence in the international monetary system – if the exchange 
rates could, at this point, be arbitrarily decided by administrative decision, then 
there might be little confidence in exchange rates which could be modified by 
administrative decision at any time in the future.  However, to stabilise them at 
their traditional rates would have involved many countries in a painful 
deflationary process.  Eichengreen notes that there was an irony in that it was 
the countries which were in the strongest position to return to pre-war parities 
that tended to advance the argument for stabilising currencies at close to their 
current exchange rates.  This, in 1922, was the position taken by the British 
delegation, whilst countries such as France, Belgium and Italy, which had 
suffered far greater inflation, refused to accept any increase in the price of gold 
relative their domestic currencies.  Eichengreen notes the further irony that 
despite arguing at Genoa for stabilisation at prevailing rates, when Britain did 
eventually re-enter the Gold Standard it was at pre-war parity, whilst the 
countries which, at Genoa, refused to consider stabilising at depreciated rates 
ultimately opted to do that very thing.166  Hawtrey warned the conference of the 
point which he had earlier stressed in his 1919 address to the British Association, 
that the competition to recover gold by countries returning to the Gold Standard 
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would drive up the world price of gold and leave the participating countries with 
a more severe deflationary task than they had ever anticipated.  In drafting the 
proposals of the Financial Commission Hawtrey had prepared plans, which by 
judicious use of foreign currency reserves, were designed to head off this 
competitive struggle.  In practice, the holding of foreign reserves had been 
commonplace before the war, but the Genoa Resolutions sought to 
institutionalise this practice.  Principal centres such as London, New York, Tokyo 
and Paris would be encouraged to establish a free market in gold. 
    Keynes had attended the Genoa Conference as correspondent for the 
Manchester Guardian.167  Prior to leaving for Genoa he had written an article, 
‘The Stabilisation of the European Exchanges: A Plan for Genoa’, which 
eventually appeared in the paper on the morning of 20 April 1922.168  He had 
considered the virtues of stabilising currencies at their existing relative values 
against restoring them to their pre-war relative values, and had come down in 
favour of stabilisation over restoration since restoration, ‘so far from fixing the 
exchanges, mean[t] a deliberate policy of altering them’.169  He had advocated 
the presentation of resolutions being brought before the conference based on 
three general principles: countries should not attempt to restore their currencies 
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to pre-war values if it entailed increasing their gold value by more than 20 per 
cent; currencies should be exchangeable against gold at a fixed rate as soon as 
possible; gold-holding by individuals should be prohibited, with gold only being 
made available for export and the settlement of international debts.170  Keynes 
inserted the last principle as a means of preventing gold-holding by individuals 
causing fluctuations in its value – he had wanted to see a gold-bullion standard 
rather than Hawtrey’s gold-exchange standard.  His ‘plan of action’ had included 
certain flexibilities: wider bands between buying and selling prices than the old 
gold-points, and provision for limited annual adjustments in gold values.  Keynes 
had circulated copies of his article among the delegates at Genoa, and (as he 
presumably had hoped) the possibility of putting his proposals before the 
Conference was considered – although decided against - by the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, Sir Robert Horne.171
    Keynes continued to file reports from Genoa back to England throughout the 
Conference.  On 15 April 1922 Keynes put his finger on one serious defect of the 
Genoa Resolutions; that there was nothing in them which committed 
governments to action. 
 
Actually, nothing is being considered at present but a series of 
pious declarations of general principles.  Many of these are old 
and stale.  It does not help much to repeat in general terms that 
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currencies should be stable, that budgets should balance, and 
that banks of issue should be free from political pressure. . . . In 
short some day, somehow, at some parity we must have gold 
again.  But when, how, or at what parity Genoa shrinks from 
declaring.172
 
Keynes acknowledged that in the proposal for a conference of central banks to 
establish measures for continuous cooperation were ‘some germs for future 
action’, but he felt that the time was ripe for much more.  On 17 April 1922 
Keynes elaborated further on the lack of practical progress being made.  He 
thought that those countries such as Britain, France and Italy – the countries 
which were no longer suffering progressive depreciation – should declare an 
early date for returning to gold.  However, he pinpointed the weakness which 
prevented this from being done; Britain’s insistence on returning to gold at its 
pre-war par with the dollar was delaying the rest of Europe from fixing their 
parities.  Furthermore, he felt the question of the stabilisation of the wealth 
value of gold might be steadied by agreement between the American Federal 
Reserve Board and the central banks of those European countries which decided 
to return to gold.  The tone of his report was that such matters were delaying 
progress, they could be settled once the decision to return had been made, and 
he rather regretted that the ‘theorists, Professor Cassel and Mr. Hawtrey, [had] 
persuaded the practical bankers that such considerations [were] really 
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important’.173  In a final dispatch on the work of the Genoa finance sub-
commission, on 27 April 1922, Keynes deplored the lack of firm commitment; 
only a vague agreement to another assembly.  He saw no evidence of progress 
from the Conference, and suggested that: 
 
. . . progress must come from the action of individual countries. 
    The experts of Genoa [seemed] to recognise this in a rather 
pathetic passage where they ‘venture to suggest’ that ‘a 
considerable service will be rendered by that country which first 
decides boldly to set the example of securing immediate stability 
in terms of gold’ by devaluation.174   
  
Reviewing the Genoa Conference, in 1923, Hawtrey would probably have been 
inclined to agree with much of Keynes’s comment.  He did, however, offer a 
defence of the proceedings at Genoa. 
 
That there should be twelve propositions on the subject of 
currency, which command the agreement of all Europe, would 
seem to be a fantasy hardly deserving serious consideration, 
[inviting] the suspicion that the resolutions must be strictly 
confined to pious platitudes . . . . And there is no difficulty 
supporting such criticisms with quotations from the resolutions 
themselves.  That stability is desirable, that Central banks should 
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be independent of political pressure, that all European currencies 
should be based on a common standard, that the only possible 
common standard is gold, and that so long as budget deficits are 
met by the creation of paper money then currency reform is 
impossible . . . .175
 
Hawtrey went on to argue that these, apparent pious platitudes, were no more 
than the necessary placing on record that the most ‘flagrant examples of 
currency inflation . . . have been due to the action . . . of Government’, and that 
‘Government action of this kind must cease if anything whatever is to be done 
with the currency’.176  The real success of the conference, he claimed, lay in the 
passing of Resolutions 3, 10 and 12, which recommended a meeting of 
representatives of central banks of Europe, to be summoned by the Bank of 
England, and to which representatives of the United States be invited.  The 
importance of this meeting, to Hawtrey, was that it recognised the principle ‘that 
currency policy is ultimately credit policy (and) the direction of credit policy is the 
special function of a Central bank’.  Again, writing in 1923 and looking back on 
the Genoa Conference, Hawtrey felt that there were elements in which the 
Genoa Resolutions were unsatisfactory. 
 
                                                 
 
175 Hawtrey, Monetary Reconstruction, p.131.  The quotation is taken from his 1923 
essay, ‘The Genoa Resolutions on Currency’. 
 
176 Ibid., p.132. 
 121
It is impossible to point to any particular time at which effect can 
be given to them. [They] must wait for the balancing of budgets 
before they can take effect in the weaker countries. . . . [they] 
must wait for the establishment of a gold parity, whether the 
restoration of the old one or the adoption of a new.  England [is] 
within less than 10 per cent of par.  But no one can say for 
certain how long it will take to bridge the gap. . . . Some 
countries whose currencies are at less than half their pre-war 
parities, are nevertheless extremely unwilling to give up the 
prospect of restoring them.  France, Belgium and Italy all took 
this attitude at Genoa.  It seems to involve an almost indefinite 
postponement of stabilisation as far as they are concerned.177
 
Indeed, the years passed and no conference of Central Banks was ever called.  
The idea went no further than Montagu Norman, Governor of the Bank of 
England, sending out letters to European central banks with a view to the 
possibility of such a meeting in September 1922.178  Co-operation over currency 
stabilisation was submerged under protracted wranglings over war reparations.  
Additionally, many central bankers doubted whether such a convention could be 
effective: the practice of central banking had long been carried forward under a 
shroud, by personal and informal contacts, and many central bankers felt that an 
open convention was foreign to their culture.  There was also a feeling at the 
Bank of England that Hawtrey had trespassed on their territory.  Hawtrey, of 
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course, was a Treasury official, and so far as Bank of England officials were 
concerned, Treasury officials should concern themselves with taxation and 
spending; international monetary negotiations were the Bank’s domain.  
Montagu Norman, whilst keen to return to gold for the exchange-rate stability 
that would enhance the City of London as a world financial centre, had little 
concern for internal stability of prices.  To him this was an irrelevant and 
impracticable ideal.  In a letter to Benjamin Strong, Governor of the Federal 
Reserve Bank, he dismissed Hawtrey as a ‘leading light of the Treasury who 
made it his particular business to quarrel with the policy of the Treasury and the 
Bank of England’.179  The Americans themselves needed little further 
discouragement from entering into such a convention since they were suspicious 
that the Europeans would use currency stabilisation as a pretext for liquidating 
war debts, and on these grounds they had refused to participate in the 
discussions at Brussels and Genoa.  Furthermore, Benjamin Strong clung to an 
old fashioned view of the gold standard’s automatic mechanism and believed 
that the gold-exchange standard with foreign reserves, as recommended by 
Hawtrey, represented a political act of interference, or a ‘watering down’ of the 
standard which could only lead to lax financial policies and uncontrolled creation 
of credit.   
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    Eichengreen has suggested that, despite the agreement which the proposals 
were accorded at Genoa, there was a strong element of British self-interest in 
the form which the proposals took.  The Act of Parliament prohibiting the export 
of gold was due to expire in 1925, putting a degree of pressure on Britain to 
return to the gold standard, in all probability at pre-war parity, before the expiry 
date.  It was seen as vital to Britain’s interests that she reduced deflationary 
pressures in the rest of the world and took steps to inhibit possible rises in the 
price of gold in order to reduce the price deflations that would have to be 
imposed before returning to the Gold Standard.180   
    Undoubtedly, if the Genoa resolutions could have been followed through, 
there would have been less pressure on Britain’s gold reserves after 1925, and 
lower interest rates could have prevailed with less aggressive deflationary 
policies being pursued.  Hawtrey’s vision of a gold-exchange standard which 
preserved the value of the monetary unit, maintained exchange-rate stability and 
stabilised the value of gold was considerably more ambitious and had greater 
vision than the narrow reactionary recommendations of the Cunliffe Committee, 
to which the government was committed.  In the end it is difficult not to see 
such a gold-exchange standard, as envisaged by Hawtrey, collapsing under the 
weight of its administrative structure.  The failure of governments to adopt the 
Genoa Resolutions remained a source of huge disappointment to him.  He always 
felt that if Sir Basil Blackett had remained as Controller of Finance at the 
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Treasury, then Blackett would have steered the Genoa Resolutions into effect.  
Blackett had been at Genoa with Hawtrey; he had a close affinity with Hawtrey, 
and besides having a professional interest, his friendship with Hawtrey gave him 
an added personal interest in the progress of the Resolutions.  But, late in 1922, 
Blackett was replaced as the Treasury’s Controller of Finance by Sir Otto 
Niemeyer.  He was a strict adherent to the canons of sound finance and a 
believer in the efficacy of the conventional Gold Standard – he did not have the 
same interest in the Genoa resolutions as Blackett nor did he have the same 
personal or professional affinity with Hawtrey.  Hawtrey’s ‘Genoa Resolutions’ 
withered through lack of support from the Bank of England and from his 
superiors at the Treasury.  Despite work which received widespread approval, 
Hawtrey was never again to play such a high-profile role as a member of a 
British delegation to a major international conference.   
    Alongside his interest in a reformed Gold Standard, Hawtrey maintained an 
interest in credit policy.  The Cunliffe recommendations, accepted in 1919, 
committed the country to a number of years of financial retrenchment and high 
interest rates in preparation for returning to the Gold Standard at a parity which, 
by generally assumption, was going to be the pre-war parity.  The inflation, 
which accompanied the 1919-20 economic expansion, gave the Bank of England 
cause to move towards a dearer money policy with even greater urgency.  The 
movement began in late 1919.  The Bank rate, which had stood at five per cent 
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for 135 weeks, from 5 April 1917 to 6 November 1919, was raised to six per 
cent.181   
    Until the end of 1919, even the relatively high Bank rate of 5 per cent had had 
little effect on curbing the money supply and inflation.  Bank rate could only be 
effective as a means of curbing lending if it forced the commercial banks to pass 
on the higher rate to their customers, and this would only happen if they were 
put in the position where they might have to use the Bank of England’s lending 
facility.  There was little danger of the commercial banks having to do this.  They 
were flush with three-month Treasury bills which the government was continuing 
to sell through the Bank of England.  These bills paid only 3.5 per cent.  If a 
commercial bank’s lending operations endangered its currency reserve, then it 
was far more economical for it to boost its reserves by failing to renew its 
holding of maturing Treasury bills – which only paid 3.5 per cent – than by 
having to borrow from the Bank of England at 5 per cent.  In effect, they were 
happy to forego the 3.5 per cent benefit in order to avoid the 5 per cent penalty, 
whilst continuing to lend profitably at rates above the effective floor of 3.5 per 
cent.  Thus the only effective check on the level of bank lending was the 
Treasury Bill rate, and the banks’ failure to renew Treasury bills was leading to 
even greater lending, as the day to day requirements of the Government had to 
be met by borrowing, on Ways and Means, at 3 per cent from the Bank of 
England.  According to Hawtrey, 
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 [i]t was not the [banks] but the Government that was then 
driven to borrow from the Bank of England.  It was the advances 
from the Bank to the Government on Ways and Means that 
supplied the cash foundation on which the inflationary 
superstructure of bank credit was being built up. . . . But if 
Treasury bills [had been] made more attractive relatively to 
advances to traders, the banks would [have raised] their charges 
for loans and overdrafts as well as for discounts, and so 
[discouraged] trade borrowing.182
 
During August and September of 1919, Bank of England officials had been urging 
the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Austen Chamberlain, to help make its Bank rate 
effective by increasing the Treasury bill rate to 4.5 per cent.183  The Bank, on 25 
September 1919, sent a letter to the Chancellor (having been invited by the 
Chancellor, who believed that he would have had difficulty in putting the move 
past the Cabinet, to put its case in a ‘reasoned statement’), in the course of 
which it argued that, since the pound had fallen to 15 per cent below parity, 
dearer money was essential to prevent further erosion of the value of the pound, 
and that an increase in the Treasury bill rate would assist in making its 5 per 
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cent effective.  On 6 October 1919 the three-month bill rate was raised to 4.5 
per cent and the six-month bill rate was raised to 5 per cent.184   
    Figures culled from various sources by Howson suggest that from December 
1919 the money supply began to grow at a slower rate, and that high-powered 
money (the sum of the currency in circulation and the currency held in reserve 
by the Bank of England) fell in the first four months of 1920.185 This was 
followed by a few months’ fluctuation in the money supply, with a steady rise 
between June 1920 and January 1921.186  Hawtrey, writing in 1937, held the 
view that after the raising of the Treasury bill rate there was ‘a pause in the 
progress of inflation, but [by] March 1920 the pace was as great as ever’.187  
However, whether primarily for purposes of controlling price inflation, or 
primarily through a desire to apply deflationary measures for restoring sterling 
parity, by February 1920 the Bank was again seeking Chamberlain’s support in 
raising Treasury bill rates in order to support a still higher Bank rate.  
Chamberlain was also under pressure from some of his Cabinet colleagues who 
wanted to see lower rates as a means of facilitating programmes such as 
housing development.  His instincts seem to have been to support the Bank; 
seeing them as the agents of ‘sound finance’.  But, needing backing with which 
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to resist Cabinet pressure, he once more sought a ‘reasoned statement’ in 
support of their proposals from the Bank.  Additionally, he sought advice from 
Treasury administrators (Blackett and Niemeyer) and from the Treasury’s 
economist (Hawtrey).  He also looked outside both the Treasury and the Bank in 
seeking advice from Keynes.  
    The five replies to Chamberlain’s request for guidance have been collected 
together in a single Treasury file.188  They were collected together during the 
Second World War – presumably with the hope that they might afford some 
guidance to conditions after that conflict.  Keynes produced a fascinating 
foreword to the collection, which it is worth revisiting after considering the 
various replies. 
    With his customary brisk efficiency, Niemeyer was the first to reply, on 3 
February 1920, with a brief memorandum listing six numbered arguments in 
favour of ‘substantially’ higher money rates.  London money rates needed to be 
higher than those in other financial centres to make sterling an attractive 
currency to hold for investment and thus help ‘bridge the gap between gold and 
sterling’; ‘inflated credit’ needed to be checked; high rates would discourage 
‘merchants’ from holding stocks and encourage them to de-stock by reducing 
their prices (Hawtrey’s influence is evident here); the current high rates were 
starting to encourage the holding of Treasury bills, and discourage the issue and 
purchase of new investment vehicles at home and abroad (points 4 and 5); 
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finally, ‘cheap money [would] undo all the educative effects of [the prevailing 6 
per cent rate]’ and as people believed the need for economy was over ‘the 
shilling [would go] the way of the franc and the mark’.189
    On the following day, 4 February 1920, Hawtrey produced his reply in the 
form of a six-page memorandum ‘Cheap or Dear Money’.190  It was a longer, 
more thoughtful, piece than Niemeyer’s in which he looked at some of the more 
commonly held views regarding interest rates, and examined the theoretical 
basis of them.  In the manner of most of Hawtrey’s writings, it was the 
memorandum of an economist rather than that of a financial administrator, and 
probably of limited use to a politician looking for arguments to justify a policy 
decision. 
    He first challenged the argument that no realistic rate of interest could check 
the borrower – the argument that since prices were rising at 3 per cent per 
month it would remain worthwhile to borrow up to an interest rate of 36 per cent 
per annum.  Such an argument, Hawtrey argued, would only hold if there was an 
expectancy that price inflation would continue unabated; the raising of interest 
rates would dampen the expectation of a further general rise in prices and thus 
quell the borrowing which was the cause of price rises.  He felt that rates ‘not 
necessarily higher than the 9 or 10 per cent which had been resorted to 
occasionally in the past’ would be sufficient deterrent.  To those who might 
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argue that such high rates would cause an ‘utter collapse of business’ he 
conceded that it was ‘very difficult to choose a rate just high enough to be 
deterrent and yet not so high as to cause a crash’. 
    Hawtrey then turned to the argument that cheap money was ‘a desirable if 
not indispensable aid to floating loans’.  Such advocates subscribed to the view 
that cheap money encouraged the purchase of longer term Government bonds at 
reasonable rates of interest, and that ‘successful[ly] funding loans [enabled] the 
Government to restore a sound currency’.191  He took this view of the effect of 
cheap money to be ‘completely fallacious’ since low rates encouraged an artificial 
demand for investments using borrowed money – the borrowed money adding to 
the aggregate stock of purchasing power and being the source of inflation.  A 
genuine funding operation, he suggested, should draw upon the savings of the 
community.  Moreover, the industrial expansion and rising prices associated with 
cheap money tended to swell industrial dividends, making shares more attractive 
investment propositions against Government fixed-interest stock.  Hence, to 
Hawtrey, a check to the expansion of credit through higher interest rates was 
desirable to restore the foreign exchanges and to reduce prices and to 
encourage the purchase of Government bonds.   
    To the point that dear money was a cost to the Exchequer due to the high 
rates of interest on Treasury bills, Hawtrey responded that –  
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. . . high rates, if made effective, do not have to last long.  Once 
the artificial stimulus to trade derived from rising prices is 
dispelled, quite moderate rates are sufficient to keep credit in 
check.  The total loss to the Exchequer would be as dust in the 
balance and ought to be more than made good by the natural 
fall of rates when expansion stops.192
 
The essential message of Hawtrey’s memorandum was that high rates, 
effectively applied to change expectations of rising prices, could very soon be 
followed by the lower rates which would stave off depression. 
    The views of Keynes were ascertained by Chamberlain in an interview at the 
Treasury on 4 February 1920.  On 15 February 1920 Keynes forwarded to 
Chamberlain a summary of the views he had expressed in the interview.  In the 
course of fifteen carefully argued points Keynes thought that dear money was 
essential in – 
 
. . . bringing the mind of the business world to a better 
realization of the true position . . . . At present . . . goods and 
labour are so fully employed that almost all new credit puts 
prices up, or puts exchanges down, by leading the borrower 
either to compete with other purchasers for home products, or to 
buy something from abroad.193
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Keynes thought it ‘vital’ that the rate in London should exceed that in New York, 
and that bank rate should be increased to 7 per cent, with an increase to 8 per 
cent ‘soon after’.  He was of the opinion that 10 per cent Bank rate might be 
required, but even at this level, and although there might be some financial 
crisis, he believed order books in the staple industries were so full that there was 
little risk of unemployment. 
     Blackett, the Treasury Controller of Finance responded on 19 February 
1920.194  Blackett, at this point, did not directly advocate a rise in Bank rate, 
stating at one point that ‘[f]or the moment a Bank rate of 6 per cent is probably 
as high as it is safe to go on political and social grounds’.195  However, since his 
concern was that the commercial banks should find Treasury bills attractive 
enough to buy sufficient numbers to prevent the Government from having to 
borrow on ‘Ways and Means’, his advice implied that a rise in Bank rate might be 
inevitable.  There is strong evidence that Hawtrey’s views on the deterrent effect 
of higher rates influenced Blackett’s memorandum.  On the rise of Treasury bill 
rates, Blackett added – 
 
. . . every rise in Treasury bill rate successfully checks some 
borrowers and that once it is realized that deflation is being 
pursued steadily and being achieved, the hope of huge profits 
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from continually rising prices will no longer operate, and 
deflation will succeed by success.196
 
The Bank of England’s memorandum was dated 10 February 1920, but was only 
sent to Chamberlain, with a dated covering letter, on 25 February 1920.  It 
stated that the current rate of 6 per cent was not sufficient to bring about the 
deflation of prices which would be necessary to return to the gold standard at 
the old parity, and that the bank would be shortly asking the Chancellor to 
support a further rate rise of 1 per cent.197
    Keynes, reviewing this set of memoranda in 1942, called them ‘fascinating 
papers’ which ‘call[ed] back to one’s mind a vanished age’.198  He was struck by 
the absence of controls – the lack of rationing, control over capital use, or ability 
to discipline the commercial banks.  In retrospect he would like to have seen 
higher rates imposed earlier.  Even so, he doubted if ‘all the evils of 1921 could . 
. . have been avoided’.  In so far as there were lessons to be learned for the 
aftermath of the subsequent conflict, he felt the papers pointed to the need for 
‘all controls – rationing control, new material control, new issue control, bank 
credit control’ to be retained for at least two years after the end of conflict, and 
only gradually released when consumption goods became more easily available.  
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Looking back at his own advice, Keynes felt that with the benefit of hindsight he 
would have given exactly the same advice – ‘a swift and severe dose of dear 
money, sufficient to break the market, and quick enough to prevent at least 
some of the disastrous consequences which would otherwise ensue’.199  This 
retrospective view of his own advice is somewhat at odds with Susan Howson’s 
contention that ‘while Keynes had argued that a prolonged period of high 
interest rates might well be needed, Hawtrey . . . thought that the high rate 
should only be for a short duration’.200
    If Blackett’s word of caution had been the been the restraining factor in 
holding back an interest rate rise in February 1920, then that word was 
withdrawn the following month as Treasury bill sales fell and the Government 
had to resort to further borrowing from the Bank of England.201  On 15 April 
1920 Bank rate was raised to 7 per cent and Treasury bill rate to 6.5 per cent. 
     The 7 per cent Bank rate was maintained for over a year.  On 19 April 1921, 
with Bank rate still at 7 per cent, Hawtrey produced a long memorandum on ‘The 
Credit Situation’.202  He regarded the developments over the previous twelve 
months as vindicating his theory of the deterrent effect of an increase in the 
discount rate. 
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 A year ago we were experiencing intense business activity, rising 
prices and wages, and scarcity of labour and commodities.  
Today we have business stagnation, falling prices and wages, 
unemployment, a glut of commodities . . . .  This is a most 
remarkable confirmation of the theory of control of credit 
through the discount rate. . . . . The prevalent opinion in the City 
was that the rise of rates was no better than a vexatious pin-
prick, [that] nothing short of 10 per cent would make any 
impression . . .203  
 
Such business stagnation ought to have brought about a marked improvement in 
sterling’s exchange-value as falling imports reduced its availability on the foreign 
exchanges.  Sadly, New York’s Federal Reserve was pursuing similar policies, 
with similar deflationary results, having also raised its discount rate to 7 per cent 
shortly after the Bank of England.  Between April 1920, when Bank rate went to 
7 per cent, and February 1921, sterling sank from $3.96 to $3.20.  Hawtrey 
calculated that if, after the raising of Bank rate, the purchasing power of sterling 
could have been raised by 23 per cent, then provided the purchasing power of 
the dollar had remained the same, the exchange could have been restored to par 
($4.86).  The high rate increased the purchasing power of sterling not by 23 per 
cent, but by over 50 per cent.  The trouble was that the corresponding policies 
being pursued in America had raised the purchasing power of the dollar by 60 
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per cent.204  To Hawtrey it seemed that each country was waiting for the other 
to reduce its rate first.  He offered his solution to the impasse:    
       
. . . [for] the restoration of gold we need that the dollar be 
cheap and that it should be stable. . . . It would be in our power 
to hasten in some degree the advent of cheap money in America 
by sending more gold thither.205   
 
It was to be Hawtrey’s continuing refrain that sending gold to America would 
permit credit expansion there.  American credit expansion, he believed, would 
create a demand for imports which, by putting more dollars on to the 
international currency exchanges, would reduce the international demand for 
dollars in relation to the pound, and thus assist the pound climb back to its old 
parity.  In the process, British exports would be boosted and trade depression 
staved off.  With American rates lowered, Britain would be in a position to follow 
suit.  Hawtrey explained his reasoning: 
     
[i]t is for us to follow, and not to lead, because we are still 
aiming at restoring the exchange at par.  To achieve this aim, all 
we shall have to do will be to hold the value of sterling 
approximately steady while the dollar depreciates.  This does not 
mean continuing deflation here, but establishing stable 
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conditions. . . . [The] inflation, or cheapening of the dollar will be 
our opportunity.  If we avoid the corresponding inflation, the 
dollar will sink to the level of sterling, and the gold standard will 
be in action again.206    
 
In an earlier part of this memorandum Hawtrey, from a theoretical standpoint, 
pointed out that central banks tended to change their interest rates in response 
to the state of their reserves, but that since the reserve level was a lagging 
indicator, interest changes were usually applied too late.  He did not, as Howson 
seems to imply, use the memorandum to criticize the authorities for maintaining 
the 7 per cent level for too long.207
    The Bank of England did not, even if it would have preferred to, wait for 
American interest rates to fall and then follow them.  From February 1921 
sterling began to strengthen against the dollar, unemployment continued to rise, 
and the Treasury continued to feel the burden of the high interest payments on 
its loans.  The Treasury, in turn, did not wait for the Bank, but took the initiative 
and reduced its Treasury bill rate in March 1921.208  The Bank, once more 
anticipating its rediscount rate proving ineffective, but fearing an adverse effect 
on the sterling exchange-rate if it allowed its rate to drop below that of New 
York, sought the co-operation of the Federal Reserve Governor, Benjamin 
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Strong, in lowering interest rates together.  Strong, at this stage, refused to 
make any corresponding reduction, and the Bank of England had to go it alone in 
reducing its rate from 7 per cent to 6.5 per cent on 28 April 1921.  The move 
was not without its wider effect, since it put Strong under pressure at home, and 
on 4 May 1921, against his own judgment, he was forced to lower the New York 
rediscount rate to 6.5 per cent.209  Henceforth, in line with Hawtrey’s 
recommendation, London followed New York as rates fell to 5.5 per cent in 
London on 21 July 1921. 
    On 5 July 1921, Hawtrey produced a memorandum, ‘Bank Rate’, in which he 
was critical of the tardiness with which the rate was being gradually reduced.210   
 
Such an inflationary movement as existed at the beginning of 
1920 could only be checked by measures drastic enough to start 
a contrary movement almost equally violent. . . . About six 
months ago at the new year it might fairly be claimed that both 
America and England had passed through the ordeal. . . . Since 
that time however both countries have persisted in the policy of 
dear money. . . . It is hardly too much to say that the economic 
troubles from which we are now suffering are mainly traceable to 
the continuance of dear money.211
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Hawtrey thought, given the general understanding that it was Britain’s intention 
to return to the gold standard at the old parity, that the fault lay principally in 
America rather than Britain.  Credit restriction in America was pushing up the 
purchasing power of the dollar and forcing Britain to pursue similar policies.  He 
questioned whether, due to business depression and unemployment, Britain 
might not find it ‘worth considering part[ing] company from America, and 
tak[ing] steps as soon as possible to revive business by easy credit, without 
regard to the policy of the Federal Reserve Board’.212  In the event of the 
Americans stabilizing the dollar and not allowing its value to fall, Hawtrey 
thought that the degree of deflation necessary to return to the pound to ‘parity’ 
would be so great that parity would be unsustainable, and thus he regarded it as 
‘futile’ to continue to inflict the ‘agonies of deflation’ upon the country any 
longer.  Moreover, he felt that, in the absence of American initiative, it was 
better for Britain to take the lead. 
 
 . . . immediate relaxation of credit here is enormously 
strengthened by the Federal Reserve Board’s want of initiative. . 
. . If we set the example of a rapid reduction of bank rate (say, 
by two or even three per cent in fortnightly steps of one per cent 
at a time) they will follow.  We shall have lost nothing in regard 
to the restoration of the exchange, and the prospect of a revival 
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of business in America as well as in Europe will have been 
enormously improved.213
 
Hawtrey warned that, even with a low Bank rate, the immediate difficulty of 
stopping a deflationary movement would not be easy since once businesses were 
in a rut of falling prices it was difficult to get out again. 
    After July 1921, the London and New York rates continued their downward 
progress.  On 21 September 1921 the New York rate was moved down from 5.5 
per cent to 5 per cent.  London held out for a little longer – seeing the value of 
sterling rise from below $3.60 to $3.92 as a result – and did not take its next 0.5 
per cent drop until 3 November 1921.214  The strength of the pound on the 
foreign exchange market (from April 1922 it moved within the range $4.42 to 
$4.47) encouraged further Bank rate reductions, with the rate reaching 3 per 
cent by July 1922.  Based on fundamentals – the relative purchasing power of 
the pound and the dollar, or the relative values of interest rates – this 
strengthening of the pound was hardly justified, in which case the strength could 
only have been due to speculation that the authorities were determined to 
restore the old parity.  A pound which was worth $4.40 at the beginning of 1922 
must have seemed worth holding on to when in the near future it might be 
worth $4.86!   
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    On 21 February 1921 the New York rediscount rate, now higher than the Bank 
of England’s rate, was raised from 4 per cent to 4.5 per cent with the aim of 
checking American inflation.  Hawtrey feared that the Bank of England would 
follow suit.  On 5 March 1923, with the pound getting ever closer to its old parity 
with the dollar and Bank rate still at its low point of 3 per cent, Hawtrey 
produced a memorandum in which he returned to the question of the export of 
gold to America.215
 
It is quite a mistake to suppose that the payment of our debt to 
America is an affair requiring heroic measures. . . . The question 
of sending gold to America ought to be considered primarily from 
a monetary point of view.216
 
Monetary policy, he suggested should have regard to the twin objectives of 
avoiding further deflation and restoring the gold par as soon as possible.  
Hawtrey feared that if the American move were to successfully check its price 
rises, then the progress towards the traditional par value for the pound would be 
reversed and the Bank of England would attempt to recover lost ground by 
raising Bank rate.  His solution was to send £100 m. of gold to America.  The 
gold would have been an advance payment on agreed war debts.  
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In that case, rather than recover parity by a renewal of deflation 
and depression here, it would be far better to send large sums of 
gold to America . . . in order to create a redundancy of sterling 
there.  For these consignments of gold the payment of our debt 
would supply a very suitable pretext.217   
 
Hawtrey conceded that there were methods by which the Americans might be 
able to absorb gold, even to the level of £100 m., without it occasioning any 
inflation, but he thought it ‘[did] not seem likely . . . that the Federal Reserve 
would adopt any systematic policy of this kind’.  His ‘presumption’ was that any 
large-scale export of gold would hasten the inflationary tendency there. 
    America already held a gold reserve far in excess of that required to support 
its issue of dollar notes, and so the question must arise as to why it could not 
simply continue to build up excess reserves of gold – technically, to ‘sterilise’ the 
gold – without, in any way, creating inflationary credit.  There were probably two 
reasons behind Hawtrey’s ‘presumption’.  First, on purely commercial grounds, 
the holding of gold, in itself, earns nothing, whilst its use for creating deposits 
earns income in the form of interest charged for the loans of currency.  
Secondly, there was a powerful American lobby which was already critical of 
measures being taken to check the expansion of credit.  Hawtrey ‘presumed’ that 
any large addition to America’s gold stock would have tipped the balance in 
favour of its use rather than its sterilization. 
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    Hawtrey had floated this idea in 1921, and it had been passed on to the Bank 
of England, without any positive response, by the then Controller of Finance, Sir 
Basil Blackett.  Similarly, Blackett’s replacement, Sir Otto Niemeyer, himself 
anxious to avoid excessive deflation, passed on Hawtrey’s memorandum to the 
Bank.  The Bank considered Hawtrey’s proposals.  The sticking point was the 
Fiduciary Issue - that part of the currency note issue in excess of the Bank of 
England’s gold holdings.  The number of permitted currency notes in circulation 
was fixed by a Treasury Minute of 1919, set at a value recommended by the 
Cunliffe Committee.218  In accordance with the Cunliffe Limit, the total 
permissible issue of notes which were not backed by gold (Treasury plus Bank 
notes), in 1923, was £290 m.  Added to the total gold holdings of £153 m., this 
gave the authorities scope to issue £443 m. of currency notes.  The sudden loss 
of £100 m. of gold would have drastically reduced the permissible number of 
notes in circulation and depressed trade.  The plan would have required some, at 
least temporary, relaxation of the Cunliffe Limit.  This proposal was considered 
by a secret ad hoc committee which included Lord Bradbury and former the 
Prime Minister, Herbert Asquith.219  The majority of the members of this 
committee were generally sympathetic towards the proposals and to any 
adjustments to the fiduciary note regulations required to effect them.  Hawtrey’s 
old mentor, Lord Bradbury, strongly dissented.  He had been influential in 
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creating the Cunliffe Limit and objected to any weakening of monetary discipline.  
By May, sterling had weakened, British prices were rising in relation to American 
prices, and the whole of the gold–export scheme seemed dangerously 
speculative.  In particular, £100 m. seemed dangerously large in relation to 
Britain’s total gold reserves, whilst somewhat insignificant in relation to the 
American stock.  The plan was dropped and the Bank looked once more to rising 
interest rates to do the work of restoring sterling to $4.86.   
    On 1 June 1923 the Governor of the Bank of England, Montagu Norman, met 
with Niemeyer and Hawtrey at the Treasury.  The Treasury men attempted to 
dissuade Norman from putting up interest rates.220  This interview was followed 
up by a note from Niemeyer, to Norman, in which Niemeyer pointed out that 
unemployment was already rising and would be exacerbated by putting up Bank 
rate.  He reiterated Hawtrey’s suggestion of shipping gold in excess of that 
required for debt payment.  On 5 July 1923 Bank rate went up from 3 per cent to 
4 per cent. 
    On 31 October 1923 Hawtrey produced a memorandum commenting on 
monetary policy.221  He once more called for the shipment of gold to America, at 
a level over and above that required for debt repayment.  He also answered the 
criticism that his plan weakened monetary discipline, in that it involved a 
reduction of the gold backing for the sterling note issue.  Credit expansion in 
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America, he argued, would increase American imports and would lead to the 
Bank of England possessing more dollars.  The dollars, a gold–backed currency, 
would be a reserve equally valid as gold for the issue of sterling currency 
notes.222
      Niemeyer followed up Hawtrey’s memorandum with a note to the Governor 
of the Bank on 20 November 1923.223  In this note Niemeyer expressed concern 
that various electoral pledges and some extravagant electoral oratory were 
having an adverse effect on the sterling exchange rate.  Niemeyer termed all 
these pre-election undertakings as ‘funk’. 
 
Unfortunately funk having set up a fall, the fall itself generates 
more funk, until things get so bad that you will want to put up 
Bank rate – if only as a sign that we have not given up the fight. 
. . .  
    Now is there nothing we can do to encourage the faint 
hearted to believe that sterling is not down and out? . . . . there 
is one course which ought to be considered.  We still have 
considerable reserves of gold – which . . . are not seriously 
needed in U.K. to meet notes.  Ought we not to use these 
reserves, somewhat as was contemplated in Genoa, rather than 
sit and look at them? . . . It seems to me that we might properly 
hold dollars against Currency Notes . . . If this is admitted, we 
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could now sell in New York up to say £80 millions of gold . . . 
replacing it in the reserve by dollars.224
     
On the following day Norman replied to Niemeyer, saying that although he was 
personally ‘in principle’ in favour of shipping gold to America, at that moment it 
was ‘impracticable’.225   
 
The immediate object of such shipment would be to restore 
confidence in the £ sterling.  It is quite possible, however that 
the withdrawal of gold from the Currency Note Reserve would in 
itself have the opposite effect.  It might be taken as showing 
that the Treasury themselves were apprehensive of the future, 
and were of the opinion . . . that ‘novel’ action was necessary to 
check a fall that was otherwise likely to occur.226
 
Niemeyer went on to add that he doubted whether the shipment, which would 
necessarily be only a ‘moderate and gradual’ addition to the large existing stock 
of American gold, could have the effect of ‘turning the exchange’.227  This seems 
to have been the last word on the export of gold, and on this matter, at least, 
the view of the Bank prevailed.   
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    The Bank did not entirely have its own way over interest rates.  True, it had 
increased its rate by a full percentage point in July 1923, but without a 
corresponding rise in the Treasury bill rate that rise could not, as we have 
previously seen, have had any substantial effect on the lending practices of the 
commercial banks.  The Treasury bill rate did not follow Bank rate up in July 
1923.228  As a result, revival in trade, which had been caused by interest rate 
reductions between April 1920 and July 1922, continued through into 1924.  In 
July 1924, however, Treasury bill rate followed Bank rate up, Bank rate was 
made effective, and all signs of trade revival stopped. 
     Hawtrey, by this time, had given up hope of affecting exchange rates by 
export of gold, and switched his advice; a switch designed to avoid a sustained 
period of depression and unemployment.  In July 1924 he produced a 
memorandum, ‘Sterling and Gold’.229  Having noted that achieving parity with the 
dollar, whether by high Bank rate or by export of gold, would involve some 
contraction of credit, he suggested that there might be an alternative method 
which would involve restriction of credit for only a shorter period of time.   
 
Suppose that instead of raising the exchange by actual sales of 
gold, a future date is named at which free exports of gold will be 
allowed without restriction.  If the date is a fairly early one (say, 
not more than six months off) and the intention to allow exports 
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of gold is really believed in, the effect must be to raise the 
exchange immediately very nearly to par.  No one will sell 
sterling appreciably below 4.86 if it is certain that in six months it 
will command that price.230
 
The artificially high level of sterling would stimulate imports at the expense of 
exports, thus creating a surplus of sterling on the foreign exchanges, but the 
speculative demand for sterling would hold up its price.   
    Even this method, Hawtrey conceded, would involve some credit restriction, 
due to the need to inhibit imports during the period of artificially high sterling. 
 
It is essential therefore to effect a suitable contraction of credit 
in the early stages . . . enough to counteract the effect of the 
high rate of exchange in attracting imports and retarding 
exports. . . . The whole advantage hoped for from the plan is to 
get through the period of falling prices quickly.231
 
Such an announcement was never made, but general anticipation of a return to 
gold at the old parity ensured that speculation contributed to maintaining the 
pound nearer $4.86 than would otherwise have been the case.    
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                                     Chapter 2 
 
 
                      The Return to the Gold Standard 
 
  
                                            1925 
 
 
By 1925, the situation of having banknotes issued by both the Bank of England 
and the Treasury needed tidying.  Sir Montagu Norman was anxious to regularise 
the bank note issue in such a way that it was once more controlled by the Bank 
of England.  He understood Labour Chancellor Snowden’s adherence to the 
orthodoxy of ‘sound’ finance, and in June 1924, with the aim of reclaiming the 
Bank’s prerogative to issue notes, he persuaded Snowden to appoint a 
‘Committee on Currency and Bank of England Note Issues’.  This committee was 
originally chaired by Austen Chamberlain.  Of the other four members, two had 
extensive Treasury experience, Sir John Bradbury and Sir Otto Niemeyer; one 
was a merchant banker, Gaspard Farrer; and the other was an academic, 
Professor Arthur Pigou.  Bradbury, Farrer and Pigou had been members of the 
Cunliffe Committee which had recommended the return to the gold standard in 
1919.  Given that the newcomer, Niemeyer, yielded to nobody in the strength of 
his devotion to ‘sound finance’, it was hardly surprising that the committee’s 
agenda should follow closely that of Cunliffe.  Indeed, since the Cunliffe 
Committee had recommended that amalgamation of the fiduciary issue should 
await at least a year’s experience  of the gold standard, then it was inevitable 
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that the primary concern of the Chamberlain Committee should be the timing of 
the return to the gold standard.  
  
    On 11 July 1924 the Chamberlain Committee took evidence from Keynes.  He 
expounded the ideas which he had recently published in his book, A Tract on 
Monetary Reform, warning the committee that a return to gold at the pre-war 
parity would raise the gold value of sterling to such a level that 12 per cent more 
gold would be required to purchase British exports – effectively a 12 per cent 
increase in British export prices.  Whilst this would also mean that fewer pounds 
would be required to purchase the gold for procurement of imports – effectively 
a 12 per cent reduction in import costs – labour costs would continue to be paid 
in pounds which had a 12 per cent greater gold content, since money wages 
would not automatically fall by 12 per cent to accommodate this change in the 
gold value of the pound.  The result would be increased costs in terms of world 
prices for British manufacturers, loss of profits, loss of export trade, and 
ultimately unemployment.  The excess of imports over exports (paid for in gold) 
would lead to credit restrictions to stem the outflow of gold, with the 
consequence of declining trade and further falls in employment.  Keynes’s 
warnings did not go unheeded since the committee’s draft report of 14 
September 1924, written by Pigou, recommended waiting 12 months before 
returning to the gold standard in the hope that, by then, American prices would 
have risen sufficiently to avoid the inconvenience of the deflation of British 
prices.  Successive drafts from this committee varied only in marginally in their 
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suggestions of the actions which might be taken by the authorities to bring 
sterling back to its pre-war par with the dollar. 
    The November 1924 General Election saw the Conservatives returned to 
power, with Baldwin as Prime Minister, and Churchill as his Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.  Prior to that election, £1 equated to $4.50.  Speculators, anticipating 
that the Conservative victory would hasten the restoration of the gold standard, 
and the pound would be returned to its previous parity of $4.87, used their 
dollars to purchase pounds.  The increased demand for sterling drove up its 
value and in December, a month after the election, the pound had climbed to a 
value of $4.70.  A further consequence of the Conservative victory was that 
Austen Chamberlain was appointed to the position of Foreign Secretary, and thus 
the chairmanship of the Chamberlain Committee, for its brief remaining life, 
passed to Sir John Bradbury. 
    On taking up office, one of the key decisions facing Churchill was the possible 
renewal, at the end of 1925, of the enabling legislation which prohibited the 
export of gold.  The various restricting regulations had been consolidated in the 
Gold and Silver (Export Control) Act 1920 – the Act which effectively removed 
Britain from the gold standard.  The Act was due to expire on 31 December 
1925.  The choice before Churchill was to either to let the Gold and Silver (Export 
Control) Act expire, or to legislate for its renewal for another period of years. 
    As Chancellor, Churchill was far more open-minded than Snowden.  He could 
not be led down the paths of conventional finance with quite the same ease as 
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his Labour predecessor.  Indeed, Sir Montagu Norman was given to expressing, 
in private, that he wished Snowden could have remained as Chancellor.232  
Churchill, unlike Snowden, was not a man of firm financial conviction, and 
lacking convictions of his own he operated by continuously and rigorously testing 
his officials with the counter-arguments which he knew that his opponents would 
use.  Only when convinced that he possessed a set of water-tight arguments, 
which he could deploy against his critics, was he prepared to move forward with 
any kind of policy programme.   
    Moreover, Churchill was an old friend of Beaverbrook, the proprietor of the 
Daily Express and the Evening Standard, and on 28 January 1925 the Express 
published an article attacking the Treasury in general, and Niemeyer in 
particular, for favouring the City at the expense of industry.  On the following 
day, 29 January 1925, Churchill sent out a minute setting out the arguments 
against a return to the gold standard, and asking for the counter-case.  The 
minute, referred to in the Treasury files as ‘Mr. Churchill’s Exercise’, was sent out 
to test Norman, Bradbury, Niemeyer, and Hawtrey.233  Sir John Bradbury, one of 
the examinees, was given to remark that ‘the writer [of the minute] . . . appears 
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to have his spiritual home in the Keynes-McKenna sanctuary but some of the 
trimmings of his mantle have been furnished by the Daily Express’.234
    ‘Mr. Churchill’s Exercise’ - headed ‘Most Secret’ - set out, in a cogent and clear 
manner, six arguments against the restoration of the gold standard.235
    First (paragraph 2), it proposed that the holding of gold was no more than a 
token of good faith , held so that others might have confidence in the country’s 
currency.  Such a token of good faith, it suggested, was a survival of 
‘rudimentary and transitional stages in the evolution of finance and credit’ and 
should be unnecessary in a country such as Great Britain which upheld the 
reputation of its currency by ‘a strict financial policy and healthy trade’.  Secondly 
(paragraph 3), it suggested that the return to gold was being urged by the 
United States which, being in possession of nearly three-quarters of the world’s 
public gold, would thereby be able to play a more dominant role in world finance.  
Thirdly (paragraph 4), it advanced an argument for an alternative course of 
action.  It argued that Britain might renounce the gold standard and ship one 
hundred million pounds of gold reserves to America as part-payment for war 
debts.  This would, in the short term, allow the authorities to replace expensive 
foreign debt by cheaper domestic debt and, in the long term, encourage 
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American credit expansion to the eventual detriment of the dollar – thus making 
the rest of the repayment of Britain’s war debt to America less onerous. 
    The fourth argument (paragraph 5) against restoration was a political rather 
than an economic one.  Churchill, in the event of maintenance of the gold 
standard requiring increases in Bank rate, wished to avoid accusations of 
favouring the interests of finance over those of industry. The fifth point in the 
memorandum (paragraph 6) was that over the past three years during which the 
currency had been managed without gold, price stability in Britain had been 
better than that in the United States, ‘for all her Gold’.  ‘Why then should we not 
continue on the basis of ‘managed’ finance?  What risks shall we run?  What evils 
shall we encounter?’  Pursuing this point of why we should not maintain the 
current strategy for longer, Churchill again looked to his own position and the 
ease with which he might be able to defend his decision within parliament – ‘if 
the Bank Rate had in the ordinary course of events to be raised, no one could 
attribute it to the action of the British Government.  It could with justice be said, 
had we restored the Gold Standard it would have had to be raised still higher’.  
The sixth, and final point, in Churchill’s memorandum (paragraph 7) was that 
since restoration of the gold standard was perceived as being so much in the 
interest of the United States, then delaying any decision as long as possible 
might enable the Government to extract better terms, in respect of repayment of 
war debts, from the Americans.  This last point is expressed in rather vague 
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terms; that American ‘persuasion may take the form of greater facilities than are 
now offered’. 
    These, then, were the six points upon which Churchill sought answers from 
his ‘wise men’: the role of gold in a modern credit economy; the extent to which 
restoration of the gold standard was in American rather than British interests; 
the drawbacks of ignoring the gold standard and exporting gold to America, 
partly as war-debt repayment and partly as a driver of American inflation to ease 
the burden of future repayments; the responses available to a Chancellor 
accused of favouring finance over industry; the drawbacks of continuing with the 
present, apparently successful and stable, managed currency; the drawbacks of 
delaying restoration of the gold standard in order to wrest concessions from the 
Americans.  Within four days, on 2 February 1925, he had received answers from 
Norman, Niemeyer and Hawtrey.  He had to wait a further three days, to 5 
January 1925, before receiving Bradbury’s response.  By 6 January 1925 
Churchill had completed the reading of the submissions.   
    The reason for choosing Sir Montagu Norman to take part in the exercise 
seems fairly straightforward; as Governor of the Bank of England he would be 
ultimately responsible for managing the restored gold standard.  He was an 
aloof, neurotic patriarch.  The revelation that he made his frequent transatlantic 
crossings under the name of his secretary, Skinner, gave rise to a hostile 
biography Professor Skinner alias Montagu Norman.  Norman believed that an 
electorate which demanded increased business activity through the adoption of 
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an inflationary policy resembled a group of shareholders who, unconcerned by a 
company’s need to invest for the future, demanded ever larger dividend 
payments.236  Such shareholders needed protecting from themselves by a wise 
far-seeing board of directors.  So far as Norman was concerned the public 
needed protecting from itself by an independent central bank committed to the 
principle of sound money.   
    Norman mistrusted politicians generally; Churchill, egged on by his friend 
Beaverbrook, reciprocated the sentiment.237  It would probably have delighted 
Churchill to have been able to frustrate Norman over the return to gold. 
    If Norman’s was the first submission to be read by Churchill then he may have 
remained unconvinced of the need to return to gold.  It was weak on analysis 
whilst strong on rhetoric, and used language which was clumsy, excruciatingly 
punctuated, and at times, intemperate.  To Norman’s credit, he was the only 
respondent who attempted to frame his response in such a way as to directly 
answer, point by point, the particular questions raised by Churchill. 
    Regarding the status of gold in the conduct of world affairs Norman was 
dogmatic:   
 
National credit needs . . .  good faith . . . . Gold is the guarantee 
of good faith. . . . A Gold Reserve and the Gold Standard . . . are 
necessary: so is a Police Force or Tax Collector: it is as 
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dangerous to abandon the former as the latter. . . . there is no 
alternative to gold in the opinion of educated and reasonable 
men.238   
 
He dismissed any notion that returning to gold was to the particular advantage 
of the Americans rather than the British: ‘the interests of Great Britain, of the 
U.S. and of most other countries are the same.  You cannot . . . have ‘patchy 
prosperity’.239  As regards shipment of gold to America to promote American 
inflation, he raised the spectre of German-style inflation occurring in Britain: 
 
. . . the result . . . would be psychological . . . our note-
circulation would be discredited at home . . . [the] exchange 
would fall . . . and fall: and the world-centre would shift 
permanently and completely from London to New York.240
 
Furthermore, on technical grounds, he repudiated the suggestion that exporting 
gold to America could act as a means of inflating the American economy, arguing 
that the Americans would use gold for European investment rather than credit 
creation at home - ‘The Federal Reserve Bank have learned how to sterilise any 
amount of gold’.241
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    On the question of the position of the Chancellor, should he be forced into 
explaining interest rate rises to industry, Norman was the unrepentant patrician: 
 
. . . the merchant, manufacturer, workman, &c., should be 
considered (but not consulted any more than about the design of 
battleships) . . . . ‘cheap money’ is the Industrialists’ big stick 
and should be treated accordingly . . . . restoration of Free Gold 
will require a high Bank Rate: the Government cannot avoid a 
decision for or against Restoration . . . . in the former case 
(Gold) he will be abused by the ignorant, the gamblers and the 
antiquated Industrialists: in the latter case (not Gold) he will be 
abused by the instructed and by posterity [this apparently 
random selection of capital letters is directly from Norman’s 
document].242
 
Norman answered the Chancellor’s point regarding the success of the ‘managed’ 
currency in the years 1922-25 by asserting his belief that stability had only come 
about because ‘the whole world’ believed that the country would return to gold 
in 1925, and advised against delaying the restoration of gold since he believed 
this would ‘shatter’ London’s position as a centre for international finance. 
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‘sterilising’ the gold by leaving it idle the American Federal Reserve Bank was 
increasingly using its gold to acquire investments in Europe. 
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    The reason for inviting Bradbury to take part in ‘Mr. Churchill’s Exercise’ would 
seem to be that he was a highly respected senior figure in financial matters who 
could be relied upon to give a balanced judgement.  A Manchester Grammar 
School boy, he had entered the Civil Service, after Oxford, in 1896.  As a 
principal clerk he had been the senior civil servant responsible for drafting Lloyd 
George's National Insurance Act of 1911.  In this task he had been assisted by 
Hawtrey and W.J. Braithwaite of the Inland Revenue.  Braithwaite, wearied by 
Bradbury’s detailed criticisms described him as ‘all teeth, talk . . . spectacles and 
argument’.243  Hawtrey was to remain an admirer of Bradbury’s abilities.244  
Bradbury rose to become Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury in the years 
1913-19.  He moved from the Treasury to become the Principal British Delegate 
to the Reparation Commission, was a member of the Cunliffe Committee, and 
assumed the Chair of the Chamberlain committee on the amalgamation of note 
issues after Austen Chamberlain’s appointment as Foreign Secretary.  Later that 
year, 1925, he was created a peer. 
    Bradbury did not attempt, as Norman did, to respond point-by-point to 
Churchill’s memorandum.  His response took the form an essay (or even a 
sermon) contrasting the gold standard against monetary management without 
the gold standard.  If, indeed, his response could be more likened to a sermon, 
he took as his text a quotation from Churchill’s memorandum:  
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 Gold is no longer a currency token, but simply a reserve 
guarantee or test of good faith between man and man and one 
country and another.  If good faith were universal gold could be 
left to the fine arts.245
 
But this text was not taken as Bradbury’s thesis – more his anti-thesis.  To 
Bradbury, the writer of this statement showed ‘an entire misconception of the 
function which gold plays in international economics’.  He then proceeded to set 
out the reason why he believed that gold played a vital function in international 
trade. 
 
However little we may like it, gold is still the international 
standard of value and the medium in which, in the long run, any 
ultimate debt against one country in favour of another must, if it 
is to be liquidated at all, be liquidated. 
    It is quite easy to conceive of a state of affairs in which each 
country would have a currency of its own, having a real value, in 
terms of commodities, of the commodities which it is capable of 
purchasing, which would be accepted by other countries in 
discharge of debts owing to them.  It is conceivable, but not in 
fact feasible, since certain countries which are debtors on 
international account would never be able to resist the 
temptation to reduce the value of their currencies in order to 
diminish the real burden of their debts.  For that reason a 
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prudent creditor would never permit a debt due to him to be 
expressed in the currency of these countries.246
 
Bradbury’s submission went on to suggest that whilst it might be more nearly 
feasible for Britain and America to maintain the relative value of their currencies 
in terms of commodities, leading other countries to settle their debts in dollars or 
pounds rather than gold, such a process would, indeed, leave gold to ‘the Fine 
Arts’.  But America, as the principle holder of gold, could not be expected to co-
operate in anything which would reduce the value of gold.   
    In contrasting the gold standard with a ‘managed’ currency Bradbury pointed 
out that there was no way, under either system, of eliminating the credit cycle 
since the same steps were necessary to stem rising commodity prices as were 
required to stem the outflow of gold – the ‘chief opponents of the gold standard 
are not the advocates of the ‘managed’ pound, but the inflationists pure and 
simple’.  Bradbury concluded by warning that there would be ‘no advantage’ and 
‘serious inconvenience’ in waiting, since in the absence of any immediate 
announcement of the intention to restore the free gold market at an early date 
there would be an appreciable set-back in the exchange value of the pound. 
    It was inevitable that Niemeyer would be asked to respond to Churchill’s 
document.  From 1922-7 Niemeyer was the Treasury Controller of Finance – 
effectively the chief financial advisor to the Chancellor of the Exchequer.  
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Niemeyer was a man with conservative ideas but outstanding ability.  After 
graduating in ‘Greats’ from Balliol College, Oxford, Niemeyer’s promotion had 
been rapid.  From coming top in the Civil Service examinations of 1906 – the 
year Keynes came second – he had risen to his present position by the age of 
thirty-nine.  Churchill needed to be absolutely clear of Niemeyer’s reasons for 
wishing to return to gold - he would be the Chancellor’s principal advisor 
throughout the whole process.  Churchill needed to have total confidence that, 
whatever decision he might take, Niemeyer could steer him through the stormy 
political waters.  In the event, Niemeyer’s submission was a masterfully argued 
advocacy for returning to the gold standard.  The ‘steely logic’ with which 
Niemeyer marshalled the argument was probably the deciding factor in Churchill 
decision.247  He felt confident that Niemeyer would provide him with the answers 
to any criticisms. 
    To Niemeyer, the return to the gold standard was a test of political will.  It 
was a test of the authenticity of the Government’s commitment to honest 
money.  He reminded Churchill that all governments since the war had endorsed 
the Cunliffe Committee’s recommendation that the gold standard should be 
returned to at the earliest possible moment; with this intention being repeated at 
successive international conferences.  He also reminded Churchill of the 
imminent expiry, some eleven months hence, of the order prohibiting the export 
of gold, and that manufacturers, exporters and bankers were expecting notice of 
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the government’s intentions in order that they might ‘fix their course with 
certainty against the appointed day’. 
 
So great is the expectation of a return that a decision to continue the 
export prohibition would not be a continuation of the present state, 
but would start us immediately in the opposite direction . . . . It would 
reverberate throughout a world . . . convinced that we never meant 
business about the gold standard because our nerve had failed when 
the stage was set.248
 
He then proceeded to summarise the reasons why the Chamberlain Committee, 
whose report awaited signing, recommended returning to the gold standard; the 
principal reason being that the committee adjudged price differences between 
Britain and America to be within four and a half per cent of each other, with 
American prices still rising and British prices still falling.  The conversion of prices 
was such that the Committee believed that only a further deflation of British 
prices by one and a half per cent would be required to achieve par; an ‘extra 
sacrifice’ that would be ‘negligible’.  Niemeyer gave his opinion that an early 
move was desirable since exchange demands were light in spring, but heavy in 
December when, on the expiry of the gold export prohibition order, the 
Chancellor might be tempted to make his move. 
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    Niemeyer concluded his submission by discussing the criticisms which the 
move back to gold might elicit; that the move would be in American rather than 
British interests; that the move was in the interests of finance rather than 
industry; that the move would require dear money from which unemployment 
would ensue.   
    Regarding the adoption of a gold standard being predominantly in American 
interests, Niemeyer argued that failure to stabilise the pound using gold would 
result in more of the world’s trade being financed by dollar Bills (or even Bills in 
the newly-stabilised Marks) rather than sterling Bills, resulting in an even more 
rapid displacement of London from the position of being the world’s financial 
centre.  As for the gold standard favouring banks at the expense of factories, 
Niemeyer regarded it as a ‘mistake to imagine that the Banks want dear money’, 
since ‘cheap money (and rapid circulation) suits them better’.  He felt that the 
real antithesis was between bankers taking the long view and manufacturers 
taking the short view.  Finally, Niemeyer argued that the best cure for 
unemployment was restoration of trade, and the gold standard was the basis for 
restoring international trade. 
 
On a long view . . . the gold standard is in direct succession to 
the main steps towards economic reconstruction . . . and is likely 
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to do more for British trade than all the efforts of the 
Unemployment Committee.249
 
Throughout February 1925 Churchill refused to allow Niemeyer to leave his side, 
and such was the dependence of the Chancellor on his Controller of Finance that 
Frederick Leith-Ross, Niemeyer’s deputy, was later to say that Churchill 
eventually went down the path of gold standard restoration ‘because he knew 
that if he adopted this course Niemeyer would give him irrefutable arguments to 
support it’.250  Conversely, if he had opted not to return to gold, then he would 
have stood alone. 
    Churchill’s fourth request for a response to his memorandum went to 
Hawtrey.  Now Hawtrey was, by considerable degree, the most junior of the 
respondents.  Norman, as Governor of the Bank of England, and Bradbury, 
distinguished ex-Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, were very senior figures.  
Niemeyer held a position below that of Permanent Secretary, but in his position 
as the Chancellor’s closest financial confidante, it was essential that Churchill was 
clear about his views.  Hawtrey held a position in the Treasury two rungs below 
that of Niemeyer.  It might have been a formality for the Chancellor to ask for a 
response from Hawtrey – after all, his Financial Enquiries Department was set up 
explicitly to ‘to collect information upon all subjects of general financial interest 
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and to prepare reports from time to time . . . upon any question which may be 
referred to it by the Chancellor of the Exchequer’ – but it is possible that 
Churchill, faced with criticisms from the an economist such as Keynes, might 
have wished for the response of an economist to go alongside those of the 
banker and the two financial administrators – to have a response with which to 
answer criticisms at a different level from that of the political. 
    The reply of Hawtrey’s is the only one that Moggridge does nor reprint in his 
account of the return to the gold standard.251  His reference to Hawtrey’s reply is 
somewhat dismissive: ‘there was a long, rather involved reply from 
R.G.Hawtrey'’252  (Since the preface to the book thanks, amongst others, ‘Sir 
Ralph Hawtrey’, for having read drafts and providing comments and 
encouragement, it seems that Hawtrey himself might not have demurred from 
this assessment).  Hawtrey’s response was thoughtful, but untidy, over-technical, 
and unfocussed.  He still believed that his authorship of the 1922 Genoa 
resolutions on currency reform through a gold-exchange standard held the 
answers to the currency problems of the day, and he used the exercise to preach 
the efficacy of these resolutions.  It is extremely unlikely that his response, 
thoughtful as it was, would have provided Churchill with the kind of armour that 
he would have required to carry gold standard legislation through the Commons, 
or even to have responded to a savage press polemic from J. M. Keynes. 
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    Hawtrey took, as his cue, the questions from ‘Mr. Churchill’s Exercise’ relating 
to continuation of a ‘managed’ currency – ‘What risks should we run?  What evils 
should we encounter?’  He pointed to the fact that the success of the ‘managed’ 
currency in maintaining stable prices during the years 1922-24 had been during a 
period of recovery from depression when cheap money was necessary to 
encourage economic expansion.  He queried whether such currency 
management would be as effective when credit restriction was called for during 
an economic boom and, without the gold standard in place, ‘the accustomed 
symptom of a loss of gold does not occur’.  Moreover, he asserted that 
stabilisation of internal prices was but one characteristic of sound currency – it 
should, at the same time, be capable of stabilising its foreign exchange value 
since the ‘injurious effect of unstable exchanges on international trade has been 
generally recognised, but . . . by no means well understood’.253  He proceeded to 
elaborate upon this.   
    Before the war, Hawtrey explained, purchases of goods and raw materials 
throughout the world had been financed by Bills of Exchange drawn on London.  
The Bill of Exchange was a device for satisfying both the provider of goods, who 
became a creditor, and the receiver of goods, who became a debtor.  The 
provider usually wanted instant payment for materials (say) whilst the receiver 
was not in a position to pay until those materials had been converted into 
saleable goods.  The Bill of Exchange bridged the gap.  It was a document which 
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was a written order to pay a definite sum at a future date (often three, or six 
months hence), ‘drawn’ by a creditor and ‘accepted’ (signed) by a debtor.  The 
debtor acquired a period of grace before settling his debt, and the creditor could, 
if he so wished, obtain immediate payment (at a small discount) by selling his bill 
of exchange to one of London’s specialist Discount Houses – leaving the Discount 
House with the task of ensuring that the debtor fulfilled his commitment.  The 
debtor, whatever his local currency, would use that currency to obtain sterling in 
order to pay his debt to the Discount House.  This system had been the source 
of London’s financial strength, but it had shrunk after the war.  According to 
Hawtrey it had shrunk because of exchange-rate instability; foreign traders had 
not been prepared to take on debts, repayable to London in sterling, when they 
were unsure of what that liability would be in their local currency.  Similar 
uncertainties had thwarted the attempts by New York to establish itself as a 
centre for short-term loans.  The result had been a falling away of world trade.  
Hawtrey’s recommendation was clear. 
 
It is emphatically a British interest that the pre-war system 
should be restored.  But it is . . . also a worldwide interest. . . . 
Exchange stability cannot be obtained at present by any other 
method than a gold standard.254
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The possibility of establishing exchange-rate stability on a managed sterling 
standard rather than on gold was considered.  Hawtrey acknowledged that this 
would be technically possible, but the practicality of holding sterling instead of 
gold as a means of transacting international trade would involve all countries 
holding sterling assets, such as Treasury bills, in London, and there would be 
objections to having large currency reserves held in a foreign centre where they 
might be blocked during periods of tension such as wartime. 
    Hawtrey then explored the possible disadvantages of the gold standard to set 
against the advantage of stable exchanges.  The fundamental problem, as he 
saw it, was that once the pound was tied to gold, the Americans, as possessors 
of half the world’s gold, were capable of exerting undue influence on its 
purchasing power.  If the Americans were to release large quantities of gold on 
to the market then its value and purchasing power would fall and prices would 
rise – currencies tied to it would keep the same relative value, but their 
purchasing power in terms of commodities other than gold would decrease.  
Conversely, a decision by the American monetary authorities to absorb gold 
would cause a fall in the general price level.  The rises, or falls, in prices would 
lead to pressures to increase or decrease money wages, with consequential 
disturbances to economic equilibrium. 
    Hawtrey then used the next part of his submission to discuss the recent 
history of exchanges and price movements in the United States.  His view was 
that a recent American credit expansion, begun in June 1924, would eventually 
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bring American prices up to British levels, concluding that the ‘present moment is 
therefore particularly favourable to a return to parity’.  Looking ahead, and if 
America continued with its expansionist policies once parity had been reached, 
then Hawtrey predicted that that increased trade activity would be 
communicated to this country.  But Hawtrey then inserted a paragraph bearing 
news which Churchill would not want to hear: 
 
There is, however, the possibility that before this has happened, steps 
may be taken in America to restrict credit and to raise the commodity 
value of the dollar.  In that case we should be faced with the 
alternatives of relapsing from the gold standard or suffering a 
contraction of credit here.255
 
Here was nourishment for Churchill’s seeds of doubt.  The thing he would most 
dread would be restoring free movement of gold, only for him to then have to 
renege upon the implied commitments – to ‘relapse from the gold standard’.  
Hawtrey went on to emphasise this point: 
 
. . . if the gold standard could be defended only by an increase 
of Bank rate to 5 or even 6 per cent, a very serious check would 
be administered to trade, industry and employment.  In present 
conditions, with employment still severe it would be better to let 
sterling relapse than to raise Bank rate to a deterrent level.256   
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 Hawtrey explained that such measures would not have to take effect 
immediately an adverse movement appeared in the exchanges, since we 
possessed a large gold reserve and that could be used, for some time, to 
maintain sterling’s value: ‘a large gold reserve is an advantage, but only if it is 
used’’257  [Hawtrey’s Italics].  Nevertheless, he warned, that if the Government 
intended to maintain the gold standard at all costs, and this entailed the 
exportation of gold to support the exchange, then eventually Bank rate would 
have to be raised in order to prevent the reserves from becoming exhausted.  In 
a sense, Hawtrey was playing devil’s advocate here, for he acknowledged that 
such measures would only be required if, having gone back to the gold standard 
with the exchanges at parity, America then began to apply a credit contraction.  
This, he did not expect to happen. 
 
What is far more likely is that the credit expansion will continue in 
America for some months, and that the consequent expansion here 
will restore the prosperity of our own trade.  When the turn of the tide 
comes, we shall be able to stand a rise in Bank rate without 
trouble.258
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Having set up one potentially disastrous scenario, and dismissed it as unlikely, 
Hawtrey then raised a further caveat.  America, since the war, had increased its 
investments in Europe, with the demand for European currencies to make these 
investments having had the effect of depressing the exchange rate of the dollar 
against European currencies, including sterling (Hawtrey suggested that 
increased overseas investment by America had been due to its recently imposed 
immigration restrictions – it no longer needed the money that it had been using 
to equip the previous growth of immigrant workers).  If America were to 
repatriate these investments, then this might adversely affect the exchange rate, 
bringing into play a whole sequence of reactions which would end with higher 
Bank rate.   But again, Hawtrey felt that increased American investment abroad 
would be a permanent part of the post-war economic scene. 
    In his submission to the Chamberlain Committee, Keynes had warned of the 
dangers of excessive credit expansion in America affecting the British economy – 
1919-20 had seen huge inflation in America.  Hawtrey felt that with the gold 
standard in place in both countries, its normal mechanisms would be sufficient to 
prevent excessive credit leading to high American inflation.  If it did not, and 
there was a danger of high inflation spreading to Britain, there was a series of 
technical measures which could be taken as protection.  Hawtrey proceeded to 
explain these measures (including, once more, the suspension of the gold 
standard) in somewhat tedious detail. 
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     Towards the end of Hawtrey’s 3,000 word submission he reiterated the 
efficacy of the 1922 Genoa Resolutions of which he had been author, under 
which a gold-exchange standard would be supported by credit agreements 
between the central banks.  He suggested that these held out the promise of ‘the 
best of both worlds – stable prices and stable exchanges’.  He did not attempt to 
link these proposals to Churchill’s questionnaire, but in an interesting paragraph, 
set out his reason for believing that, in the event of failure to co-ordinate interest 
rate strategy, British credit policy need not necessarily be dictated from New 
York: 
 
The great wealth of the United States is . . . important . . . . But 
British wealth is far more mobile.   American wealth is derived 
mainly from production, British from commerce and finance.  In 
the regulation of credit the merchant is more sensitive than the 
producer.  The pre-eminence of the Bank of England in the 
control of credit before the war depended on this fact.  Credit 
conditions in London affected the action of merchants all over 
the world.  Producers depend on the orders they receive from 
merchants, and credit in a producing country is less affected by 
the action of the country’s own banks than by that of the banks 
which finance the merchants who buy the produce.259
 
Hawtrey seemed to imply that the conditions which governed interest rates and 
credit in America were more localised than those in Britain – therefore it would 
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be possible for there to be a degree of independence between the credit policies 
of the two countries – Britain need not necessarily follow America in the setting 
of interest rates.  At another level the paragraph suggests that Hawtrey regarded 
London rates as far more important than those of New York in determining the 
world’s trading climate.   
    After this lengthy economic analysis Hawtrey had remarkably little policy 
advice for the Chancellor.  In fact, he advised inaction. 
 
What then is the upshot of the foregoing arguments in relation 
to the action to be taken in this country between now and the 
31st December next?  No active measures at all need be taken.  
It is to be hoped that the exchange will come to par of itself.  If 
it does not, a credit contraction is still undesirable.260
 
Hawtrey did not quite leave it at this.  Whilst advising the Government (and, I 
suppose, by implication) the Bank of England to restrain from active measures, 
he did suggest that if, on the pound achieving par with $4.87, there was a 
subsequent reaction, then the authorities should be prepared to let large 
quantities of gold go to America, and, even if this should prove unsuccessful in 
restoring the exchange rate, there should be no increase in Bank rate or attempt 
to restrict credit – ‘it would be better to let sterling fall to a discount’. 
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    Norman, mistrusted by Churchill, had, however crudely, articulated the 
interests of the City.  Bradbury, respected by Churchill, had provided a polished 
advocacy of the ‘jewelled’ mechanism which was incapable of political corruption.  
Niemeyer, relied upon by Churchill, had emphasised the psychology of 
confidence, and the consequences of people perceiving that the Government 
lacked political will.  Hawtrey, Churchill’s ‘learned man’, had provided the typical 
‘two-handed’ response of the economist.  Churchill, like Harry S. Truman, might 
well at this point have prayed for a one-handed economist.  On a superficial 
reading Hawtrey’s submission could be accused, as Churchill feared he might be 
accused, of favouring City interests at the expense of industry.  It was not 
Hawtrey’s intention.  To him, industry could only prosper if conditions were 
favourable to traders who wished to place orders for industry’s products.  Theirs 
was an essential function in a free, healthy and democratic economic society, 
and they could operate with greatest confidence in a world where currency 
exchange rates were stable.  On balance, Hawtrey felt that such stability was 
best achieved through a gold standard – hence his guarded recommendation.  
On the other hand, unlike Norman, to whom exchange-rates and gold reserves 
were City virility symbols, to be defended, if necessary by high interest rates, 
Hawtrey cared for neither as ends in themselves.  He would have been prepared 
to see gold lost, the exchange fall, or the gold standard itself fall into abeyance, 
if its perpetuation entailed high interest rates stifling industry.  There may have 
been economic logic in such measures, but for a Chancellor they would have 
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been political suicide.  Despite three ringing endorsements, and one guarded 
recommendation, Churchill remained unhappy about returning to gold.     
    Niemeyer was due to attend a conference in Geneva during February 1925.  
Churchill refused to let him go and so Niemeyer’s deputy, Frederick Leith-Ross 
went in his place.  Whilst he was in Geneva, Niemeyer sent Leith-Ross an 
informal note which included a reference to Churchill’s state of mind: ‘Gold is 
excessively active and very troublesome.  None of the witch-doctors [Niemeyer’s 
view of economists] see eye to eye, and Winston cannot make up his mind from 
day to day whether he is a gold bug or a pure inflationist’.261  This, perhaps 
rather unguarded, communication from Niemeyer is probably more revealing 
than many his official memoranda.  Not only did he regard Churchill as a 
ditherer, but he dismissed advocates of a managed currency as ‘inflationists’.   
   Niemeyer’s personal view, as implied in his letter to Leith-Ross, was that 
Churchill was a ‘ditherer’ over the question of the return to gold.  This may be 
true, but it is not necessarily so.  Booth and Glynn, in questioning the value that 
can be put on public records, have suggested that the Treasury records 
regarding the return to the Gold Standard are almost certainly incomplete since 
there is no indication as to whether the move to return was initiated by Churchill 
or Niemeyer.262  They suggest it probable that, all along, Churchill was politically 
committed to returning to the Gold Standard, but he was aware of the barrage of 
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criticism he would have to face from industry as a result of the high interest 
rates that would be necessary to maintain the Gold Standard.  Thus it is equally 
valid to suggest that, far from being a ditherer, Churchill’s exercises were a 
means of testing his officials to the limits of the support they would be capable 
of giving him in pursuing the course he had chosen.   
    If, indeed, Churchill harbored doubts, then these would have been fuelled by 
an article of Keynes’s in The Nation on 21 February 1925 in which Keynes 
pleaded for a managed currency and drew attention to ‘the paradox of 
unemployment amongst dearth’.  On the following day, 22 February 1925, 
Churchill wrote to Niemeyer: 
 
The Treasury have never, it seems to me, faced the profound 
significance of what Mr. Keynes calls ‘the paradox of 
unemployment amidst dearth’.  The Governor shows himself 
perfectly happy in the spectacle of Britain possessing the finest 
credit in the world simultaneously with a million and a quarter 
unemployed.  The community lacks goods and a million and a 
quarter people lack work. . . . I do not pretend to see even 
‘through a glass darkly’ how the financial and credit policy of this 
country could . . . bridge the gap between a dearth of goods and 
a surplus of labour . . . . I would rather see Finance less proud 
and Industry more content.  You and the Governor have 
managed this affair . . . (which is) surely a cause for the deepest 
heart searching.263
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 Niemeyer’s response was immediate and there is no evidence of Hawtrey having 
played any part in its formulation.  It was uncompromising: 
 
You can by inflation (a most vicious form of subsidy) enable 
temporarily, spending power to cope with large quantities of products.  
But unless you increase the dose continually, there comes a time 
when having destroyed the credit of the country you can inflate no 
more, money having ceased to be accepted as value.  Even before 
this, as your inflated spending creates demand, you have claims for 
increased wages, strikes, lock-outs etc.  I assume it be admitted that 
with Germany and Russia before us we do not think plenty can be 
found on this path. 
    If that be admitted, economic employment can only be given to the 
extent to which commodities can be produced at a price which 
existing uninflated wealth can pay for them.  As a result of war there 
has been a great decrease in wealth, and there is consequently less 
effective demand.  The only permanent remedy is to recreate the 
losses of war, really – not by manufacturing paper – and what we 
have to do for this purpose is (1) to stabilise our currency in relation 
to the main trading currencies of the world, (2) to reconstruct the 
broken parts of Europe and (3) to encourage thrift and the 
accumulation of capital for industry.  These methods . . . are going to 
remedy unemployment.  
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This reply could only have left Churchill with the understanding that, whatever 
his misgivings, if he went against his advisors, then he could not rely on 
committed official support.   During the war he had gone against official advice 
in ordering the Dardanelles operation, which turned into a disaster.  He was 
surely haunted by the thought of a similar disaster. 
  Still not content, Churchill sought further reassurance from Hawtrey.  He 
requested a note on the return to the Gold Standard after the Napoleonic wars.  
In 1816, the Coinage Act had created legislation for the establishment of a Gold 
Standard.  In 1914 the price of gold had been well over its coinage price and 
parity was not achieved until 1919.  The free-coinage of gold at the parity rate of 
just over £3 17s. 10d. did not occur until 1821.  Hawtrey’s note, running to eight 
pages, was probably heavier reading than Churchill had anticipated, and would 
not have allayed his fears. According to Hawtrey the ‘outstanding fact in the 
process of returning to the gold standard after the inflation of the Napoleonic 
Wars was the tremendous fall of prices which started in 1814 . . . . showing a fall 
of nearly 40 per cent in two and a half years’.264  According to Hawtrey, the 
‘commercial crisis of the years 1814 to 1816 brought about by the fall in prices 
was one of the most severe recorded in history’ and the fall in prices drove 
British traders ‘to the verge of ruin by the collapse of values’.   However, his 
opinion was that the ‘drifting’ of the price of gold in the years prior to parity 
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being achieved had been ‘at the cost of great unsettlement to business’.265  The 
only message to be extracted from this memorandum of Hawtrey was that ‘if it 
were to be done, it were best done quickly’. 
  Churchill made one last effort to resolve his conscience.  On 17 March 1925, 
Churchill hosted a dinner party.  His purpose was to involve the proponents and 
opponents of the gold standard in discussion, presumably hoping to remove any 
lingering doubts over the wisdom of the impending move.266  Niemeyer and 
Bradbury were pitted against Keynes and McKenna.  He was well aware of the 
views of Niemeyer and Bradbury.  Keynes and the former Liberal Chancellor of 
the Exchequer, McKenna, had been the two most vociferous opponents of the 
return to gold.  Churchill’s private secretary, Grigg, was also present that evening 
and his autobiography remains the only record of the encounter.267         
    Grigg records that in the course of the evening McKenna gave way to 
opposition arguments. 
 
CHURCHILL (to McKenna)   
    But this isn’t entirely an economic matter, it is a political 
decision, for it involves proclaiming that we cannot . . . complete 
the undertaking which we all acclaimed as necessary in 1918 . . . 
You have been a politician; indeed you have been Chancellor of 
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the Exchequer.  Given the situation as it is, what decision would 
you take? 
 
McKENNA 
    There is no escape.  You will have to go back, but it will be 
hell.268
 
Thus, left by himself, Keynes failed to impress Churchill.  Grigg, as recorder of 
the encounter, was not sympathetic to Keynes, but was particularly struck by 
Bradbury’s reference to the gold standard as being ‘knaveproof’ – a phrase which 
Grigg attempted to encourage into common usage.  There was little appreciation 
of the fact that Britain’s position in the world had changed and that the Bank of 
England might not be in the same position of strength which had previously 
enabled it to manage the Gold Standard in Britain’s interests.269
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    On Friday 20 March 1925 the decision was taken to announce the return to 
the gold standard.  Those present at the decisive meeting were Prime Minister 
Baldwin, Chancellor of the Exchequer Churchill, Foreign Secretary Chamberlain, 
Norman, Bradbury and Niemeyer. 
    Peter Clarke has spoken of the verdict to return hinging only very loosely upon 
the evidence supplied by the relative values of index numbers of prices in Britain 
and the United States.  Rather its return depended upon the ‘charm of its 
austere purity.  It spoke with the purity of a dead language; it operated with the 
perfection of calculus; and as such it captivated minds that had been schooled to 
esteem elegance and rigour . . .  the Oxford classicists and Cambridge 
mathematicians who staffed the Treasury’. 270  
    Middleton (1998) has identified six characteristics of the policy style which 
marked the episode; principally, that the return to gold was driven by political 
considerations rather than economic analysis.271
                                          
 
                                           
                                                                                                                                                 
adherence to the gold standard was a signal of financial rectitude that facilitated access 
by peripheral countries to capital from the core countries of western Europe.   
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                                            Chapter 3 
 
            The Gold Standard and High Interest Rates  
 
                                   1925-1931 
 
The return to the gold standard did not herald a prosperous period of 
international trade as its advocates had anticipated, but neither did it bring about 
the disastrous collapse of British trade which the doomsters, critical of the return 
to the old parity, had predicted.  With the return to the gold standard, in one of 
Professor Pigou’s more memorable phrases, Britain entered ‘the Doldrums’. 
 
The ending of the slump was the beginning of the Doldrums.  In 
these we might say the country remained more or less – not of 
course completely – becalmed until the Wall Street crash in 1929 
heralded a second and greater slump.272
 
Hawtrey, however, writing in a personal capacity in 1938 – and despite his 
guarded recommendation to Churchill in favour of returning to the gold standard 
- viewed the return to gold as an interruption of a long period of progress from 
depression. 
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 The return to the gold standard, with the re-imposition of dear money, 
had interrupted the progress of recovery from the severe depression 
of 1922. . . . the true efficacy of dear money as a support for the gold 
position was to be found in the deflationary effect on this country.273
 
Hawtrey deplored the way in which the authorities operated the gold standard by 
maintaining unnecessarily high interest rates.  The Bank of England was 
reluctant to use its gold and purposely maintained deflationary rates.  Others 
have seen the problem differently; Sayers, for instance, has suggested that the 
gold standard acted as a brake on the economy in ways other than through its 
requirement for dear money – rather it was through the way in which 
maintaining the high level of the pound demanded the maintenance of high 
export prices. 
 
There is little sign that the Bank consciously used Bank Rate to force a 
deflation of the home price and income structure.  Depression in the 
export trades and the competition of imports were the powerful 
deflationary forces at work; it was through these conditions rather 
than through high interest rates that the gold-standard policy was 
depressing the British economy.274
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The dissent to the return to the Gold Standard was led by Keynes. His name and 
reputation had been made by a post-war best-seller in which he pointed out the 
disastrous economic and political consequences which would flow from the heavy 
reparations imposed on Germany by the Treaty of Versailles, and he enhanced 
that particular reputation in 1925 with his criticism of Churchill’s restoration of 
the gold standard at the pre-war parity of $4.86.   
    On 22, 23 and 24 July he wrote three articles in Beaverbrook’s London 
Evening Standard under the general title of ‘Unemployment and monetary 
policy’.  These articles were shortly to be expanded and published in pamphlet 
form as The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill.275  They laid out many of 
his criticisms of Britain’s financial system.  Keynes accused the Chancellor of 
incompetence and of having ‘no instinctive judgment to prevent him from 
making mistakes’.276  Consequently, the Chancellor had been ‘deafened by the 
clamorous voices of conventional finance’ and ‘gravely misled by his experts’.277    
    Keynes argued that entry upon the standard at the $4.86 level would involve 
a 10 per cent upward re-evaluation of the pound, rather than the 2-3 per cent 
which Treasury officials had calculated.  They had, he suggested, by comparing 
wholesale index numbers here and in America, been guilty of using the wrong 
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index, since the wholesale price indices were weighted towards internationally 
traded commodities which would, under conditions of international trade, have 
tended towards a uniformity of price.278  A study of retail prices would, he 
suggested, have revealed greater discrepancy in prices.  Hawtrey, who later 
recalled ‘watching the American indices like a hawk’ in those years, always 
remained adamant that the appropriate index for comparison was the wholesale 
index.279  Keynes also suggested that the authorities had readily assumed that 
lower prices would bring about lower costs without them having any 
understanding of the mechanisms by which this would be brought about. 
    In the second part of his pamphlet, Keynes went on to outline the role which 
he envisaged the Bank of England would be forced to play in maintaining the 
balance of trade.  The high value of the pound would strangle exports and suck 
in cheap imports with a tendency to deplete the Bank of England’s gold deposits 
– and thus bring into action the appropriate sequence of corrective measures.  
‘The Bank of England is compelled to curtail credit by all the rules of the gold 
standard game.’280  The rules of the game, of course, included raising interest 
rates – a move which would have had the effect of exacerbating the 
unemployment problem.  According to Keynes this was the opposite measure to 
that required. 
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 What we need to restore prosperity today is an easy credit 
policy.  We want to encourage business men to enter on new 
enterprises, not, as we are doing, to discourage them.  Deflation 
does not reduce wages ‘automatically’.  It reduces them by 
causing unemployment.  (The miners) represent in the flesh the 
‘fundamental adjustments’ engineered by the Treasury and the 
Bank of England to satisfy the impatience of the City fathers to 
bridge the ‘moderate gap’ between $4.40 and $4.86.  They (and 
others to follow) are the ‘moderate sacrifice’ still necessary to 
ensure the stability of the gold standard.  The plight of the coal 
miners is the first, but not – unless we are very lucky – the last 
of the Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill.281
 
Although The Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill had, through its criticism 
of the authorities’ pricing comparisons, been implicitly critical of Hawtrey, the 
policy prescriptions of Keynes and Hawtrey remained very close at this stage.  In 
the next six years, even as Keynes moved towards recommending public works 
and import tariffs, Hawtrey continued to produce memorandum after 
memorandum appealing for lower interest rates and the extension of credit. 
    The Treasury was anxious to prevent Keynes’s ideas getting a foothold in the 
Government, and Niemeyer, the Treasury’s Controller of Finance, responded 
immediately to the Evening Standard articles with a memorandum to the 
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Chancellor in which he laid out the official Treasury line.282  He pointed out some 
of Keynes’s recent inconsistencies. 
 
In reading Mr. Keynes’s three articles one must remember that he has 
always avowedly wished to desert the gold standard for a standard 
under which money rates would vary in accordance with internal 
prices.  If prices rose, he would increase money rates, and vice versa.  
Accordingly last autumn when United Kingdom wholesale prices had 
risen from 159 to about 170 Mr. Keynes was advocating an increase in 
Bank rates – several months before it actually took place . . . . (a 
measure which) one would think, would have had just the results 
which he now regards as the deplorable consequences of the rise in 
Bank rate of March last . . . 283
 
Niemeyer’s memorandum went on to criticise Keynes’s proposed remedy of 
lowering Bank rate in order for the consequent outflow of gold to encourage 
credit expansion in America with, hopefully, a rise in American prices.  He argued 
that there was no certainty of such measures provoking an increase in American 
prices (indeed, the Federal Reserve had become increasingly skilled at ‘sterilising’ 
gold imports so that they were not inflationary), but the lowering of the Bank 
rate, with subsequent credit expansion in Britain, would increase prices in 
Britain.284  (Somewhat ironically, this was an argument that Keynes was later to 
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use, with devastating effect, when questioning Hawtrey’s policy prescriptions 
during the course of the hearings of the Macmillan Committee on Finance and 
Industry).   
    There had been general satisfaction within the Treasury and the Bank of 
England at the restoration of the Gold Standard and Keynes was a largely 
isolated critic.  Most of the remainder of 1925 augured well for its operation.  
Immediately prior to restoration, on 5 March 1925, the Bank had raised its rate 
by 1 percentage point to 5 per cent.  Montagu Norman had expressed the 
opinion that the re-institution of the free movement of gold would necessitate a 
further rise to 6 per cent in order to prevent gold draining away from London.285  
In the event, the 5 per cent Bank Rate was sufficient to attract liquid investment 
to London.  Foreign investors wished to hold sterling, and they used gold and 
other gold-related currencies to buy their sterling holdings.  The increase in the 
Bank’s reserves enabled it, under some political pressure, to lower bank rate to 
4.5 per cent on 6 August 1925.286  On 1 October 1925, again under some 
political pressure, there was a further lowering of Bank rate to 4 per cent.  Sir 
Montagu Norman’s view was that the situation was not as favourable as it 
seemed, since, given the growing speculation on the New York stock exchange, 
the gold which had found its way to London was only likely to spend a brief 
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sojourn there, and before long higher interest rates would be necessary to 
prevent loss of gold in the direction of America.287   
    The rise in interest rates came on 3 December 1925, when Bank rate was 
raised to 5 per cent, a full percentage point increase.  At this stage, it was 
difficult to put down such an increase to speculation on the New York Stock 
Exchange.  Sir Ernest Harvey, Deputy Governor of the Bank, explained the 
course of events in November 1925 when he later gave evidence before the 
Macmillan Committee. 
 
The market decided, so it appeared, to leave the Treasury bills 
severely alone.  We had difficulty for a week or two, the Bank 
had to come to the rescue to cover the amounts required, efforts 
were made to reassure the market, but without success, and 
eventually at the end of the month, the last week, the amount 
which the bank had to provide in order to cover the required 
amount of tenders was very substantial.  Finally we were 
compelled, simply in order to get the bills taken up, and to avoid 
our being driven into a very difficult position by reason of the 
very large additions of credit that we were having to create, to 
raise the rate from 4 per cent to 5 per cent.288
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This retrospective explanation by the Bank seems typical of the obfuscation by 
which the Bank of England conducted its policies at the time.  The argument that 
Harvey seems to have been deploying was that general awareness had been 
growing that the short-term funds attracted to London by the increase in Bank 
rate in March had begun to seep away as a result of the two subsequent 
reductions in the rate.  Thus, the commercial banks, who were the biggest 
purchasers of Treasury Bills, had anticipated an increase in the Bank rate to stem 
this outflow and, alongside the higher interest regime, heavier discounting of 
Treasury Bills.  Consequently they were reluctant to purchase existing Treasury 
bills, and the Government, to cover the shortfall in its finances, had needed to 
borrow under Ways and Means from the Bank of England.  Thus, his argument 
seems to imply, the Bank was forced into a regime of generally higher interest 
rates in order to encourage the sale of Treasury Bills and to prevent the 
Government from depleting the Bank’s reserves. Hawtrey was sceptical about 
this explanation, and figures published by him for the weekly returns of Treasury 
Bill tenders, do indeed, cast some doubt on Harvey’s explanation: in each week 
of October and November of 1925 the number of Treasury Bills applied for 
exceeded that being offered.289  The suspicion must remain that the Bank of 
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England, especially Norman, had resented political pressure to reduce Bank rate 
during 1925 and sought a justifying pretext to return to dear money in defence 
of the institution of the gold standard. 
    Hawtrey was furious with the Bank for this move.  He later recalled, having 
just heard the news of the rise, storming angrily into Niemeyer’s office and, 
unknown to him as he vented his anger, finding Norman seated behind the door.  
It was an incident from which Hawtrey’s relationship with the Bank of England 
never recovered.290  On 5 December 1925 Hawtrey produced his own 
memorandum, entitled ‘The Credit Situation’, criticising the Bank’s policy.  He 
circulated the memorandum within the Treasury, and the marginal comments of 
Leith-Ross and Niemeyer reveal the divisions developing between the Treasury’s 
senior officials and Hawtrey.  Hawtrey was now arguing along similar lines to 
Keynes.  Moreover the tone of the memorandum was one of anger; not only did 
he feel that the Bank of England was displaying callousness towards the 
problems of the unemployed, but he despaired of the Treasury itself, the 
institution within which he was employed, for failing to use its powers over the 
Bank – powers which he believed it to constitutionally possess.    
                                                                                                                                                 
th9    October                                40                                   66.4 
16th October                                35                                   41.9 
23rd October                                40                                   48.4 
30th October                                40                                   49.2 
th  November                              45                                   47.9 6
13th November                             40                                   44.8 
20th November                             40                                   43.1 
27th November                             45                                   47.4  
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    The attitude of the senior Treasury Officials to Hawtrey’s ideas can be seen in 
the covering note with which Sir Frederick Leith-Ross passed on his copy of 
Hawtrey’s memorandum to Niemeyer: ‘This is almost pure Haverstein and I kept 
a copy for you.’291
    The ghost of German hyperinflation must have given sleepless nights to Bank 
and Treasury officials.  Hawtrey, however, set out his case very clearly in his first 
paragraph: 
 
The raising of the Bank rate to 5 per cent is nothing less than a 
national disaster.  That dear money causes unemployment is a 
proposition which ought not to admit of dispute.  Not only is it 
the generally accepted opinion of theoretical economists, but it 
was well recognised by practical financiers and men of business 
before economists paid much attention to it.292
 
In the margin of the memorandum, against this introductory assertion, and in 
Niemeyer’s handwriting, is pencilled the comment ‘turns on length of view’.  
Niemeyer, the most influential Treasury official, seemed to hold the classical view 
that ‘in the long run’ stable exchanges, stable currencies, and balanced budgets 
were the key to restoration of full employment.  As with public works, the 
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Treasury authorities regarded low interest rates as only short-term palliatives 
which in the end would only make the unemployment problem worse.   
    Hawtrey proceeded to develop his argument within the terms of his economic 
theory: 
 
Many people, while admitting that monetary causes affect 
unemployment, nevertheless deny that they are primarily 
responsible for at any rate the present burden of unemployment. 
. . . Many theories of unemployment have been enunciated, but 
practically all those which have any plausibility can be reduced to 
particular applications of the monetary theory.  Unemployment 
always arises in some way or other from consumers not having 
enough money to spend, and every theory of unemployment is 
directed to explaining why this is so.  Falling prices are a 
symptom of a shortage of the means of payment.  When 
markets are slack people will not borrow and because they will 
not borrow the supply of purchasing power is diminished, and 
the slackening of markets is aggravated.  Trade thus falls into a 
vicious circle and an apparently moderate contraction of credit 
may have very severe results.293
 
Leith-Ross’s marginal comment dismissed Hawtrey’s idea of unemployment being 
due to lack of purchasing power: ‘no doubt’ he added ‘but it is the comparative 
level between our internal prices and world prices which matters:  and if our 
internal prices are above world prices, they must fall if we are to get rid of 
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unemployment’.294  Official Treasury thinking obviously remained that credit 
policy must continue to exert a downward pressure on wages and prices to bring 
them into line with levels seen in the rest of the world before inroads could be 
made into relieving unemployment. 
    Hawtrey’s memorandum then went on to track recent unemployment figures 
and their relationship with Bank rate.  He pointed out that at ‘the present time 
we are still suffering from the effects of a contraction which was not moderate, 
but was perhaps the most intense in the history of the Bank of England’.295  He 
was referring to period between April 1920 and April 1921 when Bank rate stood 
at 7 per cent and, as a result of which, unemployment grew to 1,936, 000 in 
January 1922.  He pointed out that, by 13 July 1922, Bank rate had 
progressively, by steps of 0.5 of a percentage point, been reduced to 3 per cent, 
and from that point there had been a slow but steady recovery in employment 
until the unemployment figure stood at 1,003,000 in June 1924.  Hawtrey then 
proceeded to suggest that from this point the monetary authorities had begun to 
prepare for the return to the gold standard with a period of dearer money and 
that by steps of 1 percentage point the Bank rate had been increased to 5 per 
cent on 5 March 1925 with the result that unemployment resumed its upward 
path – to 1,354,000 in August 1925.  To Hawtrey, the link between Bank rate 
and unemployment was undeniable. 
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   Hawtrey turned his wrath against the Bank of England: 
 
Why, it may be asked has the Bank of England seen fit to inflict 
this calamity against the country?  The ostensible reason is 
hardly creditable, such is its triviality.  The market rate, it is said, 
has approached close to Bank rate, and if it passes it, the Bank 
will be compelled to lend the market more than is desirable. 
    The Bank of England can do what it pleases with the market 
rate.  It can at any moment force the market rate up to Bank 
rate by selling securities, since deposits decline pari passu with 
securities, and as soon as the market is short of cash it must 
borrow from the Bank.  Or on the other hand the Bank can, if it 
chooses, buy bills or Government securities in the market and 
create cash for the money market.  In order to get this cash 
used, the market will immediately reduce discount rates, which 
may thus go far below Bank rate . . . . The rise of the market 
rate very near Bank rate cannot be given as a reason for the 
Bank of England’s action in raising Bank rate, for the former is as 
much the Bank’s action as the latter.  The real question is, why 
has the Bank been restricting credit at all?   
    Sometimes it is desirable to put up Bank rate to check an 
excessive activity of trade.  To speak of that now would sound 
like irony [The underlinings in this passage appear in Hawtrey’s 
original document].296
 
This, to the general reader, is a somewhat technical extract, but the extent of 
Hawtrey’s condemnation of the Bank’s action pierces the technicalities, and his 
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anger could not be expressed more strongly.  In order to clarify the nature of 
Hawtrey’s criticism of the Bank of England it is necessary to examine the 
distinction between ‘the Bank rate’ and ‘market rate’, the reasons why ‘Bank rate’ 
might not be ‘effective’, and the actions which the Bank might have taken to 
make it effective.   
    ‘Bank rate’ was, as it remains today, the interest which the central bank, the 
Bank of England, charged the commercial banks for loans of currency.  Given the 
competitive nature of commercial bank operations, business, and profits, would 
go to the banks which charged the lowest rate, and if any bank could increase its 
business by charging a rate below ‘Bank rate’, then it would do so, and the Bank 
rate would become ineffective.  If banks had sufficient spare currency to enable 
them to make loans without having to go to the Bank of England then they could 
offer loans (or, alternatively, discount bills) at a rate – the ‘market rate’ – below 
Bank rate.  ‘Market rate’ could only be forced into line with Bank rate when the 
commercial banks lacked sufficient currency and had to approach the Bank of 
England to borrow money at a rate determined by the central bank.  The Bank of 
England could ensure this by a process of ‘open-market operations’ whereby they 
made available Government securities, at sufficiently attractive rates of interest, 
to persuade the commercial banks buy them.  In purchasing the securities, the 
banks would reduce their currency holdings and be forced into borrowing from 
the Bank of England in order to provide loans or discount commercial bills.  The 
higher Bank rate would force the banks into heavier discounting and charging 
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higher interest rates, thus bringing the ‘market rate’ into line with ‘Bank rate’.  
Were a situation to develop where the commercial banks were so short of 
currency that they were in danger of having to discount at a rate greater than 
‘Bank rate’ – they would be in a position where they were able to borrow from 
the central bank at a rate lower than they were charging their customers.  So 
long as this situation prevailed, the commercial banks would be encouraged to 
create deposits for their customers and discouraged from from purchasing more 
lowly rated Treasury Bills. 
    The shortage of currency could have been remedied by the Bank of England 
buying Government securities from the commercial banks, and thus releasing 
currency.  Thus, Hawtrey felt obliged to underline – ‘rise of the market rate very 
near Bank rate cannot be given as a reason for the Bank of England’s action for 
raising the Bank rate, for the former is as much the Bank’s action as the 
latter’.297  He believed that Bank rate had been raised to protect the size of the 
Bank’s gold reserve, and the action had been an aggressive gesture to affirm the 
authority of the Bank of England.  Moreover he believed, as he proceeded to 
argue, that the preservation of the gold reserve at the prevailing level was 
unnecessary.  
    Yet before proceeding to argue that case Hawtrey turned his guns on his own 
institution, the Treasury.  The gold policy of the country, he argued, was opaque 
– ‘if it be asked what our gold policy is, the answer must be a matter of 
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inference.  No one has ever disclosed what it is. . . . In order to discover what 
the gold policy of the country is the first thing is to find what authority is 
responsible for it.’ 298  He then went on to point out that under the terms of the 
Bank Charter Act of 1844, the obligations of the Bank with regards to its gold 
reserves were subject to temporary suspension at the discretion of the Treasury.  
Therefore, he argued, ultimate responsibility for gold policy rested with the 
Treasury and that if the Bank, under the depressed conditions of trade which 
currently existed, believed that it needed to restrict credit in order to preserve 
the level of its gold stocks, it could only be because it believed that the Treasury 
would never use its powers.  Hawtrey believed that the Bank of England ‘could 
quite cheerfully let £50 million go (even £100 million might be contemplated 
without serious risk to the gold standard)’.299  The implication of Hawtrey’s 
argument being that the Treasury was falling down in its responsibilities to the 
nation by failing to step in and prevent the Bank from tightening monetary 
policy. 
    Marginal comments by Leith-Ross indicate a dismissive attitude within the 
Treasury towards Hawtrey on these points.  On the question of the Treasury’s 
powers over the Bank, Hawtrey does seem to be invoking an obscure clause of a 
nineteenth century Act of Parliament which was at variance with almost a 
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century of central bank practice.  On this particular point Leith-Ross’s marginal 
commentary does not seem unreasonable: 
 
The Treasury can only be justified in using this power (a) for a 
temporary emergency or (b) on condition that Bank rate was 
raised to such a point as to cause the excess issue to be 
retrieved.  It is nonsense to speak of this power as one that 
could be used to keep Bank rate at 4 per cent.  The only result 
will be to accelerate the weakness of sterling with the result 
either that we should have to go off gold or that we should in 
the end have to restrict credit much more violently than if it had 
been taken in hand at the time [underlinings in the original].300  
 
In suggesting that the Bank of England could ‘quite cheerfully’ lose up to £100 
million of gold without undue concern, Hawtrey was pursuing his own economic 
model within which he believed that the export of gold abroad would encourage 
credit expansion and price rises abroad.  This, he believed, would bring foreign 
prices into line with home prices without the need for the deflationary measures 
which would be needed if the Bank of England insisted on maintaining the 
prevailing level of reserves.  Holding this view, it can be seen that Hawtrey’s 
thinking was very much in line with that of Keynes’s as expressed in The 
Economic Consequences of Mr. Churchill – undoubtedly to the chagrin of both 
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Niemeyer and Leith-Ross.   Leith-Ross had no great pretension to be an 
economist, but he saw fit to pour scorn on such ideas as he continued to scribble 
marginal notes with his pencil. 
 
This is bunkum.  The actual gold is not of importance but the 
fact that it goes is of importance as indicating an unsound 
position.  The gold is like the canary in the submarine.  It doesn’t 
matter if it dies: but if you don’t bring the submarine up when 
this happens, you remain submerged for ever.301
 
Frederick Leith-Ross was the Treasury’s Deputy Controller of Finance from 1925 
to 1932.  He was an ambitious civil servant who ‘aspired to fill Niemeyer’s 
shoes.’302  With Niemeyer’s transference to the Bank of England in 1927 Leith-
Ross was overlooked for the position of Controller of Finance in favour of Sir 
Richard Hopkins who had been head of the Inland Revenue.  Leith-Ross seemed 
to resent this appointment and Clarke suggests that there was a suppressed 
rivalry between the two men.303  Between 1922 to 1927, nearly all the direct 
communication from the Treasury to the Chancellor had been through Niemeyer.  
After 1927 a fair proportion of the memoranda from the Treasury to the 
Chancellor came from Leith-Ross.  This internal Treasury rivalry was only 
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resolved in 1932 when Leith-Ross was appointed to the position of ‘Chief 
Economic Advisor to His Majesty’s Government’.  In this new role his 
responsibility was to the Cabinet rather than to Chancellor of the Exchequer (he, 
himself, described this title as a misnomer in that he was not an economist and 
he was principally engaged in economic diplomacy).304  In 1968 Leith-Ross 
published an autobiography, Money Talks; Fifty Years of International Finance.305  
It is an exercise in self-justification and name-dropping.  It includes unabridged 
copies of letters from, amongst others, Churchill, Snowden, Keynes and Margot 
Oxford (wife of Asquith), all complementing him on the quality of his work.  
Despite working with him closely, as a Treasury colleague for twenty three years, 
Hawtrey doesn’t merit even a single mention. 
    Hawtrey’s memorandum, suggesting that the Treasury might have a measure 
of responsibility in the matter of Bank rate, caused a stir of activity.  It provoked 
Niemeyer (still Controller of Finance at the Treasury) to write to two former Joint 
Permanent Secretaries to the Treasury, Chalmers and Bradbury, to enquire if 
they regarded Bank rate as a matter for Treasury concern.  Bradbury replied on 
6 December 1925 and Chalmers replied the following day.  Both informed 
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Niemeyer that it was not the practice of the Bank either to consult the Treasury 
or to inform it beforehand of variations in Bank rate.306  
    During the mid-1920s criticisms of the Gold Standard and its workings, by 
such as Keynes and Hawtrey, were isolated events.  There was no great general 
feeling of discontent.  If, to Pigou, the period of Baldwin’s second administration 
represented ‘the doldrums’, to A.J.P.Taylor they were ‘five quiet years, with one 
alarming, and perhaps unnecessary interruption: the General Strike’.307  He 
perceived a sense of harmony between the Conservative and Labour leaderships: 
‘Baldwin would have been at home leading the Labour Party, and MacDonald . . . 
was well suited to lead the Conservatives’.308  Unemployment over this period, 
despite booming world trade, stabilised at around 10 per cent of insured 
workers.309  But for most workers in secure employment the times were good.  
Even if wages were no more than static, between 1924 and 1929 the index of 
wholesale commodity prices fell by 17 per cent while the cost of living fell by 
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over 6 per cent.310  Thus, for the majority of the population, standards of living 
were rising whilst they read about unemployment in the newspapers.  The gold 
standard was not a big issue, nor did it arouse strong passions.  Taylor’s view 
was that the restoration of gold was a half-hearted measure, since it no longer 
involved the use of gold coinage – ‘men with gold in their purses had taken the 
gold standard seriously . . . [but now] . . . it was easy to guess which would win 
if it came to a clinch between Gold Standard and standard of life.’311   
    In this becalmed situation, economic debate also tended to stagnate.  Keynes 
sensed that the British economy was ensnared between two sets of rigidly 
unadjustable prices – labour and gold – which would inevitably lead to higher 
unemployment when booming world trade began to subside.  He was to spend 
the years of the ‘doldrums’ preparing his next major text, A Treatise on Money, a 
text which, in the end, assumed the gold standard as given, but included a raft 
of ingenious devices, of which public works was only one, by which Britain might 
co-exist with the gold standard.312  The novelties of his economics at this time 
were inextricably intertwined with his efforts on behalf of the Lloyd George 
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Liberals.  At the Treasury, Hawtrey saw no need for such novelties.  He had 
rounded on the monetary authorities for raising Bank rate to 5 per cent at the 
end of 1925 and for the next four years, in a stream of memoranda, he 
continued to preach the efficacy of cheap money.   
     The price of money remained relatively stable during this period.  It stayed at 
5 per cent from 3 December 1925 until 21 April 1927, a period of seventy-two 
weeks.  For an even longer period, ninety four weeks, Bank rate remained at 4.5 
per cent from 21 April 1927 until 7 February 1929.  At this point the frenzy of 
speculation on the New York stock market encouraged speculators to use sterling 
to withdraw gold, with which they proceeded to purchase dollars in order to buy 
escalating stocks.  The loss of gold caused the Bank of England to raise Bank 
rate once more – to 5.5 per cent on 7 February 1929, and further to 6.5 per cent 
on 26 September 1929.   
   Typical of Hawtrey’s writings during this period was his response to a Times 
leader, ‘Monetary Outlook’, on 17 March 1927 (this leader happened to be 
published only four days before the reduction in Bank rate from 5 per cent to 4.5 
per cent).313  The article suggested that ‘all monetary signs point[ed] to a 
continuance of credit stringency for some time to come’.314  It gave four reasons 
for this analysis.  First, an unfavourable exchange with New York, with the pound 
pressing hard against the lower limit of its gold-points [under the gold standard 
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with both pound and dollar tied to fixed weights of gold, if exchange dealers 
offered less than $4.867/£, it became advantageous to convert pounds to gold, 
then export the gold to convert to dollars in America; the shipping cost setting a 
low limit of $4.86656 below which the pound could not fall].  Secondly, there had 
recently been an increase in bank advances which had depleted bank reserves.  
Thirdly, New York had put out a statement indicating that its re-discount rate 
would not be reduced for some time to come.  Fourthly, the spread of the use of 
the gold standard, particularly to India, had increased world demand for gold, 
raising its price and lowering the price of all other commodities in relation to gold 
and the currencies which were tied to gold.  The article concluded that ‘a 
lowering of the official minimum would merely increase the demand, while at the 
same time diminishing supply through the withdrawal of foreign balances, which 
would lead to a further loss of gold to the Bank, thereby restricting current 
supplies at a moment when an enlarged gold stock is desirable in order to 
broaden the basis of credit’.315
    The Times article provoked Hawtrey to send a memorandum to Niemeyer.316  
Marginal comments by Niemeyer once more show differences of view between 
Hawtrey and his senior colleagues.  Hawtrey viewed the Times article with 
concern. 
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City Notes of the Times are often highly authoritative, and the 
opening paragraphs yesterday (17th March), if they are to be 
taken as an indication of the policy which is to be pursued in the 
City, are extremely disquieting. . . . With regard to the 
unfavourable New York exchange, the bank has now been trying 
to correct it by means of a 5 per cent bank rate (with one short 
interval) for two years.  It has accomplished very nearly nothing 
[Hawtrey’s underlining], and at the same time has brought about 
all the disastrous consequences of falling prices and depressed 
trade.317
 
Hawtrey’s opinion that the 5 per cent Bank rate had achieved ‘very nearly 
nothing’ obviously jarred with Niemeyer, and caused him to add in the margin 
that ‘it had practically kept the exchange within the gold-points’.  Niemeyer, 
along with the Governor of the Bank of England, obviously believed that if Bank 
rate had been lower, then the rush to take and export gold would have been so 
great that the Bank of England would have been left with nothing to protect the 
value of the pound.  Hawtrey continued to believe that the loss of gold from 
London to the rest of the world would have encouraged lower interest rates and 
credit expansion throughout the world, with foreign prices rising to British levels.  
His confidence in London’s power to sway the rest of the world in this direction 
remained unabated.   
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    He went on to repeat very similar advice to that which he had given over 
eighteen months previously, when Bank rate had been increased to 5 per cent 
on 3 December 1925: 
 
A loss of gold arising either from the withdrawal of foreign balances or 
from Indian currency policy, is not evidence of an unsound currency 
position here. . . . We ought to be able to face withdrawals of that 
kind with complete equanimity.  To say that gold withdrawals would 
‘restrict credit supplies when an enlarged gold stock is desirable in 
order to broaden the basis of credit’, is an amazing confusion. 
 
The confusion, to Hawtrey, was that the Times, presumably following the ‘rules 
of the gold standard game’, believed that the only basis upon which credit could 
be extended was by the Bank of England increasing its gold deposits – and this 
required higher interest rates.  To Hawtrey this was nonsense; the only way in 
which manufacturers and traders could be encouraged to take on credit with 
which to invest was through lower interest rates.  Niemeyer seemed to see 
nothing wrong in the statement of the ‘Times’, adding that it might be ‘clumsily 
expressed: but surely axiomatic’.318  As Hawtrey continued with his theme, 
pointing out that a stock of gold ‘is of no value whatever . . . [and] . . . cannot 
broaden the basis of credit in any way, except by leading to a reduction of 
discount rates’, Niemeyer underlined the word ‘except’ with the comment 
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‘exactly’ in the margin.  The Treasury Controller of Finance was clearly a believer 
in the ‘long run’; that low interest rates and credit expansion could only come 
after a prolonged period of high interest rates to garner the necessary gold.  
    Hawtrey dismissed concerns over the Bank of England’s gold stock, and the 
view that it was insufficient. 
 
Insufficient for what?  If the Cunliffe Committee recommended 
that we should hold £150 millions of gold, that was with a view 
to its being used [again, Hawtrey’s underlining].  They 
repeatedly contemplated contingencies in which the entire gold 
reserve might be used up, and they recommended the power of 
suspending the limit of the fiduciary issue of the Bank of England 
should be retained. 
    It may be that the occasion for really drawing deeply on a 
reserve of £150 millions only comes once in a generation, 
perhaps only once in a century.  But it has come now.319
 
It is easy to see how such views could cause disquiet amongst the men of sound 
finance at the Bank of England and in the higher reaches of the Treasury.  
Nevertheless, three days after Hawtrey’s memorandum the Bank rate was 
reduced from 5 per cent to 4.5 per cent. 
    Hawtrey, no less than Keynes, saw the reduction of unemployment as the 
paramount concern of economic policy at this time.  And, like Keynes, he 
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believed that lack of investment was the root cause of unemployment.  Keynes 
had warned against restoration of the gold standard at its pre-war parity because 
he believed it implied a period of deflation with high interest rates in order to 
bring home and foreign prices into line.  Hawtrey’s response to ‘Mr. Churchill’s 
Exercise’ on the gold standard was the most reserved of the replies, suggesting 
that going off gold would be preferable to the harmful effects of a prolonged 
period of high interest rates.  For some time after the restoration of gold, both 
Hawtrey and Keynes continued to criticise the monetary authorities for the 
maintenance of high rates of interest.  But Hawtrey continued to have faith in 
the power of the Bank of England to influence world rates, and thus influence 
world trade.  He believed that if the Bank had the necessary courage it would cut 
its rates, and in the process stimulate both home and international trade – thus 
public investment was an unnecessary and, largely, wasteful exercise.  The 
parting of the ways for the two men came largely because Keynes perceived that 
the war had financially enfeebled Britain to such an extent that it could no longer 
impose its interest rates on the rest of the world.  If Britain were to go down the 
road of lower interest rates then it may well do so alone, with loss of gold 
eventually forcing it off the gold standard.  Hawtrey may have been prepared to 
watch, with ‘equanimity’, as Britain’s gold disappeared and it was forced off the 
gold standard, but this was a step too far for Keynes.  He did not believe that 
interest rate reductions alone would provide the necessary investment to 
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overcome unemployment, and so alternative means of investment, such as 
public works, began to assume greater importance for him. 
    Hawtrey continued to press for radical new procedures which would give the 
authorities greater flexibility over credit policy.  In May 1927, as the moment for 
amalgamation of Bank and Treasury note issues approached, he produced a 
memorandum criticising the proposed continuation of the ancient system of a 
fixed fiduciary issue.320  He argued that that there was no need of legislation to 
either predetermine a fixed fiduciary issue, or a proportionate reserve system. 
 
There is no real need for the legislature to give any directions to 
the Bank of Issue except to maintain convertibility into gold.  In 
1844 that was not enough, because it was not clear by what 
practical measures that end was to be secured.  Now that the 
means are fully understood, Parliament can content itself with 
prescribing the end . . . The science of credit regulation has been 
explored and there is no reason why full responsibility should not 
be placed upon the bank as the technical organ of the 
community established for the purpose.321
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Within a decade, Hawtrey’s suggestion was to become standard practice, but 
Niemeyer, just about to move from Treasury to Bank, thought this radical idea 
‘far too theoretical: and dangerous for the Bank’.322  
    Between September 1928 and June 1929 Hawtrey took unpaid leave of 
absence from the Treasury to spend time as Visiting Professor of Economics at 
Harvard University.  Before departing for America he wrote a series of 
memoranda relating the British and American rates of interest which showed the 
extent of his disillusion with the way in which the restored gold standard was 
operating. 
    In a short memorandum on 1 February 1928 Hawtrey noted that whilst the 
London Bank rate had remained at either 5 per cent. or 4.5 per cent., the New 
York discount rate had remained below 4 per cent.   
 
    . . . two contrasted policies, credit restrictions in London and 
credit relaxation in New York.  The improvement of the sterling 
exchange is one of the consequences; dollars have been 
cheapened relatively to pounds.  On the whole also the 
corresponding contrast in the state of trade has continued; trade 
is active in America and depressed here.323
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The cheapening of dollars relative to the pound was, of course, severely limited 
by the operation of the gold standard.  Once the pound’s exchange rate 
exceeded $4.86656 beyond a given margin – the upper gold point – it became 
profitable to use dollars to purchase gold in New York and then ship it to London 
to exchange for pounds (the precise value of the gold points varied according to 
shipping and insurance costs at the time).  This was the outcome of the 
difference in the two rates of interest - New York lost gold to London.  To 
counteract this loss, on 3 February 1928, New York raised its rediscount rate to 4 
per cent. This was to be followed by the raising of the rediscount rate to 4.5 per 
cent. at the beginning of May of that year.  Hawtrey regarded this, at a time 
when complaints of depression were growing in America, as a series of 
disastrous moves, and evidence that London still had the power to influence 
world interest rates.  
 
In so far as the motive is the outflow of gold, the raising of the 
rediscount rates illustrates once again the disastrous effects of 
gold hunger.  Competitive demands for gold are being 
intensified.  When some countries start accumulating gold, 
others follow their example, and those with excessive stocks are 
reluctant to part with it.  The safeguards recommended at Genoa 
against this calamitous train of events have never been 
adopted.324
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Hawtrey despaired of the situation, since the rise in American rates implied an 
intensification of the scramble for gold.  He continued to believe that the Bank of 
England still possessed the power to take a lead and, by lowering its own rate, 
bring down interest rates world-wide.  His own ‘Genoa Resolutions’, back in 
1923, had provided for a convention of central banks which would co-operate 
and co-ordinate their interest rates in order to stabilise the world value of gold 
and avoid the unseemly scramble for the metal which was now in evidence.  But 
he began to increasingly recognise that the Bank and the Government had 
painted themselves into a corner.  While, he believed, they might still have the 
economic muscle to reverse the world-wide growth in interest rates, it was 
politically impossible for them to reverse their existing policies.  They were in a 
corner from which there was no escape.  Some of these views were expressed in 
a memorandum which he produced for the Treasury in July 1928, immediately 
prior to his departure for America. 
 
Probably therefore we have to look forward not to a rise but to a 
fall in the world price level. . . . increased credit pressure will 
become necessary to maintain the gold standard.  We must look 
forward to increased unemployment, increased budget deficits, 
renewed industrial unrest. . . . A reversal of policy would be hard 
to explain. . . . how can we justify a resort to cheap money at 
the very time when the exchange moves against us . . . . such a 
change would be regarded as a confession of error . . . . the 
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Government as well as the Bank will be open to accusations of 
having miscalculated.325  
 
It was, incidentally, in this memorandum that Hawtrey introduced an idea which 
was to echo down through the following years. 
 
It is possible for industry to get into a position of temporary 
equilibrium while seriously underemployed, and to remain so for 
a considerable time.  Demand and supply, being equally 
restricted, balance.326  
 
The years 1925-28 were depressing years for Hawtrey, and he probably looked 
forward with relative optimism to his year away from the Treasury, at Harvard.   
    There seems to have been no attempt to replace him by appointing an acting 
Director of Financial Enquiries during his nine months’ secondment.  His absence 
gave rise to a number of concerns, but the non-existence of a professional 
economist within the Treasury does not seem to have been one of them.  
Hawtrey’s own overriding concern seems to have been that his forthcoming year 
should count towards his pensionable service.  Despite considerable 
correspondence between Hawtrey and Mr. Rae of the Civil Service staffing 
section no such allowance could be offered.  In order to minimise the loss to his 
pension rights, therefore, Hawtrey attended the Treasury up to the 14 
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September, before sailing to America on the 15 September 1928.  By doing this 
he was able to use his annual leave for part of his time at Harvard, and in 
consequence his period of special leave did not start until 1 November 1928.327  
He took similar measures to minimise the loss to his pension rights on returning: 
 
With reference to my forthcoming visit to America . . . I 
understand that I will be able to return at the beginning of June . 
. . I propose that my special leave should end at the end of May 
and that I should count the week or two that will intervene 
before I actually attend at the Treasury as part of the annual 
leave . . . [for] . . . 1928-9.  Will this be all right?328
 
It seems to have been ‘all right’ since a subsequent note from the staffing 
section accountant to the Treasury advised that ‘Mr. R.G.Hawtrey has been 
granted special leave of absence without pay from 1 November 1928 to 31 May 
1929’.329   The only areas which the Treasury seemed concerned about were his 
absences from certain standing committees, and his failure to complete the 
Treasury’s First World War Book.  On the second matter, Mr. Rae was given to 
write to the Treasury, rather stiffly, regarding Hawtrey. 
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In 1921 he was appointed Chairman of the Treasury War Book 
Committee. . . . The Committee has not so far reported and I 
have occasionally drawn Mr. Hawtrey’s attention to the fact.330
 
Despite assurances from Sir Richard Hopkins to Mr. Rae that Hawtrey had this 
matter in hand, there is no evidence that any Treasury World War I record was 
ever compiled (giving a little irony to Hawtrey’s subsequent appointment to write 
the Treasury’s World War II history).  The other area of concern regarding 
Hawtrey’s absence was his membership of various Civil Service standing 
committees – The Organising Committee on War Risks Insurance, The Standing 
Committee on Blockade and Enemy Trading, The Air Risks Insurance Committee 
and the Committee on Emergency Legislation in Time of War.  Once it was 
established that David Waley, an assistant secretary within the Treasury, was 
prepared to represent the Treasury on these committees for the period of 
Hawtrey’s absence, then there was no further problem regarding his period of 
secondment.331
     During Hawtrey’s absence, the advice on financial matters which he might 
have been expected to undertake was taken on outside the Financial Enquiries 
section, much of it by Frederick Phillips, who had been appointed principal 
assistant secretary within the Treasury in 1927.  It was a time during which the 
                                                 
 
330 Ibid., Letter from Mr. J.Rae to Sir Richard Hopkins, 15 July 1928. 
 
331 Ibid., Letter from Mr. J.Rae to Sir Richard Hopkins, 31 July 1928. 
 218
Treasury’s new leadership team with a new leadership style began to emerge – a 
team with a style that would take the Treasury through the 1930’s. 
    In 1927 Sir Otto Niemeyer, formidable defender of ‘sound’ financial policies 
and Churchill’s ‘minder’ during the return to gold, had resigned from the post of 
Controller of Finance at the Treasury to take up a position at the Bank of 
England.  After his rapid rise through the Civil Service ranks he had found his 
way to further promotion blocked by Sir Warren Fisher, who as Permanent 
Secretary and Head of the Civil Service was a mere four years older.  After over 
two years dealing with Churchill as Chancellor, he had also had enough of 
Winston’s unpredictability and rudeness towards his officials.  For his part, 
Churchill was not unhappy to see Niemeyer go; privately he had had strong 
reservations about returning to the gold standard and resented the feeling that 
he had been manipulated in the matter by Niemeyer and Norman.  Niemeyer 
was to remain at the Bank from 1927 until 1965, where every morning he could 
be observed walking up Threadneedle Street ‘with an expression on his face that 
suggested that if he had come up against a brick wall he would have walked 
straight through it’.332   
    Niemeyer’s replacement as Treasury Controller of Finance was Sir Richard 
Hopkins who had previously been Chairman of the Board of Inland Revenue.  
After King Edward’s School, Birmingham, he had studied History and Classics at 
Emmanuel College, Cambridge, before entering the Inland Revenue.  He was as 
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pragmatic regarding policy as Niemeyer had been dogmatic.  On transferring to 
the Treasury he read widely on economic matters.  He retired from the Treasury 
(as Permanent Secretary) in 1945, and his idea of retirement was, that year, to 
read through Keynes General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money – 
twice!  He was interested in all aspects of economic theory, and was a member 
of the ‘Tuesday Club’ which brought City men, journalists, civil servants, 
academics (and Keynes) together to debate economic matters, but he 
nevertheless remained sceptical about the practical value of theory.  Hopkins’s 
touchstone for pursuing any particular policy was not whether it could be 
justified by recourse to one or other economic theory, but whether it was 
administratively feasible.  During the hearings of the Macmillan Committee he 
successfully re-orientated the Treasury’s arguments against loan-financed public 
works away from theoretical concerns over the ‘crowding out’ of private 
investment by public investment towards the administrative problems inherent in 
government sponsorship of public works.   
    Hopkins was a popular man with an impish sense of humour.  He accepted 
the soubriquet of ‘Hoppy’ and most of his correspondents prefaced their letters 
with ‘My Dear Hoppy’ – Keynes refrained from this familiarity until  after he had 
shared a working lunch with Hopkins on 1 November 1939, whereupon he, too, 
relaxed his form of address.  In an early biography of Keynes, Sir Roy Harrod 
described Hopkins as someone ‘who might be taken for an ancient sage, who 
had somehow been wafted through the centuries to give wise counsel to a half-
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baked generation’.333  Lionel Robbins described Hopkins as ‘diminutive in stature, 
with the general appearance of an extremely intelligent monkey, on the general 
subject of government finance he was an intellectual match for anyone of his 
generation’.334  Hopkins is credited with persuading Keynes, during the 1930s, 
that practical and administrative feasibility must be considered alongside 
economic theory as determinants of economic policy.  Sir Thomas Padmore, war-
time Principal Private Secretary to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, once 
remarked that ‘Keynes would talk to anyone, but he would listen to Hopkins’.335  
    The ‘rising star’ of the Treasury at this time was Frederick Phillips.  Phillips had 
attended Aske’s School in London and then, like Hopkins, Emmanuel College, 
Cambridge, where he read Mathematics.  He had entered the Treasury in 1908, 
and though he had read a wide range of books on economics he never 
considered himself an economist (Phillips was to later tell an internal Treasury 
organisational enquiry in 1937 that he could not do without Hawtrey, since 
Hawtrey understood professional economists in a way that he did not, so that he 
could make intelligible what other economists were advising).336  Peden 
describes Phillips as being ‘inarticulate in conversation, although lucid on 
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paper’.337  His characteristic response to every comment might have been a 
grunt, but his memoranda display a powerful analytical mind capable of taking 
scattered, diffuse arguments, sweeping away irrelevancies, posing the essential 
issues and expressing clear, balanced judgements on them.  Phillips died, still 
relatively young at the age of 58, in 1943 and Keynes, who had grown to admire 
him, wrote an obituary on him in which he described him as ‘a formidable figure 
who hated fluffy thinking’.338  From Hopkins’s appointment as Controller of 
Finance in 1927 he increasingly turned to Phillips for advice.  Leith-Ross 
remained, somewhat uncomfortably, from the Niemeyer regime, but when he 
was found an alternative position, in 1932, Phillips was promoted to the position 
of Deputy Controller of Finance. 
    Thus, while Hawtrey was in America a new structure was beginning to take 
shape within the Finance Section of the Treasury.  A new leadership team was 
settling in; a team which, whilst generally sceptical about the value of economic 
theory, was nevertheless not wedded to the nineteenth-century canons of sound 
finance, but prepared to give consideration to the merits of new theoretical 
developments. For a time, this new team operated without the assistance of 
Hawtrey. 
    This newly-emerging team was called upon to give advice to Churchill on 19 
January 1929 when Keynes published an article in the Nation and Athenaeum in 
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which he expressed concern about the adequacy of the world’s stock of gold 
available for central banks to meet their international payments.  Keynes’s 
argument had been that since, by laws and regulations, central banks were 
required to keep a stipulated quantity of gold locked away in proportion of their 
note issue any attempts by the central banks to increase credit in order to 
alleviate unemployment necessitated, by law, that they should increase their gold 
reserves – leaving insufficient gold for the transaction of international business.  
This was driving up the price of gold and driving up the value of currencies tied 
to gold in relation to other commodities – hence driving down the money value 
of other goods and contributing towards deflation.  His thesis had been that the 
requirement by the central banks to hold gold in proportion to their note issue, 
generally 30 to 40 per cent, was a useless convention. 
    Only a few months previously, Hawtrey, as the Treasury’s Director of Financial 
Enquiries, had penned a memorandum deploring the intensification of the 
competition for the world’s gold.  Hawtrey’s argument was so close to that of 
Keynes that it is difficult to see how Hawtrey, asked to comment on Keynes’s 
article, could have shown any great measure of dissension.  Hawtrey would, 
without doubt, have reiterated the need for co-operation between central banks, 
along the lines of the Genoa Resolutions, in order to stabilise the demand for 
gold.  In the absence of such co-operation he would have urged the Bank of 
England to set the agenda for world interest rates by aggressively reducing bank 
rate.  In the event of loss of gold he would have recommended that the Treasury 
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use its powers to permit the issue of notes in excess of the prescribed fiduciary 
limit, just as his mentor, Bradbury, had done during the 1914 crisis.339  In 
Hawtrey’s absence, Hopkins forwarded comments from Phillips and himself to 
the Chancellor, Churchill, on 31 January 1929.  Their comments are included 
here as indicative of new emphases and a new style. 
    Phillips’s produced a characteristically measured document under numbered 
points.340  Firstly, by citing an article which Keynes had written in the Nation on 
2 February 1924, urging the United States to ‘buy all the mines in Africa and 
cement them down securely’ since the excessive supply of gold was about to 
cause rampant inflation, Phillips painted Keynes as an obsessive who moved 
excessively between extreme positions.  Phillips then proceeded to depict Keynes 
as an alarmist by taking the figures in his article – a 2 per cent annual increase in 
the world’s output of gold whilst the annual increase in the world’s demand for 
gold for monetary purposes was 3 per cent – and argued that, even if these 
figures were correct they implied a fall in world prices of only 1 per cent, which 
was far smaller than variations in world prices due to non-monetary causes.  As 
regards the scramble for gold amongst the central banks, Phillips pointed out 
that in the previous year, 1928, the United States had, in fact, released £31 
millions of gold reserves, and as for Keynes suggestion that gold might be 
released from the central banks in order to check its tendency to appreciate, 
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Phillips agreed that ‘in theory’ this problem might be solved, be he remained a 
pragmatist. 
 
A release of gold by the Central Banks, unless it were of minute 
dimensions, is a potent cause of inflation. . . . the difficulty in 
practice is to detect and measure a minute change in prices due 
to a deficiency in gold, and second how to apply a remedy which 
is not ten or a hundred times too powerful.341
 
Hopkins added his customary words of wisdom to Phillips’s memorandum – 
‘[Keynes’s] argument rest[ed] on the belief that Central Banks would behave 
better if less restricted by law.  This may be so but the picture of a Bank of 
France bursting to be generous with its gold but restrained by law is not 
convincing’.342  He made two particular criticisms of Keynes’s article, pointing 
out, firstly, that Keynes’s description of the locking away of gold being ‘merely a 
ritual observance’ was untrue since this gold was a second-line reserve which 
could be used for trading purposes in an emergency; secondly, he took the 
opportunity to gainsay Keynes’s accusation that the Bank of England had been 
greedy in their accumulation of gold, pointing out that the Cunliffe Committee 
had recommended a gold reserve of £150 millions, and this remained the Bank’s 
holding. 
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 This country, still the monetary centre of the world, liable to be 
drawn upon not only from all European quarters, but from North 
and South American quarters as well, liable to feel the 
repercussions of monetary disturbances in any part of the world, 
- disturbances accentuated by the proportional reserve adopted 
by most countries but eschewed by ourselves – is content with 
about £150 millions of gold.  The United States have three and a 
half times that amount, an excess accounted for neither by 
population nor by needs.  France with about the same population 
has 70 per cent. more gold . . . . Wherever the greed for gold 
may have been manifested, it has not been manifested here.343
 
Hopkins acknowledged that there was ‘undoubtedly’ something to be said about 
Keynes’s thesis, but that a ‘slight diminution in the reserves of those countries 
whose proportions are highest and a gradual substitution . . . of the holding of 
foreign currencies in place of gold seem to be the natural remedies’ (the 
influence of Hawtrey’s Genoa Resolutions can be seen here).344  In the mean 
time, Hopkins recommended that, while the matter was looked at by the League 
of Nations’ Economic Committee, suspicions of foreign central banks could best 
be allayed by everyone, including Keynes, saying as little as possible about the 
matter in public.  Neither Hopkins nor Phillips resorted to quoting the canons of 
‘sound finance’, but challenged Keynes on his assumptions and the justification 
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of his conclusions.  Hopkins in particular was prepared to acknowledge the 
justification of Keynes’s case whilst questioning the wisdom of his approach.      
    This was a new style of regime, with a special competence of its own, to 
which Hawtrey had to accommodate as he returned from Harvard in June 1929.  
On appointment to his post, back in 1919, the Treasury Controller of Finance had 
been Sir Basil Blackett.  To a degree, Blackett, like Hawtrey, had been a protege 
of Sir John Bradbury up to the time when Bradbury relinquished the position of 
Joint Permanent Secretary to the Treasury in 1919.  Blackett had continued to 
encourage Hawtrey after the latter’s appointment as Director of Financial 
Enquiries.   
    Blackett’s successor, the austere but capable Niemeyer, gave some support to 
Hawtrey’s early plans, such as his gold shipment recommendations, but ignored, 
and even derided, Hawtrey’s later memoranda appealing for lower interest rates 
and extension of credit.  The extent of the eventual polarisation of the positions 
of Niemeyer and Hawtrey can be seen in Niemeyer’s evidence to the Macmillan 
Committee on Finance and Industry (by which time, of course, he was at the 
Bank of England): he expressed the view that Britain should have returned to 
gold ‘at a higher rather than a lower parity’ and that the joint-stock banks had 
been ‘too ready to help industry’.345   
    Hawtrey left Harvard to return to work with the newly-settled Treasury team, 
as well as minimise his pension losses, in June 1929, just before a major 
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financial crisis was about to unfold.  His return coincided with the formation of 
Ramsay MacDonald’s Second Labour Government and the replacement of 
Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer by Philip Snowden.  The Great Crash of 
October 1929, on the New York Stock Market, was still some months away.  
Deflationary forces, concealed by the world boom, had been in existence for 
some time; notably the falling prices of primary commodities in primary-
producing countries due to their relative overproduction.  The New York crash 
was but one of the symptoms of wider deflationary forces that were at work. The 
Great Crash destroyed confidence.  It also brought about a liquidity crisis.  Much 
of the share speculation had been with the aid of bank loans – loans which the 
borrowers hoped to repay when the shares had been re-sold at a profit.  When 
the profits never materialised the banks were left with outstanding loans which 
the borrowers could not repay: many banks were forced into closure whilst many 
others had to severely restrict their lending. 
    The crash brought one kind of relief to Britain.  The process of withdrawing 
gold to purchase dollars, and thence shares, was stopped in its tracks.  The Bank 
of England was at last able to respond to critics of its high Bank rate.  The rate 
was reduced by stages from 6.5 per cent on 31 October 1929 to 2.5 per cent on 
14 May 1931.346  It was constrained by the slow rate at which the U.S. Federal 
Reserve was prepared to lower its interest rates in response to American 
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deflation.  The clamp shackling the two sets of interest rates together was, of 
course, the gold standard system, and Britain’s desperation to remain on it. 
    The Bank probably would have wished to drive interest rates down faster and 
further, but it was restricted by the developing problem of Britain’s balance of 
payments.347  Deflation in primary-producing countries and the fall in demand 
from the United States reduced demand for British manufactured goods.  An 
adverse balance of payments replaced Wall Street speculation as the cause of 
the haemorrhaging of gold.  The current balance on foreign trade peaked, at a 
surplus of £124 million, in 1928 and then progressively deteriorated to a deficit in 
excess of £100 million in 1931.348  The Bank was in the position of having to 
maintain its gold reserves by attracting short-term funds to Britain – something it 
was only able to do by maintaining its short-term interest rates above those of 
New York.   
    Reflecting on this situation, in 1937, Hawtrey was convinced that it provided a 
validation of his sustained appeal for lower interest rates – irrespective of the 
loss of gold: 
 
The conclusion to be drawn is that the Bank of England ought to 
have been willing to let gold go [Hawtrey’s italics].  It ought in 
fact to have been willing to do so at any time since the return to 
the gold standard.  If it could only retain its gold by a recourse to 
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deflationary measures, and could not otherwise maintain the 
gold standard, then either the return to the gold standard was 
premature or the restoration of the former parity was a mistake.  
It is, I think, not unreasonable to hold that a policy of cheap 
money and credit relaxation from the beginning would have had 
a favourable effect on economic activity throughout the world in 
1925, and would have made the task of retaining the Bank of 
England’s gold quite easy. But even if that had not been so, and 
credit relaxation had been found to involve a serious outflow of 
gold, an acquiescence of that outflow would have afforded the 
best prospect of maintaining the gold standard. 
    Even in 1929 it was not too late . . .349  
 
The central issue to the Labour Chancellor of the Exchequer, Snowden, was 
confidence.  If the Government were perceived to be spending an amount 
greater than its revenues, then two fears arose: that the government would have 
to resort to printing paper pounds out of proportion to its gold reserves, and thus 
be unable to guarantee the gold value of the currency;  that the consequent 
increase in the money supply would draw in excessive imports, exacerbate the 
balance of payments deficit, and deplete the Bank of England’s gold reserves – 
casting even more doubt on the Bank’s ability to maintain sterling’s fixed value 
against gold.   
    With confidence being the issue, very few dared mention the option of 
devaluation, or departing from the gold standard.  Not even Keynes.  During the 
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Macmillan Committee discussions, Keynes was moved to express the opinion 
that: 
 
. . . I should not recommend going off the gold standard at this 
moment; not until I had tried other expedients, but I should not 
have complete confidence in the efficacy of these alternatives.  
Meanwhile I think the dangers of going off are such, that I would 
not even talk about it.350
 
There was a very small number of exceptions.  In the summer of 1930, Professor 
G. C. Allen canvassed a large group of economists on their views on the gold 
standard.  He encountered only two who considered devaluation a permissible 
option – ‘J. W. F. Rowe of Cambridge University and R. G. Hawtrey of the 
Treasury’.351
    For some time prior to Britain’s gold standard exit, Hawtrey had refused to 
support any memorandum which implied an attempt to maintain the value of 
sterling at $4.86.  Writing in 1939, he noted that ‘premonitory symptoms’ of a 
doubt as to the continuance of the gold standard were already appearing in 
February 1931 when forward quotations of the pound on the foreign exchanges 
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fell below the gold export point – people, in effect, were undertaking three 
months hence, to buy dollars when the cost of the dollars would exceed the 
combined value of the pounds surrendered and the cost of shipping the 
equivalent gold from London.352  Misgivings about Britain’s willingness to make 
the efforts to maintain the gold standard were manifesting themselves.  
According to Hawtrey the reason for the failure of the gold standard lay deeper 
than either foreign bank failure or a deteriorating balance of payments: 
 
The cause of the failure of the gold standard was simple.  It was 
the appreciation of gold in terms of wealth.  Gold had not 
supplied a stable unit for the measurement of values. . . . the 
immediate cause of the crisis, it is true, was the withdrawal of 
foreign money, first from Austria and Germany and then from 
England.  But that was the result of distrust, and that distrust 
was directly due to the appreciation of gold. . . . It was the same 
fall in prices that had caused in Great Britain the unemployment, 
the shrinkage of exports and the budget deficits.353
 
As ever, Hawtrey felt that the central Banks had been culpable because they 
reinforced falls in world prices by their dear money policies – policies which were 
designed with the sole purpose of retaining as much as possible of the 
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appreciating metal.  He harked back, yet again, to the lost opportunities afforded 
by the Genoa resolutions:     
 
The responsibility of central Banks for determining the wealth-
value of gold had been recognised at the Genoa conference, but 
by 1929 the Conference had been forgotten and the 
responsibility disclaimed.  The central banks had reverted to the 
ideas of the nineteenth century gold standard, which limited their 
responsibility to restraining the expansion of credit whenever it 
outran the gold reserves.  Here was an objective which made no 
demands on the reasoning faculty; it could be treated as an 
article of faith.354
 
    As a final comment upon this act of faith Hawtrey permitted himself the 
indulgence of a short parable. 
 
    A man once set his dog to guard his clothes whilst bathing.  
Unfortunately the dog did not recognise his master naked, and 
guarded the clothes too faithfully.  The man remained 
disconsolate and deflated; the dog barked and the caravan could 
not go on.355   
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                                         Chapter 4 
 
 
                      Unemployment and the Liberal Plan 
 
                                      
                                        1928-1930 
 
 
 
To Hawtrey, the reason for the unemployment of the 1920s was straightforward 
– and consistent with his theory of currency and credit.  Unemployment was due 
to lack of effective demand; effective demand could only be increased by 
extension of credit; high interest rates were a barrier to the extension of credit.  
He devoted a large section of his historical study A Century of Bank Rate to 
tracing the close relationship between Bank rate and the ensuing trade activity. 
    Edward Heath once criticised Nigel Lawson for being a ‘one-club chancellor’; 
likening his one tool of economic policy, the raising or lowering of interest rates, 
to a golfer who attempted to play a round of golf with only a single club.  
Hawtrey was the original ‘one-club economist’.  Whether on, or off, the gold 
standard he regarded the manipulation of the Bank of England discount rate as 
the supreme instrument for controlling the economy.  When there was evidence 
of an impending downturn of trade then easing of the discount rate would ward 
off depression.  When there were signs of overheating, an early rise of the Bank 
rate would damp down any inflationary pressures.  Provided the monetary 
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authorities were vigilant and prompt, appropriate adjustment of Bank rate would 
see everything right. 
    Keynes was no such ‘one-club’ economist.  He proposed an array of measures.  
Different measures were required under a gold standard from times when it was 
absent.  To charges of inconsistency, he replied ‘If a situation changes, I change 
my mind; what do you do?’.  During the Macmillan Committee deliberations he 
identified no less than seven different classes of remedy for unemployment.  His 
favourite, government investment in public works, caused him frequently to 
cross swords with Hawtrey and the Treasury. 
       Between the onset of depression in 1922, and 1928, the demand, at a 
political level, for publicly funded works as a cure for unemployment remained 
muted.  From 1921 Lloyd George’s Liberal Summer Schools had discussed 
interventionist policies.  Keynes became involved with these Summer Schools, 
and in 1924 both he and Lloyd George produced articles advocating capital 
development programmes in Keynes’s journal, Nation and Atheneum.  The 
Nation did not have a mass circulation and Lloyd George, by then, was 
discredited and mistrusted politician. 
    The long political silence on public works as a means of alleviating 
unemployment was broken, by Keynes, on 31 July 1928.  He used the pages of 
the Evening Standard to attack Treasury policies in an article, ‘How to Organise a 
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Wave of Prosperity’.356  Keynes was in no doubt about the root cause of low 
business activity – the return to the gold standard at too high a level.  The 
Treasury copy of this article is heavily marked by officials, and the second 
paragraph below has been marked and initialled by Hawtrey. 
 
 . . . there can be no doubt about the explanation [for low 
business activity], it is as well to remind ourselves . . . Labour 
costs are exactly what they were three years ago . . . . 
    Meanwhile wholesale prices have fallen 9 per cent compared 
with 3 years ago and 13 per cent compared with 4 years ago, 
while the cost of living has fallen 5 per cent.  But many 
industries have not enough margin of profit to employ men at 
the same wages as before and to sell their products 5 to 10 per 
cent cheaper. . . . .  
    The fundamental blunder of the Bank of England has been 
due, from the beginning, to their belief that if they looked after 
the deflation of prices the deflation of costs would look after 
itself . . . it is extraordinarily difficult to deflate costs.357
 
Keynes argued that it was beyond the power of individual businesses to reduce 
unemployment; they needed supportive measures from Bank and Treasury.  He 
urged steps to increase credit and encouragement of capital projects by local 
authorities.   
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 When we have unemployed men and unemployed plant and 
more savings than we are using at home, it is utterly imbecile to 
say that we cannot afford these things . . .358
 
The phrase ‘more savings than we are using at home’ is underlined in pencil in 
the Treasury copy of the article, with a note by Leith-Ross asking ‘is this true?’  
On the following day Leith-Ross wrote to Hawtrey raising two points regarding 
Keynes’s article.  First he queried Keynes’s assertion that ‘Labour costs . . . are 
exactly what they were three years ago . . .’ – adding ‘I should have thought that 
the average wage rates showed a substantial decline during the past 4 years’.     
    Leith-Ross seems to have been making certain assumptions about the 
consequences of the outcome of the General Strike.  The outcome was generally 
seen as a defeat for labour, especially the miners, who were forced into 
returning to work at the reduced wages on offer - hence Leith-Ross’s assumption 
that the general level of wages was being forced down.  This was against the 
evidence of Bowley’s figures.  Laybourn has argued that strategically the General 
Strike acted in the long term interest of labour.  It acted as a warning shot 
across the bows of employers who might be tempted to adopt an over-
aggressive attitude towards wage reductions.  The level of wages, which had 
been falling rapidly before 1926, started to level off after the General Strike.359     
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    Secondly, Leith-Ross queried Keynes’s assertion on the excess of savings over 
investment and wanted Hawtrey’s view on Keynes’s statement that we ‘have 
more savings than we are using at home’ – again adding his own view that ‘this 
seems to be sheer perversion of the facts’.360  Hawtrey replied, on 4 August 
1928, by drawing Leith-Ross’s attention to ‘Bowley’s index of wages’ which 
showed that there had been ‘no appreciable variation since 1924’.361  Again, he 
assured Leith-Ross, that given the capital exports of £96 million in 1927, the 
statement of Keynes’s with regard to savings exceeding home-investment was 
also true. 
     The extent to which Keynes’s criticism stung the Treasury can be gained from 
the tone of the memorandum with which Leith-Ross responded on 3 August 
1928 – a memorandum rushed out before he had received Hawtrey’s answers to 
his queries. 
      
I am sorry to see that Keynes is renewing the Press propaganda 
which has done him little credit as a politician and considerable 
harm as an economist.362
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He blamed ‘political influences’ for counteracting economic forces ‘by means of 
subsidies’ for the failure to bring down wage rates, adding that by ‘paying the 
unemployed to remain idle rather than compete for jobs in the market, it tends 
to immobilise surplus labour . . . and to maintain wage rates at their existing 
levels . . .’363  He thought it ‘absurd of Keynes to suggest that we have savings 
which are available and not being used’.  He thought that inflation of bank credit 
could only encourage wage increases and excessive consumption, and that 
encouragement of local authority capital projects was ‘the same principle that 
the Soviet Government is trying’.  ‘More of the same’ seemed to be Leith-Ross’s 
only answer to the unemployment problem. 
    On 5 August 1928 Sir Richard Hopkins received a note from the Chief 
Secretary to the Treasury, Sir Warren Fisher, bearing an instruction from the 
Chancellor of the Exchequer (Churchill) - that ‘Sir Richard Hopkins, Mr. Leith-
Ross and Mr. Hawtrey study Keynes’s article . . . of last week, and to let him 
have . . . their observations’.  
    Leith-Ross toned down his original memorandum for Churchill’s consumption.  
He omitted his abusive references to Keynes and also his criticisms of the 
National Insurance scheme.  He paid no regard to Hawtrey’s reminder that 
Bowley’s index of wages had remained at the same level since 1924, but pointed 
out that ‘miners wages had been very definitely and drastically reduced’ – 
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against which someone has subsequently written ‘and the worst unemployment 
of all is in the coal industry’.364
    Hawtrey’s (relatively short) note to Churchill reiterated his long-held view that 
public spending on capital account could only increase employment if were to be 
accompanied by appropriate credit expansion, and the latter would in any case 
increase employment whether accompanied by increased public spending or not.  
If the loans to finance the public spending diminished the export of capital, then 
this would permit a credit expansion which would not otherwise be possible.  
Hawtrey expanded on this idea.   
 
If we started spending £60 million a year on capital works and 
thereby reduced our export of capital . . . imports and exports 
would have to be adjusted to the change in the balance of 
payments.  A part might be . . . the import of materials . . . for 
use in the capital works . . . . But only a fraction of the [£60 
million] could be disposed of in these ways. 
    Suppose that the discrepancy between the balance of trade 
and the balance of payment is thereby reduced to £50 million.  
Then there must be a sufficient monetary expansion so to 
increase the purchasing power of the community that additional 
imports to the amount of £50 million will be attracted. . . . With a 
given price level that would mean a substantial increase in 
activity.  Even if part of the increased demand went to increase 
prices and wages, the increase in activity would still be 
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considerable [in the margin, at this point, is written the word 
‘inflation’].365 
 
Hawtrey added that the stimulus to trade brought about in this way would be 
similar to that obtained by exporting gold, but cautioned that ‘[t]he effect [was] 
only temporary’, since it would be impossible to permanently increase capital 
outlay at home by £60 million per year [this point had been heavily marked in 
the margin].  He thought that the initially favourable effect on the balance of 
payments might prompt the Bank of England to lower interest rates, with all the 
beneficial effects of credit creation.  However, to Hawtrey, it was ‘hardly 
worthwhile to consider elaborate and roundabout devices for giving the Bank of 
England an opportunity of relaxing credit’ when such things could be done more 
directly.  This was a theme which Hawtrey was to develop as the debate over 
unemployment progressed. 
    Sir Richard Hopkins evidently felt that Churchill had sufficient to digest within 
the missives from Leith-Ross and Hawtrey, since he felt no need to add a note of 
his own.  It is not known how Churchill responded.  He could hardly have been 
reassured by his Treasury advisors.  On the one hand Leith-Ross opined that 
‘What Keynes is after, of course, is a definite inflation of credit’, adding that ‘if 
the object is to reduce labour costs, the inflation of credit is the last possible 
thing that will do what is required’.  On the other hand, Hawtrey was arguing 
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that the need to increase the total consumers’ income was paramount if 
unemployment was to be overcome, and the key to this was the relaxation of 
credit – advising that Keynes’s pet remedy of public works would lead to 
relaxation of credit if only in a roundabout way.  Hawtrey was on the point of 
leaving for America and would be unavailable to follow up his advice; he was 
also generally known to have views which were out of line with those of his 
senior colleagues.  Leith-Ross was the senior figure; he would be on hand for 
advice during the coming year and Churchill must have realised that his view 
must have been close to that of most other senior Treasury figures.  Churchill 
also had form.  At the time of the return to the gold standard, he had wriggled 
before acquiescing to its return, but he had never felt confident enough to 
depart from the Treasury line – knowing that he would depend on Niemeyer’s 
support at difficult times.   Once again he kept to the line of his senior officials 
and articulated the ‘Treasury View’ in the face of Keynes’s criticisms. 
    After the publication of the Liberal ‘Yellow Book’, Britain’s Industrial Future, it 
became clear that public works as a means of combating unemployment would 
be a major theme of a future election campaign.  Moreover the Treasury could 
not isolate it as the irrational brain-child of an untrustworthy politician and an 
unconventional economist.  On 7 February 1929 the Conservative’s Home-
Secretary, Sir William Joynson-Hicks, prepared a memorandum, CP 27 (29), in 
which he set out a programme of public works, especially in the Dominions and 
Crown Colonies, aimed at stimulating exports and encouraging emigration – all 
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with a view to reducing unemployment.  Close on the heels of this 
memorandum, on 16 February 1929, another memorandum by a Conservative 
minister appeared, produced by the Minister of Labour, Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland.  
Steel-Maitland’s memorandum, CP 37 (29), called for an £8 million plan for trunk 
roads at home.366  As a response to these stirrings Churchill requested his 
officials to prepare a document to show the ‘fallacies underlying the idea that a 
great loan . . . . would be a permanent remedy for unemployment’.367   
    The outcome was a Cabinet paper CP 53 (29), produced on 23 February 1929, 
and designed to bring recalcitrant cabinet colleagues to order.  Perhaps, under 
normal circumstances, the task of preparing this document would have fallen 
upon Hawtrey, but he was away at Harvard, and not due to return until June 
1929.  In his absence Churchill called upon other civil servants to carry out this 
duty: Frederick Phillips, then a Principal Assistant Secretary, and Gilbert Upcott, 
then Deputy Controller of Supply Services.  Additionally, a week later, when 
calling upon his officers for a reaction to Lloyd George’s election pamphlet, he 
suggested that Alfred Hurst, another Principal Assistant Secretary, should be 
enlisted to assist in its preparation.368  All the Treasury preparation to meet the 
Chancellor’s Cabinet critics, prepare Churchill for his 1929 Budget presentation, 
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and counter the Liberal public-works proposals were being done by a team which 
included Phillips, Upcott, Hurst, Grigg and Leith-Ross.  The team was overseen 
by the Controller of Finance, Sir Richard Hopkins.  Even before his departure for 
America, Hawtrey had become something of an isolated figure amongst 
officialdom, a lone voice in the wilderness calling for lower interest rates and the 
exportation of gold to raise world prices.  This new, increasingly collegiate 
approach within the Treasury increased the danger of Hawtrey becoming an 
even more isolated figure on his return.  First, a new-found sense of confidence 
amongst the team of generalists would have seriously undermined Hawtrey’s 
position as an ‘essential’ economic consultant.  Secondly, policies and approaches 
developed in his absence might well have run contrary to those suggested by his 
own economic model; a model to which he was invariably faithful. 
    At the beginning of March 1929 Lloyd George’s Liberals had launched their 
election campaign, making the ‘conquering’ of unemployment the centrepiece of 
their electioneering strategy.  Lloyd George had launched the Liberal election 
campaign at the Connaught Hotel on 1 March 1929 with a pledge: 
    
If the nation entrusts the Liberal Party . . . with the 
responsibilities of government . . . we are ready with schemes of 
work which . . . will reduce the terrible figures of the workless in 
the course of a single year . . . enrich the nation and equip it 
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successfully for competing with all its rivals . . . (and) . . . not 
add one penny to the national or local taxation.369
 
The press derided this as the pledge of a man who knew he would never have to 
honour it.  A few days later the full programme was outlined in the pamphlet We 
Can Conquer Unemployment; the personal commitment of Lloyd George being 
emphasised on the cover, which depicted Lloyd George moving on from tackling 
the munitions factories to tackling the dole queues.  The detail was a reworking 
of the ‘National Development’ of the ‘Yellow Book’ which had been produced by 
the Liberal Party’s Summer Schools.370  Essentially it claimed that 600,000 men 
could be directly employed for two years at a cost of £250 million; this money to 
be raised by a special loan which would be largely repaid through the proceeds 
of the work itself.  The new workers would have both added their tax 
contributions to the overall level of taxation, and not drawn on the 
unemployment fund.  Thus, it was claimed that the schemes could be carried out 
without raising tax rates.371  Within Treasury File T. 172/2095 at the National 
Archives there is a copy of We Can Conquer Unemployment.  Hand-written 
across the front, in block-capital letters of increasing size, are the words: 
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                                              EXTRAVAGENCE 
                                        INFLATION 
                                 BANKRUPTCY 
 
The block-capital writing makes the task of determining the writer difficult, but 
the capital letters tally closely with those of the hand of the Deputy Controller of 
Finance, Frederick Leith-Ross.  They leave little doubt as to the attitude of the 
Treasury. 
    As Lloyd George was launching his election programme Leith-Ross from the 
Treasury together with the Chancellor’s Principal Private Secretary, P.J.Grigg, 
were preparing the ground for Churchill to use his Budget speech of 16 April 
1929 as a means of re-stating the principle, in the face of opposition from within 
his own Cabinet, that no extra employment could be created as a result of 
government borrowing for the purpose of public works.  Behind the confident 
Treasury facade, however, there were some shreds of doubt.  In a hand-written 
note from Leith-Ross to Grigg, Leith-Ross mused over the fact that there ‘just 
might be possibilities’ of creating unemployment in the distressed industries by 
either loans or taxation – and maybe wishing he had paid a little more attention 
to one of Hawtrey’s long memoranda.  Generally, Leith-Ross continued to equate 
credit-expansion with inflation. 
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I suppose taxation must (a) abstract money which would 
otherwise be saved and invested, in which case the anti-loan 
arguments apply exactly or (b) cause abstention from 
expenditure – which would presumably have given employment 
in some form but most likely only in those trades, e.g. luxury 
goods, where there is little unemployment. . . . On the other 
hand . . . it would possibly be that the net employment effect of 
the transfer would be nil.  Indeed, I have a clear recollection that 
Hawtrey has published a tract proving that relief works in 
general effect no increase in unemployment [sic] unless it 
produces inflation, which of itself adds to employment without 
the machinery of relief works. . . . I can’t see my way through to 
the second order effects but perhaps Hawtrey clears up all these 
points.372
     
Churchill’s P.P.S. had fewer doubts. On 2 March 1929, Grigg wrote to the 
Chancellor, again invoking the name of Hawtrey as guarantor of the soundness 
of the anti-relief work argument. 
 
. . . I am increasingly coming to the view that the argument is 
unimpeachable.  As I told you, Hawtrey (in 1925) wrote an 
article (of extreme obscurity) proving that relief was an absolute 
delusion unless they were accompanied by an expansion of 
banking credit, which would relieve unemployment without any 
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intervening relief schemes.  Of course he ends up saying that all 
we want is ‘a wise regulation of credit’ i.e. inflation. . . . I shall 
have a copy of this tract by Monday.373
 
The tract in question was ‘Public Expenditure and the Demand for Labour’, 
originally a talk to the Economic Club on 10 February 1925 , later published as an 
article in Economica.374  It is probably Hawtrey’s best-known piece of writing.375  
It was not an article designed with the intention of refuting public works, and 
indeed, at the time of its writing, in 1925, government-sponsored works were 
not the contentious political issue which they were to become by the end of the 
decade.  As such, it may not have been the most useful material for Churchill to 
have had to hand as he sought to see off calls for Government action.  In the 
article, Hawtrey carefully considered the necessary conditions required before 
public works would be capable of providing further employment.  He explored, in 
a manner not unlike the way he developed his theory of the trade cycle in Good 
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and Bad Trade, the implications of borrowing in order to finance public 
enterprises, with a series of restricting conditions gradually lifted. 
    Hawtrey first limited the problem by assuming no additional creation of bank 
credit and no complicating foreign investments.  Under such conditions, he 
argued, any sum borrowed by the government must be genuine savings and 
come out of the consumers’ income.  If it were withdrawn from consumers’ cash 
balances then, unless habits changed, those cash balances would be restored, 
out of consumers’ future income.  Such diversion into the hands of Government 
would reduce, by an equal amount, the effective demand for consumer products 
and other investment products. 
 
Here then is a shrinkage in the consumers’ outlay equal to the 
new Government expenditure.  But it must not be supposed to 
be self-evident that this shrinkage cancels the effect of the new 
expenditure of the Government and leaves the volume of 
employment unchanged.  The question turns out to be a very 
subtle and elusive one.376
 
The subtlety turned on the public’s desire for cash (or bank) balances, and the 
effect of public works on the velocity of circulation of money.  Newly employed 
people would wish to build up cash-balances, which in the absence of credit 
(new money) would be at the expense of the cash balances of those in work.  
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Given the absence of new money, any individual who tried to restore his cash 
balance to its original level would do so at the expense of his neighbour, but 
overall individual cash balances would be lower and people, in general, with 
lower quantities of money available, would tend to reduce their outlays.  But 
Hawtrey then asked the rhetorical question: 
 
. . . is not this to take the old narrow rigid view of the quantity 
theory, and to disregard the fact that the ratio of consumers’ 
income to the unspent margin may and frequently does vary?377
 
Hawtrey was putting forward the suggestion that increased economic activity 
might increase the velocity of circulation of money; in this way, the same overall 
stock of money might be capable of supporting a higher level of activity.  This 
could happen if consumers were content to maintain their previous outlay from 
smaller balances.  Hawtrey’s (extremely convoluted) answer to this was that 
whilst increased trade activity, with prospects of profits, did increase the rapidity 
of circulation, there would be, ‘except in cases of marked distrust of the 
currency’, no tendency for cash-balances to be run down to release the money to 
start the expansion of trade which would increase the velocity of circulation.   
    He made one concession. 
 
                                                 
 
377 Ibid., 42. 
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In a period of depression the rapidity of circulation is low, 
because people cannot find profitable outlets for their surplus 
funds and they accumulate idle balances.  If the Government 
comes forward with an attractive gilt-edged loan, it may raise 
money, not merely by taking the place of other possible capital 
issues, but by securing money that would otherwise have 
remained idle in balances.378
 
In passing, it is worth noting that this seems to have been one the earliest 
references to ‘idle balances’, a concept of great importance to Keynes as he 
based the theoretical section of his Treatise on Money on ‘idle balances’ causing 
the divergence between savings and investments.  To Hawtrey, at this stage of 
his argument, ‘public expenditure [could] only give additional employment if it 
[increased] the rapidity of circulation of money’, and it could only do this in the 
exceptional case described. 
    With Hawtrey’s removal of the restriction against bank credit, the government 
could finance its operations without any diminution of the consumers’ cash-
balances.   
 
If the new works are financed by the creation of bank credits, 
they will give additional employment.379
 
                                                 
 
378 Ibid., 43. 
 
379 Ibid., 43. 
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However, to Hawtrey, the key to creating employment was not the public works, 
but the creation of credit. 
 
Is the case then proved?  Not quite.  What has been shown is 
that expenditure on public works, if accompanied by a creation 
of credit, will give employment.  But then the same reasoning 
shows that a creation of credit unaccompanied by any 
expenditure on public works would be equally effective in giving 
employment. 
    The public works are merely a piece of ritual, convenient to 
people who want to be able to say that they are doing 
something, but otherwise irrelevant.380
 
Hawtrey acknowledged, once again, that exceptional circumstances might arise 
when the prospect of profit was so poor that no Bank rate, however low, might 
tempt businesses to borrow for investment.  Even so, he thought that if low Bank 
rate were reinforced by the purchase of securities by central banks to create 
liquidity, it would be ‘possible to find an escape from any depression, however 
severe’.381
    Finally, Government borrowing for public works, if the interest offered were 
sufficiently attractive, would divert part of the consumers’ outlay on investment 
products away from foreign investment.  From this would flow a chain of events 
                                                 
 
380 Ibid., 44. 
 
381 Ibid., 45. 
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linked by the need to maintain a stable balance of payments and stable gold 
reserves.       
    Foreign investment entailed an outflow of gold to pay for the investment.  An 
attractive Government issue would curtail this outflow, and the resulting build-up 
of the reserves of gold would need to be reduced.  This would be done by 
importing capital. 
 
In order that people may buy more [imports] there must be an 
increase in the purchasing power of the consumers’ outlay.  
Either the consumers’ outlay must increase in terms of the 
currency unit, or the value of the currency unit in the foreign 
exchange market must rise.  If there is a gold standard in 
operation, the exchange value of the currency is fixed.  It follows 
that the consumers’ outlay must increase: there must be a 
monetary expansion, and that means increased employment.382
 
By monetary expansion Hawtrey meant a relaxation of credit.  Thus he came to 
what seems to be an anomalous conclusion: that the extent of the upward credit 
adjustment which provided for extra employment was measured by the 
increased imports necessary to maintain the balance of payments.  He saw one 
‘fundamental flaw’ in the mitigation of unemployment in this way.  One country 
could only undertake the exercise at the expense of another, and where there 
existed groups of countries with a common monetary standard, the problem of 
                                                 
 
382 Ibid., 46. 
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unemployment became an international one.  In this respect he likened the 
extension of credit through public works to an import tariff.    
    Hawtrey concluded that public works financed by borrowing would lead to an 
expansion of credit, and hence employment, but public works were not, under all 
but the most extreme circumstances, necessary for the expansion of credit.  
Under nearly all circumstances, Hawtrey held, low Bank rate supplemented by 
central bank purchases of securities, would supply the liquidity, and the 
incentive, for credit expansion.        
    I doubt whether Churchill felt any great increase in confidence at the prospect 
of having to face the Commons after having read Hawtrey’s tract.  Technical 
arguments relating levels of cash deposits with the velocity of circulation of 
money, and the importation of capital from abroad stimulating domestic credit 
expansion would not have provided him with the armour to stave off 
parliamentary demands for increased government spending on public works.  
    But, with the Chancellor in possession of Hawtrey’s tract, Leith-Ross took 
charge of preparing Churchill for his Budget speech, hoping to prime his man in 
the way that Niemeyer had primed him prior to the return to the Gold Standard 
in 1925.  Again, the preparation took place without Hawtrey’s presence.  The 
outcome of Leith-Ross’s work was Churchill’s budget speech of 16 April 1929 in 
which he gave the most famous public statement of the ‘Treasury View’, that in 
the process of borrowing for public works the Government competed for 
available funds with private industry and thereby raised ‘the rent of money to all 
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who have need of it’, and that prior experience of attempting to cure 
unemployment by such means had been so disappointing ‘as to lend 
considerable colour to the orthodox treasury doctrine which has been steadfastly 
held that, whatever might be the political or social advantages, very little 
additional employment and no permanent employment can in fact and as a 
general rule be created by State borrowing and State expenditure’.383
    Whilst the Treasury and the Government worked to undermine the validity of 
the Liberal proposals, there were others – people with influence – who were 
prepared to take the Liberal pamphlet more seriously.  Beaverbrook, for one, 
was prepared to endorse the Liberal message. 
 
Economists, men of affairs, industrial leaders and successful 
businessmen have all agreed that . . . this is no unworkable 
dream, or crazy-quilt policy of a party with no chance in office.  
It will succeed.384
 
There was support from other newspapers, but a measure of academic 
respectability was added to this support by Keynes and Hubert Henderson.  On 
10 May 1929 they published a pamphlet – Can Lloyd George Do It?  Their 
answer, of course, was a resounding ‘Yes’.   
                                                 
 
383 House of Commons Debates, Vol. 227, 1928-29. Columns 53-4. 
 
384Daily Express, 25 March 1929. 
 255
    Can Lloyd George Do It? was, in part, a serious document intended to explain 
the economics of the interventionist position, and partly a satire on Treasury 
arguments.   The introductory section of the document pointed out that £500 
million had been paid out in unemployment benefits between 1921 and 1929 – 
with absolutely no return.  Had this sum, they argued, been paid in wages to 
construction workers then not only would ‘a million’ houses have been built, but 
many workers would have been saved from the indignity of the dole, profits 
would have accrued to the manufacturers of building materials, and increased 
tax revenue, both from wages and business profits, would have been returned to 
the Exchequer.385   
    At the end of May 1929 Hawtrey returned from his stint at Harvard and his 
colleagues at the Treasury were able to consult him directly rather than having 
to delve into their archives for his somewhat dated articles.  On 13 June 1929 
Hawtrey produced his memorandum on ‘The Liberal Unemployment Plan’.386  It 
concentrated upon, and developed, the section of his Economica article of 1925 
relating to increasing home investment at the expense of foreign investment.  
The memorandum used a numerical example in which Hawtrey assumed certain 
values for economic output.   
                                                 
 
385 J.M.Keynes and H.Henderson, Can Lloyd George Do It? (London, 1929) 
 
386 Treasury Papers, T.175/26. The Hopkins Papers. ‘The Liberal Employment Plan’ by 
R.G.Hawtrey, 13 June 1929. 
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    Hawtrey’s figures bore a fair approximation to Feinstein’s retrospective 
estimates for 1929, and Feinstein’s figures have been shown to be close to the 
one official estimate made for 1923-24.     
    The annual publication, Reports of the Commissioners of Inland Revenue, had 
been first published in 1857, and used by scholars (such as Bowley, Clarke and 
Feinstein) to estimate National Income.  In 1904 Bowley had encouraged the 
Inland Revenue to use its vast resource of information to make its own estimate 
of National Income.  It was reluctant to do this because it viewed its principal 
role as that of maximising its own income with a minimum of inconvenience.  But 
in 1929 it undertook an experimental exercise in the estimation of not only the 
National Income, but also other key economic data. 387
    It took its definition of National Income from Marshall; a definition which 
excluded both earnings accruing to foreigners, and foreign earnings, by British 
nationals, from the totals.  The exercise was to determine National Income for 
the financial year 1923-4.  It also estimated National Production and the 
fluctuation in National saving (its estimate for saving was that in 1925-26 the 
nation was saving 14 per cent of income).  It also made estimates for the 
distribution of income size and the distribution of production by different trade 
groups.  Its estimates for National Income tended to be slightly lower than the 
unofficial estimates by Bowley and Stamp who had been working from more 
limited information.   
                                                 
387  J.R.N.Stone, Inland Revenue Report on National Income (Cambridge, 
University of Cambridge Department of Applied Economics, 1977). 
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    Hawtrey approved of the exercise and suggested that it should become a 
permanent one.  Unfortunately the importance of statistics as a means of guiding 
economic policy was not fully recognised at the time, and the exercise was not to 
be repeated until 1941; during which time reliance continued to be placed upon 
the unofficial statistics calculated by Bowley, Stamp and Colin Clark.      
     Scholarly estimates and the Inland Revenue exercise were directed towards 
calculating National Income, whereas Hawtrey’s calculations were based upon 
assumptions of National Output.  In a closed system, with no international 
considerations, National Output and National Income would be identical since the 
total money value of output would be equal to the sum of all incomes received 
through wages, rent, dividends, interest and profits (with the possibility of losses 
acting as a negative factor).  This identity would be distorted by part of National 
Income being received from dividends from overseas production, and part of the 
profits from home production being transferred abroad.  Customs and exercise 
figures for international earnings would have been able to accurately calculate 
the value of National Output from that of National Income.       
    With his assumptions for National Output in place, Hawtrey set out a 
numerical calculation which, as so often in his memoranda, saw him in the role 
of the pedagogue tutoring his generalist colleagues.388   
                                                 
 
388 At the root of Hawtrey’s system was the belief that production and employment could 
only expand if credit could be expanded to both pay wages prior to the sale of products, 
and enable dealers to increase the levels of their stocks.  The Liberal plan to finance 
public works through Government spending would normally have been interpreted as a 
fiscal measure.  Hawtrey’s response was to turn the plan into a device for creating an 
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  Hawtrey’s numerical example will be worked through at some length here, 
rather than merely its results being summarised.  This is for illustrative purposes.  
It is given as an example of the way in which Hawtrey, in many of his 
memoranda, set up a hypothetical situation, using figures which approximated to 
the real situation, and then worked through the figures to a conclusion which 
supported his recommendations.  This memorandum contained a number of 
terms which were peculiar to Hawtrey’s economic analysis and will need 
explanation as the memorandum is broken down and its argument worked 
through.  I have tried to shorten, simplify, and clarify Hawtrey’s numerical 
example without in any way misrepresenting his argument.  His numerical 
example contained at least one numerical slip, and a number of questionable 
assumptions.  
 
    Hawtrey commenced by assuming a total national income of £4,000 million – 
broken down as follows (to produce table A): 
                                                           A
From production of home trade products                       £1,700 million         
From production of foreign trade products                     £2,000 million 
From foreign investments                                             £ 300   million 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
extension of credit via potential changes in foreign exchanges.  In this respect he can be 
seen to have been tutoring his generalist colleagues on the, to him, all important role of 
credit creation. 
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   He also assumed the figure of £150 million as the amount of capital exported 
abroad per year and proceeded to give the following set of figures for what he 
simply called ‘consumption’.    He did not explain how he arrived at the figures in 
the following table, but it would seem that he assumed a state of equilibrium in 
the holding of gold reserves and the balance of payments.  Income from foreign 
investments (£300 million) involved the import of gold, whilst the exportation of 
capital abroad for investment purposes (£150 million) involved export of gold.  
Thus if income from foreign investment earnings exceeding capital exported 
abroad by £150 million, then Hawtrey would have required, for the maintenance 
of equilibrium, a further annual loss of £150 million of gold.  This could be 
accounted for by imports exceeding exports to the tune of this value – i.e. the 
national consumption of foreign-trade goods exceeded home production of 
foreign-trade goods by £150 million.  Giving -       
                                                            B 
Consumption of home trade products        £1,700 million        
Consumption of foreign trade products      £2,150 million 
Total consumption                                   £3,850 million 
    [When £150 million of net foreign investment income is added to this figure it 
sums to the National Income] 
 
    The idea of ‘foreign trade products’ is a concept used by Hawtrey in his 
economic analysis.  It means the type of product which is exportable or 
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importable.  As such its price will, to a large degree, be determined by world 
prices rather than local supply and demand.  A cotton sheet would seem a 
suitable example.  By contrast a haircut can not easily be exported or imported; 
its price will be set by local supply and demand and Hawtrey would regard this 
as one of his ‘home trade products’.  The distinction is not a simple division 
between manufactured goods and service goods, but it could well tend to run 
along these lines.   
    Hawtrey then rehearsed the two broad alternative ways of improving 
employment; firstly, by reducing prices and wages.  Reducing prices would have 
enabled Britain’s home-produced foreign trade products to be more competitive 
in world markets with resultant increase in output and employment.  Lower 
wages were a necessary concomitant.  The second way was by increasing the 
money value output of products for a given level of wages – with increased 
profits encouraging employers to take on additional labour. 
    Since there was no way of effecting an ‘overnight’ and simultaneous reduction 
of prices and wages, and the alternative ways of bringing this state of affairs 
about had been shown to be too unpalatable, then increasing the money value 
of output – implying an increase in demand – was the only realistic option. 
    Hawtrey then suggested that the Liberal plan, if it could successfully raise a 
loan of £125 million per year, might cause foreign investment to be reduced by 
an equal amount – from £150 million to £25 million.  The consequences of that 
would be as follows: 
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 i) The balance of payments would be disturbed and gold would be imported to 
the extent of £125 per year.   
ii) To restore equilibrium, using the addition to the gold stocks, credit should be 
expanded sufficiently to attract additional imports of £125 million per year – 
thereby balancing the fall in external investment.      
 
    Extra imports of £125 million could only be absorbed if the national income 
rose.  Hawtrey then addressed the question of the extent to which national 
income must rise to absorb an extra £125 to million imports. 
    He started by supposing that every £100 million added to the national income 
(an increase of 2.5 per cent. on £4,000 million) would be applied to purchases in 
proportions according to the figures in table B, i.e. each increase amounts to 2.5 
per cent of each figure in that table -   
                                                              C
to home trade products                                        £42.5 million              
to foreign trade products                                     £53 .75 million               
to external investment                                         £ 3.75 million 
 
    At this point Hawtrey ran up against the problem of not knowing what 
proportion of any increased consumption of foreign trade products would be 
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satisfied by imports and what proportion by home-produced foreign trade 
products.  As he pointed out: 
 
Increased British consumption of importable agricultural products 
is likely to be satisfied almost entirely by additional imports.  
Increased British consumption of cotton goods is likely to be a 
negligible factor in the activity of Lancashire.  On the other hand 
increased consumption of coal will take effect almost wholly in 
increased activity of the British mines.  Increased consumption of 
iron and steel and engineering products . . . would go mainly to 
British production.389
 
Hawtrey then made an assumption, that one-fourth of the increased 
consumption of foreign trade products would be satisfied by increased British 
production, and therefore three-quarters of any increase in the consumption of 
foreign trade products was satisfied by increases in imports. Accordingly, his 
previous breakdown of the sources of the increase in national income was 
subdivided further:  
 
Application of increased income: 
                                                       D
    
     to home trade products                                         £42.5 million 
                                                 
 
389 Ibid. 
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     to foreign trade products produced at home            £13.5 million 
     to foreign trade products produced abroad              £40.25 million 
     to external investment                                           £3.75 million    
 
Taking the increase in ‘imports’ together with ‘external investment’ as the ‘gold 
exporting items’ on this list, Hawtrey thus calculated that an increase in national 
income of £100 million per year would lead to increased annual exportation of 
gold amounting to £44 million.  This proposition could be reversed to say that in 
order to increase gold exports by £44 million then an increase in national income 
of £100 million was required.  But, the Liberal plan envisaged transferring £125 
million from external to internal investment, producing an equal net importation 
of gold, and requiring, by way of equilibrating compensation, increased imports 
of £125 million.  This would require an increase in national income (in £m.) of 
100 X125/44, or £284 million.   
    Allowing for the fact that diversion of £125 million from foreign investment 
would, in itself, increase national income by that amount, a further increase in 
national income of £159 million would be needed to balance the external 
payments.  This would have to be from the production of home trade products 
and foreign trade products produced at home.  Using the figures in table C, 
which are based upon an increased national income of £100 million, the 
corresponding figures for an increase of £159 million from trade would be £121 
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million from home trade products and £38 million from foreign trade products 
produced at home.390
    The conclusion to be derived from this numerical example was that if a loan 
for £125 million could be successfully launched, then it might induce sufficient 
extension of credit to increase the national income by £159 million (this figure is 
roughly £4 per person in Britain).  More importantly, by far the greatest boost to 
trade activity would be to that to home trade products, and not to the foreign 
trade products of the depressed regions.   
    Acknowledging the fact that that he had attempted to simplify his calculations 
by basing them on the assumption that the whole of the £125 millions of capital 
raised would be by diversion of investible savings (i.e. the diversion of monies 
already earmarked for investment in other ways) , Hawtrey admitted that they 
might need to be modified in two respects: firstly that part of the funds could be 
diverted from money previously spent on unemployment benefit, and secondly 
that investment schemes might entice holders of cash, cash which might 
otherwise have been held idle, to invest that cash.   
    As regards the first consideration: 
 
                                                 
 
390 Hawtrey did not explain it in this way in his memorandum, but it is the only way I 
can make sense of the figures he produced.  Additionally, it appears that he made an 
arithmetical slip at this stage in his calculations, resulting in him calculating the increase 
required from home manufactured foreign trade products to be only £35 million.  For 
further notes on the slip see Peden, Keynes and his Critics, p. 91. 
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. . . the figures . . . may be put at 30 millions.  That means . . . 
the amount of employment given is greater by the employing 
power of 30 millions, but on the other hand, the effect on the 
balance of payments is 30 millions less.  In fact  . . . (given the 
diminished need to increase national income as a means of 
drawing in compensating imports) . . . net effect may be 
small.391
 
As regards drawing ‘idle’ money into investment schemes, Hawtrey regarded the 
support of Keynes and Henderson for the Liberal scheme as ‘extremely obscure’ 
and confusing. In particular, he regarded the mobilisation of idle balances as an 
increase in the velocity of circulation of money which would have inflationary 
consequences leading to loss of gold and the restriction of credit. 
    Given that Hawtrey saw neither diversion of unemployment benefit nor 
mobilisation of idle savings as means of reducing the export of capital and 
enhancing the nation’s gold, he dismissed these as a sources of finance. 
 
It is in fact a blunder to advocate, as Messrs. Keynes and 
Henderson do, the provision of funds for the scheme in any 
other way than by drawing on the investible savings of the 
community out of income.  Its foundation is the diversion of 
capital resources from external to internal investment. . . . the 
one and only obstacle to remedying unemployment by an 
expansion of credit is the loss of gold that would ensue.  Were 
                                                 
 
391 Treasury Papers, T.175/26. The Hopkins Papers. ‘The Liberal Employment Plan’ by 
R.G.Hawtrey, 13 June 1929. 
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this loss of gold made good by borrowing abroad and taking the 
proceeds either in gold or in foreign exchange, the threat to the 
gold standard would be avoided.392
 
Thus Hawtrey saw the Liberal unemployment plan as a means of boosting the 
gold reserves by diverting foreign investment to home investment, but he 
thought that an even better solution would be to borrow directly from abroad.  
The enhanced gold reserves would permit the monetary authorities to expand 
credit and increase employment and the national income.  The amount by which 
the increase in the national income could be permitted was calculable by the 
extra imports which would be required to restore the country’s balance of 
payments – in short it was ‘nothing more than a very elaborate and roundabout 
alternative to raising loans abroad for the strengthening of our gold reserves’.393   
    If the loss of gold were made good by borrowing from abroad then it would, 
Hawtrey acknowledged, lead to a burden of external indebtedness, but set 
against this there would be no need to reign back on investment abroad and the 
benefits, in terms of foreign earnings and enhanced export opportunities, 
brought about by that activity.  The borrowing from abroad could be more easily 
controlled and limited to that which was strictly necessary, whereas an elaborate 
programme of development works involved heavy commitments which could not 
be easily or quickly curtailed.  Finally, as Hawtrey pointed out, as part of the 
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Liberal plan, Keynes advocated dear money in London as a means of attracting 
investment which would otherwise have gone abroad.  This would have tended 
to suppress trade whereas, by borrowing: 
 
. . . we start with a credit expansion through a reduction in bank 
rate and . . . . a general tendency to activity all over that world, 
and so far as international markets are concerned the greatest 
share of this activity will be secured by those producers who are 
most seriously under-employed.394
 
Having indicated, in his memorandum on the Liberal unemployment plan, that he 
regarded it as merely a ‘roundabout’ way of raising loans from abroad in order to 
bolster the gold reserves, in which case, in his opinion, the matter would be 
better done directly, some two weeks later, on 29 June 1929, Hawtrey produced 
an alternative scheme which did not involve foreign borrowing.395   
    By way of introduction Hawtrey explained how the act of borrowing from 
abroad would have the same effect as the borrowing during the Great War which 
enabled Britain to nominally remain on the Gold Standard.  The adverse trade 
balance was countered by the device of making good the gap in the balance of 
payments by the proceeds of loans raised in America.  But under the conditions 
of 1929 he felt the Americans, who were best placed to make the loan, might 
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oppose a scheme embarked upon for the purpose of relaxing credit in Europe.  
Hawtrey was concerned America might fear that easy money in Europe ‘would 
tend to infect the American money market and encourage the stock market 
speculation which (had) been causing them so much uneasiness’.396  There were 
other concerns regarding the respective levels of interest rates and the existing 
British policy on taxation of foreign loans which reduced the attraction of this 
particular option. 
    Hawtrey began to outline his strategy, explaining that it would involve 
diverting some of the £149 million of capital exported abroad to home 
investment. 
 
If a portion . . . (of capital currently being invested abroad) . . . 
were drawn from the market by the issue of a sterling loan in 
London and applied in some other way than external investment, 
the effect on the balance of payments would be just the same as 
if the export of capital had gone on unabated, and the same sum 
had been borrowed abroad.397
 
In the margin of the memorandum there are a number of queries pencilled in by 
Hopkins.  The word ‘if’ has been doubly underlined by him.  However, Hawtrey 
then went on to explain how the development plans of Keynes and the Liberals 
were devices for preventing the proceeds of such loans from being used abroad.  
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But Hawtrey felt that there was another, possibly more effective, way of 
achieving the same result. 
 
Suppose that the British Government issues a loan on the 
London market and applies the proceeds to paying off Treasury 
Bills.  The loan will presumably absorb investible savings, and 
since the export of capital practically represents the surplus of 
savings after meeting the requirements for capital outlay at 
home, the savings subscribed for the loan may be regarded as 
diverted from external investment.398
 
The paragraph above was heavily marked, underlined and question-marked by 
Hopkins.  Hawtrey went on to explain his reasoning behind a move which senior 
Treasury officials, judging by the copious marginal pencil markings, must have 
seemed somewhat bizarre.  His principal point was that the issue and paying off 
of Treasury Bills was a transaction within the sphere of banking rather than 
within the sphere of investment.399  The rate of issue of Treasury Bills had been 
increasing and providing significant profits for the commercial banks.  If, he 
suggested, the supply of these bills were mopped up – creating a ‘bill famine’ – 
the banks would have to seek alternative short term investments for their profits 
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399 Treasury Bills are instruments by which the government covers temporary short-term 
deficiencies in its funds.  They are promissory notes with the government promising to 
pay the bearer a fixed sum 91 days from the date of issue.  The banks are invited to 
tender for these on a weekly basis.  The tenders will be below the face value of the bills 
by an amount dependent upon prevailing rates of interest. 
 270
in the form of advances to traders.  Presumably, Hawtrey thought that the banks 
would have to lower their interest rates in order to encourage traders to take on 
loans.  By this process the government would have applied the resources 
diverted from external investment, through bank loans to traders, to increased 
orders to manufacturers - thus providing additional working capital for trade and 
industry. 
    Adjacent to the paragraph in which Hawtrey suggested that the banks, in 
search of profit, would have to transfer funds to loans to traders, Leith Ross has 
pencilled the comment ‘or loans abroad?’.  Hawtrey did then go on to concede 
that some advances would inevitably be made ‘to merchants (British or Foreign) 
engaged in international trade, and will be used by them to buy goods from 
producers abroad’.400  However, he did not regard this as a deficiency in the 
scheme.  Quite the reverse, in fact; since loans at low interest rates were 
essential for reviving international as well as national trade. 
 
By itself an expansion of the national income, through improving 
employment in the production of home trade products, can do 
little to stimulate British production of foreign trade products, 
whether exportable or importable.  The trouble of the past four 
years has been a heavy fall in world prices in terms of gold. . . . 
London is the centre of the world credit market and conditions 
there affect trade everywhere else.  The high bank rate which 
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has prevailed since February 1925 has depressed our export 
industries because it has depressed world markets . . . . funding 
of Treasury bills stimulates short term lending to international 
traders . . .401
 
Secondly, with regard to the refunding of Treasury bills leading to foreign 
investment, Hawtrey cast doubts on the wisdom of the Bank of England’s 
‘unceasing endeavour to attract foreign balances for temporary investment in 
London’, since this had been the ‘one justification . . . for the high Bank rate’.402  
These short-term foreign balances, in that they could be withdrawn at short 
notice, were an embarrassment rather than an advantage, acting as negative 
hidden gold reserves, and causing the monetary authorities the problem of 
getting rid of them without their being withdrawn in gold.  The paragraph 
pointing out this problem is endorsed with a tick and triple marking by Hopkins 
who nevertheless, like the writer of this thesis, seemed somewhat perplexed by 
Hawtrey’s explanation of the mechanism by which this might be achieved: 
 
In so far as a plan for funding Treasury bills fails to affect the 
balance of payments that will be because London is coming into 
the market as a short-term lender.  The balances will be in effect 
to that extent got rid of without a loss of gold, and our 
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underlying reserve position will be strengthened by the 
dissipation of our “negative gold reserve”.403
 
Hawtrey suggested that measures should be taken, such as there being no due 
date of repayment, which would encourage the public, rather than the banks, to 
purchase the new stock, fearing the banks might use the new issue as substitute 
for Treasury bills.  He concluded a lengthy memorandum by conceding that the 
main practical objection against such a scheme would be that, at the time, the 
gilt-edged market was not very favourable and would require ‘substantial price 
concessions’.  Leith-Ross doubly marked, ticked, and wrote the word ‘Yes’ 
against this point.  On 15 July 1929 Hawtrey distributed a second memorandum 
giving a more detailed strategy for the implementation of his scheme for 
withdrawing Treasury bills.404  The marginal comments continued to show the 
Treasury’s scepticism.  
    The Treasury passed Hawtrey’s scheme on to the Bank of England for 
comment.  They hardly treated it with any sense of urgency for it was not until 2 
October 1929 that Sir Otto Niemeyer replied on behalf of the Bank.  Niemeyer 
was totally unsupportive.  His principal concern regarding Hawtrey’s scheme was 
the high rate that might be needed to compete with the attractions of foreign 
                                                 
 
403 Ibid. 
 
404 Treasury Papers T175/26.  ‘Debt Policy and Unemployment II’ by R.G.Hawtrey, 15 
July 1929. 
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investment.  In making his point he took a sideswipe at the Keynesian 
alternative. 
 
Hawtrey’s plan assumes the existence of “genuine savings not 
created by Bank credit” which can be attracted to his funding 
loan to repay Treasury Bills.  He does not indicate clearly where 
these savings are but they are presumably those now going into 
foreign issues.  If so, they can only be diverted by a sufficiently 
high rate of interest to compete with foreign attractions.  In 
other words, we must have (a) a high bank rate and (b) a high 
yielding Government issue, say 5.5 per cent. or 6 per cent.  that 
will depress all existing Government municipal and commercial 
stocks and is a curious method of facilitating development works.  
Indeed Hawtrey’s thesis is contrary to the whole development 
work plan (and may be in so far right).405
 
Niemeyer doubted whether the banks receipts from the funding of their bills 
would be used as advances to traders, ‘many of them could not show 
prospective profits’, with the New York stock exchange being the more likely 
destination for these funds.  He went on to deplore the way in which the 
Treasury had allowed the issue of bills to expand and had allowed ‘the sinking 
funds to be filched’, suggesting that what the Treasury should really be doing 
was to increase the sinking fund out of taxation and so forcing ‘an increase not 
                                                 
 
405 Treasury Papers, T175/26.  Response by Sir Otto Niemeyer on behalf of the Bank of 
England to R.G.Hawtrey’s ‘Debt Policy and Unemployment Scheme’, 2 October 1929. 
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in “consumers’ income” but in “consumers’ saving”’.406  He ended up with further 
swipes at Hawtrey: 
 
He has some other very odd ideas, e.g. 
(1) “With a gold standard . . . it is impossible . . . for increased 
consumption of imports . . . to occasion an adverse balance 
of payments”! 
(2) “Export of capital practically represents the surplus of savings 
after meeting the requirements for capital outlay at home”!! 
. . . he is on firmer ground in deploring the fall of world prices: 
but how he can believe that the Bank of England can control 
that, I cannot conceive.407
 
The essential point of Hawtrey’s criticisms of monetary policy over the previous 
four years had been that the world-wide clamour for gold, which as extremely 
influential agent the Bank of England had taken part in, was entirely responsible 
for the collapse of world prices.  However, lacking support from both the Bank 
and the Treasury, Hawtrey’s scheme for Debt Repayment made no further 
progress.  
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                                       Chapter 5 
 
 
        The Treasury before the Macmillan Committee 
 
 
                                      1930 
 
 
Philip Snowden would ‘no more have dreamt of budgeting for a deficit than of 
going into a public house’.408 409  The words ‘credit’ and ‘debt’ would not have 
rested easily with his puritanical Keighley upbringing.  Yet it was Chancellor 
Snowden who, at the end of his speech to the Labour Party’s Brighton 
Conference of 1929, announced that he intended to institute a thorough 
investigation into ‘all aspects of banking, financial and credit policy, particularly 
to find out what . . . are the effects of present policy upon industry, and to put 
forward suggestions for (improvement)’.410   
    He almost certainly did so reluctantly, feeling it was unnecessary to go beyond 
the strict economic orthodoxy and probity of sound Victorian economics.  But, on 
                                                 
 
408 Taylor, English History 1914-45, p. 33. 
 
409 In the context of this quotation, Professor Keith Laybourn has reminded me that, in 
1915, and motivated by his dislike of alcoholic drink, Snowden accepted Lloyd-George’s 
offer of a seat on the Central Control Board (Liquor Traffic).  The purpose of this body 
was to prevent alcohol consumption from impairing the war effort.  He had previously 
been a member of the Samuelson Commission which had recommended state control of 
breweries and licensed premises.  These recommendations were rejected, but licensed 
premises in Carlisle were controlled with the intention of curtailing the drinking of 
munitions workers who were resident in Carlisle but worked at Gretna.  The curtailing 
regulations were no match for the ingenuity of the Carlisle workers.   
 
410 S.Howson and D.Winch, The Economic Advisory Council 1930-39: A Study in 
Economic Advice During Depression and Recovery, (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1977). P.26. 
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20 September 1929, Bank Rate had risen to six and a half per cent in order to 
stem an outflow of funds.  Ernest Bevin used his platform at the Brighton 
Conference to denounce the move, maintaining that every ‘one per cent on the 
Bank Rate means a quarter of a million increase in unemployment in six 
months’.411  Painted into a corner by Bevin, Snowden announced the formation 
of the committee of inquiry; probably hoping that the arguments for ‘sound’ 
finance would prevail.  In a later memorandum he was to explain that he 
instituted the committee ‘largely because of the impression made on public 
opinion by Mr. Keynes’s proposals on these points as enumerated in the Liberal 
Yellow Book before the last election’.412  Generally, the authorities were nervous 
about the outcome of the committee of inquiry – ‘Is there not some danger of 
giving the impression that the Governor is being put in the dock?’ the 
Chancellor’s Private Secretary, Grigg, confided to his master.413
    The Macmillan Committee, under the chairmanship of a barrister who 
specialized in public law, consisted of academic economists as well as 
representatives from the central bank, the clearing banks, trade unions, industry 
and commerce.  The Treasury was represented in the form of Lord Bradbury, 
former Joint Permanent Secretary, whilst the Deputy Controller of Finance, 
Frederick Leith-Ross, attended all meetings on behalf of the Treasury as an 
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412 Treasury Papers, T 175/26.  Snowden memorandum (drafted by Treasury Controller 
of Finance, Sir Richard Hopkins) 8 April 1930.   
 
413 Treasury Papers T 160/46.  Letter from Grigg to Snowden, 11 October 1929.  
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observer.  The three anti-establishment figures were Keynes, Ernest Bevin, and 
Asquith’s one-time Chancellor, now serving as Chairman of the Midland Bank, 
Reginald Mckenna.  This trio was to form a powerful axis of discontent. 
    An early casualty of the hearings was the Governor of the Bank of England, 
Montagu Norman. Norman’s evidence, on behalf of the Bank, had been penciled 
in for 28 November 1929.  The  prospect must have been too much for him.  On 
26 November 1929 he reported himself too unwell to attend the committee 
hearing, sending his deputy, Sir Ernest Harvey, while he went on a recuperative 
Mediterranean cruise.  Over the next five days Harvey gave a competent account 
of the Bank of England’s functions.  He was not subjected to any searching 
questions; those awaited a recuperated Governor.  In the intervening time 
Keynes took the opportunity to extend the economic education of the committee 
by a series of five private meetings of the members between 20 February 1930 
and 7 March 1930.   
    Two weeks of the Macmillan Committee’s time were taken by Keynes as he, in 
effect, explained his Treatise to the committee members.  The two weeks were 
to change much of the tone of the remaining proceedings.  
    Keynes’s argument was, that in a closed system, it was relatively easy for a 
single instrument, Bank Rate, to maintain equilibrium between savings and 
investment.  Lowering of Bank Rate discouraged excessive savings whilst 
encouraging businesses to borrow for investment – and vice versa.  But the 
same instrument, within an international context, had to also maintain the 
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equilibrium between foreign earnings and foreign investment: raising interest 
rates to keep money at home when the attraction of foreign investments was in 
danger of causing too large an outflow of funds.  External and internal functions 
were often incompatible.  Moreover, in the process of both returning to, and 
maintaining the gold standard, a high Bank Rate had been allotted the task of 
reducing British costs to competitive levels without sufficient understanding of 
the mechanism by which high rates would bring about lower wages.   
    By requiring Bank Rate to perform a multiplicity of tasks it had lost the ability 
to maintain savings and investment in equilibrium.  In this way Keynes 
introduced his committee colleagues to the most distinctive feature of his 
Treatise, the distinction between savings and investment.  Saving, or refraining 
from consumption, had been regarded as the first pre-requisite before 
investment could take place.  Keynes was at pains to point out that saving and 
investment were different activities carried out by different sets of people and 
there could be a serious imbalance between the two.  Under the conditions 
necessary to maintain the gold standard, high interest rates were attracting 
savings whilst discouraging entrepreneurs to invest. 
    With high rates discouraging investment – but, he believed, unavoidable if the 
Gold Standard were to be maintained - Keynes outlined seven measures which 
carried the potential for increasing investment and stimulating trade.  
Devaluation, simultaneous reduction of all domestic incomes, taxation to support 
exporting industries, rationalisation to increase efficiency, import tariffs to allow 
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domestic prices to rise, investment by the Government in public works, 
concerted action by central banks to bring down rates.  To Keynes, each 
proposal had some merit, but he left his colleagues in no doubt that investment 
in public works was his favourite remedy.   
    Keynes’s last ‘tutorial’ with the Macmillan Committee was on 7 March 1930. 
Just over a month later, on 10 and 11 April, 1930, Hawtrey appeared as a 
witness, not as the Treasury’s Director of Financial Enquiries, but in a personal 
capacity as an economist.  Nevertheless, it was an opportunity for the Committee 
to scrutinize the source of the economic justification for the ‘Treasury View’.  
Speaking to Alec Cairncross, in 1966, Hawtrey referred to his status before the 
committee as an independent economist rather than a Treasury employee and 
said that he ‘felt on safe grounds talking about economic theory, but not 
policy’.414  Hawtrey also submitted three documents to the committee: ‘Mr. 
Keynes’s Treatise on Money’, ‘International Short Term Investment’, and 
’Remedies for Unemployment’.415  In addition, after being invited to appear 
before the committee, Hawtrey was sent a transcript of Keynes’s testimony from 
which he prepared a memorandum for Treasury consumption, ‘Mr. Keynes’s 
Theory of Bank Rate’.  He sent a copy of this memorandum to Keynes on 1 April 
1930. 
                                                 
 
414 Hawtrey Papers, HTRY 13/5.  Interview with Sir Alec Cairncross, 1966. 
 
415 These three documents subsequently appeared as chapters in Hawtrey’s book The 
Art of Central Banking (London, Longmans Green, 1932).  References to the documents 
will be to the versions in which appear in this publication. 
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      At the beginning of 1930 differences in theory between Hawtrey and Keynes 
were slight.  Differences regarding policy were somewhat greater.  Hawtrey 
believed that Britain was still economically strong enough, given London’s 
worldwide influence, to unilaterally reduce interest rates and then influence 
world rates downwards.  Keynes believed that such a policy would endanger the 
Gold Standard – hence his advocacy of alternative measures such as public 
works.  There was a close affinity between the two men.  Between 1925 and 
1929 Hawtrey and Keynes would have met regularly at the gatherings of both 
the Royal Economic Society and the Royal Statistical Society.  It was at a 
meeting of the Royal Statistical Society, as late as 17 December 1929, at which 
Hawtrey presented his paper ‘Money and Index Numbers’, that Keynes, 
responding to the presentation, began by making the meeting clear about his 
attitude towards Hawtrey: 
 
There are very few writers on monetary subjects from whom one 
receives more stimulus and useful suggestion. . . and I think 
there are few writers on these subjects with whom  I personally 
feel more fundamental sympathy and agreement.  The paradox 
is that in spite of that, I nearly always disagree in detail with 
what he says!  Yet truly and sincerely he is one of the writers 
who seems to me to be most nearly on the right track!416
 
                                                 
 
416 Deutscher, R.G.Hawtrey  and the Development of Macroeconomics, p.79. 
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The verbatim recordings of the Minutes of Evidence of the Macmillan Enquiry 
seem to indicate that Hawtrey was ill-at-ease; discussion and debate within the 
settings of a formal committee were not his milieu.417  In contrast to his writings, 
where his arguments are developed at length with painstaking care, his answers 
to the committee were often terse and abrupt.  In contrast Keynes, the 
consummate debater (who always made Bertrand Russell feel ‘stupid’ in 
discussion), was perfectly at home within this setting.  
   Hawtrey had submitted a prepared paper, ‘Future Monetary Policy’, with 
members quizzing him on it.  If Keynes was the principal inquisitor then there 
were others, who took a keen professional interest: Reginald McKenna, former 
Chancellor of the Exchequer; Theodore Gregory, Professor of Banking at the 
London School of Economics; Ernest Bevin, General Secretary of the Transport 
and General Workers Union; Cecil Lubbock, director of the Bank of England; 
R.H.Brand, merchant banker from Lazard Brothers. 
    Hawtrey’s written submission was a distillation of his economic analysis and its 
application to the trade depression.  It began, unsurprisingly for Hawtrey, with a 
statement which carried the weight of an article of faith – that the greatest 
service that the credit system could render to industry was to maintain the value 
of the currency unit stable. Having pointed out that a stable currency avoids 
injustice between debtor and creditor, and also avoids distortion of the 
relationship between prices and wages and between wages and fixed costs, 
                                                 
 
417 Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry.  Minutes of Evidence. (London, 
H.M.S.O., 1931),  pp. 273-294. 
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Hawtrey then asserted that a stable currency avoids the ‘evil of . . . fluctuations 
in business activity . . . the most serious of all the injurious consequences of 
monetary instability.  For, here is to be found the cause of the unemployment 
problem.’418
means of payment can . . . be controlled if the creation and extinction 
of bank credit can be regulated.  Credit is created when people 
borrow from banks, and extinguished when they repay.  Regulation of 
credit is effected by encouraging or discouraging borrowers.419
 
This was the central message of Hawtrey’s written submission – that Bank Rate 
changes, usually enacted in order to control external flows of gold, have 
significant effects on the all-important consumers’ outlay, with important 
consequences for economic activity.   
    Turning to the problems of the gold standard, Hawtrey outlined its workings; 
a credit contraction, in addition to leading to a fall in the price of home-based 
goods, led to a reduction of imported goods with the effect being a net inflow of 
gold.  More importantly, for Hawtrey’s analysis, the outflow of gold from foreign 
central banks would cause them to raise their interest rates in order to squeeze 
credit and restrict the increased inflow of goods from Britain. 
 
The general principle is thus that under a gold standard the power of 
the Central Bank is used to impose on the country the same credit 
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movements and the same changes of price level as occur in other gold 
standard countries.  The fluctuations in the price level are therefore an 
international problem.  To prevent them it is necessary to prevent 
fluctuations in the wealth value or purchasing power of gold in world 
markets.420
 
Since the wealth value of gold was largely determined by the demand for gold by 
central banks using it for the purpose of regulating credit, and given the 
tendency, under the gold standard, of international credit movements to 
synchronise, then, to Hawtrey, the international stabilisation of the level of credit 
was of paramount importance.  He briefly recalled the Genoa Conference of 
1922, and lamented that its recommendations to ‘centralise and co-ordinate the 
demand for gold, and so to avoid  . . . wide fluctuations in the purchasing power 
of gold’ had never been acted on.421   
 
It cannot now be assumed that the generous international spirit of the 
Genoa conference can be revived.  But we have reached a stage at 
which the most important countries may be regarded as having 
settled their gold policy for the time being.  If that is so, an 
international agreement in regard to gold is not at present a matter of 
urgency.  But the question of preventing cyclical or short period 
fluctuations of purchasing power has become more pressing than 
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ever.  And in this respect I am inclined to suggest that no explicit 
international co-operation is really necessary at all.422
 
It was at this stage, towards the end of his formal presentation, that Hawtrey 
began to outline his view of how he believed credit, the purchasing power of 
gold, gold-related currencies and economic activity could be stabilised with lower 
levels of unemployment.  Essentially he believed that London, acting alone, had 
sufficient power and influence to stabilise international finance and trade. 
 
The position of London in the international credit system is so 
predominant that the Bank of England can take the lead and set the 
pace for all other countries. . . . if the Bank of England consistently 
pursued a policy of stabilising the purchasing power of the pound it 
would not encounter active opposition in any quarter.  To . . . expand 
credit when the price level tends to fall will be quite in accordance 
with the past practice to which foreign banks have long been 
accustomed.  The only innovation called for is that the appropriate 
action should be taken earlier than in pre-war days. . . . the Bank 
must be prepared to face some loss of gold when it is expanding 
credit.423
 
Expanding and contracting credit was to be effected, of course, by the Bank of 
England lowering and raising the Bank’s discount rate. The remainder of 
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Hawtrey’s submission to the Macmillan Committee is a refinement of the criteria 
for changing Bank Rate.   
 
It is customary to measure the price level by index numbers . . . but 
an index number is by no means a perfect measure, in that it may be 
affected by the scarcity or plenty of some important commodities . . . 
(for example) a scanty cotton crop in America, by raising the prices of 
cotton and cotton goods in the index number, might lead the Bank of 
England to initiate a contraction of credit so as to depress the prices 
of other commodities.424
 
Uprooted from 1930 to 2005, with oil substituted for cotton, this might well be 
wise advice for our own Monetary Policy Committee; as, also, could one of 
Hawtrey’s final paragraphs – 
 
The Bank of England should not confine itself narrowly to the 
guidance afforded by movements of the price level.  Movements of 
price level are only symptoms of underlying movements of the 
consumers’ . . . outlay.   And other symptoms should be taken into 
account, particularly the state of unemployment.  An unemployment 
percentage above normal itself affords a strong presumption in favour 
of relaxation of credit . . . .425
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Hawtrey’s presentation probably caused some unease in both the Treasury and 
the Bank of England.  They would regard as cavalier his view that the Bank, 
whilst waiting for world prices to rise, should watch with equanimity as its gold 
holdings ebbed away.  As the Committee’s examination of Hawtrey began, the 
Chairman was at pains to make it clear that Hawtrey was speaking in a personal 
capacity. 
 
The excerpts of dialogue in this chapter have all been taken from Minutes of 
Evidence taken before the Committee on Finance and Industry.  As indicated in 
the Introduction, the purpose of using this format is to attempt to re-create 
some of the drama, tension and sense of theatre which accompanied many of 
the Committee’s proceedings – particularly when Keynes was operating with 
great effect.  All the excerpts have been edited for purposes of brevity, but in 
such a way that neither the sense of the argument nor, hopefully, the drama of 
the occasion has been lost.   
 
MACMILLAN.  Just for the purpose of record, Mr. Hawtrey – you are 
an Assistant Secretary in the Treasury and Director of Financial 
Inquiries?  
 
HAWTREY. Yes. 
 
MACMILLAN.  . . . you appear before us today in your personal 
capacity as an economist and an author of works dealing with 
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monetary questions.  You wish it to be recorded that your evidence is 
given purely in that capacity? 
 
HAWTREY. Yes. 
 
The chairman, Macmillan then led the discussion towards eliciting Hawtrey’s 
views upon the causes of the depression; the questioning being subsequently 
taken up by Bevin and Keynes. 
 
MACMILLAN.  We . . . have been appointed to investigate monetary 
problems . . . and the state of unemployment . . . . do you think we 
are in the region of something which is quite different in kind as well 
as in degree? 
 
HAWTREY.  I do not think it is different in kind; I think that the causes 
are similar, but they have been intensified. 
 
BEVIN.  How?                         
 
HAWTREY.  . . . the policy of cheap money has been abandoned . . . 
 
KEYNES.  Why was it abandoned? 
 
HAWTREY.  . . . the Bank Rate . . . which had till then been little, if at 
all, above 3 per cent., was forced up . . . in . . . March 1925 . . . to 5 
per cent., and presumably that was all  intended to prepare the way 
for the return to the gold standard. 
 
 288
KEYNES.  Was that necessary? 
 
HAWTREY.  No I don’t think it was. . . . the American price level was 
steadily rising . . . from 144.6 in June 1924, to 161 in March 1925 . . . 
. accompanied by . . . an improvement in the rate of exchange . . . 
from 4.32 in June to . . . 4.79 in March . . . that process might have 
continued . . . until we had reached par, without any strain at all.   
    The effect of dear money in England was to lower world price levels 
(by restricting the credit available for the purchase of goods) . . . due 
to the position of London as . . . the centre from which a great part of 
the international trade of the world is financed.  [Thus] the effect of 
our 5 per cent Bank Rate has been to make the effort to put sterling 
at par . . . much greater than it would otherwise have been. 
 
MACMILLAN.  That is one of the exceptional causes that has been at 
work, in your view? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes, I should say, so far as employment is concerned, it is 
the exceptional cause.426
 
    After the chairman had given Hawtrey time and freedom to expand upon his 
theory of the instability of credit (described at length in an earlier chapter), and 
its responsibility for the trade cycle, Keynes returned to question Hawtrey on the 
dear money policy of the Bank of England and its relation to the return to the 
gold standard. 
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KEYNES. You told us that the dear money which preceded the return 
to the gold standard was perhaps not necessary . . . [and] . . . things 
would have been very much better if we had enjoyed cheap money in 
subsequent years? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
 
KEYNES.  Do you hold that dear money in that period 1926-1929 was 
also unnecessary? 
 
HAWTREY.  . . . there certainly have been periods when it would have 
been quite easy to escape from dear money. 
 
KEYNES.  You mean . . . having got ourselves into a fix we had to 
have dear money, but if we had studiously pursued a cheap money 
policy all the way through we should probably have been able to 
overcome our difficulties? 
 
HAWTREY  . . . there has probably hardly been any time up to last 
year when we could not have escaped from dear money. . . . The 
price at certain times would have been . . . loss of gold.427
 
The prospect of loss of gold under Hawtrey’s cheap money prescription was 
something which other members of the committee found disturbing, and Gregory 
(Professor of Banking; L.S.E.) was quick to take up this issue with Hawtrey.   
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GREGORY.  Would have been or might have been? [referring to the 
potential loss of gold]. 
 
HAWTREY.  Would have been; but not so great as to have driven us 
off the gold standard.428
 
    After a brief interruption from Mckenna, Hawtrey returned to complete his 
carefully reasoned answer to Gregory on what the consequences for Britain’s 
gold reserves would have been if the Bank of England had pursued a cheap 
money policy in the period following the return to the gold standard.  His lengthy 
response indicates he believed that his initial answer to Gregory might have been 
too pessimistic and that gold reserves need not have been depleted. 
 
HAWTREY. [continuing his response to Gregory].   . . . . if the gold 
had been allowed to form the basis of credit expansion in the United 
States that would have eased the situation here . . . . In 1925, 1926, 
1927 . . . the United States was clearly aiming at a credit expansion, 
they had cheap money all through that period . . . . they would have 
been willing to expand credit if they had received additional gold . . . .   
Instead of that . . . gold was sent on an enormous scale from the 
United States to Europe . . . we got our share, and we used the 
opportunity not to expand credit here, but to increase our gold 
reserves . . .429
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After brief exchanges involving Macmillan and Lubbock, in which Hawtrey 
acknowledged that credit expansion was no panacea for all Britain’s economic ill 
– inefficiency in the staple industries would have reduced the growth of the 
British standard of living whatever credit policies had been pursued - Gregory 
returned to interrogate Hawtrey on the extent to which his cheap money 
recommendation in Britain might have stimulated world prices. 
 
GREGORY.  I wish you would explain more fully what I have always 
felt to be the difficulty of accepting your theory, how precisely cheap 
money in this country has an influence out of proportion to cheap 
money in New York and the rest of the world? 
 
HAWTREY.  Cheap money in London means a low rate of sterling bills.  
Sterling bills are the means of financing international trade. . . .a low 
rate on sterling bills is encouragement to the merchant who borrows 
to hold larger stocks . . . this leads to increased orders and therefore 
increased activity . . .  
 
GREGORY.  . . . but . . . during the years you have described . . . New 
York was very actively financing international trade? 
 
HAWTREY.  . . . it seems to me that the evidence of experience is 
decisive . . . for two years the Americans failed to make their cheap 
money policy effective . . . it is a point of great practical importance as 
to what is the power of London and New York over [the international 
price level].  I regard that experience as a very important piece of 
evidence, and  insofar as the power of London has been impaired I 
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think it has largely been due to dear money, which has resulted in 
traders financing themselves by drawing bills on New York, 
Amsterdam or Switzerland in preference to London, because the 
discount rate has been cheaper.430
 
After an interchange with Brand (merchant banker from Lazard Bros.) concerning 
the extent of purchases of American securities in Europe, Keynes brought the 
questioning back to the main argument.  During the times when Keynes was the 
interrogator, from the evidence provide by the verbatim record, Hawtrey seemed 
more cautious, less confident, and more hesitant in his responses.  
 
KEYNES.  . . . you regard the history of events from 1924 to 1930, and 
their effect on unemployment, as the tragedy of a series of avoidable 
errors in monetary policy? 
 
HAWTREY.  Well, yes.  
 
KEYNES.  And that is based on two assumptions. . . . the Bank of 
England could . . . have followed an easy money policy without losing 
too much gold . . . and . . . if it had . . . that would have cured 
unemployment? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes 
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KEYNES.   As regards the first, of course, you can only get a 
conclusive answer by trying? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes 
 
KEYNES.  . . . as regards the other, do you consider that the level of 
money wages in this country was such that, in order to obtain full 
employment, the rise of prices in the outside world would have had to 
be quite substantial? 
 
HAWTREY.  No . . . Wages in America are 120 per cent above the pre-
war level and prices are about 40 per cent above . . . no doubt [due] 
to technical improvements in production. . . .  The Americans do not 
have a monopoly on technical improvements. I think it reasonable to 
assume that the enormous disparity . . . between prices and wages 
would have had its counterpart here.  Wages here are [only] 70 per 
cent . . . above the pre-war level.431
 
By this last statement Hawtrey seemed to be answering the implication in 
Keynes’s question that British wages were unduly high in relation to world rates.  
Keynes continued to press Hawtrey, suggesting, with appropriate analogy, that 
whilst lower interest rates might have encouraged expansion of credit, this in 
itself was no guarantee of a healthy economy with low unemployment. 
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KEYNES.  It is an expression of opinion on your part.  The argument 
to me is rather this.  One wants a man to weight 12 stone to be 
healthy.  He, in fact, weighs 10 stone; you say if he ate another 
biscuit every day he would weigh 12 stone.  But all you have proved is 
that the tendency of the biscuit would be to increase his weight? 
 
HAWTREY.  I think you have statistical data which take you further 
than that.  The American price level in 1925 was 161 . . . now it is 
140.  That disparity is . . . fully equivalent to the percentage of 
unemployment here. 
 
KEYNES.   . . . . to assert that if the Bank of England had been brave it 
could have had sufficiently cheap money to prevent a fall of prices is, 
it seems to me, unwarranted? 
 
HAWTREY.  I have given you ground for supposing the . . . price 
change involved was sufficient. . . . that ought to wipe out all 
exceptional unemployment we are suffering from.432
 
There were further interjections by Brand and Mckenna on the theme of the 
relationship between British levels of interest and foreign price levels, which 
Hawtrey handled confidently with historical illustrations, before Keynes, once 
more, took up the interrogation. 
 
KEYNES.  Supposing in earlier years we had pursued an easier money 
policy, and that had led to loss of gold; if we had just let the gold go 
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to America, that might have led to the boom on Wall Street coming at 
an earlier date than it actually came in 1929, and the Federal Reserve 
system would have taken steps to sterilise the gold? 
 
HAWTREY.  That is to build hypothesis on hypothesis.  It took them a 
long time to get worried about Wall Street speculation as it was.433
 
Brand and Gregory then attempted to clarify the extent to which Hawtrey 
believed London interest rates were capable of swaying the general level of 
world prices. 
 
BRAND.  Does your case involve the supposition that it is the Bank of 
England which determines the American price level? 
 
HAWTREY.  That would be carrying it too far. . . . if there is active 
opposition between the two credit operations, the tendency is for the 
London policy to prevail owing to its effect on international trade.  I 
would not go beyond that. 
 
GREGORY.  Would you be prepared, at least, to accept this: that a 
cheap money policy initiated in London will fail . . . unless . . . the 
action of the Bank of England is accompanied by systematic action by 
the other Central Banks of the world? 
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HAWTREY.  . . . if they do not actively take concerted measures I 
think there is a very strong presumption that the London policy will 
govern the situation.434
 
Here the day’s proceedings drew to a close with Hawtrey facing a somewhat 
sceptical set of questioners.  At the conclusion, Hawtrey was invited back to face 
a further day’s questioning. 
    On Friday 11 April 1930, the twenty-third day of the committee’s 
deliberations, Hawtrey was re-called and further examined.  Macmillan, the 
Chairman, after summarising the view expressed by Hawtrey on the previous 
day, with Hawtrey agreeing that it was a fair summary, voiced the anxieties 
which most of the committee felt about Hawtrey’s preferred option.         
 
MACMILLAN.  Suppose . . . without restricting credit . . . that gold had 
gone out to a very considerable extent, would that not have had very 
serious consequences on the international position of London? 
 
HAWTREY.  I do not think the credit of London depends on any 
particular figure of gold holding. . . . The harm began to be done in 
March and April of 1925 [when] the fall in American prices started.  
There was no reason why the bank of England should have taken any 
action at that time so far as the question of loss of gold is concerned. 
. . . I believed at the time and I still think that the right treatment 
would have been to restore the gold standard de facto before it was 
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restored de jure.  That is what all the other countries have done. . . . . 
I would have suggested that we should have adopted the practice of 
always selling gold to a sufficient extent to prevent the exchange 
depreciating.  There would have been no legal obligation to continue 
convertibility into gold . . . if that course had been adopted, the Bank 
of England would never have been anxious about the gold holding, 
they would have been able to see it ebb away to quite a considerable 
extent with perfect equanimity, and might have continued with a 4 per 
cent Bank Rate. 
 
MACMILLAN.  . . . the course you suggest would not have been 
consistent with what one may call orthodox Central Banking, would it? 
 
HAWTREY.  I do not know what orthodox Central Banking is. 
 
MACMILLAN.  . . . when gold ebbs away you must restrict credit as a 
general principle? 
 
HAWTREY.  . . . that kind of orthodoxy is like conventions at bridge; 
you have to break them when the circumstances call for it.  I think 
that a gold reserve exists to be used. . . . Perhaps once in a century 
the time comes when you can use your gold reserve for the governing 
purpose, provide you have the courage to use practically all of it.  I 
think it is possible that the situation arose in the interval between the 
return to the gold standard . . . and the early part of 1927 . . . That 
was the period at which the greater part of the fall in the 
[international] price level took place.435
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For several minutes Hawtrey confidently fielded further questions on the Bank of 
England’s policies from Keynes and Gregory, displaying a mastery of the history 
of exchange rates, price indices, interest rates and gold movements, and 
asserting at one point (note, in April 1930) that Britain had been ‘heading all 
through last year straight for the abandonment of the gold standard’.436   
    Macmillan then decided to move the discussion on from criticism of the Bank’s 
past failings to recommendations for the future, and Hawtrey was given the 
opportunity to make a general statement.  This he divided into short and long-
term recommendations.  Inevitably his short-term recommendations were that 
everything should be done to bring the effective Bank Rate down to a level of 
two per cent. – a level which had been regarded as ‘cheap money before the 
First World War.   
 
. . . the Bank of England ought to carry the process of credit limitation 
to its limit.  The more it does . . . the faster the revival of business will 
come. . . . I would attach importance to the buying of securities (by 
the Bank of England from the commercial banks, thereby increasing 
their cash deposits), . . . and the setting in motion of that tendency 
that the joint stock banks have, to increase their lending when they 
have more cash on their hands than they need.  That is what I would 
rely on so far as the immediate future is concerned.437
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Turning to the more distant future, Hawtrey’s recommendations, once more, 
read uncannily like a handbook for the guidance of the Bank of England’s 
Monetary Policy Committee of 2007.  Much of his recommendations for the 
future had already been covered in his written submission.  The greatest and 
overriding need was for a policy to ‘stabilise the purchasing power of the 
pound’.438  To this end he regarded independent action to adjust interest rates 
on the part of the Bank of England to be the most effective means of procuring 
stability.  His view was that there were wide limits within which the Bank of 
England could exercise freedom of action without endangering the gold standard.  
In setting interest rates the Bank of England should be guided by a number of 
indicators; principally an index number of prices.  Hawtrey suggested that credit 
policy should be based on an international price index composed of the 
quotations of all the staple commodities which have an international market.  He 
also believed there should be sensitivity to situations where prices of 
commodities were being forced up (or down) by non-monetary causes.  Finally, 
Hawtrey regarded any rise in unemployment as an indicator that the consumers’ 
outlay was being reduced and that an expansionist credit policy was being called 
for. 
 
. . . if the Bank of England were guided in its credit policy primarily by 
these two considerations, the price index with its necessary 
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corrections, and the state of employment, then it would get as near 
an ideal credit policy as practicable.439
 
Following this statement there was an interlude of jousting between Hawtrey and 
Keynes on theoretical concerns.  From the verbatim report of the encounter 
Keynes was the more confident and relaxed combatant.  Misunderstandings 
abounded.  Each of the two economists used different concepts in their analysis.  
Hawtrey insisted on using his concept of ‘consumers’ outlay’. Hawtrey regarded 
‘investment’ as part of the consumers’ outlay with the investment market being 
the intermediary agency for transferring it to business use; Keynes treated 
savings and investment as distinct entities enacted by different groups of people 
– saving being carried out by individuals, investment by businessmen.  To 
Hawtrey ‘investment’ meant the purchase of investment goods – shares, 
government bonds, and so on by individuals – to Keynes’s, the word meant the 
creation of real ‘bricks and mortar’ by industry.  Keynes’s Treatise, which he was, 
at that time, in the process of completing, put great store upon trade depression 
and unemployment being the result of savings exceeding investment.  Hawtrey’s 
theory of the trade cycle required that depressions began when consumers’ 
outlay fell short of consumers’ income.  Keynes tried to get Hawtrey to restate 
his theory in terms of the difference between savings and investment, with 
depressions being caused by the level of investment falling short of the level of 
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savings, but Hawtrey clung on desperately and refused to yield his ground.  At 
one point, during a disagreement about the appropriate definitions for 
‘investment’ and ‘savings’, Keynes felt sufficiently confident of his grounds to 
taunt Hawtrey – ‘I am defining ‘savings’ as the excess of a man’s income over his 
expenditure on consumption.  If his income is less than what he spends on 
consumption then his savings are negative.  You are sufficient of a 
mathematician to appreciate that.’440   
    After this interlude, which was probably only enjoyed by the two principal 
participants, Keynes returned to matters of economic policy.   
 
KEYNES.  . . . when we returned to the gold standard we tried to 
restore equilibrium by trying to lower prices here, whereas we could 
have used our influence much more effectively by trying to raise 
prices elsewhere? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
 
KEYNES.  . . . I should like to take the argument a little further. . . . 
the reason the method adopted has not been successful, as I 
understand you, is partly . . . the intrinsic difficulty of . . . [reducing] 
wages? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
 
                                                 
 
440 Ibid., p.287. 
 302
KEYNES.  . . . and partly the fact that the effort to reduce [prices] 
here causes a sympathetic movement abroad . . .? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
 
KEYNES. . . . you assume a low Bank Rate [here] would have raised 
prices elsewhere? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
 
KEYNES.  But it would also, presumably have raised [prices] here? 
 
HAWTREY.  . . . what I have been saying . . . is aimed primarily at 
avoiding the fall in prices both here and abroad. . . . it is possible 
there might have been an actual rise in prices here . . . 
 
KEYNES.  . . . one would have expected our Bank Rate to have more 
effect on our own price level than on the price level of the rest of the 
world? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
 
KEYNES.   So in that case . . . wouldn’t dear money have been more 
efficacious . . . in restoring equilibrium between home and foreign 
prices . . .?  
 
HAWTREY.   . . . the export of gold itself would have tended to 
produce equilibrium.  It depends very much at what stage you 
suppose the process to be applied. 
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KEYNES. . . . so cheap money here affects the outside world more 
than it affects us, but dear money here affects us more than it affects 
the outside world? 
 
HAWTREY.   No. My suggestion is that through cheap money here, the 
export of gold encourages credit expansion elsewhere, but the loss of 
gold tends to have some restrictive effect on credit here.   
 
KEYNES.  But this can only happen if the loss of gold causes a reversal 
of the cheap money policy? 
 
HAWTREY   No, I think that the export of gold has some effect 
consistent with cheap money.441
 
Here, the general scepticism of the committee seemed to be in the process of 
justification as, for the first time, cracks began to appear in what seemed to be 
the previously ruthless logic of Hawtrey’s case.  Why, without dearer money to 
stem credit should the loss of gold, in itself, act to restrict credit and prevent the 
rise in prices in Britain from being even greater than the rise in prices which the 
export of gold sought to stimulate abroad?  The merchant banker, Brand, 
interrupted the dialogue between the two economists to try to obtain clarification 
upon this point. 
 
BRAND.   The effect is psychological? 
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 HAWTREY.  Yes, it is psychological . . .  
 
KEYNES.  I suggest that the loss of gold here only has a restrictive 
effect if it leads the Bank of England to reverse the easy money 
policy? 
 
HAWTREY.  No . . . I think the loss of gold does have some restrictive 
effect. 
 
KEYNES.  The Bank of England could only continue to keep money 
easy . . . [by] replacing the gold with securities? 
 
HAWTREY.  . . . . having regard to the very obvious bias of the 
Federal Reserve System to cheap money and credit relaxation in the 
whole period 1925 to 1928, I do not think that [this would have been 
necessary]. 
 
GREGORY.  Is not the proper answer to Mr. Keynes that you might 
have kept wages steadier and let wholesale prices rise? 
 
HAWTREY.  It is difficult to say, . . . cheap money [might have 
produced] a material rise of prices relative to wages, which, of course, 
would almost certainly have been accompanied by some rise of 
wages. 
 
KEYNES.  . . . you are suggesting that . . . our loss of gold . . . spread 
[thinly] over a wide area, is going to have a larger effect on world 
prices than our . . . [substantial loss] . . . is going to have on ours.  Is 
that a hypothesis on which you would risk very much? 
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 HAWTREY.  I do not think you risk very much, because all the time 
you are exporting gold the export of gold is itself a corrective of your 
balance of payments . . . and affords you shelter under which your 
industrial situation is being revived. 
 
KEYNES.  How much gold do you consider we could have lost with 
impunity in 1924, 1925 and 1926? 
 
HAWTREY.  . . . it would have been worth getting rid of one hundred 
million pounds of gold in order to cure unemployment.442  
 
After a short discussion with Lubbock, the Bank of England representative, over 
the legality of this move – Hawtrey remained adamant that there was nothing 
illegal about such a manoeuvre.  Keynes then moved on to quiz Hawtrey on how 
he felt releasing what amounted to only five per cent of the world’s gold stocks 
might influence world prices to the extent of fifteen per cent.  
 
KEYNES.  . . . would [the loss of gold] have affected speculation 
against sterling? 
 
HAWTREY.  . . . the speculation against sterling would have created a 
situation in which inflation of credit would have cured unemployment 
very quickly.  You will recollect that in the autumn of 1923 that very 
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thing began, a speculation against sterling, and there was a greater 
improvement in trade than at any other time since 1920. 
 
KEYNES.  I do not know that I agree with that.  One hundred million 
pounds of gold would be 5 per cent. of [the world’s gold supply] ? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
 
KEYNES.  The fall in international prices from the end of 1924 to the 
middle of 1927 was about 15 per cent? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
 
KEYNES.  You think . . . letting out . . . 5 per cent. additional gold 
would have prevented prices from falling? 
 
HAWTREY.  There is only one place to which the gold would have 
gone . . . the United States. 
 
KEYNES.  . . . [that would have] only affected the situation there, 
surely it would not have helped us . . .? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes, there was very little of the world on the Gold 
Standard then . . .  
 
KEYNES.  . . . one is seeking to affect world priced? 
 
HAWTREY.  Yes. 
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KEYNES.  World prices are . . . not simply determined by the demand 
of the United States. . . . you would not get a proportionate rise in 
world prices? 
 
HAWTREY.  In the conditions of 1925-1926 the relevance of the 
demand for gold was . . . practically confined to the United States. . . . 
all other countries . . . would have quite readily followed the lead of 
London and New York so far as the value of their currency was 
concerned.443
 
Keynes moved relentlessly onwards, dominating the inquiry.  He asked Hawtrey 
how he saw a low interest policy would affect Britain’s capital exports, and 
suggested that if, as a consequence of low interest rates, London became a 
more attractive place from which to borrow this might not exacerbate the 
outflow of gold.  Hawtrey argued that such an effect would be insignificant, and 
produced a lengthy, reasoned argument as to why the effect of Bank Rate 
changes on capital flows was both small and short-lived.  When Keynes 
disagreed with the outcome of his analysis and solicited the support of the 
various practical men of finance on the committee, Hawtrey was in no way 
submissive – ‘I regard my arguments as very cogent.  All I hear against them is 
that practical opinion is unanimously against them, but that does not dismay me 
unless practical opinion can give good grounds for its beliefs.’444   
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    Two weeks after Hawtrey gave evidence to the Macmillan Committee Keynes 
sent Hawtrey the proofs of his Treatise on Money for comment, adding ‘although 
we always seem to differ on these monetary questions in discussion, I feel that 
ultimately I am joined in common agreement with you as against most of the 
rest of the world’.445
    With the benefit of the proofs of Keynes’s Treatise on Money to hand Hawtrey 
prepared, in July 1930, his memorandum ‘Remedies for Unemployment’ for 
submission to the Macmillan Committee.446  It was, as ever, a meticulous, 
logically argued document, with numerical illustrations, within which he had 
given carefully consideration to the arguments within the Macmillan Committee, 
and also to Keynes’s most recent published work.   
     Hawtrey began by clearly stating the parameters of his argument: to increase 
employment by, say, 10 per cent., the consumers’ outlay must be increased by 
10 per cent., or the amount of employment afforded by a given outlay must be 
increased – which, in effect, meant a reduction in wages  He ruled out the 
second alternative.  With an inconvertible paper currency, i.e. no gold standard, 
he suggested that there would be no problem in expanding credit by 10 per cent. 
in order to provide the extra consumers’ outlay to give the additional 
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employment.  The same result could be could be secured under the gold 
standard with a reduction of its gold parity in the proportion 10 to 11. 
    With the gold standard in place and an unalterable parity there were 
inevitable problems associated with the policy of increasing the consumers’ 
outlay by expansion of credit.  Using carefully selected figures for the purpose of 
illustration, Hawtrey showed that where, previously, equilibrium had existed 
between the inflow and outflow of gold, and in the state of consumers’ cash 
deposits, an increase in credit for the purpose of expanding consumers’ outlay 
would result firstly, in depletions of the consumers’ deposits and secondly, 
depletion of the nation’s gold reserves.  In the first case it would be because a 
portion of the extra outlay would be on imported goods, and consequently the 
total consumers’ income would be less than increased level of outlay, causing 
consumers to have to draw on their cash reserves.  In the case of the gold flows, 
Hawtrey reasoned that foreign investment (which involved the export of gold) 
had only been maintained because the loss of gold entailed in the purchase of 
foreign investments had been covered by the net inflow of gold as a result of 
exports exceeding imports.  If expanding credit sucked in extra imports then the 
excess of exports over imports would no longer be capable of compensating for 
this loss of gold; gold would be lost or foreign investment cut back – a course of 
action with potentially undesirable consequences for future exports.   
    Hawtrey then looked at some of the measures Keynes’s had recommended for 
reducing unemployment in his Treatise on Money; starting with protective tariffs.  
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He started by making the obvious point that the effectiveness of tariffs as a 
means of reducing unemployment depended upon the extent to which the tariffs 
were capable of causing shrinkage of imports, and this, in turn, depended upon 
the capability of home producers to expand their output in order to fill the partial 
vacuum left by the fall in imports.  The bulk of British imports, at that time, were 
agricultural products, or other raw materials where Britain had little scope to 
expand its own output.  Hawtrey also pointed out that there would be a 
tendency for British prices to rise above world prices; this would have a 
deleterious effect on British exports, with further implications for employment.  
He also made three other points regarding the imposition of tariffs.  First, the 
uncertainty with regards to the fluctuating level of tariffs would make business 
planning difficult, and thus, if any tariffs were imposed, they ought to be 
considered as virtually permanent measures.  Secondly, the field of products 
favourable to protection by tariffs was very limited; there was little to be gained 
by imposing tariffs on agricultural products or raw materials, and where imports 
were officially classified as manufactured, this often meant little more (especially 
in the case of petroleum products), than that they were basic manufacturing 
materials which had been put through a preliminary preparation process.  
Thirdly, Hawtrey pointed out, effective tariff protection tended to disadvantage 
one country, or set of countries, to the benefit of another set, whereas in a 
trading nation such as Britain the imperative was for a general revival in world 
trade. 
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    In the remainder of the memorandum Hawtrey dealt with the effects to be 
expected from government expenditure, discrimination against foreign 
investment, inflationary expenditure by Government, funding the floating debt 
and the open-market operations of the Central Banks.  The entire document was 
heavily illustrated with numerical examples, with considerable mathematical 
facility being required to follow the various sets of figures thrown up by his 
postulated scenarios.   
    Sir Richard Hopkins, the Treasury Controller of Finance and Supply Services 
appeared as a witness on Friday 16 May 1930 and Thursday 22 May 1930.  His 
evidence signaled the adoption of a more pragmatic, and less dogmatic, 
approach by the Treasury to the issue of public works.  His interrogation by 
Keynes over public works yielded the most fascinating of confrontations – 
producing the temptation to dwell on it for longer than this particular thesis 
merits.  Hopkins’s views, as expressed within the Macmillan Committee, do have 
a bearing upon Hawtrey’s position within the Treasury, and it is from this 
perspective that his appearance will be considered.    
    The first day of Sir Richard Hopkins’s testimony dealt with technical matters 
over profits on the fiduciary issue of Treasury notes and policy objectives relating 
to the conversion of floating debt to long-term debt.  At the beginning of his 
second day of evidence, Hopkins discussed the various forms of Government 
assistance which had been in operation since 1920, before the Committee moved 
on to the matter of how the Treasury viewed the possibility of a large 
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programme of public works, initiated by Government, with the express purpose 
of stimulating trade – establishing what really was ‘The Treasury View’. 
 
HOPKINS.  I think the Treasury view has sometimes been rather 
compendiously and not very accurately stated. 
 
MACMILLAN.  Now is your chance, Sir Richard. 
 
HOPKINS.  If I may say so, officials, if their views are published, 
start a controversy, and they are not able to intervene in its 
progress, and sometimes the exact form of their view - - -  
 
MACMILLAN. - - - is a little misunderstood? 
 
HOPKINS.  - - - is a little misunderstood.447
 
 
Hopkins proceeded to explain certain aspects of the 1929 White Paper, 
Memoranda on Certain Proposals Relating to Unemployment – making the point 
that it was not intended as a general statement of Treasury policy on 
development works but as response to the publication of a scheme by the Liberal 
Party and ‘an exceedingly able and lively pamphlet under the names of Mr. 
Keynes and Mr. Henderson, in which Mr. Keynes rather severely, though not 
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unkindly, beat the Treasury about the head for views which he ascribed to 
them’.448
    Hopkins drew the attention of the committee to paragraph 3 of the 1929 
White Paper in which the Treasury acknowledged that the state accepted 
responsibility for such services as roads, telephones and housing ‘to the fullest 
extent that can be justified by our economic needs without extravagance’.449  As 
regards the actual amount of expenditure, Hopkins drew the Committee’s 
attention to the following passage: 
 
The scale of State capital expenditure is therefore not a question 
of principle but of degree.  The view hitherto followed has been 
that State expenditure should be framed with due regard to 
other competing calls on our national resources, and that, as the 
natural test of profit making capacity was absent, the economic 
justification of all schemes ought to be thoroughly examined 
before they are put in hand.450
 
The essence of the Liberal plan, to which the 1929 White Paper was addressed, 
was that schemes should be started ‘swiftly’.451  Taking road construction as an 
illustration, Hopkins pointed out that not only was ‘swiftness’ an objective 
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incapable of achievement – ‘[a road] cuts across people’s gardens . . . cottages . 
. . beauty spots . . . time has to be spent by engineers familiar with the locality in 
making plans . . . on proper recruitment and proper accommodation for labour’ - 
but that the process of planning, especially if ‘swiftness’ was regarded as 
essential, would arouse public hostility to the extent that it would be impossible 
to attract financial support.  Hopkins continued to stress the importance of the 
inter-related factors of planning feasibility and public acceptance in deciding 
whether a proposed scheme was a ‘good’ scheme.   
    After some discussion Keynes returned the question of clarifying the nature of 
‘The Treasury View’. 
 
KEYNES. . . . there is the proposition that schemes of capital 
development are of no use for reducing unemployment . . . . 
[and] the proposition that it is difficult to find good schemes? 
 
HOPKINS. Yes 
 
KEYNES. Would it be a misunderstanding of the Treasury view to 
say they hold to the first proposition? 
 
HOPKINS. . . . [that] goes much too far. . . [it] would ascribe to 
us an absolute and rigid dogma, would it not? 
 
KEYNES. . . . the Treasury view, I thought . . . was, that . . . any 
capital that could be found for those schemes would be diverted 
from other uses.  That is a misunderstanding then? 
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 HOPKINS. Yes.  That is much too rigid an expression of any 
views that have come from us. 
 
The proposition, in the form in which it was put by Keynes, came as close as 
possible to the conclusion of Hawtrey’s Economica article of 1925 that the idea 
that public works, in the absence of credit creation, gave additional employment 
was ‘fallacious’.452  The Treasury might have once had a large degree of 
confidence in Hawtrey’s ability, on theoretical grounds, to counter Keynes’s 
claims on behalf of public works.  Clearly, that confidence no longer held and 
Hopkins can be seen to be anxious to move as far away as possible from any 
basis to the ‘Treasury View’ within macroeconomic theory. 
     Keynes moved on to try to establish the grounds by which the Treasury might 
judge a proposed scheme to be ‘good’. 
 
KEYNES.  So the issue between those who are in favour of these 
schemes and those who are against them is not whether they 
cure unemployment? 
 
HOPKINS.  Do you wish me to agree? 
 
[MACMILLAN.  I do not think you must take it that Sir Richard 
agrees.] 
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KEYNES.  What is the point where we differ? 
 
HOPKINS.  The capital for these schemes has got to come from 
somewhere. 
 
Hopkins had been at pains to make the point that speedy establishment of public 
works was undesirable since he regarded the careful nurturing of public support 
to be an essential part of any public works programme.  Keynes’s line of 
questioning offered Hopkins the chance to point out one particular reason why a 
scheme which did not command public sympathy might, despite its short-term 
creation of employment, be a ‘bad’ scheme. 
 
KEYNES.  [The need for capital] is equally true of ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ schemes? 
 
HOPKINS.  . . . if . . . a . . . scheme . . . is not a dynamic force 
towards a great renewal of activity and prosperity . . . it does 
make a hole in the capital which is available for the purposes of 
the community. 
 
KEYNES.  But do ‘bad’ schemes make a larger hole than ‘good’ 
schemes? 
 
HOPKINS.  . . . they may in their consequences. 
 
KEYNES.  . . . I fail to see the logic of what you are saying. 
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HOPKINS.  Well it may divert capital from more useful schemes. 
 
KEYNES.  That is equally true of ‘good’ and ‘bad’ schemes? 
 
HOPKINS.  . . . the general effect upon the public mind of what 
you are doing is very much going to influence the amount of 
capital which is going abroad. . . . It might lead people to think 
that this country was a much better place to invest, or it might 
lead them to think that it was a much worse place to invest.  
When you were speaking of ‘bad’ schemes I was thinking of the 
latter. 
 
KEYNES.  Our foreign investments cannot increase unless our 
exports increase. 
 
HOPKINS.  No, but the burden on the exchange can increase. 
 
Here, in conceding that capital might be diverted from ‘more useful’ schemes, 
Hopkins had come dangerously close to admitting that the old Hawtreyan 
‘Treasury View’ with its thesis of ‘crowding out’ still persisted.  On this occasion 
he outsmarted Keynes by changing the nature of ‘crowding out’ from one of rival 
schemes competing for limited home investment funds, to one in which the 
necessary investment funds would only be forthcoming if the schemes 
themselves did not alienate public opinion – a ‘psychological crowding out’.453  
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Keynes was forced to concede that he had been left in a position where he could 
not press home his advantage over Hopkins as an economist. 
       
KEYNES.  . . . Nearly all of what you have been saying today 
comes to this, that it is difficult to find good schemes? 
 
HOPKINS.  Yes. 
 
KEYNES.  That is quite different from what I previously thought 
to be the ‘Treasury View’.  It was not a view of that kind but a 
theoretical view, that the objection to these schemes was that 
they caused diversion on theoretical grounds.  That was a 
misunderstanding on my part of what the Treasury intended, 
was it? 
 
HOPKINS.  Yes. . . . It is . . . the views we take as to the 
practical reactions of [a] scheme. 
 
KEYNES.  It bends so much that I find difficulty in getting hold of 
it. 
 
Keynes certainly did not relent at this point, nor was there any relaxation in the 
drama of the confrontation.  Keynes continued to press Hopkins on his criteria 
for a ‘good’ scheme; at one point progressively pushing Hopkins down from 5 
per cent, then 4 per cent., and finally to 3 per cent., on the overall return which 
the Treasury might expect before deeming a scheme to be worthwhile.  In the 
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end, the Chairman declared the discussion to have been a ‘drawn battle’.454  
Many subsequent commentators have viewed this verdict by Macmillan as being 
overly generous to Hopkins since there is no doubt that he underwent 
considerable discomfort under Keynes’s relentless questioning.455  But if Keynes 
scored more debating points than Hopkins (as Keynes tended to do with 
everybody) then, in terms of overall strategy, Hopkins emerged as the clear 
winner.  He (at least, for some time, until Keynes began to introduce the 
multiplier concept into his promotion of public works) successfully removed the 
question of public works out of the realm of macroeconomics and into that of 
microeconomics, where individual works were assessed on their merits in terms 
of the returns which they might generate and the extent to which each project 
might receive public support.  In doing so he temporarily took the debate on 
public works away from the sphere of Keynes’s special economic expertise.  
Within the Treasury, he took the public works debate away from the area of the 
expertise of Hawtrey.   
    Public works did not disappear as an issue.  But, so far as the Treasury was 
concerned, they were divorced from the issue of unemployment.  Instead of 
being part of a macroeconomic solution to the overall level of unemployment, 
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they were dependent upon feasibility and local acceptability, as judged by the 
Board of Trade and the members of various local Boards and Councils. 
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                                          Chapter 6 
 
 
                              Leaving the Gold Standard 
 
 
                                           1931- 32 
 
   
 
    The formal process of withdrawing from the gold standard began on Thursday 
17 September 1931.  On that day, the Cabinet Committee on the Financial 
Situation discussed the drain of gold.  It was resolved at the meeting to make 
every effort to secure extended credit from abroad in order to avoid resorting to 
either of the two alternative courses of action: suspension of the gold standard, 
or import tariffs.456  However, on the same day, the Treasury began contingency 
preparations for suspending the gold standard when Frederick Phillips began to 
draft the Gold Standard (Amendment) Bill.457  On Friday evening, 18 September 
1931, at 9.45 p.m., Ramsay MacDonald met with the Deputy Governor of the 
Bank of England, Sir Ernest Harvey, and Fisher, Leith-Ross and Phillips from the 
Treasury.  Harvey announced that £17 million had been lost during the day and 
this had exhausted the dollar credit.  The Federal Reserve Bank of America had 
indicated that a banking credit would be unlikely to be available to save the 
situation.  With the following day being a Saturday, and thus a short day, it 
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might be possible to get through it with the aid of a loan made available from 
France, but they would be forced to stop on the Monday.458  It was agreed that 
the suspension of the gold standard should be announced before trading 
commenced on Monday, and the necessary legislation should be rushed through 
parliament on Monday 21 September 1931.  In the event, the public 
announcement of the suspension was made after a special Cabinet meeting on 
the evening of Sunday 20 September 1931 – provoking the Daily Mail headline of 
Monday 21 September: ‘Six months’ suspension of Gold Standard’.459  The Gold 
Standard (Amendment) Act was passed on Monday 21 September, and Bank rate 
was immediately raised to 6 per cent. for the purpose of preventing an 
immediate collapse of sterling.  Now, at least for the time being, the currency 
needed to be managed.    
    The introduction of a managed currency was not quite the straightforward, 
‘commonplace’ event that A.J.P.Taylor might have had us believe.460  The 
suspension of the gold standard on 21 September 1931 forced the issue of a 
managed currency on to the economic agenda, but neither the Chancellor, nor 
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the Treasury nor the Bank of England had a policy regarding the future of 
sterling.   
    Prior to moving off the gold-standard the Bank of England had exercised the 
greater control over monetary policy and interest rates.  Its discount rate, at 
which it was prepared to lend to the commercial banks, formed the basis of 
short-term interest rates, and its level was determined by the Bank in accordance 
with its need to preserve its gold reserves.  The emergency legislation, the Gold 
Standard (Amendment) Act – drafted by Phillips within the Treasury - gave 
responsibility for, and power over, monetary policy to the Treasury.  The Act 
represented a giant snatch of power, by the Treasury, away from the Bank of 
England.  But, for the Treasury, these were uncharted waters and it had no firm 
idea of how it should use its enhanced powers - of the course upon which it 
should embark.  There was little agreement between the Chancellor and senior 
Treasury officials as to the best way forward.  Between 21 September 1931 and 
February 29 1932, when Sir Frederick Phillips presented the final draft of his 
policy memorandum to the Government, there had been wide divergences of 
opinion and much changing of minds.  For Philip Snowden, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, the suspension of the gold standard was a temporary measure 
designed to deal with abnormal withdrawal of deposits – ‘I believe the countries 
will return to an improved Gold Standard’ he assured the nation.461  Others were 
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less sure.  The steadiest mind throughout the entire period of deliberation was 
that of R. G. Hawtrey, and it was his view which was to eventually prevail. 
    The first contribution to the Treasury’s debate on the future of sterling came, 
on 26 September 1931, from the direction of the Bank of England; from the 
Treasury’s former Controller of Finance, Sir Otto Niemeyer.  Niemeyer, it must be 
remembered, was the civil servant who, along with Montagu Norman, presented 
Churchill with the ‘irrefutable’ arguments for the restoration of the gold standard, 
and then proceeded to act as Churchill’s ‘minder’ through the subsequent 
parliamentary debates.  Time had not softened his views. 
 
I start from the point of view that the suspension of gold 
payments, so far from being a welcome and glorious relief from 
unconscionable burdens, is alike for this country, for foreign 
countries and for the general restoration of world confidence, a 
very great disaster, the full dangers of which we are as yet far 
from realising.462
 
Niemeyer suggested that foreign countries were ‘vacillating between following 
gold and following sterling’ and that the ‘first and urgent [Niemeyer’s 
underlining] essential is to frighten the bears and reassure those people who 
would follow sterling if given a modicum of hope’.  To this end he felt it 
necessary that there should be a ‘definite official statement that there was going 
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to be no inflation of credit and that it should proposed not to allow an increase of 
the note circulation’.  By making it clear that the authorities would take strong 
measures to support sterling he believed that it would be possible to form a 
considerable sterling block which would cause ‘the position of the gold holding 
countries, i.e. France and America [to] become more and more unenviable’.463  
Niemeyer’s argument for fiscal and monetary rectitude as a means of 
establishing a strong sterling block did, to a large extent, presage the 
international currency situation throughout the 1930’s and was very much in line 
with the arguments being put forward by Snowden as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.  But Niemeyer’s (and Snowden’s) ultimate purpose in establishing a 
strong sterling block was as a means of bringing about a re-distribution of the 
world’s gold with the intention of restoring a more effective gold standard.  
    Likewise at the Treasury, Leith-Ross, formerly assistant to Niemeyer, 
representative of the old ‘sound finance’ regime and still, for another year, 
occupying the post of Deputy Controller of Finance at the Treasury, favoured an 
early return to the gold standard (maybe, at a slightly reduced sterling value).  
But Frederick Phillips, his successor-in-waiting, was unconvinced about the 
advantages of returning to gold.  A week after departing from the gold standard 
Phillips responded to Leith-Ross.  The exact date of the response is uncertain 
since the memorandum is undated, but the position of the memorandum in 
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Leith-Ross’s well-ordered file indicates a date between 26 September and 28 
September.  Phillips pointed out to Leith-Ross that: 
 
. . . since October 1929, the appreciation of gold has: 
 
     Lowered wholesale prices by 25%; 
     Lowered cost of living by about 10%; 
     While wages have been practically unchanged. 
 
Now all these things were out of harmony already in 1929.  By 
the beginning of this month the disharmony was becoming 
fantastic.  Compared with pre-war: 
 
     Wholesale price level was about the same (100); 
     Cost of living was about 145; 
     Wages were about 175. 
 
This is what was crushing our farmers and manufacturers for the 
benefit of the rentier, the distributive trades and the fixed 
income man, while the working classes were losing as much 
from unemployment as they were gaining from an increase in 
real wages. 
 
Why go on with it? . . . . 464
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Phillips went on to argue against Leith-Ross’s suggestion that the return to gold 
might be at a somewhat lower level; suggesting that if the value of gold went on 
rising at its present rate (and he saw no reason why it shouldn’t) then, within a 
year, the country would be back in the same position from which it had just 
escaped – ‘. . . a poor set off to the blow our prestige has suffered from 
suspending gold payments’.465  Phillips favoured attempting to stabilise the 
pounds exchange rate with the dollar without recourse to the gold standard.  He, 
nevertheless, favoured the rather high value of four dollars to the pound as a 
target. 
    Hawtrey echoed Phillips’s rhetorical question of ‘Why go on with it?’.  He saw 
no advantage in rushing back to gold; moreover, to him, four dollars to the 
pound was far too high a target level for the stabilising of the pound.  He 
recommended that policy on the exchange rate should aim at the maximum 
beneficial effect on trade and industry, and accordingly suggested that the 
monetary authorities should attempt to peg the pound at $3.40.  His advice 
regarding future exchange rate policy was laid out in a memorandum – ‘Pegging 
the pound’ - addressed to Sir Richard Hopkins on 28 September 1931.    
    Hawtrey began his memorandum by making it clear that the virtue of the gold 
standard was not the extent of the level at which it maintained the pound, but its 
use as an agent of stability. 
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It was, no doubt, desirable to maintain the gold standard in 
order to avoid the adverse effects of fluctuating exchanges with 
gold standard countries upon the credit business of London.  
But, the gold standard, once suspended, the effect on credit 
business is much the same whatever the value of the pound is, 
whether 50 per cent or 95 per cent or par.  In either case there 
is uncertainty.  The question of the rate of exchange to be 
maintained ought therefore to be settled with a view to securing 
the maximum beneficial effect upon trade and industry.  The 
detrimental effect on finance hardly enters into it.466
 
The essence of Hawtrey’s argument was as follows.  British costs (predominantly 
wages) were too high in relation to world prices.  British wages were paid in 
pounds whereas the rest of the world, predominantly, paid for British goods with 
gold.  Where British goods were sold abroad, at world prices, the incoming gold 
did not convert to sufficient pounds to pay British wages; if the price of British 
goods for sale abroad were to cover British costs then they would be unsellable.  
Moving off the gold standard afforded the opportunity of adjusting the value of 
the pound in relation to gold in such a way as to bring British costs back into 
equilibrium with world prices (this did not necessarily imply moving back to the 
gold standard at a lower rate, with all the commitments of convertibility, but 
looking to manage the value of the pound to keep it in a close relationship to the 
world value of gold or, in effect, the value of the dollar).  Looking back, for a 
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base year in which Britain’s costs could be considered to be in equilibrium with 
world prices, he suggested 1925 as suitable for such a base year. 
 
 It is probable that the year 1925 would supply a tolerable 
standard of the equilibrium relation between wages and prices.  
Some people would argue that wages were substantially too high 
then, and Mr. Keynes sometimes estimates the discrepancy at 
the time of the Gold Standard Act at 10 per cent., but on the 
other hand something must be allowed for the effect of 
increased technical efficiency upon the price level.  A slightly 
lower price level would be appropriate now to a given wage 
level, owing to the decrease in the real cost of production.467
 
Hawtrey continued to pursue this line of argument.  His starting point for 
calculating an appropriate figure for the devaluation of the pound was that, at 
the time of writing, the wholesale index number of prices was 37.5 per cent. 
lower than in 1925.  He conceded that this figure included the price of products 
from the primary producing countries which, of late, had fallen 
disproportionately, and therefore was an index number which overestimated the 
general fall in world prices of both primary products and manufactured goods.  
On the other hand, the 27 per cent. fall in the price of British exports, he 
suggested, probably underestimated the fall in world prices, since Britain’s poor 
export performance had been, in part, due to Britain’s prices remaining too high.  
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Taking these figures, together with appropriate allowances, Hawtrey felt that the 
pound could be allowed to fall by 30 per cent. to bring British costs into 
equilibrium with world prices – ‘that is to say, the exchange on New York ought 
to be 3.40’.468
    Hawtrey saw no problem with the mechanism by which this rate could be 
achieved and maintained.  Reducing the Bank rate would lower the demand for 
pounds on world markets and cause its price to fall.  If necessary, the Bank of 
England could reinforce this process; increasing the quantity of pounds on world 
markets by buying bills or foreign currency.  He did warn, however, against 
allowing the pound to fall below what he considered to be its equilibrium value: 
 
It is undesirable to let the exchange fall below 3.40, or whatever 
the equilibrium point might be, because that would involve an 
actual rise in wages.  (In any case wages will have to be raised 
in one or two of the unsheltered trades where they have been 
disproportionately depressed . . .).469
 
    In the event of the pound falling below this equilibrium level Hawtrey foresaw 
no problem in the Bank of England supporting it by raising interest rates, selling 
bills and selling foreign exchange.  Once equilibrium was established, he 
suggested that the monetary authorities should permit the pounds exchange rate 
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with gold to fluctuate with changing world prices.  In the event of a large rise in 
world prices (which he predicted), he believed that it was quite possible to 
achieve ‘in the end, a restoration of the old parity without any effort at all’.470  At 
that stage (realising the old parity) he believed that an Anglo-American 
agreement for stabilising world prices would be both ‘practicable and 
desirable’.471
    The exchange rate of $3.40 to the pound was considerably less than Phillips’ 
original suggestion of $4.00, but by the end of October 1931 Phillips had come 
down to the idea of an exchange rate of $3.65 to the pound (he was, later, to 
lower his recommendation even further – to $3.40).472  Treasury Controller of 
Finance, Sir Richard Hopkins, must also have had reservations about the 
apparently low figure of $3.40 recommended by Hawtrey.  He wrote to Hubert 
Henderson, secretary of the Economic Advisory council, asking for his comments 
on Hawtrey’s figure.  Henderson replied with a long memorandum which 
criticised the basis for Hawtrey’s recommendation of an exchange figure of 
$3.40.   
    Henderson was a former Cambridge economics lecturer who had had a close, 
but sometimes strained, relationship with Keynes.  Virginia Woolf described him 
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as a ‘small, testy, unheroic man’.473  Some seven years younger than Keynes, 
Keynes recognised his potential when he took him from Cambridge in 1923 and 
appointed him editor of the Nation and Athenaeum; the periodical of which 
Keynes was chairman, and which he regularly used as a vehicle for expressing 
his disapproval of government policy.  Henderson remained editor of the Nation 
and Athenaeum until 1930. He worked closely with Keynes on sections of the 
Liberal Party’s ‘Yellow Book’, Britain’s Industrial Future, and was co-author with 
Keynes of the pamphlet Can Lloyd George Do It?  - an endorsement of the 
Liberal Party’s election prospectus of 1929.  After this collaborative effort 
Henderson gradually began to distance himself from Keynesian ideas on public 
works, which he came to regard as having the nature of a ‘quick fix’, more likely 
to destroy business confidence than create permanent employment.474  In 1930 
Henderson had moved from the Nation and Athenaeum to become secretary of 
the Economic Advisory Council.  The E.A.C. (which included Keynes, Bevin, 
Balfour and Tawney amongst its members) was a kind of economic general staff 
– a body instituted partly in recognition of the growing importance of economic 
theory to policy decisions, and partly Ramsay MacDonald’s counterweight to the 
influence of Snowden and the Treasury on economic policy – which met in 
Downing Street and reported directly to the Cabinet.  Henderson was persuaded 
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to take up the position of secretary of the E.A.C. after reassurance from Keynes 
that he ‘really would be at the centre of things and not in a sort of Hawtrey 
backwater’.475  As a consequence of accepting the position Henderson turned 
down the Chair of Economics at the London School of Economics, resulting in the 
position being offered to Hayek. 
    On 6 October 1931 Henderson sent his memorandum, critical of Hawtrey, to 
Sir Richard Hopkins.  Susan Howson has suggested that, like Hawtrey, Keynes 
was a ‘$3.40 man’, and therefore it seems that Henderson was writing to 
Hopkins in a personal capacity rather than expressing the collective view of the 
Economic Advisory Council.476   
    Henderson attacked, as over-simplistic, Hawtrey’s notion that there was some 
definite exchange rate of the pound with the dollar which represented a state of 
equilibrium which presumed full employment - he instanced the problems posed 
by Indian tariffs and Japanese competition for the Lancashire cotton industry.  
No amount of exchange-rate adjustment according to the general level of world 
prices could realistically restore cotton exports to their former volume.  
Furthermore, he suggested, that the current low, ‘unremunerative’, level of world 
prices was a temporary phenomenon which could not possibly persist and, as 
such, was a poor basis for calculating a suitable gold-value for sterling.477
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    Henderson also believed that Hawtrey’s analysis was simplistic in assuming 
that other variables such as world prices, world wage levels, British prices and 
British wage levels could be treated as independent of the gold-value of sterling.  
To illustrate this point, he suggested that if the value of sterling were adjusted 
downwards to $3.40, then this would make imports from the United States more 
expensive, and thus reduce the volume of American exports – which in due 
course would lead to a fall in American wages and a fall in the general price level 
of world manufactured goods.  According to Hawtrey’s line of reasoning, he 
suggested, this would involve even further reduction in the gold value of the 
pound – with the reinforcing nature of the exercise pushing the pound’s gold-
value down to absurd levels. 
 
Indeed, I may sum up my essential criticism of Mr. Hawtrey’s 
reasoning as follows.  His goal is an exchange level which would 
permit Great Britain to have normal trade activity and full 
employment at a time when trade in the outside world is more 
depressed than it has ever been before.  It cannot be done. . . . 
It is just possible that employment might be made very active for 
some time by a continuous and unlimited depreciation, with the 
printing presses hard at work.  That is another story.  But the 
notion that a country with Great Britain’s international 
ramifications could build up a domestic paradise of normal trade, 
profits and employment in the setting of an unprecedented world 
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slump is a will o’ the wisp, and it would be absurd to regulate 
our monetary policy by reference to it.478
 
Henderson then gave his own reasoning for limiting the scale of the fall of the 
value of the pound.  First, Henderson argued, a 30 per cent. fall in the exchange 
rate would, in the first instance, lead to an adverse effect upon the balance of 
payments, since imports would immediately cost more, and it would take time 
before a new equilibrium in trading patterns could be established.  Furthermore, 
pursuing the implications of this first point, Henderson pointed out that:  
 
. . . a 30 per cent. fall in the exchange means, other things being 
equal, over 40 per cent. on the price of imported goods.  I find that . . 
. represents 27 per cent. of the total national consumption . . . 
[which] might raise the cost of living by over 10 per cent. . . . . That 
seems to me beyond the margin of safety, if a general process of 
rising wages, including the sheltered trades, is to be avoided.479
 
Secondly, Henderson questioned Hawtrey’s assumption that there would be no 
difficulty in checking an undue fall in the exchange rate; experience, he claimed, 
showed that where there was a lack of confidence then no amount of monetary 
or fiscal tightening could be relied upon to stem the fall in the value of the 
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currency – if it could, then ‘we need never have been driven off the gold 
standard’.480           
    The general point of Henderson’s memorandum was that to reduce the gold 
value of sterling by as much as 30 per cent. would be too great a ‘shock’ to the 
international financial system with many ramifications; some predictable, such as 
the loss of earnings on Britain’s foreign investments; others less predictable, 
such as the likelihood of other countries abandoning the gold standard as part of 
a process of competitive devaluation.  Overall he felt that ‘he would like to see 
the pound settle at a depreciation of 15 to 20 per cent.’481  Henderson was a 
‘$3.90 man’. 
    Sir Richard Hopkins had much to occupy his mind at this time.  Within 
Hopkins’s Treasury file, immediately following the Henderson memorandum, is a 
reply from Hawtrey, dated 2 October 1931 – ‘Pegging the Pound II’.482  This was 
a new situation for Hawtrey who was unused to the Treasury soliciting advice 
from economists from outside the Treasury.  We cannot be sure how rapid 
Hawtrey’s robust response was, since the hand-written date on it, 2 October, 
actually precedes the date of 6 October which is addended to the Henderson 
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memorandum, yet it must have been penned with knowledge of the contents of 
the Henderson document.   Hawtrey returned to his main point: that there was 
an exchange rate at which British costs and prices were in equilibrium with world 
prices and whilst there was room for differences of opinion on what the 
equilibrium exchange rate should be, ‘the real question at issue is whether the 
exchange should be maintained at a rate above the equilibrium point, whatever 
that point may be’.483
     He conceded that there were three arguments for maintaining the exchange 
at a higher rate than its equilibrium rate.  First, lower economic activity meant 
less possibility of demands for wage increases.  Secondly, with exports priced in 
sterling but paid for by the transfer of gold, a higher exchange rate would, for a 
given level of exports, earn a greater value of gold.  Thirdly, allowing the 
exchange to sink to its equilibrium level could damage confidence in the pound 
to the extent that preventing a fall to even lower values would prove too difficult.  
Hawtrey dealt with each of these points in turn.   
    First, regarding wages, he pointed out that there was no precedent for fears 
about wage demands, since in the past, in periods of active trade, wages had 
always tended to lag behind the growth of prices and profits.  Furthermore, 
some wage increases, especially in the unsheltered industries, were necessary to 
remove anomalies which had developed. 
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If we adopt a high exchange, we leave all the existing anomalies 
amongst wages in different industries undiminished.  If, as a 
result of a low exchange we let industry in for an increase in 
wages, this has the advantage of permitting the inequalities to 
be in some degree addressed.  The pressure for an increase will 
be mainly (and at first exclusively) in the unsheltered trades.484
 
Hawtrey dealt with the second point in favour of a high exchange – that a low 
exchange rate would reduce the country’s gold earnings, and thus adversely 
affect its balance of payments – by providing figures which showed how the 
French balance of payments had moved from deficit to credit during a period of 
depreciation of the Franc between 1923 and 1927. 
 
British manufacturers are bound to make some concessions in 
the price of exports in order to get the business which the 
sudden reduction of their costs brings within their reach. . . . to 
recreate the export trade fairly substantial price concessions 
must anyhow be given.485
 
As regards loss of confidence leading to the monetary authorities being unable to 
prevent a collapse of sterling, Hawtrey felt confident that the monetary 
authorities could well control any tendency for the exchange to fall below its 
equilibrium point: 
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 For people to persist in selling sterling at a heavy sacrifice they 
must feel very certain that it is not going to recover. . . . 
experience has abundantly proved that every sudden fall of a 
currency is followed by a shortage of cash and a temporary 
recovery, which can easily be made permanent unless there is 
some serious underlying cause in inflation.486
 
There was a divergence of views within the Treasury on the level at which the 
monetary authorities ought to attempt to stabilise the exchange rate.  Frederick 
Leith-Ross - Deputy Controller from the days of Niemeyer, but soon to leave the 
Treasury – saw the departure from gold as very temporary, and anticipated a 
rapid return at the old parity.  He favoured stabilisation at $4.00 - $4.25.  The 
Controller of Finance, Sir  Richard Hopkins, favoured $4.00 in September 1931 
because he felt that a lower rate would reduce confidence, raise the cost of living 
unduly, and lower the value of investments abroad, but later he came down to 
the value of $3.60 - $3.70.  Hawtrey’s favoured value remained at $3.40 
throughout.  Frederick Phillips – increasingly influential and soon to be promoted 
to Deputy Controller – started, like Hopkins, favouring an exchange value of 
$4.00, but adjusted this downwards, a month later, to $3.65, but from December 
1931 to March 1932 he was arguing for a value of $3.40.  Outside the Treasury 
Keynes was giving the weight of his support to Hawtrey’s figure of $3.40.487
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    Aside from the most appropriate level at which the authorities ought to 
attempt to stabilize the pound there remained concern, in some quarters, over 
the past failure of the gold standard system, and steps which might be taken to 
reinstate the institution in a more effective way.  As previously noted, Leith-Ross 
remained in favour of a return to the gold standard, and on 9 October 1931 he 
wrote to Hubert Henderson asking for his views on steps which might be taken 
to bring about its restoration.  He posed the following question to Henderson: 
 
It is frequently suggested that France and America do not 
understand the rules of the game, and that if these rules were 
properly observed the gold standard would work without any of 
the present dislocation or maldistribution of gold. . . . I would 
find it extremely valuable if some statement could be drawn up 
showing the practical measures which we consider that France 
and America and other countries should take and have not taken 
to operate the Gold Standard fairly.  Do you think that you could 
get something like this prepared?488
 
It is quite likely that, at this stage, Leith-Ross felt that the argument in favour of 
an early restoration of the gold standard was drifting away from him with, in 
particular, Phillips and Hawtrey questioning the wisdom of returning to the gold 
standard, and that he needed some ammunition from Henderson to fight his 
                                                                                                                                                 
487 Howson, Domestic Monetary Management in Britain, p.84. 
 
488 Treasury Papers, T188/28.  The Leith-Ross Papers.  Letter from Frederick Leith-Ross 
to H.D.Henderson, 9 October 1931. 
 341
particular corner in the Treasury.  There is also a possibility that he was 
subjecting Hawtrey’s analysis of the situation to scrutiny.  Ever since the Genoa 
Convention of 1922 Hawtrey had continued to bemoan the lack of any 
international apparatus for attempting to stabilise the price of gold in relation to 
other commodities, and had put the blame for the failure of the gold standard on 
America and France for deflating the price of other commodities in relation to 
gold by their accumulation of the metal. 
    Henderson sent his reply to Leith-Ross on 16 October 1931.  In his opinion 
there was ‘no substantial foundation for the common complaint that our present 
troubles are largely attributable to failure on the part of France and the United 
States to observe the rules of the game in the working of the gold standard’.489  
Henderson attributed the tendency of gold to pile up in France and America as 
being due to the fact that the balance of payments had been heavily in their 
favour.  He attributed their advantagous balances to, on the whole, France’s 
early stabilisation of her exchange rate on the gold standard at a value lower 
than its pre-war rate, and to American tariffs.  He saw nothing to substantiate 
the charge (implicit in Hawtrey’s criticisms) that either France or America had 
embarked upon a policy of gold hoarding.  He feared that serious damage had 
been done to the de facto operation of a gold-exchange system, whereby many 
foreign central banks had kept there reserves, as sterling, on deposit in London.  
They had been operating under the belief that sterling was ‘as good as gold’, and 
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their faith had been severely shaken and that was a factor which was likely to 
intensify the scramble for gold.490  Given the sudden fall in the value of sterling, 
Henderson argued, foreign investors were reluctant to remove their money from 
London in case there were to be a rebound in its value.  Any premature attempt 
to stabilise its value, particularly at a low rate, might convince foreign investors 
that there was little to play for in keeping their deposits in London, and cause 
them to withdraw them – giving further concern to the Bank of England over the 
level of its deposits.  He suggested an interim policy.  The Bank of England, he 
suggested, should announce ‘a definite buying and selling price for gold which 
should hold good until further notice’, the period of notice being, perhaps, a 
short as one week.491  The reason for Henderson suggesting a temporary value 
was that, by frequent movements, it could be adjusted according to the flow of 
gold in, or out, of the country (although off the gold standard, Britain still 
required deposits of gold with which to conduct international trade).  If gold 
were being lost then the Bank of England could raise the price it was prepared to 
pay for gold (in effect, by giving more pounds per unit weight of gold it would be 
reducing its exchange value with the dollar and other gold standard countries); if 
gold were flowing into the country then the Bank should reduce the price of gold.  
If stability could be achieved under the operation of such a system, Henderson 
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suggested that it might, only then, be an opportune moment to convene an 
international conference to achieve exchange stability. 
    On the following day, 17 October 1931, Hawtrey produced a memorandum 
covering similar ground to that of Henderson.  The proximity of Hawtrey’s 
memorandum to that of Henderson suggests that it was in no way a response to 
Henderson’s document, but that Hawtrey was working to the same brief as 
Henderson.  Although Hawtrey attributed the failure of the gold standard to its 
escalation in price caused by the absorption of gold by France and America, he 
absolved these countries of failing to ‘play by the rules of the game’, since no 
rules for playing the game had been drawn up – it was impossible for Hawtrey to 
write a memorandum without reminding the Treasury and the Bank of England 
that they had failed, back in 1922, to carry out the procedures necessary to 
implement his Genoa Conference resolutions.  He thought that gold still offered 
the best hope for stability of prices and exchanges, but that any early return to 
gold was out of the question.  In the mean time it was desirable to draw up a 
new code along the lines of the Genoa resolutions, and that the best hope for 
bringing into effect such a code would be through bilateral Anglo-American talks. 
 
There is not the slightest chance of getting the French to give a 
moments consideration to any such proposal.  French economists do 
not recognise that a problem exists . . . . French bankers and 
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politicians are equally immovable.  Probably European opinion would 
be predominantly the same.492
 
The Americans, Hawtrey believed, could be persuaded to co-operate in attempts 
to stabilise the value of gold, but not so long as Britain remained on a paper 
standard with no policy regarding the future value of the pound.  He 
recommended a three-stage programme by which Britain might return to a 
restored, stable gold standard.  First, the regulation of credit, by changes in Bank 
rate, to stabilise the purchasing power of the pound.  Secondly, negotiations with 
America to secure a policy for the stabilisation of the value of gold.  Thirdly, 
settling an appropriate gold parity of the pound in order that there should be no 
new disturbances of the price level. 
    Hawtrey’s basic scheme for stabilising the value of gold was a bilateral 
agreement along the lines of part of the Genoa Resolutions of 1922:  
 
The Bank of England and the Federal Reserve System should agree 
that whenever the world price level showed signs of falling and trade 
of becoming depressed, they should adopt measures of credit 
relaxation (low Bank rate and purchases of securities) and that 
whenever the world price level showed signs of rising and trade 
becoming excessively active, they should adopt restrictive measures 
(high Bank rate and sales of securities).  It should be understood that 
they would both persist in the former measures despite losses of gold, 
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and that each would support the others gold reserve if circumstances 
so required.493
 
Whilst it might be desirable to secure the agreement of other countries, Hawtrey 
felt that it would be much better to be content with a two-party agreement ‘than 
to complicate credit policy by the ostensible addition of a number of monetary 
authorities who neither believe in stabilisation nor understand it’.494  Hawtrey 
followed up this memorandum, on 26 October 1931, by commenting on 
Henderson’s paper.  Apart from some detailed qualification of Henderson’s ideas 
– for instance, he suggested that the course of trade, rather than the inflow or 
outflow of gold, should be the basis of Henderson’s proposal that the Bank of 
England should, as an interim measure, frequently revise the price at which it 
was prepared to buy gold - Hawtrey agreed that their two sets of ideas were not 
incompatible. 
    When, on 3 August 1928, three years prior to these discussions, Leith-Ross 
had responded to Keynes’s article ‘How to organise a wave of prosperity’ which 
Keynes had written for the Evening Standard on 31 July 1928, he had prefaced 
his note with the words: ‘I am sorry to see that Keynes is renewing the press 
propaganda which has done him little credit as a politician and considerable 
harm as an economist.495  Leith-Ross had been an admirer of the hard-line 
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Niemeyer, a man whom he regarded as the great model public servant.496  In 
the intervening three years Leith-Ross had been the Treasury observer within the 
deliberations of the Macmillan Committee on Finance and Industry, where, along 
with the others, he would have admired Keynes’s intellectual showmanship.  By 
general consent, Keynes had dominated the proceedings of this committee.  The 
experience had been sufficient to thaw the relationship between Leith-Ross and 
Keynes, and toward the end of November 1931 there was a cordial interchange 
of letters between the two men in which Keynes forwarded to Leith-Ross a 
personal copy of his memorandum on the currency question which he had 
prepared for Ramsay MacDonald’s Economic Advisory Council.  Keynes’s 
document is dated 16 November 1931, but from his acknowledgement of receipt, 
Leith-Ross received it on 20 November 1931.497
    Along with Hawtrey, and to a lesser extent Henderson, Keynes believed there 
was no need to hurry back to gold, nor to convene an International Currency 
Conference – it would ‘merely be an occasion for France to endeavour to 
exercise pressure to induce us to return to gold at too high a figure and at a 
premature date’.498  Rather than an International Currency Conference, which 
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was generally mooted, or an Anglo-American Conference, suggested by Hawtrey, 
Keynes put forward the idea of an Imperial Conference to create an Empire 
Sterling Standard, with the suggestion that South American, Scandinavian and 
Central European nations be invited to join such a standard (the sterling 
exchange question was creating some very strange bedfellows, since this idea of 
Keynes’s came very close to that of Niemeyer, who had advocated such an 
alliance in order to ‘frighten’ the French and Americans).  Keynes presented a 
number of ways in which sterling might be managed within such a sterling block, 
but his favoured method (his ‘third' option) was to manage sterling, not in terms 
of some parity with respect to either gold or the dollar, but in terms of an index 
of commodity prices. 
    Keynes then turned to the most appropriate level at which to attempt to 
stabilise the pound, since even though he had suggested stabilising by means of 
a basket of tradeable commodities, any value would have implications for the 
current relationship of the pound with gold and the dollar.  Here, he suggested 
that four criteria were available by which the most appropriate level might be 
arrived at.  Firstly, he suggested, the prevention of inflation may be considered 
an important criterion.  Those who considered this to be the most important 
criterion argued that a low exchange rate would raise the cost of imported goods 
and provoke demands for rises in wages.  ‘This school of thought generally has 
in mind some value for sterling in the neighbourhood of $4.00 at the existing 
commodity value of gold.  The second criterion was a level of the pound which 
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might reduce the national debt to a more manageable proportion.  This criterion, 
he suggested, was ‘at the opposite pole from the first’.499  Relief for the 
Treasury’s debt burden would come from the increased tax revenue brought 
about by rising money wages.  Rising money wages would only come about 
through the rising prices caused by a low pound; hence a value for the pound of 
around $3.00 would satisfy this criterion. 
    Keynes’s third criterion for assessing a suitable level for the pound was to 
maximise the benefit to the country from external trade.   
 
Too high a rate of exchange will hinder the development of an 
adequate volume [Keynes’s emphasis] of exports, whilst too low a 
volume may lead to our selling our exports too cheap in terms of gold 
. . . . Moreover if we give an excessive bounty to our exports, we run 
the risk of provoking reprisals of one kind or another; whilst too great 
a rise in the sterling price of imports might set in operation a 
premature movement towards wage increases.500
 
If the external trade balance were to be the sole criterion for establishing the 
pound’s value, then this, to Keynes, suggested a figure between $3.50 and 
$3.75. 
    The fourth and final criterion by which Keynes thought the most suitable value 
of the pound might be judged was linked to his suggestion of the formation of a 
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sterling block.  According to this criterion the appropriate level for the pound 
would be one which gave a satisfactory return to the primary producers (a return 
to a level approximating to that of 1929 according to Keynes).  This would not 
only stimulate trade with the Empire but give adequate returns on many British 
investments held abroad.  (This criterion must have been in Keynes’s mind when 
suggesting that the value of the pound be managed according to the value of a 
basket of commodities).  If this were the overriding criterion then a value for the 
pound of $3.40 to $3.50 would be appropriate. 
    The contrast between the contributions of Keynes and Hawtrey to this debate 
reflected the contrast in their personalities and modes of working as economists.  
Hawtrey’s advice came from an allegiance to his own theoretical model and his 
understanding of the possibilities within the real world.  His basic model of the 
working of the economy had evolved only slowly from its first fashioning during 
the first decade of the twentieth century.  He was capable of fitting the world’s 
economic problems into his working model, and seeing, with great clarity, how 
economic problems related to his model.  Within this model, it was clear to him 
that British costs and prices were not in equilibrium with world prices and that 
restoration of equilibrium demanded a parity rate of $3.40 for the pound.  
Recognising the problems of achieving international agreement, he knew that an 
Anglo-American agreement would be sufficiently powerful to be hegemonic.  His 
advice was direct and contained within the limits of the implications of his 
economic model.   Keynes, on the hand, worked intuitively; he usually ‘sensed’ a 
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problem, and its solution, long before he could marshal a rational justification for 
the solution.  Because he worked intuitively, the formal presentation of Keynes’s 
economics often fell short of satisfying his intuitions.  In many ways this was 
because the formal tools of classical economics were inadequate to express the 
ideas of his fertile imagination - the rapid abandonment of his Treatise on Money 
was in part due to being forced to express many of his intuitive ideas in terms of 
the concepts of classical economics.  Being unconstrained by a formal theory, 
Keynes’s approach to problems was often highly imaginative, even if the result 
was that he might make himself open to criticism.  He also ran a greater risk of 
being clearly wrong.  Keynes’s notion of a sterling trading block based on the 
Empire might have been wrong, but it was imaginative and in sympathy with 
many of the sentiments of the time. 
    Following Keynes’s memorandum, within Leith-Ross’s file, there is a note on 
the Keynes document, by Leith-Ross, which illustrates the way the currency 
problem was perceived by a financial administrator as opposed to an economist. 
 
The whole of this document seems to be written on the assumption 
that we are sailing on an even keel in a smooth sea and that it rests 
with us to decide to what extent we will allow the pound to depreciate 
and where we are going to stop it. . . . £250 million to £300 million of 
sterling is held by foreign banks and Governments.  This sterling was 
sent here for security and is not likely to remain here if our currency is 
likely to be unstable . . .501
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 Leith-Ross remained in favour of an early return to gold, regarding it as 
‘impossible for a country so deeply committed to international trade to cut itself 
adrift from the staple basis of international commerce and sacrifice all its 
financial business in order to attempt to maintain internal prices stable in terms 
of commodities’.502
    Keynes’s memorandum had been sent to the Prime Minister, Ramsay 
MacDonald, who circulated it amongst Cabinet ministers.  Treasury Controller of 
Finance, Sir Richard Hopkins, concerned about some sections of Keynes’s 
memorandum, produced a lengthy document in response and sent it to the 
Chancellor, Neville Chamberlain, on 15 December 1931.  The text of Hopkins’s 
memorandum refers to that of Keynes being written some 16 days previously 
(Keynes’s document is dated 16 November 1931), and must have been some 
time in preparation.  It appears twice within Hopkins’s papers; the first copy is 
within the file T175/56, the second is within T175/57.  The second copy contains 
a large number of amendments by Phillips which are instructive of the direction 
in which Treasury thinking was changing.  Phillips’s amendments tended to 
gently modify the document away from the idea that it was inevitable that, at 
some time, Britain would return to a gold standard with a fixed exchange-rate, 
and also towards $3.40 rather than $4.00 being the rate at which the Treasury 
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would prefer to attempt to stabilise the pound.  There seems to be no record of 
the final draft of this document, but it is presumed that the amended version 
was forwarded to the Chancellor. 
    The Hopkins-Phillips paper was meant to be a commentary upon Keynes’s 
memorandum; an aid to Ministers and intended to be read alongside the 
document of Keynes.  On closer reading it turns out to be a savage demolition of 
Keynes’s main arguments. 
    Hopkins, initially influenced by Leith-Ross, began his paper with Leith-Ross’s 
suggestion that the Bank of England did not possess the means to control the 
exchange rate by purchasing and selling gold or foreign exchange.  In doing this 
he incorporated, almost verbatim, Leith-Ross’s naval imagery that ‘Mr. Keynes 
seems to assume that we are sailing, or shall very shortly be sailing, on an even 
keel in a smooth sea . . . . . .’503  He then went on to expand upon the problem 
which Leith-Ross had pointed out – the existence of large short-term deposits in 
London – and, in the process, make Keynes’s advice seem totally unrealistic. 
 
In sixteen days since from the date of Mr. Keynes’ Memorandum the 
pound has sunk to $3.30.  Not only is there the German riddle 
[Keynes’s term for the reparations problem]: not only is there the 
problem with the balance of trade: not only is there the problem of 
the immediate fate of other countries now precariously clinging to the 
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gold standard; not only are there the new exchange and other 
restrictions springing up in all quarters of the globe to impede the 
revival of the export trade.  Beyond this . . . . the Bank of England and 
the Treasury are known to have short debts running to £100 million 
which have to be met within the year and this repayment will entail 
heavy purchases of foreign exchange or the export of all our present 
store of gold.  Our income from investments abroad is gravely 
reduced by bad trade and by foreign default and there are doubts how 
far our exporters will repatriate the money proceeds from their sales 
abroad.  Nor are these by any means the only clouds upon the horizon 
. . . . It is not true that in present conditions the Bank of England can 
effectively control the pound.504
 
Hopkins went on to condemn Keynes’s preferred option: the tying of the pound 
to a basket of currencies since there was no mechanism within it to stem 
withdrawal of balances from London.  Under the floating exchange system 
operating at that time the fall in sterling exchange resulting from any incipient 
movement towards the withdrawal of balances tended to be self-correcting with 
the lower value of the pound attracting money in anticipation of a rise.  Under 
Keynes’s scheme, Hopkins argued, the pound would have the worst of all worlds 
– lack of flexibility allied to lack of stability.  If adopted, it would most likely 
break down very quickly. 
    In discussing the exchange rate which Keynes felt would be most appropriate 
for the commencement of his system Hopkins included the following extract: 
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 He would begin his new system of course at some very low point, say 
with the pound at $3.40.  That level is so low that in all probability 
wages would increase at any rate in the unsheltered trades.  He is 
asking us to commit ourselves to a system under which for a period 
the pound would be at $3.40 and then, possibly within a short time, it 
might rise progressively as commodity prices improved to a figure as 
high as $4.40 or more.505
 
Phillips, in his amendment, deleted this section and pencilled in the following: 
 
He would begin his new system at a very low point, say with the 
pound at $3.40.  That is fairly in accordance with the Treasury view, 
but on the Treasury view the exchange should not be allowed to move 
upwards unless and until world prices have moved upwards quite 
substantially.  On Mr. Keynes’ plan the exchange must move upwards 
immediately the price of raw materials shows any recovery.506
 
Hopkins’s initial effort hinted at some alarm at the idea of accepting an exchange 
rate as low as $3.40.  Phillips felt that such a rate could be accorded with 
‘Treasury Policy’.  It is not known what discussions, and at what level, might 
have taken place within the Treasury, but the figure now being accorded the 
status of ‘Treasury Policy’ was the exact figure which Hawtrey had recommended 
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in his first submission on the matter in September 1931.  Moreover if, as Hopkins 
had conceded, the Bank of England was incapable of controlling the exchange 
rate by the sale of gold or foreign currency, how was such a figure to be 
managed?  It could only be by short-term adjustments to Bank rate supported by 
open-market sales and purchases of securities – exactly as originally 
recommended by Hawtrey 
    Hopkins went on to dismiss Keynes’s idea of summoning an early Imperial 
Currency Conference since only Britain could formulate a sterling policy, and at 
that point it was not yet in a position to produce a plan.  ‘The conference could 
only end in either disappointment or in dangerous commitments’.507
    The paper presented to MacDonald’s National Government Cabinet was 
prepared by Phillips on 29 February 1932.508  He pointed out that stabilising the 
pound at a high value - $3.90 or over - would give the advantage of low import 
prices and that Britain’s fixed interest investments abroad, which were 
denominated in sterling but transferred back home in the form of gold, would 
bring in a greater value of gold at the higher exchange rate (reserves of gold still 
being necessary for trading with countries which were still on the gold standard).  
But he felt that the decisive arguments were in favour of a lower value of $3.40.  
In adjudicating in favour of $3.40 Phillips put emphasis on the need to raise 
wholesale prices by at least 25 per cent above their value of the previous 
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September in order to bring wholesale prices into line with British costs.  He also 
emphasised that it might be necessary to resort to credit restriction – raising 
Bank rate by another name – if it was felt necessary to prevent the pound falling 
below this equilibrium value.509  Treasury policy had, very largely, returned to 
the advice first offered by Hawtrey in his memorandum of 28 September 1931. 
    Donald Moggridge, in his biography of Keynes, has suggested that Keynes 
influenced Hopkins and Phillips towards adopting a target rate of $3.40 rather 
than the $3.90 rate proposed by Henderson, or even higher rates which certain 
other high ranking officials felt to be appropriate.510  George Peden has argued 
that Hawtrey’s influence ‘was no less important, and perhaps more so’.511  The 
Treasury may have taken cognisance of Keynes’s thoughts, but the evidence of 
close examination of the Treasury files seems to indicate that Hopkins 
demolished the proposals of Keynes as those of an unrealistic, remote don who 
was completely out of touch with the realities of government finance (small 
wonder that the Chancellor’s private secretary, Sir Thomas Padmore, should 
have remarked that ‘Keynes would talk to anyone but he would listen to 
Hopkins).512  The ideas that eventually prevailed were those of the Treasury’s 
own in-house economist, R.G.Hawtrey.  Throughout the deliberations on 
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exchange-rate policy Hawtrey had steadfastly maintained that $3.40 was the 
most suitable level for the pound.  His argument was framed not in terms of the 
convenience, or status of the City of London, but in terms of the rate which 
would be most beneficial to industry.  The steadfastness of his arguments gave 
Hawtrey a new prominence as the Treasury assumed control over discussions to 
stabilize worldwide exchange rates. 
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                                         Chapter 7 
 
                                     Currency Chaos. 
  
                                        1931-1933 
 
During the 1920s Hawtrey tended to be a lone voice within the Treasury as he 
appealed, first, for the export of gold to raise American prices, and later for the 
lowering of interest rates to raise demand through the extension of credit.  After 
the relapse from the Gold Standard he became embroiled in disputes with other 
economists over matters of policy: the preferred way to stabilize currencies and 
the value of gold, and the appropriate measures needed to be taken to finance 
the rearmament programme and the prosecution of the war.  Thus the form of 
chapters 7-9 differs slightly from that of earlier chapters.  More space is allocated 
to the alternative views expressed by other economists, and to providing the 
background to the disputes.  The Committee for Economic Information, with 
responsibility to the Cabinet, included Keynes, Henderson and Robertson among 
its membership.  This was a powerful gathering of expertise which provided an 
alternative base for economic advice after 1930.  The members of this group, 
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especially Henderson, were sometimes called upon for critical commentary on 
Hawtrey’s memoranda. 513
    One argument of this thesis is that the early 1930s saw an initial resurgence of 
Hawtrey’s influence within the Treasury as a result of his persuasive arguments 
over the appropriate target level for the pound after going off the Gold Standard 
in 1931.  Winch (1969), and Howson and Winch (1977) do not acknowledge 
Hawtrey’s influence over this period, but subscribe to the view that Keynes’s 
ideas gradually took over Treasury thinking during the 1930s.  Winch (1969) 
worked without the benefit of access to the Treasury Papers of the period, but 
Howson and Winch (1977), despite having access to the Treasury Papers, did not 
see fit to substantially revise their view.514  Middleton (1998) dismisses Hawtrey, 
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suggesting that ‘his major influence was, if anything, to convince his generalist 
colleagues that economic theory posed no great intellectual challenge nor had 
any real relevance to the administrative tasks facing the department’.515  The 
evidence presented in this thesis will suggest that these views are very much 
overstated.  It will suggest that Hawtrey robustly challenged economic opinions 
coming from outside the Treasury, and that his views tended to be supported by 
senior Treasury staff.  It will argue that although Hawtrey’s principal concern, the 
co-ordination of international interest rates through co-operation between the 
world’s central banks, was never adopted as policy, the Treasury’s attitude to 
public works continued to be shaped by Hawtrey’s arguments.  Finally, it will 
argue that inspection of Treasury documents suggests that it was Keynes’s ability 
to put forward a mechanism for financing the Second World War without 
                                                                                                                                                 
    E. T. Nevin, The Mechanism of Cheap Money: a study of British Monetary Policy, 
1931-1939 (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1955).      
    Susan Howson’s Domestic Monetary Management is the published version of her 
Ph.D. thesis.  It uses Treasury, Cabinet and Bank of England Papers, together with a 
huge amount of monetary data, to trace the effects of the monetary policy of the 
authorities between the two World Wars.  Her principal conclusion is that cheap money 
after 1931 stimulated the housing boom, and that this was the foundation of economic 
recovery.  The short essay ‘Hawtrey and the Real World is one overspill from Howson’s 
extensive study of Treasury Papers.  In this essay she still clings to the conclusion that 
Hawtrey lost influence in the 1930s.   
    Howson’s volume, Sterling’s Managed Float, is a study of the way in which the 
authorities, led by Phillips, managed the level of Sterling through a ‘float’ – the 
Exchange Equalisation Account.  Howson’s study of the mechanics by which this fund 
was operated complements her earlier study.  It suggests that the float might have been 
‘dirty’ in that it was designed to deliberately maintain sterling at below its equilibrium 
value in order to gain an advantage to British exports.   
    Nevin’s The Mechanism of Cheap Money gives an account of how, largely through the 
Exchange Equalisation Account, Britain was able to maintain a permanent cheap money 
policy throughout the 1930s whilst still controlling the external value of the pound. 
 
515 R. Middleton, Charlatan’s or Saviours: Economists and the British Economy from 
Marshall to Meade (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1998), p.199. 
 361
recourse to high interest rates that eventually saw him displace Hawtrey within 
the Treasury. 
    The year 1932 was, eventually, to see the realisation of the low Bank rate for 
which Hawtrey had been pleading throughout the 1920s.  It did not entirely 
please him since he regarded the move has having been too tardy to break the 
‘vicious circle’ of depression.
 
    On the outbreak of the financial crisis of 1931, on 23 July, as gold and foreign 
reserves drained away from London, Bank Rate was raised from 2.5 per cent to 
3.5 per cent.  On 30 July 1931 it was raised further to 4.5 per cent.516  
Immediately, on the day of departure from gold, 21 September 1931, Bank Rate 
was increased from 4.5 per cent to 6 per cent.  This was a defensive measure to 
temper the expected fall in sterling.  Thereafter, despite being maintained at the 
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high level of 6 per cent for the next 21 weeks, the pound moved down to a low 
of $3.27 in November 1931; a value some way below the Treasury target value 
of $3.40.  This overly large fall could be attributed to Britain selling pounds in the 
market in order to acquire the foreign currency which it needed to repay the 
loans obtained from France and America at the height of the September 1931 
crisis.  However, after November 1931 the pound climbed back above its target 
value; hitting $3.80 by March 1932.  Breaking above $3.40 enabled the Treasury, 
with its newly acquired powers, to force the Bank of England to commence 
lowering its discount rate, which by six stages reached 2 per cent in June 1932.  
The motive behind the Treasury pressure was less concern for the expansion of 
credit than as a means of paving the way for the purchase and re-issue of its 
expensive war-loan debt.  By lowering short-term interest rates to 2 per cent and 
creating the expectation that interest rates would remain low, the Treasury were 
able to persuade the public to purchase its new issue of war loan at 3.5 per cent. 
The successful conversion of 5 per cent war-loan to 3.5 per cent war Loan in 
1932 was an immense saving for the Treasury.  It was also a significant step in 
enabling low interest rates to be maintained throughout the 1930s. 
    Having decided upon a target exchange rate of $3.40 for the pound, the 
Treasury needed some means of overcoming fluctuations in the value of the 
pound; fluctuations which were often due to large short-term capital movements 
for speculative purposes.  It could have attempted to continue to control the 
fluctuation in demand for sterling by equally rapid contrary movements in Bank 
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rate, but this would have negated its policy of encouraging an expectation of 
permanently low interest rates; an expectation necessary for encouraging the 
purchases of its own reduced-rate War Loan.  Instead, the Finance Act of 1932 
saw the establishment of the Exchange Equalisation Account (EEA); a fund 
intended to offset fluctuating market demand for sterling.  The EEA was the 
brainchild of Sir Frederick Phillips, and he was the most senior Treasury official 
charged with supervising it.   
    The assets of the Exchange Equalisation Fund were supported by Government 
funding and included gold, foreign currency and pounds sterling.  When 
international demand for sterling caused it to be in short supply and threatened 
to send it above the target value of $3.40, then pounds were released into the 
market by the process of buying up foreign currency.  If excess supply of sterling 
threatened to lower its value then the EEA would use its gold, or reserves of 
foreign currency, to mop up that excess.  The beauty of the EEA lay in its ability 
to relieve Bank Rate of the burden of controlling the external exchanges.  
Politically, it even further emasculated the Bank of England.  Being dependent on 
Government support, the EEA was under the control of the Treasury; the Bank 
finding itself reduced to the status of little more than that of errand boy as it 
performed the mechanical operation of buying or selling foreign currency at the 
behest of the Treasury.  The fund was held by the Bank of England in the form 
of Treasury Bills.  When the Bank required sterling for the purpose of purchasing 
foreign exchange it sold Treasury Bills to the market; when it released foreign 
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currency, it used the newly acquire sterling to purchase Treasury Bills.  By this 
use of Treasury Bills it kept the domestic money supply steady whilst countering 
international fluctuations in the demand for sterling.517
    The strategic thinking of the senior Treasury officials – a strategy very much 
led by Phillips – was only partly along the lines which Hawtrey had recommended 
throughout the deliberations over the appropriate level for the pound.  The policy 
of keeping sterling at $3.40 and not permitting it to rise until sterling prices had 
risen at least 25 per cent above their level of September 1931 was certainly in 
keeping with Hawtrey’s views.518  However, Hawtrey had envisaged a greater 
role for the Bank of England, in the sale and purchase of open-market securities 
as a means of controlling the exchange rate. By purchasing securities the Bank 
of England would have widened the monetary base for the extension of credit; a 
process which Hawtrey regarded as an essential preliminary to any economic 
regeneration.  Suitably controlled extension of credit, he argued, would have 
permitted an adjustment of demand and, by regulating imports, the adjustments 
to demand could have effectively varied the exchange value of the pound to any 
desired level.  He regarded undue reliance on the Exchange Equalisation Account 
for maintaining the level of the pound as neglecting the importance of credit 
creation to economic recovery.  In pursuing their strategy the Treasury officials 
were left quite remarkably free of interference from politicians; Neville 
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Chamberlain and the Cabinet of National Government were far more concerned 
with the strategically less important issues of import duties and Imperial 
Preference.519      
    Britain’s departure from gold had not been an isolated event.  By September 
1931 the strains of maintaining convertibility of currency with the ever 
appreciating value of gold had already forced Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, 
Australia, New Zealand and Mexico off the gold standard.  Following Britain’s 
departure from the standard Canada, India, Egypt, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, 
Finland, Portugal and Japan left the gold standard before the end of 1931.520  
Germany and Eastern Europe maintained a semblance of the gold standard by 
prohibiting both foreign exchange dealing and imports.521  Only the United States 
of America, France, Switzerland, Holland and Belgium retained an effective gold 
standard after 1931.  London’s position as a centre for international credit meant 
that Britain’s departure was by far the most significant of the withdrawals, a 
withdrawal which inevitably accelerated the worldwide process, but it was but 
one of many such events.  The effect of such wide-scale withdrawal from gold 
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was to diminish any competitive advantage Britain might have gained from 
devaluation and to encourage discussion of the formation of a ‘sterling block’.   
     Despite Hawtrey’s recommendation that Britain should not return to gold until 
measures had been taken to stabilise the wealth value of gold, he nevertheless 
regarded the effects of Britain’s suspension of gold payments as ‘far-reaching 
and catastrophic’.522  The German prohibition against foreign exchange dealing 
was but one of the moves which gave rise to general fears for balances held in 
foreign capitals and an early effect of this fear was a withdrawal of balances by 
the French, Swiss, Dutch and Belgian banks from the United States.  The 
situation with regard to the United States was both complicated and exacerbated 
by multiple banking failures following the Wall Street Crash, but as a result of 
European countries withdrawing their American holdings in the form of gold, the 
United States lost $703 million of gold in September-October 1931.523  If this 
figure is added to that lost by Japan, Germany and Argentina, a total of $858 
million of gold was lost from the central banks of these countries.  The total gain 
in gold of the central banks of the acquisitive European central banks was only 
$653.  The difference of $205 million could only be attributed to hoarding by 
individuals and commercial concerns – a process which was sending up the price 
of gold and further deflating the price of other commodities in relation to gold.  
Bank failures in America produced a wave of currency hoarding in that country 
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which, alongside its loss of gold, forced the Federal Reserve sharply to raise its 
rediscount rate from 1.5 per cent to 3.5 per cent in October 1931 – a move 
which further deterred any expansion of credit.  Overall, the initial effect of 
Britain’s withdrawal from the gold standard was to exacerbate world deflationary 
pressures, but particularly in those countries which attempted to maintain the 
gold standard. 
    Britain, however, was given a degree of freedom.  Whilst being unable to 
escape some of the consequences of the deteriorating world depression, the 
freedom to vary the value of the pound promised a reduction, in terms of gold, 
of the costs of British manufacturers.  According to Hawtrey, this afforded the 
possibility of breaking the ‘vicious circle’ of trade depression.  It held out the 
possibility of profits for industries. 
 
At the prices prevailing in world markets they could see their 
way to business which, if not remunerative by the standards of 
normal times, would at any rate keep their works going, 
preserve their goodwill, and cover prime costs with some margin 
by way of contribution to overhead expenses. . . . . There were 
seen in some industries an activity and an optimism such as had 
hardly been known since 1920.  The flow of credit, which in 
conjunction with productive activity, generates incomes, was set 
in motion.524
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Unfortunately Hawtrey regarded this initial burst of optimism as premature since 
he viewed the policies adopted (largely by the Treasury) in the fields of credit 
and currency as too timid and tardy to decisively break the cycle of depression.  
He was critical of the long period of almost 22 weeks, between 21 September 
1931 and 18 February 1932, when the authorities held Bank rate at 6 per cent, 
and although he did not voice them at the time, he had reservations about the 
30 per cent depreciation of the pound being sufficiently adequate. 
    Hawtrey regarded the depreciation of the pound to a level where industry, 
with its rigid wage costs, could once again become profitable as one of the 
essential conditions for the continuation of the revival.525  Throughout the 
deliberations on the appropriate level for the pound (discussed in the previous 
chapter) Hawtrey had consistently argued for a 30 per cent depreciation leading 
to a value of $3.40 (based on a 37.5 per cent fall in world wholesale prices and a 
27 per cent fall in British export prices between 1925 and 1931, with some 
allowance for increased productivity).  Reviewing his recommendations, in later 
writings, he considered that the price levels of ‘the raw materials and farm 
products which do not meet a shrinkage of demand’ (rather than those of 
manufactured goods) would have been the best measures of the change in the 
purchasing power of the pound.  Any tendency for the price of manufactured 
goods to fall would have been tempered by a decline in their output – a decline 
which, through increased scarcity, would have tended to hold up their price to a 
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level which did not truly reflect the fall in world prices.526  Using the criterion of 
the price of ‘raw materials and farm products’ and two sets of data, first the fall 
in the American index of raw materials between 1925 and September 1931 of 
41.2 per cent and secondly the fall of the American index of farm products over 
the same period of 44.9 per cent, Hawtrey suggested that to return the pound to 
its 1925 level should have demanded a depreciation of over 40 per cent below 
gold parity (which would have taken the pound to a value in the region of 
$2.91).  If Keynes’s claim that the pound had been overvalued by 10 per cent in 
1925 had been factored into these considerations it would have demanded an 
even lower value for sterling.  Not only did the subsequent devaluation of the 
pound never reach anything like these levels, but the persistent appreciation in 
the value of gold after September 1931 (for reasons outlined above) meant than 
when a steady value of the pound (in terms of gold and the dollar) was 
eventually reached, the effective depreciation from the 1925 level was only 20 
per cent.527  Thus, despite the depreciation of sterling, the sterling price level of 
British manufactured goods actually decreased slightly between September 1931 
and June 1932.528
    As well as the depreciation of sterling being inadequate to restore business 
profits, Hawtrey believed that the Treasury were guilty of allowing the Bank of 
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England to maintain high interest rates for too long.  Acknowledging that ‘in the 
first week or two something of the kind was needed to prevent too precipitate a 
depreciation of the pound’, Hawtrey believed that the authorities kept Bank rate 
at 6 per cent for too long.  As a consequence he did not believe that the self-
reinforcing cycle of depression had been effectively broken. 
 
By the 18th February 1932, when Bank rate was reduced, the 
vicious circle of deflation had been once again joined, and it was 
as impossible as it had been a year before to induce traders to 
extend their borrowing by cheap money alone.  The opportunity 
had been lost, deflation and falling prices prevailed in spite of the 
abandonment of gold, and the pound sterling had become a 
currency only one degree less intolerable than gold itself. . . . 
The transition to cheap money, when it came, was prompt. . . . 
But it was too late.529
 
Meanwhile, internationally, France continued to accumulate gold at the expense 
of its foreign currency reserves; in the first three months of 1932 the French 
central bank disposed of $305 millions of foreign currency and increased its 
holding of gold by £313 millions.530  The rapid appreciation of the value of gold, 
and the heavy fall of world commodity prices (in terms of gold) continued to dog 
the economies of the remaining gold-standard countries.  In an attempt to 
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‘reflate’, the Americans embarked upon a programme of ‘open market purchases’ 
– the Federal Reserve Bank releasing extra currency into the public domain by, 
itself, purchasing shares and Government bonds.531  Given the amounts of gold 
which America had released to continental Europe, such intended injection of 
currency into the economy would have exceeded the limits imposed by the 
Federal Reserve’s gold holdings.  In February 1932 the American Senate passed 
legislation (the Glass-Steagall Act) which allowed the Federal Reserve to include 
Government securities, in addition to gold, as cover for its currency note issue.  
Thus there commenced the weakening of the rigid grip which the gold standard 
had held over the American economy.  To Hawtrey, these were ‘heroic 
measures’, but they had little immediate effect on boosting American prices since 
the Federal Reserve’s attempt to inject currency into the economy by purchasing 
securities in the open market was being offset by American’s using currency to 
purchase, and hoard, gold.532   
      By the end of June 1932 France had effectively liquidated the whole of its 
foreign reserve holdings and its absorption of gold ceased.  The American 
Federal Reserve’s injection of currency into the economy, through purchase of 
securities, continued until August 1932.  ‘Faint stirrings’ were felt as a few 
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commodity prices began to rise.533  But, according to Hawtrey, the American 
cycle of depression, like the British one, was never broken since: 
 
[i]t proved only too easy to re-establish unrelieved pessimism.  
The fact is that the policy of reflation was placed at a serious 
disadvantage by the adherence of the United States to the gold 
standard. . . . the dollar could not depreciate in terms of wealth 
except in so far as the currencies of [France, Germany, 
Switzerland] depreciated.534    
     
By the autumn, all indications of revival of American activity had faded.  
Renewed transatlantic depression caused such a fall in imports that America 
started to see a net inflow of gold.  Their monetary authorities took the renewed 
accumulation of gold as an opportunity to reverse the policy of purchasing of 
securities in the open market; a move which had the effect of stemming the 
injection of liquidity into its sagging economy, continuing the fall in prices, and 
further increasing the grip of the depression on America.  Borrowers from the 
American banks were obliged to repay the banks with currency which had a 
greater value than that with which they took out their initial loans.  Many were 
unable to; there were a large number of defaulters and banks continued to 
collapse.   
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    World depression, collapsing prices, French absorption of gold, American bank 
failures: this was the international background to the League of Nations World 
Economic and Monetary Conference, eventually planned for London in the 
summer of 1933.  The countries remaining on the gold standard pointed an 
accusing finger at Britain; citing the uncertainties arising from her 1931 
withdrawal from the gold-standard as the root-cause of the world’s currency 
chaos.  Prior to the London Conference there were monetary discussions in the 
League of Nations Conference at Lausanne, in the June and July of 1932, and 
preparatory discussions in Genoa and Geneva in October-November 1932 and 
January 1933.  Throughout these meetings the senior British representative was 
the government’s Economic Advisor, Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, but his case was 
prepared by the Treasury, and he was guided, at all times, by Treasury officials.     
     With the emasculation of the Bank of England, and the Government being 
absorbed with matters of Imperial Preference (a theme which set the agenda for 
the Ottawa Conference of July and August 1932), there were few challenges to 
the Treasury’s domination of monetary policy.  MacDonald’s Economic Advisory 
Committee, a body organised by Henderson but which came to be dominated by 
Keynes, was one attempt to set up a counterweight to Treasury dominance.  It 
suffered from the inevitable disagreements between economists from different 
schools and eventually dwindled in effectiveness to that of one of its 
subcommittees, the Committee on Economic Information.   
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   Howson and Winch give a generally sympathetic account of the work of the 
Committee on Economic Information, and also of its parent body, the Economic 
Advisory Council.535  Whilst acknowledging that the successes of the E.A.C. – a 
body composed of politicians, businessmen and economists - were limited, they 
claim greater success for its offshoot, the economist-dominated Committee on 
Economic Information.  Two members of the C.E.I., Sir Frederick Leith-Ross 
(1932 – 1939) and Sir Frederick Phillips (1935 – 1939), were associated with the 
Treasury, although Leith-Ross left the Treasury very soon after the formation of 
the committee.  Howson and Winch take the view that the presence of Treasury 
members during discussions at the C.E.I. assisted in diffusing Keynesian ideas 
into the Treasury’s work.  In particular, they feel that the ‘airing of differences of 
viewpoint in front of the Treasury members may even have been beneficial in 
changing the theoretical basis of the Treasury’s views’.536
    This view was gainsaid by Sir Frederick Leith-Ross, who felt that the 
divergence of views within the committee prevented it from giving clear guidance 
regarding policy, adding that the secretary of the committee ‘worked like a slave 
to secure agreement between the irreconcilable views of the members’.537  
Likewise, there seems to have been no permanent conversion of the Treasury’s 
Second Secretary, Sir Frederick Phillips, to Keynesian thinking, since as late as 
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1939 he was found to be in agreement with Hawtrey that it was on the basis of 
the extension of credit, not public works, that unemployment might be reduced. 
    From the somewhat limited perspective of a study of Hawtrey, the evidence 
seems to support Leith-Ross’s view that Keynes’s ideas made little inroad into the 
Treasury during most of the 1930s.  First, whenever differences of opinion arose 
between Hawtrey and Keynes, as in the appropriate plan to present to the World 
Economic Conference, Treasury officials seemed generally more sympathetic to 
Hawtrey.  Secondly, whenever Hopkins or Phillips sought a second opinion on a 
Hawtrey memorandum then it was not to Keynes, but to Henderson that they 
invariably turned (it is worth bearing in mind that Hopkins, Phillips and 
Henderson were all products of Emmanuel College, Cambridge).  By the 1930s 
Henderson was markedly less sympathetic towards Keynes’s ideas on public 
works, regarding them as something of a ‘quick fix’ which would undermine 
business confidence.  
    This committee gave Keynes and Henderson an elevated platform from which 
they were enabled to retain the status they acquired in the 1920s – thorns in the 
side of the Treasury.  Out of the Committee on Economic Information, on 17 May 
1932, came a memorandum for increasing global liquidity and halting the fall of 
world prices. The plan was intended for the Lausanne conference of 1932, bore 
the signature of Henderson, and came to be recognised as the ‘Keynes-
Henderson International Note-Issue Plan’.538
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    The ‘Keynes-Henderson Proposal’ was based upon a number of ‘International 
Certificates’ being issued by the Bank for International Settlements, each 
certificate being fully equivalent to a fixed weight of gold.  Every government 
which legislated to recognise the ‘International Certificate’ and fixed its currency 
in terms of gold would be entitled to receive an interest-free loan of the 
certificates up to a level determined by some economic criterion (Keynes-
Henderson suggested 15 per cent of the gold value of its 1928 exports).539  It 
was intended that the extra liquidity afforded by this move would reverse the fall 
in world commodity prices.  In the event of world prices being successfully 
forced up, then the Bank for International Settlements would have the authority 
to order governments to return an appropriate proportion of their certificates, a 
proportion which would rise to 100 per cent at the point where prices were 
restored to their 1928 level.  Any government unable to meet the request for 
repayments would be charged interest of 5 per cent on outstanding loans.540
    In addition to their proposal, Keynes and Henderson produced a four-page 
‘Argument’ to back up their plan.  They started from the proposition that world 
economic recovery required a recovery of commodity prices in terms of gold, and 
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that whilst the Federal Reserve was attempting to turn the tide of falling prices 
by large-scale purchase of securities in order to swell their banks’ funds of cash, 
this was but an experiment, and it might yet fail since ‘solvent people are 
reluctant to borrow and those anxious to borrow are insolvent’.541  The 
requirement, as they saw it, was to secure increases in the international 
purchasing power of debtor countries and in the domestic purchasing-power of 
the consuming publics in the creditor countries.  Keynes-Henderson considered 
public works as one means of meeting the latter objective, but pointed out the 
associated problems in a way which suggests that they had taken on board the 
new ‘psychological crowding-out’ dimension to the Treasury View: 
 
Such schemes . . . run up against the difficulty of Governmental 
finance.  The Governments must either tax or borrow to defray 
the cost.  If they tax there is no gain to consumers’ income: if 
they borrow, the growth of deficits disturbs confidence, keeps up 
the rate of interest, and may stimulate a tendency to hoard or a 
flight from the currency, even a strong currency like the 
dollar.542
 
They argued that their scheme would allow different countries, with different 
needs, to pursue the most appropriate policies, thus for example, obviating the 
requirement to persuade all countries to pursue common credit policies (a co-
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operative requirement of Hawtrey’s Genoa proposals for stabilising the wealth 
value of gold).  Keynes and Henderson believed that acceptance of their scheme 
would have the same effect as if ‘in every country there were discovered on the 
same day a vast hidden treasure of gold’.543
    At the Treasury, Phillips had reservations about the plans, regarding ‘the 
extreme novelty of the proposals’ as being against their acceptance.544  The 
Keynes-Henderson proposal was passed on to Hawtrey, for comment on their 
technical merit.  He produced his first memorandum on the plan on 20 May 
1932; he seemed to be not particularly impressed, but as with many of 
Hawtrey’s critical memoranda, there was an element of nit-picking about his 
criticism.  As regards the plan’s ability to relieve debtor countries of their 
liabilities, Hawtrey thought the suggested resources would be insufficient – he 
calculated (on the basis of 15 per cent of 1928 exports) that Germany would 
receive $415 million, and that this ‘would not go far towards relieving’ her.545  
Relief for the debtor countries, he believed, would come through growing 
exports, which depended upon ‘a sufficient degree of inflation in the creditor 
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countries’.546  Therefore he believed that the fundamental question was how the 
new international currency would operate on the creditor countries. 
    Hawtrey saw it as inevitable that the ‘International Certificates’, like the 
remaining gold, would eventually find their way into the possession of the central 
banks of the creditor countries where they would simply serve as additional 
central bank assets enabling them to increase their supply of cash to the 
commercial banks.  As such, they would be nothing more than a variant of the 
securities which permitted open-market operations.  The real problem of 
persuading ‘solvent people to borrow’ would remain.  It is at this point in the 
interchanges that a sense of mutual mellowing from long-held uncompromising 
positions can be faintly detected.  If Keynes (albeit, in conjunction with 
Henderson) could concede that concerns about a form of ‘crowding out’ were 
legitimate (see above), then the merest hint of validation of public works can be 
detected in the following part of Hawtrey’s reply: 
 
It is true that a Government could use the money . . . on 
measures of relief or public works . . . and if so used it would 
make its first appearance in the form of income, giving rise to 
demand.  Undoubtedly there is something to be said, at a time 
of extreme business stagnation, for a Government deliberately 
incurring a deficiency on its current expenditure and meeting the 
deficiency by inflationary devices.547
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 This was a concession rather than a conversion.  Hawtrey remained sceptical 
about the potency of public works: 
 
In reality the direct [Hawtrey’s underlining] effect of inflationary 
expenditure supplementing incomes is small.  Mr. Lloyd George 
in 1929 wanted to spend £250 million a year.  It is hardly 
conceivable that an outlay of that amount would be sanctioned, 
and yet the deficiency in the national income to be made up to 
get our price level normal . . . might well be . . . £2000 million a 
year.  To be effective, the inflation must [again, Hawtrey’s 
underlining] work through an expansion of credit.548
 
In order to emphasise his view on the inadequacy, in terms of the existing 
position, of public works financed by deficit spending, Hawtrey instanced the 
situation in the United States.  The American national income had fallen from 
$90,000 million in 1929 to about $50,000 million in 1932 – an annualised fall in 
the region of $40,000 million.  Its budget deficit was accruing at an annualised 
rate of only $2,000 million and was negligible in terms of the deficiency of 
income to be made up. 
      In summary, Hawtrey regarded the Keynes-Henderson plan as having no 
technical advantage over other inflationary plans, being disadvantageous in re-
establishing fixed parities at a time when conditions were very unstable, and 
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having the defect of requiring prolonged negotiations when other reflationary 
methods, such as open-market purchases of securities by the central banks could 
be instigated without delay. 
    Four days later, on 24 May 1932, Henderson wrote a reply to the criticisms.  
His first point was that Hawtrey had assumed too rigid an interpretation of the 
Henderson-Keynes criteria for determining the level of distribution of the 
‘International Certificates’.  Henderson regarded the freedom to re-commence 
trading of debtor countries as of greater importance than the inflating of prices 
in the creditor countries, and would have been happy to see the issue of 
certificates to any level adequate to ‘ensure the unfreezing of the international 
situation’.549  With regard to the creditor countries, Henderson was adamant that 
his plan was more than merely a variant of current open-market operations in 
that his certificates would provide additional strength to the resources of 
governments.  Furthermore, he argued, any unilateral or uncoordinated 
execution of open-market purchases by a country, or group of countries was 
liable to lead to mistrust and speculative flight from particular currencies.  His 
‘Currency Certificate’ plan would remove mistrust because it would be 
international in character.  It would have the effect of an internationally 
coordinated open-market policy to restore the original purchasing power of gold, 
and although he did not remind Hawtrey of the fact, this was not very far away 
from what Hawtrey had recommended to the Genoa Economic Conference back 
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in 1922, where he had advocated international cooperation on credit policy to 
stabilise the value of gold.  Henderson’s final point was concerned with the idea 
that his plan might not be ‘practical politics’.  Phillips had used this phrase about 
the plan, but it was originally inserted, by Henderson himself, into the original 
proposition to suggest that no ‘plan’ would be internationally acceptable until 
disputes over war reparations had been settled.  He and Keynes had floated the 
idea as something that would be needed to fill the inevitable void in international 
monetary policy once reparations were out of the way. 
    Hawtrey came back at Henderson on 30 May 1932 to create a series of 
exchanges reminiscent of those of the previous year when, like two exhausted 
heavyweights, they had pounded each other over an appropriate level for 
sterling.550  Hawtrey repeated his view that revival of world trade depended 
upon industry once more becoming profitable in the creditor countries, and the 
effect of any new currency issue depended upon its effect on the creditor 
countries.  In this respect he questioned Henderson’s assertion that the new 
currency units would strengthen the resources of individual governments since 
the advances from the Bank for International Settlements would be added to 
their national debt.  Moreover, he pointed out, if the British Government were to 
be the recipients of the certificates then it would be enabled to make commercial 
loans using the certificates as reserve.  The interest from these loans would 
accrue to the Government at the expense of the Bank of England.   
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    With regard to the international character of the proposal, which Henderson 
felt gave it a distinct advantage, Hawtrey had some reservations about linking up 
all currencies to that of the depressed United States, but he viewed the prospect 
of the flight from a particular currency with some equanimity: 
 
[i]f only a flight from the pound or a flight from the dollar could 
be started, our difficulties would be at an end.  In reality I do not 
think Mr. Henderson’s plan would do anything at all to prevent 
either of them from occurring, and the plan is all the better for 
that.551
 
The preceding paragraph calls for a moment’s pause.  Conventional wisdom was 
that a single country’s depreciation of its currency was an unfriendly act, 
designed to gain immediate short-term advantage for its exports, but that the 
ultimate gain would be nothing since it would provoke competitors to depreciate 
by an equal, if not greater, amount.  Hawtrey did not accept that.  The benefit of 
depreciation was not competitive advantage but the rise of the price level in 
terms of the depreciated unit, thereby enabling manufacturers to make profits 
and stimulate economic activity.  The increase of activity would bring about an 
expansion of credit – as ever, the key to economic expansion for Hawtrey.  
Subsequently, another country might devalue and receive the same stimulus to 
its economic activity.  It could only work if, at any one time, a country acted in 
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isolation so that the general world price level, in terms of gold, remained roughly 
constant.  If all countries devalued in consort then any one country’s devaluation 
would be accompanied by a corresponding fall in price and no expansion could 
ensue.  Hawtrey applauded such devaluation, and believed that the process 
contained its own corrective mechanism which would prevent it being carried out 
to excess – eventually, unduly large profits would lead to excessive wage 
demands. 552  
    Hawtrey conceded that if the Keynes-Henderson plan ever did become 
‘practical politics’ then with ‘careful handling’ to avoid landing the world in a fresh 
series of monetary fluctuations it was one way of leading the world out of 
depression – but the careful handling would not be forthcoming.  The plan would 
be rejected by the French who had deliberately built up their gold reserves as a 
buffer against currency collapses.  They would be unwilling to participate in any 
scheme which diluted their holdings.  Nor would the scheme commend itself to 
the United States since public opinion in that country was ‘psychologically 
resistant’ to a form of inflation which depended upon the creation of ‘new’ 
currency.  Hawtrey felt that the necessary legislation could never get through 
Congress and even if it could, the inevitable delay would mitigate against the 
scheme. 
    Two weeks after Hawtrey’s final reply to the Keynes-Henderson document, 
the League of Nations Conference opened at Lausanne on 16 July 1932.  Sir 
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Frederick Phillips concurred with Hawtrey that under prevailing circumstances, 
especially with the stance likely to be adopted by the French, the Keynes-
Henderson scheme stood no chance of acceptance and the plan was not 
therefore put to the Lausanne Conference.  Immediately prior to the Conference, 
Hawtrey produced a memorandum suggesting that, because of the difficulty of 
securing agreement, it would be inappropriate at that stage to produce any 
specific plan for raising world prices.  Nevertheless, he urged the British 
delegation to stress the importance of raising world gold prices, and suggested 
that it might point to a role which individual countries could play by their taking 
steps to prohibit the holding of gold by individuals.553  In the event, the 
discussions at the Lausanne Conference were dominated by the issue of the 
cancellation of war reparations and questions of currency stability hardly 
surfaced.  The Lausanne Conference ended with an agreement to abolish 
reparations and, in the absence of progress on monetary stabilisation, a request 
that the League of Nations hold a World Conference ‘to decide upon the 
measures to solve the other economic and financial difficulties which are 
responsible for, and may prolong, the present world crisis’.554  For the time 
being, the real issues had been shelved.  The gold bloc blamed Britain’s 
departure from gold for currency chaos; Britain required measures to reflate 
prices before returning to gold could be contemplated.  Under these 
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circumstances the onus was on Britain to devise a reflationary policy which was 
internationally acceptable. 
    To prepare the ground for the 1933 World Economic Conference, a 
Preparatory Commission met in Genoa in October-November 1932.  The 
apparently irreconcilable differences between Britain and the gold bloc emerged.  
The gold bloc rejected ideas of reflation and insisted that the onus was on non-
gold countries to deflate.555  Deflation was diametrically opposed to the 
Treasury’s policy, but it had no plan to offer which might have bridged the two 
camps.  Prospects for the 1933 World Economic Conference were not good.  
Ramsay MacDonald had pressed for the conference to be in London with himself 
as its president; his prestige rested on its success and he was anxious that the 
British delegation should be well prepared for the conference.  The Treasury 
were under rather more pressure than usual to produce some scheme to present 
to the gold bloc.  MacDonald’s own advisory group (in which Keynes was again 
prominent) prepared a revised version of the original Keynes-Henderson plan.  
Once more the Treasury rejected it as internationally unacceptable, but this put 
even more pressure on the Treasury to come up with its own plan.556  The 
Treasury’s solution was the Kisch plan; a plan devised in early 1932 by Cecil 
Kisch, an official at the India Office, and later revised in conjunction with Phillips 
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and Hawtrey at the Treasury.  Whilst Treasury officials may have had limited 
hopes for the plan, it did at the very least answer criticism that the Treasury had 
no policy for international monetary stabilisation.557
    Kisch’s revised memorandum clearly presented the problem that would be 
faced by the British delegation at the conference: Britain would insist on a rise in 
world price levels before its return to gold could be contemplated - and the gold-
using countries would insist on Britain returning to gold as a prerequisite of 
monetary stabilisation.558  Therefore, Kisch argued, any plan must hold out the 
prospect, within a measurable period of time, of Britain returning to the gold 
standard – but under conditions which it regarded as satisfactory.  His plan 
started from five basic propositions: appreciating gold values had unfairly 
advantaged creditor countries at the expense of the debtors since the ‘real’ value 
of what they had to repay had increased; the exhaustion of gold in certain 
central banks had prompted various regimes of import control and exchange 
restriction; the high levels of gold-holding in the central banks of the creditor 
countries were a symptom of ‘something radically unsound’; the longer such 
disproportionate gold holdings were held, the more popular opinion would resist 
their reduction; the enlargement of the gold basis of credit would contribute to 
the restoration of world economy.  The purpose of Kisch’s plan was to enlarge 
                                                 
 
557 Ibid., pp. 180-85. 
 
558  Treasury Paper T 177/7 (Phillips Papers).  ‘The Gold Problem’, C. Kisch, 25 
November 1932. 
 388
and redistribute the gold basis of credit, and to safeguard, as far as possible, the 
recurrence of any mal-distribution of gold. 
    The achievement of these ends would be by the following procedures.559  
First, central banks with excess gold would transfer gold to their governments in 
exchange for government bonds;   gold earns no interest, so if the government 
paid some interest on the bond their central bank would be in profit.  Secondly, 
governments thus endowed with gold would transfer it to the governments of 
debtor countries in exchange for a bond repayable, with interest and in the 
currency of the lender, over a long period (say 30 years).  Thirdly, debtor 
governments, newly flush with gold, would transfer it to their central bank in 
exchange for a cancellation of the governments indebtedness to its central bank 
(or a deposit at the bank in favour of its government). There were provisions for 
the process to be carried out through a subsidiary of the Bank for International 
Settlements.  In order to guard against further mal-distribution of gold Kisch, and 
his Treasury collaborators, included a provision that creditor countries should 
make deposits at the Bank of International Settlements (or its designated 
subsidiary) when its gold assets rose above a prescribed level. 
    The Kisch plan can be seen as a modest attempt to redistribute the world’s 
gold supplies in favour of debtor countries without diluting the gold holdings (as 
the Keynes-Henderson plan would) of the creditor countries.  Its provisions for 
enabling governments to procure gold from their central banks would have 
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further weakened the power and independence of central banks in the face of 
government, and the Bank of England pressed for an alternative plan (the 
Kindersley plan), but the Treasury disregarded it in favour of Kisch.560
    After the lack of progress at the first Preparatory Commission at Genoa, a 
second Preparatory Commission for the 1933 World Economic Conference was 
arranged for Geneva in January 1933.  The British Delegation of Leith-Ross and 
Phillips was strengthened, for the purpose of dealing with technical issues, by the 
addition of Hawtrey and Kisch.  Hawtrey’s inclusion annoyed Montagu Norman at 
the Bank of England.561  For many years Hawtrey had been an irritant to the 
Bank: criticising its maintenance of high interest rates and its refusal to release 
gold prior to the return to the gold standard; demanding that the Treasury 
exercise its statuary powers over the Bank to force down interest rates in the 
late 1920s; influencing the Treasury to target a rate of exchange with the dollar 
in 1931 which the Bank believed to be dangerously low.  After an initial 
‘honeymoon’ between the two men in the early 1920s, when Hawtrey had given 
support to the Bank’s high discount rate to fight post-war inflation, Norman had 
always regarded Hawtrey as a radically dangerous theorist.  The rift between 
Hawtrey and Norman had, in fact, pre-dated the return to the Gold Standard.  
Although Norman and Hawtrey consulted over the Genoa resolutions in 1923, 
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Hawtrey had already been pressing for lower interest rates and urging the Bank 
of England to export gold to America as a means of encouraging prices rises 
there.  Norman regarded the former measure as an inflationary risk and the 
latter measure as futile in view of America’s ability to ‘sterilise’ its excess gold 
holdings.  In a letter, in 1922, to Benjamin Strong, Norman’s counterpart at the 
New York Federal Reserve Bank, Norman criticised Hawtrey as someone ‘who 
made it his particular business to quarrel with the policy of the Treasury and the 
Bank of England’.562  At an even earlier date, in his diary entry of 7 July 1921, 
Norman had expressed his mistrust of Hawtrey’s ‘reliance on theory’.563   
    Writing after the Second World War, Hawtrey reported that in 1923, his 
proposal to accelerate American price rises by the shipment of gold was rejected 
by Norman, and even when the proposal was revived in 1925, by Churchill as 
Chancellor of the Exchequer, it was dropped in deference to Norman.564   
 
Whilst Leith-Ross was to lead the British delegation, Norman knew that policy 
would be directed by the Treasury.  Sir Frederick Phillips was the driving force 
within the Finance Division of the Treasury, but he tended to look to Hawtrey for 
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theoretical and technical support, and Norman was therefore concerned at 
Hawtrey’s inclusion in the official British delegation. 
    The progress made by the delegates at the second Geneva Preparatory 
Commission was sufficiently encouraging to give the green light to the World 
Conference, whose very existence had been in doubt after the first Genoa 
Preparatory Commission.  Britain had tempered the demands of the gold bloc, 
which would have insisted that it return to gold, by forcing an acknowledgement 
of the deflationary problems which had caused the defaulting countries off the 
gold standard.  The Kisch plan was not discussed by the Commission, but it 
remained open for discussion at the World Conference planned for June 1933.565
    Whilst the monetary authorities waited for the World Conference, the world 
situation deteriorated.  To Hawtrey, the growing banking crisis in America was 
yet one more consequence of failure to stabilise the value of gold. 
 
The same deadly disease that had destroyed the German 
banking system was assailing that of the United States.  It was 
the appreciation of gold, or, in other words, the fall in the price 
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level that was steadily augmenting the burden of debts in terms 
of goods, and reducing those customers who had received 
advances from the banks to insolvency.566
     
Hawtrey was increasingly coming to see stabilisation of world prices and 
economic expansion as being realisable only through joint action between Britain 
and the United States.  He regarded it as essential that agreement be reached 
between the world’s two most powerful economies to permit easy credit and 
carry out open-market purchases of securities by their central banks.  Any 
consequent loss of gold through their adverse balance of payments could be 
countered by a negotiated devaluation of their currencies against gold.567  When 
recommending a $3.40 value for the pound, during the discussions of 1931, he 
had always emphasised open market operations, rather than the sale and 
purchase of foreign exchange through an equalisation account, as a means of 
both controlling the value of sterling and permitting expansion.  In his diary entry 
of 8 April 1933, Leo Amery records a ‘certain amount of interesting discussion’ in 
which Hawtrey despaired of anything being ‘done to set the economic situation 
right as long as the present people were in control at the Treasury and the Bank 
of England’.568   
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    On 20 April 1933 the United States authorities ceased the issue of licences to 
export gold, effectively withdrawing from the gold standard, and the dollar 
immediately began to depreciate.  To Hawtrey the resulting ‘relief to business 
was sensational, the transition to activity rapid’.569  The index of factory 
employment, which had fallen from 108.4 in August 1929 to 62.2 in March 1933, 
rose again to 77.4 by July 1933.  Taken with the figure for the average weekly 
hours worked, which rose from 32.2 hours in March to 42.6 hours in July, these 
figures indicate an increase of over 60 per cent in the input of factory labour.  
This corresponds with the increase in the American index of industrial 
production, which rose from 60 to 100 over the same period.570  In his 
discussion of the Keynes-Henderson ‘International Note’ plan, Hawtrey had 
argued for the merit of serial devaluation and the American experience seemed 
to be confirming his argument.  After the burst of activity between March and 
July the American revival was checked and industrial employment fell for the 
remainder of the year.571  Hawtrey attributed this to the provisions of Roosevelt’s 
National Industrial Recovery Act – part of his ‘New Deal’ – under which weekly 
wages were to be maintained whilst, to spread employment, hours were 
reduced. 
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 The increase in costs suddenly extinguished the prospect of 
profit that had been offered to industry by the growing 
depreciation of the dollar.  With the prospect of profit there 
vanished the stimulus of activity . . . . The vicious circle of 
expansion was broken, and the impetus of recovery was lost.572
 
The Treasury had gone to great lengths during 1931-32 to establish a policy for 
sterling. The policy eventually established, of maintaining the pound at $3.40, 
was based upon the assumption that the dollar would maintain a stable 
relationship with gold.  The dollar’s departure from gold left this policy in disarray 
since, in the three months subsequent to leaving gold, the dollar depreciated by 
28 per cent and returned to very nearly its old parity with the pound.573   
    Prior to the United States going off the gold standard, a visit to Washington 
had been arranged for Ramsay MacDonald.  He had been given an ‘aide 
memoire’ on monetary questions, prepared by Phillips and Hawtrey, and it had 
been agreed, in discussions with Neville Chamberlain, that the ‘Kisch plan’ for 
redistribution of the world’s gold supply should be brought up.574  MacDonald’s 
‘memoire’, ruling out any return to gold until prices had risen to cover costs, bore 
the clear stamp and language of Hawtrey.  It suggested that the principal 
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requirements would be ‘agreement between principal creditor countries . . . to 
maintain and extend the policy of cheap and plentiful credit with a view to a rise 
in wholesale prices (and). . . a combined aggressive expansionary policy by the 
Federal Reserve Board, the Bank of England and Bank of France’.575  It 
suggested that the Bank of France ‘be empowered to undertake open market 
operations . . . to further credit expansion policy’.  It cautioned that 
‘expansionary action by Governments [underlining in the memorandum] . . . 
depend for success on the cooperation of Central Banks’, and if ‘financed by 
ordinary methods . . . will result in a rising rate of long term interest and their 
effect on prices would be negligible and very slow’.  The note went on to add, in 
best Hawtreyan fashion, that if ‘the central bank in each country cooperated by 
expanding credit . . . the desired effects would be produced’.576  Susan Howson 
may have concluded that ‘Hawtrey’s influence waned during the 1930s’,577 but in 
this short note written during 1933, for the Prime Minister’s use on visiting the 
American President, the ideas, tone and language of Hawtreyan economics were 
still being conveyed to the highest offices in the world.  
    MacDonald’s visit to Washington was unproductive.  He was accompanied by 
the Government’s Chief Economic Advisor, Sir Frederick Leith Ross, that erstwhile 
deputy to Niemeyer and Hopkins at the Treasury – a man whose personal 
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preference and instinct was still for Britain’s earliest possible return to an 
international gold standard.  Leith-Ross relied, for guidance, on frequent 
telegram exchanges with Bank and Treasury.  Roosevelt, guided by the merchant 
banker James P. Warburg, was willing to enter into an informal three-way 
arrangement by which separate exchange equalisation funds would operate in 
concert to stabilise the dollar, sterling and franc.  The Bank of England cautioned 
Leith-Ross against this since it feared such an arrangement would delay its 
preferred option – the return to a gold standard; the Treasury, whose strategy 
still hung on the $3.40 pound, found itself in the incongruous position of being 
unable, itself, to stabilise on gold, yet being reliant upon, and hoping for a return 
to the gold standard by the Americans.  Leith-Ross received no clear message 
and the Washington talks made no progress towards currency stabilisation.578  
    J. K. Galbraith has described the World Economic Conference of 1933 as ‘one 
of the truly bizarre international convocations of the century’.579  For Ramsay 
MacDonald, it may have been conceived as a means of allowing him, in his role 
as President, to act the part of the world statesman, but its success was 
increasingly being seen as a means by which the National Government might be 
seen to deliver upon its ‘Doctor’s Mandate’.580  A. J. P. Taylor describes the 
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conference as MacDonald’s ‘last moment of aspiration’, as he sought to end the 
world’s economic problems through a great international meeting.581
    Sixty-six nations, ‘not excluding Liberia’, convened at the Geological Museum 
at South Kensington on 12 July 1933. 582  They ostensibly intended that 
international discussion might mitigate unstable currencies, beggar-my-
neighbour tariffs, the dumping of surplus commodities, and in consequence, the 
world’s economic depression.  Each nation had its own agenda.  France, as the 
leader of the gold bloc, hoped to shame the defecting nations into once more 
stabilising their currencies in terms of gold.  The British Treasury, who had led 
the departure from gold and seen relief from the burden of high interest rates as 
a consequence, secretly hoped that the rest of the world would not respond to 
French promptings.583  The cynicism within the Treasury towards the World 
Economic Conference is wonderfully illustrated by a hand-written comment by its 
Permanent Secretary, Sir Warren Fisher, which he addended to a short 
memorandum to the Chancellor by Sir Richard Hopkins, during the course of 
which Hopkins outlined the possibilities of agreement on currency with France.  
Fisher had few illusions about the conference: 
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It is that precursor of Utopia – the World Economic Conference – 
that forces upon the Chancellor’s attention this metaphysical, not 
to say mystical, topic.584
 
The shadow of unpaid war-time debts to the United States remained, and hung 
over the conference.  It had been agreed in preparatory talks that any discussion 
of war debts would jeopardise the possibility of currency agreement - rendering 
such a topic taboo.  Ramsay MacDonald launched the business proceedings by 
calling, in his opening address, for a reduction of war debts, leaving the British 
delegation to explain that this was an aberration brought on by his ‘advanced 
mental and physical deterioration’.585  France, predictably, made the stabilisation 
of currencies in terms of gold the first order of business.  The American response 
to the French changed as the personnel of its delegation changed.  Roosevelt’s 
letter to the conference on 2 July 1933, advising it that the United States 
intended to manage the dollar for the purposes of internal stability rather than 
external stability, was less of a ‘bombshell’ to the conference than a humane 
injection, finally putting it out of its misery.  Keynes congratulated Roosevelt on 
his stand, declaring him to be ‘magnificently right’.586  The British Treasury, for 
the moment enjoying the relief of low interest payments on its debts, was, on 
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the whole, probably equally appreciative of Roosevelt’s announcement.  It had 
experienced too many recent years of balancing internal price levels against the 
external value of the pound to want to return to that situation so soon. 
    If there was despondency from within the Treasury at Roosevelt’s rejection of 
cooperation on currency exchange, then it was from Hawtrey.587  From the time 
of the 1922 Genoa Conference he had urged international cooperation between 
the world’s central banks to both stabilise the exchanges and also stabilise the 
wealth value of gold in order to maintain steady world prices.  These twin 
objectives represented ‘the best of both worlds’ to him.  On 8 July he produced a 
short memorandum with this title, arguing that by stabilising the pound against 
both the newly valued dollar and gold, it would, indeed, be possible to have ‘the 
best of both worlds’.588   
      Before Hawtrey produced the memorandum the dollar had been falling 
rapidly, and by the date of the memorandum it had fallen to a level where the 
pound corresponded to $4.70.  This was sufficiently close to the historic value of 
the pound for Hawtrey to propose that there was ‘the prospect of linking the 
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pound to the dollar without any serious risk of subsequent loss’.589  He 
suggested that it would be possible to stabilise the exchange at around $4.70 ‘by 
buying all the dollars offered on the market’, and that the risk of holding dollars 
would be ‘much less than the risk of holding either gold or gold currencies, for it 
is almost certain that the purchasing power of gold must fall heavily in the next 
year or two’.590  His argument for stabilising the pound against the dollar was 
that it would encourage trade and enable Britain, and all sterling-linked 
countries, to participate in the rising prices and revival of business which, since it 
devalued its currency, were beginning to take place in the United States.  He also 
suggested that there was a case for simultaneously, and independently, 
stabilising both the pound and the dollar in terms of gold. 
 
For the past twelve months we have been buying gold and so 
helping to make it dearer.  If we started pegging the pound and 
gold at a time when we are independently taking measures to 
reduce the purchasing powers of the pound, then we shall have 
to sell gold. . . . The appearance of a flood of gold pouring into 
the continent would tend to diminish the hoarding . . .591  
 
Hawtrey did not spell it out, but the ‘measures to reduce the purchasing powers 
of the pound’ would be open-market purchase by the Bank of England in order to 
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stimulate credit creation.  Such credit creation would have drawn in imports and 
forced the Bank of England to release gold – gold which would have formed the 
basis for credit expansion and economic revival abroad.  This argument for the 
exportation of gold as means of boosting business abroad and reviving 
international trade was little different from that which Hawtrey had been making 
through the late 1920s – the argument which Keynes had strongly queried 
during Hawtrey’s interrogation before the Macmillan Committee in 1931.   
    In producing these proposals Hawtrey severely misjudged the mood of the 
Treasury.  Apart from MacDonald, whose personal prestige had suffered from the 
conference’s collapse, few people in Britain were sorry at the outcome of the 
World Economic and Monetary Conference.  The Chancellor and the Treasury 
were relieved; they had little interest in international monetary arrangements as 
means to economic recovery.  For the moment, low interest rates at home meant 
low debt costs and relief for the Budget.  The Exchange Equalisation Account 
was successfully serving the purpose of managing the external value of the 
pound.  The Treasury was happy to focus on those domestic variables which it 
could control, without jeopardising them to the vagaries of international 
arrangements.  ‘The Best of Both World’s’ was Hawtrey’s last attempt to 
persuade his colleagues of the possibility of action on an international scale to 
reflate the world’s economy, and probably marked the peak of his influence over 
the Treasury’s monetary policy.   
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                                     Postscript to Chapter 7  
                              Hawtrey and ‘Competitive Devaluation’ 
Throughout the depression and the relentless appreciation of the value of gold, 
Hawtrey argued that whilst simultaneous devaluation of all currencies in terms of 
gold would not bring about recovery, a staggered devaluation of all currencies 
would, nevertheless, be effective.  He gained little support for this argument 
from his fellow economists.592
    In the process of reviewing Hawtrey’s book Trade Depression and the Way 
Out in June 1934, Roy Harrod had this to say, and his view may be taken as a 
typical criticism: 
 
The sections of [Hawtrey’s] argument which seem least 
convincing are those concerned with competitive exchange 
depreciation.  That is an absurd bogey we may well agree.  But 
to the view that each country can by depreciating its currency 
send up its own price level without damaging the external price 
level is less easy to subscribe.  Imagine the world divided into 
two areas, A and B.  The authorities of A arrange that the value 
of its currency in terms of B’s is reduced.  The necessary 
consequence is a realignment of prices, such that international 
goods have the same price in A and B, taking the new rate of 
exchange into account.  [Why] is it certain that it is the A prices 
that will move?  Is it not equally likely that B prices will fall? [Or] 
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that A prices will rise somewhat and B prices fall somewhat? 
While refusing to regard competitive exchange depreciation as a 
menace, we need not rush forward and hail it as a panacea.593
 
Harrod’s argument was surely right on the basis of his assumption that the world 
was divided into only two trading zones.  Hawtrey’s theoretical argument was 
based upon a single country, in isolation, taking the step to depreciate its 
currency.  This argument assumed that a single country’s change in prices would 
not materially have affected world prices.  In this assumption Hawtrey, too, may 
have been correct – but the wholesale departure of countries from gold after 
1931, added to the formation of a large group of countries who attempted to 
maintain parity between their currencies and sterling, did in effect, gradually 
create a model somewhat closer to that of Harrod than that of Hawtrey’s isolated 
countries. 
    On 25 April 1933 Hawtrey had read a paper ‘Public Expenditure and Trade 
Depression’ to the members of the Royal Statistical Society.594  He asserted that: 
 
Currency depreciation is the most satisfactory measure of revival 
. . . . As our experience in the weeks following the suspension of 
the gold standard in 1931 demonstrated, a sudden depreciation 
of the currency unit of an order of 20 per cent is quite sufficient 
                                                 
 
593 R.F.Harrod, The Economic Journal Vol. 44  No. 174 June 1934.  Review of Hawtrey’s 
book Trade Depression and the Way Out. 
 
594 Printed and published as R.G.Hawtrey, ‘Public Expenditure and Trade Depression’, 
Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Vol. 96, No. 3. (1933), pp.438-477. 
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to revive the spirit of enterprise . . . . here is a short cut to 
revival, which makes other and more doubtful expedients 
unnecessary.  The world price level can be made remunerative to 
our producers . . .595
 
From the floor of the meeting Professor Jones raised a somewhat different point 
to that raised by Harrod when he questioned Hawtrey concerning the effect on 
exports arising from progressive currency depreciations: 
 
. . . Mr. Hawtrey . . . . said . . . that by . . . depreciating the 
exchange it would be possible to increase employment more 
quickly and more permanently than in any other way, and then 
he went on to say that it did not make any difference if a similar 
policy were pursued by other countries at the same time.  In 
other words, by depreciating the exchange it would be possible 
to increase exports, decrease imports and thereby secure an all-
round improvement in the trade of the country, and then when 
other countries did the same, they could enjoy the same 
results.596
 
Professor Jones suggested that the effect on one country would be destroyed by 
extending it to all countries, and that as countries sought to progressively gain 
further advantage, ‘the result would be serious’.  He also suggested that if 
Hawtrey’s analysis was correct, then this country need not fear the recent 
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departure from gold of the United States, but he feared the result would be an 
increase in American exports and a decrease in her imports – all to the detriment 
of Britain.   
    Hawtrey replied that Professor Jones’s view of a depreciation of currency 
being for the purpose of ‘increasing exports, decreasing imports and thereby 
securing an all-round improvement in the trade of the country’ was a ‘complete 
misconception’.597   
 
I advocated depreciation as a device for starting a credit 
expansion and a rise of prices.  If the rise of prices did not occur, 
then indeed, the depreciation would increase exports and 
decrease imports.  But that merely means that a favourable 
balance of payments would counteract the depreciation, the 
currency would rise again and the plan would have been a 
failure. 
    If, on the other hand, the plan achieved its object, there 
would be an expansion of the consumers’ income, which would 
attract additional imports, and would require a continuance of 
the depression of the currency to maintain equilibrium in the 
balance of payments. . . . therefore there is nothing inconsistent 
in supposing all countries to adopt the same policy.598  
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 Hawtrey deplored the view that depreciation of the currency was in some way 
an unfriendly act; a device for assisting one’s own exports by making them 
cheaper, and repelling the exports of others by making them more expensive.  
He saw benefits to exporters through the depreciation, but the main benefit was 
through the rise in price of exportable products on the home market.   
    His causal sequence ran as follows.599  The depreciation would cause 
imported goods to be dearer (in terms of sterling).  It is at this stage of the 
argument that Hawtrey believed the critics of currency depreciation made a false 
assumption.  The assumption that people would then reject imports and 
immediately turn to alternative home-produced goods, whose price would remain 
unchanged, was, he believed, a false one.     Home-producers in competition 
with importers, had often been unable to make profits, and so had curtailed 
production.  Alternative cheaper home produced goods were simply not 
available.  However, the newly increased price of the imported goods afforded 
the domestic producers the opportunity of raising prices to a level where profits 
could, once again, be made.  This would encourage them to expand production.  
To do so, required the availability of cheap credit to buy materials and pay extra 
wages until such times as goods could be sold.  The newly created credit would 
be the source for the increase in the consumers’ income and consumers’ outlay 
which would provide the means for purchasing the increased output.  Hawtrey 
conceded that the increase in price of imported goods could also have been 
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achieved by import duties, and a similar sequence would have followed, but the 
imposition of import duties without currency depreciation would have 
handicapped the principal exporting industries; by keeping the price of exports 
restrictively high and also through retaliatory measures. 
    Writing in 1947, Hawtrey suggested that the process of staggered 
depreciation had, in fact, occurred during the early 1930s, and had in large 
measure been responsible for the climb out of the deep depression of 1929-32.   
     
. . . the benefit is conditional on the action of the country being 
more or less isolated; there must be a sufficient inertia in the 
world price level in terms of other countries’ currencies for it to 
pull against. . . . It is as if several men were in a pit too deep for 
any one of them to climb out alone, yet such that any one of 
them can climb out on the shoulders of the others, and once out, 
can help his comrades up.  But at no time from the first 
suspension of the gold standard at the end of 1929 to the break 
up of the gold standard group in September, 1936, was there 
any question of general simultaneous depreciation.  The 
countries acted one by one or occasionally in groups of two or 
three, but never so many at times as to fail to secure a sufficient 
leverage on the price level.600  
     
Subsequent writers have questioned the extent to which devaluation – as 
opposed to the imposition of tariffs – was responsible for the industrial revival of 
the 1930s.  To Hawtrey, the effect of an import tariff had similar effects to that 
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of devaluation – both raised the price of imported goods, thus allowing domestic 
producers to raise the price of their goods.  Higher prices enabled employers to 
make profits and thus encouraged them to expand production.  Overall, he 
argued that devaluation was not as restrictive on trade as import tariffs. 
    The withdrawal from the Gold Standard saw both devaluation and import 
tariffs.  Capie has concluded that ‘since the two biggest sectors (construction and 
iron and steel) generally accredited with the principle contribution to economic 
recovery had very low effective rates of protection, the tariff played an 
insignificant part in the upturn out of depression’.601  Eichengreen and Sachs 
have argued, in a similar way to Hawtrey, that currency depreciation in the 
1930s was not a beggar-thy-neighbour policy designed to gain a competitive 
advantage for its exports over that of other countries.  They have argued that 
had devaluation policies been adopted more widely then recovery from the 
depression of 1930 could have been achieved more rapidly.602  The argument of 
Eichengreen and Sachs was essentially the same as that which Hawtrey was 
making in 1933, and yet despite very extensive referencing, Eichengreen and 
Sachs make no reference to Hawtrey’s work.  
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    Foreman-Peck’s studies have contradicted these findings and argued that 
tariffs made a greater contribution to recovery.603  His calculations suggest that 
‘there is as yet no good reason to abandon the view that the Iron and Steel 
Trades benefited greatly from protection’.604
    Middleton has concluded that ‘the balance of evidence at the macroeconomic 
level suggests that the case for a positive contribution of the tariff to recovery is 
unproven’.605   
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                                      Chapter 8 
 
                
                  Rearmament and Preparation for War 
 
 
                                      1935-1939 
 
 
                          
 
In 1935, it could not be foretold that the country would have to commit its 
resources to war in four years’ time, and this uncertainty was at the heart of the 
Treasury’s problems.  No time-scale could be given to the preparations.  The cost 
of an extended period of rearmament might lead to financial exhaustion before 
the nation was called upon to fight a war; in which case victory would have been 
handed to an aggressor without it needing to actually use its arms.606      
                                                 
 
606 G.C.Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury (Edinburgh, Scottish Academic 
Press, 1979). 
     R. Middleton, Towards a Managed Economy: Keynes, the Treasury and the Fiscal 
Policy Debate of the 1930s (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1985). 
     S. K. Howson, Domestic Monetary Management in Britain (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1975). 
     M. Thomas, ‘Rearmament and Economic Recovery in the late 1930s’, Economic 
History Review, 36(4), pp.552-79. 
     Peden’s British Rearmament and the Treasury examines the extent to which Britain’s 
lack of readiness for war in 1939 could be attributed to Treasury parsimony.  His 
findings are that Britain was walking a tightrope between military unpreparedness and 
allowing the demands of rearmament to destroy the economy.  The Treasury, in his 
view, worked to prevent rearmament disrupting the economy by forcing the cabinet to 
establish defence priorities and then forcing the spending departments, over which it 
had control, to stick to these priorities.  Peden’s book is also an excellent study of the 
way in which a few strong officials dominated a very small Treasury staff. 
    Middleton (1985) discusses the Treasuries assessment of the ‘balance of risks’ as it 
walked the tightrope between inadequate preparation for war and damaging a fragile 
economy.  Parker (1981) argues along similar lines to Peden, and also considers the 
response of the British Trade Unions to the reorganisation of labour demanded by the 
rearmament programme.  Howson (1975) discusses monetary policy during 
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    In 1919, following the end of the First World War, Lloyd-George’s Cabinet had 
introduced the ‘Ten-Year Rule’ as a means of curbing the demands of the service 
chiefs.  They were told that their spending allocations would be based upon the 
assumption that, with the existing state of international relations, they would not 
be called upon to fight a major war within the next ten years.  By use of this 
measure the Treasury was able to reduce the annual estimates of the defence 
departments from £604 million in 1919 to £111 million in 1922.607  Thereafter, 
whenever the service chiefs agitated for increased armaments spending, the rule 
proved to be of immense convenience to the Treasury: 
 
In 1925 the service chiefs asked again and were given the same 
answer: no major war within the next ten years.  This answer 
was repeated in 1926 and 1927.  Finally, in 1928, the service 
chiefs were told, on Churchill’s prompting, that they need ask no 
more: the ten years freedom from major war began 
automatically each morning.608
 
With, in retrospect, admirable timing, the government succumbed to the 
pressure from the chiefs of staff and, in March 1932, they rescinded their guiding 
rule that no great war need be anticipated within the next ten years.  The move 
                                                                                                                                                 
rearmament, and the Treasury’s concern that borrowing for rearmament should not 
mark the end of its cheap money policy.  Thomas (1983) has attempted to assess the 
effects of the rearmament programme on unemployment.   
 
607 Peden, British Rearmament and the Treasury, p.3. 
 
608 Taylor, English History 1914-45, p.228. 
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was not prompted by any fear of German aggression but by the Japanese 
invasion of Manchuria, which had taken place in September 1931.609  Despite 
this move, Neville Chamberlain failed to raise the defence estimates, and 
expenditure on defence reached its lowest inter-war value of just over £103 
million in 1932/33.610  The National Government had been elected as a means of 
restoring confidence after the economic crisis of 1931 and did not regard the 
abandonment of the ten-year rule as justification for the demands of the defence 
chiefs to overrule national economic recovery.  If this might seem a frivolous 
attitude to national defence, the figure of £103 million represented roughly 3 per 
cent of Gross National Product whereas in the same year Germany was devoting 
only 1 per cent of its Gross National Product to defence.611  In the years 1932-
36, German defence spending was to grow to 13 per cent of its G.D.P. whilst, in 
terms of G.D.P., that of Britain remained virtually stagnant (rising G.D.P. over the 
period meant that British defence spending rose from £103 million in 1932 to 
£186 million in 1936, an increase which can be seen to have justified the priority 
given to increasing national production in 1932).612
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    In November 1933 a Defence Requirements Committee (D.R.C.) was 
appointed within the Committee for ImperiaL Defence.  It comprised the service 
chiefs of staff and three leading civil servants who included Sir Warren Fisher, 
the Permanent Secretary, as the Treasury’s representative.613  The Committee’s 
first report, in February 1934, put the cost of making up the ‘worst deficiencies’ 
in the armed forces at a mere £93 million – a cost to be spread over five 
years.614  It recommended that the forecast for the annual expenditure on all 
forces should rise from an actual expenditure of £103 million in 1932 to £119 
million in 1934, with subsequent increases to £132 million in 1938.615  The 
cabinet, mindful of the National Government’s pledge to restore the 1931 pay 
cuts and pre-1931 rate of Income Tax, subsequently cut the figure of £93 million 
to £77 million in a meeting in July 1934.616   
    In the autumn of 1934 the German Army began to equip itself with weapons 
that had been prohibited by the Treaty of Versailles and in 1935 the full extent of 
German military expenditure became apparent.617  It was clear that British 
rearmament needed to be on a much greater scale than that envisaged by the 
Defence Requirements Committee in its first report of February 1934.  The 
                                                 
 
613 Ibid., p.28. 
 
614 Ibid. 
 
615 Ibid., p.205. 
 
616 Ibid., p.68. 
 
617 Ibid., p.71. 
 414
D.C.R., in July 1935, was asked to reconsider defence requirements in the light 
of the emerging international situation.  Its brief still included the requirement to 
match defence spending against the country’s general economic state, but it 
undertook its work with the understanding that a defence loan would be made 
available to augment money raised through taxation, and the Treasury 
Permanent Secretary, Warren Fisher, who was a member of the Committee, was 
of the view that a defence loan would be preferable since the public would 
resent the imposition of greater taxes for the purpose of armaments.618   A 
report by the D.R.C. in November 1935 raised its recommendations regarding 
defence spending to figures which were generally about 70 per cent higher than 
those in its February 1934 recommendations (thus, for example, it raised its 
recommendation for 1938 from £132 million to £213 million – the actual defence 
expenditure in 1938 materialised at over £400 million, rising to over £700 million 
in 1939).619
    The Treasury’s Controller of Finance, Sir Richard Hopkins, who had 
responsibility for public finances, was less enthusiastic about a loan than his 
Permanent Secretary.  His memorandum to the Chancellor, Chamberlain, in 
October 1935, was in the tradition of the ‘McKenna rule’ of 1916, that borrowing 
for expenditure must never take place without provision through taxation for 
sufficient to cover both interest and sinking fund. 
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  We should delude ourselves if we looked upon the expenditure 
facing us as capital in nature. . . . it is most of it ephemeral [sic.] 
and all of it unproductive of any money return, and all of it in 
nature revenue expenditure. . . . it would be unfortunate if the 
country began to think of a Defence Loan as a comfortable 
Lloyd-Georgian device for securing not only larger forces but also 
lower estimates, Budget surpluses and diminishing taxation.620
 
Accordingly, Hopkins believed that the re-armament programme should be 
financed from taxation.  The general economic background against which 
Hopkins expressed this preference was one of stumbling economic recovery and 
growth during the period 1933-36.  A major contributor to this fragile recovery 
had been relief from the strait-jacket of the gold standard in 1931.  From 1932 to 
1939 investment had been encouraged by holding Bank Rate down to 2 per cent. 
– half that of the average rate during the period 1925-1931.621  There was 
concern that the Treasury would have to issue Bills at sufficiently high, attractive 
rates of interest to persuade the public to purchase them and that this would 
cause a general rise in interest rates; a rise which would stifle the halting 
recovery.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain, was also concerned 
that recovery would be halted if, even with a low Bank Rate, businesses did not 
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have confidence to invest.  He regarded the greatest destroyer of confidence to 
be Governments failing to follow the precepts of ‘sound’ finance by not balanced 
their budgets.  His 1936 budget raised the standard rate of income tax from 4s 
6d to 4s 9d and also raised both tea duty and the Road Fund.  This was to be his 
last ‘nominally’ balanced budget.622  Over and above these considerations, the 
current balance of payments remained a problem.  In peacetime, Britain’s only 
balance of payment deficits prior to 1931 had been in 1919 and 1926; after 
leaving the gold standard there were deficits in 1931, 1932, 1934 and 1936 
(these deficits were amplified dramatically in the years leading up to the war).  
The consequence of these deficits was that Britain’s reserves of gold and foreign 
currency became depleted leading to concerns about her ability to purchase 
essential food and raw materials from abroad.623
    The buoyancy of Chamberlain’s tax revenues in 1936-37 obviated the 
requirement for borrowing for re-armament purposes in that year.624  By 1937, 
however, the estimated cost of the rearmament programme over the subsequent 
five years had risen to £1500 million, whereas the anticipated sum available for 
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Review, 36 (4), pp.552-79.   
     Thomas examines the economic recovery of the late 1930s and attempts, using a 
matrix model, to separate the contribution of rearmament to recovery from that due to 
other factors.  His conclusion is that roughly one million man-years of employment were 
created over the period 1935-38 (effectively reducing unemployment by around a 
quarter of a million during these years).  The major beneficiaries of the rearmament 
programme were iron and steel, coal and engineering.  
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the purpose from taxation was only £1100 million.625  Phillips was charged with 
preparing a Defence Loans Bill with which to raise the £400 million balance over 
the five-year period 1937-1942, and this bill was enacted on 19 March 1937. 
    Under the authority of the Defence Loans Bill, and bearing in mind that the 
prevailing Bank Rate was 2 per cent., the Treasury issued £100 million of 
National Defence Bonds at 2.5 per cent interest in April 1937 followed by £81 
million at 3 per cent. interest in June 1938.626  The Defence Loans Bill did not 
find universal favour, being criticised by the Governor of the Bank of England for 
its disturbing effects upon the markets for industrial finance, and by the Labour 
Party for being inflationary.627   
    As the international situation deteriorated, and after the Munich crisis of 
September 1938, defence estimates continued to rise, necessitating further 
borrowing.  In February 1939 the government’s borrowing powers under the 
Defence Loans Act were doubled to £800 million.628  Peden has suggested that 
this figure was ‘a deliberate understatement to prevent too violent an adverse 
reaction on financial markets’.629  The Treasury was walking a tightrope.  Heavy 
taxation for armaments had depressed general trade with the annual average of 
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insured workers who were unemployed rising from 10.8 per cent in 1937 to 12.9 
per cent in 1938.  This had reduced the revenues which might be expected from 
taxation whilst increasing the burden of unemployment payments.  Failure to 
raise sufficient revenues from taxation with the increased requirement to borrow 
had undermined international confidence in the pound.  Fisher, Permanent 
Secretary to the Treasury, wanted large increases in taxation to reassure 
international markets that Britain was not about to abandon ‘sound finance’ in its 
quest to re-arm; his chief lieutenants, Hopkins and Phillips, who would be the 
architects of the budget, wanted to rely on borrowing from the people’s savings, 
in the hope that merely token increases in taxation – token, in that their purpose 
would be to try to maintain confidence in sterling – would help stimulate the 
economy into a position where revenues would once again begin to rise.   
    On 17 April 1939 and 19 April 1939 Keynes wrote articles in The Times on his 
view of the policy options.630  They embodied thinking arising out of his General 
Theory of Employment Interest and Money.  He began with a reassurance that 
the Chancellor could safely forget about the problem of unemployment; the 
estimated government expenditure of £350 million (an increase of £220 million 
over that for 1938-39) would assuredly, he claimed, consign the unemployment 
problem to recent history.     
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We have experience of peace finance and of war finance.  But 
this is neither.  And it needs fresh thinking to know how to act. . 
. . it is impossible for private enterprise to plan confidently for 
the future (therefore) we should feel in any other circumstances 
great anxiety concerning unemployment.  But in the actual 
conditions of today it is safe to say that no such anxiety is 
necessary. . . . The Chancellor of the Exchequer should frame his 
Budget on the assumption that the problem of normal 
unemployment will cease to exist during the financial year 1939-
40, and that all plans and special provisions for dealing with this 
problem should be dropped forthwith as being a waste of time 
and money.631
 
As Keynes continued, he attempted to illustrate how the multiplier principle, an 
important element of the theoretical position worked out in his General Theory, 
would amplify the increased loan expenditure of £200 million to an increased 
income of around £400 million, and that this would reverse the economic 
priorities of the Government.  In his estimation of an overall increase in income 
of £400 million from an injection of £200 million of extra public spending Keynes 
was assuming a propensity to save of 0.5 (the public would save one half of all 
increases in income) – the propensity to save being the reciprocal of the 
multiplier effect. 
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. . . the increase in primary demand may be of the order of 
£200,000,000, which should mean an increase in total demand of 
perhaps twice this amount.  Now, this is a very big figure. . . . in 
proportion, about twice the maximum public works expenditure in 
America. . . . the prospective increase in demand would require the 
services of about 1,500,000 men. . . . We have been so long in the 
notion – it is nearly 10 years now – that we have vast unused surplus 
capacity that we are being extraordinarily slow in facing the palpable 
fact that a complete reversal is in sight.632
 
Apart from the possibility of there being a shortage of suitable skilled labour, his 
first concern was that increased incomes would draw in greater imports and thus 
drain the country of its gold and foreign reserves.  To this end he proposed an 
embargo upon foreign investment.  Such an embargo would, he argued, have 
two beneficial effects.  Firstly, it would conserve foreign reserves.  Secondly, 
investing savings at home would provide the necessary funds for the 
governments public spending. 
 
The time has come . . . to tighten up to the fullest extent the 
embargo on sending capital funds oversea by British nationals. . 
. . The whole of our liquid capital resources must be 
concentrated henceforward to meet the adverse balance of trade 
and to provide for political loans.633
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For one so long associated with the idea of saving being responsible for creating 
unemployment through reducing demand, there is an element of disbelief in 
reading Keynes now extolling the virtues of saving – ‘Virtue will come into its 
own. . . . private saving . . . will again serve a social purpose and private 
prudence will coincide with the public interest’.634
    Pursuing the model of the economy derived from his General Theory, he was 
at pains to emphasise that public expenditure would, of itself, generate the 
necessary savings for government lending after the expenditure has taken place.  
Any attempt to acquire funds before expenditure would result in the Treasury 
siphoning off funds which would be used for investment by private industry. 
 
Loans must be raised after the expenditure has been incurred and not 
before. . . . If an attempt has been made to borrow them before they 
exist, as the Treasury has done once or twice lately, a stringency in 
the money market must result, since, pending the expenditure, the 
liquid resources acquired by the Treasury must be at the expense of 
the normal liquid resources of the banks and of the public.635
 
Keynes’s final plea was that, to avoid handicapping private manufacture, the 
borrowing process should be undertaken without any increase in interest rates.  
Essentially, he felt, this could be done if that Treasury pandered to the public’s 
preference for short-dated debt.   
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 If the public prefer short-dated debt, nothing can be gained and much 
will be lost in terms of interest . . . by attempting to force long-dated 
loans on them. . . . It would be well for the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer to announce that in no circumstances will he offer loans 
carrying a rate of interest in excess of 2.5 per cent.  In the first 
instance a large addition to the volume of Treasury (six month) bills 
will be right and probably inevitable.636
 
Whenever Keynes’s opinions appeared in the press it was customary for Hawtrey 
to prepare a critical commentary for the benefit of Treasury colleagues, and on 
20 April 1939 he produced his reply to the article.637  It was robust in its 
criticism.   
    Hawtrey first questioned Keynes’s assumption that government spending 
would automatically enhance economic activity and employment, noting that the 
early stages of rearmament had actually been accompanied by an increase in 
unemployment. 
 
. . . half [of Keynes’s presumed increase in national income as a result 
of his multiplier argument] will be lent to the government . .  . half will 
pay for additional production by the consumption industries, 
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    That is a possible calculation.  But . . . if the whole of the 
Government’s loan expenditure were met from (1) additional savings, 
(2) reduced capital outlay by private enterprise, (3) sales of securities, 
gold or other capital assets abroad, there would not necessarily be 
any increase in activity, employment or national income at all.638
 
As ever, just as he had done after the publication of Keynes’s major works, 
Hawtrey was ready to pick holes in the structure of Keynes’s theoretical 
arguments.  In seeking to reassure the public that savings would be forthcoming 
as a result of government expenditure and that the process need not be 
inflationary, Keynes had argued that ‘the income of the community will be equal 
to what the Government spends plus what individuals spend.  What is one man’s 
expenditure is another man’s income.  Thus the excess of the community’s 
aggregate income over what individuals spend, which is left over and available to 
pay taxes and loans to the Government must be exactly equal to what the 
Government spends’.639  Hawtrey took exception to this, arguing that the ‘true 
principle is that the excess of what individuals and the Government spend over 
the community’s aggregate income must be met out of stocks of goods 
(Hawtrey’s italics)’.640  This, according to Hawtrey, was the beginning of the 
inflationary process.  Dwindling stocks would cause their prices to rise, whilst at 
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the same time encouraging manufacturers to invest in further plant to increase 
capacity.  The additional incomes paid to producers of capital goods would bid 
up still further the prices of continually dwindling stock. 
 
If there were specific measures to limit capital outlay by private 
enterprise, inflation might be prevented.  But it would be quite 
impossible to decide the extent of such measures.641
 
In pressing the monetary authorities to avoid raising interest rates, Keynes had 
regarded the form of Government borrowing as irrelevant – it could equally have 
been ‘balances at the Bank of England, in Treasury Bills and Bonds, or in longer 
dated Government debt’.642  Hawtrey regarded this as ‘very dangerous doctrine’, 
since if ‘the Government borrows from the banks, whether by bills or bonds, so 
that it creates new incomes while leaving the existing incomes undiminished, the 
effect will be . . . inflationary’.643  On the other hand he viewed the issuing of 
long-term bonds as non-inflationary since they would encourage extra income 
into savings rather than pushing up prices by creating excessive demand.   
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    Hawtrey was contemptuous of Keynes’s advice to the Treasury that ‘loans 
must be raised after the expenditure has been incurred and not before’.644   
 
. . . the idea that the Treasury can postpone borrowing . . . till after 
expenditure is incurred is an absurdity.  Whenever the Treasury incurs 
expenditure in excess of current revenue, it has to borrow the excess 
in some form or other. . . . The reduction of the . . . debt tends to 
have a deflationary effect, and may well have contributed in the last 
two years to retard the revival of activity. . . . It might prevent even 
the swollen rearmament expenditure of the present time from 
restoring normal activity and full employment.645
 
Moving through Keynes’s list of items of policy advice, Hawtrey then turned to 
the suggestion that the Treasury might obtain adequate loan advances without 
causing any rise in interest rates.  He believed that this would be achievable only 
if ‘an absolutely rigorous restraint were to be placed on all forms of investment, 
and if people believed that it would never be relaxed’.646  Noting that Keynes’s 
proposals included the prohibition of investment abroad – a proposal which 
would restrict investment opportunities and accord with his desire to raise loan 
finance without incurring rising interest rates – Hawtrey also noted that Keynes 
had little to say about exchange rates.  If the loan expenditure succeeded in 
increasing economic activity and employment then this would draw in extra 
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imports in addition to the additional imports necessary to fulfil the rearmament 
programme.  Unless steps were taken to mitigate the effects of increased 
imports, the result would be the loss of gold and international purchasing power.  
He suggested that such a loss might be mitigated by a managed depreciation of 
the currency, by tariff or quota measures to restrict imports, or by raising capital 
from the sale of assets held abroad.647
    By the late 1930’s Keynes was no longer an outsider having, amongst other 
roles, served with distinction on the Macmillan Committee and the Economic 
Advisory Committee.  Moreover he was gaining a substantial following amongst 
academic economists through his 1937 publication of his General Theory.  By this 
time Keynes’s censures of the Treasury should have been carrying greater 
weight with Treasury officials.  As a means of evaluating the relative influences 
of Keynes and Hawtrey it is worthwhile examining Sir Frederick Phillips’s reaction 
to Hawtrey’s memorandum of 20 April 1939. 
    Frederick Phillips, by 1939, was Under-Secretary and Head of the Treasury’s 
Finance Divisions.648  He had responsibility for the detailed construction of the 
budget.  After reading Keynes’s article and Hawtrey’s comments, he sent a 
memorandum to Hopkins on the merits of the two economists’ approaches.649  
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In general, it belies the view that Keynesian thinking had taken hold of the 
Treasury before the outbreak of the Second World War. 
    Phillips began by gently mocking Keynes’s journalistic efforts: 
 
On the whole I am somewhat less critical than Mr. Hawtrey of Mr. 
Keynes’s two articles in the ‘Times’, though to be sure these are 
marked by Mr. Keynes’s customary optimism, over-emphasis and 
neglect of ulterior consequences.  It is almost as though he sets 
himself out to instil distrust in his readers.650
 
Phillips acknowledged that armaments spending, on the scale contemplated, 
must reduce unemployment, but he felt that Keynes failed to recognise the 
potential effects of falling business confidence caused both by fear of impending 
war and concern at the necessary scale of government borrowing.  He also felt 
that Keynes slipped too easily over historical experience whereby neither 
Roosevelt’s expenditure on public works nor Britain’s already substantial 
spending on armaments had, to date, been successful in preventing rises in 
unemployment.651  Both Hawtrey and Phillips ignored Keynes’s point that 
Britain’s intended spending on armaments would be about twice the maximum 
expenditure in America on public works.  
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    He was more sympathetic than Hawtrey to Keynes’s suggestion that public 
expenditure should take place prior to borrowing the money – following the 
Keynesian argument that enhanced incomes should generate the additional 
savings from which borrowing could take place. 
 
. . . however unhappy his language, Mr. Keynes is really making a 
point.  Spending first and borrowing afterwards is surely not too 
inaccurate a description of exactly the process by which Germany 
reached full employment.  It is true that she adopted the worst 
possible methods, in particular that of paying armaments bills or part 
of them by I.O.U.’s and it is true that as a result she is now 
threatened with inflation.  But our position is that we have not yet got 
out of the depression, and that to be frightened of inflation with 
unemployment as heavy as it is, is absurd.652
 
In the above extract Phillips referred to Keynes ‘making a point’ without spelling 
out precisely what that point was.  It can only be inferred, from later in the 
document, that Phillips felt that Keynes had been making the important point 
that government borrowing in itself tends to be deflationary, since when 
individuals use existing savings for the purpose of purchasing government debt 
then the liquidity of the banks is correspondingly reduced and the banks 
attempted to regain their liquidity levels by reducing credit levels to their 
customers.  Bemoaning the fact that the low level of Treasury Bills held by the 
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banks - which the banks were able to readily sell back to the Bank of England for 
cash - had been a contributory cause of the existing depression he added the 
following footnote.    
 
It ought not to have been.  It is merely due to the folly of the Clearing 
Banks that they reduce the credit extended to customers when they 
experience a shortage of quick assets such as Bills, even though their 
cash position is amply secured.  Still we must take the world as we 
find it and allow for the fact that banks are governed by rule of thumb 
methods.653
 
On the matter of Keynes’s injunction that the government must under no 
circumstances borrow at interest rates greater than 2.5 per cent., Phillips was 
terse in his response: 
 
I agree with Mr. Hawtrey that there is no basis for Mr. Keynes’s belief 
that we shall be able to borrow at rates not worse than 2.5 percent.  
We shall be lucky if the rate can be kept down to 4 per cent.654
 
The strongest criticism of Keynes in Phillips’s memorandum was related to 
Keynes’s proposals for combating inflation, should it arise – ‘Mr. Keynes is 
extremely vague as to what we ought to do if later on inflation threatens.  He 
                                                 
 
653 Ibid. 
 
654 Ibid. 
 430
seems to think that it is all a question of the physical control of industry.  It is 
not easy to grasp his reasoning’.655  In his press article Keynes had spoken of 
‘rationing and a compulsory reduction of public consumption’ as a means of 
curbing inflation.656  To Phillips this was unnecessary since ‘if and when we reach 
a state of full employment and prices continue to rise without more labour being 
absorbed into work we must be ready to revert to all the usual controls, 
including heavier taxation, heavier customs duties, higher bank rate, a strong 
loan policy, reduction of floating debt and so on’.657  Furthermore ‘once full 
employment has been reached, the country can very well stand increased 
financial pressures without going back to a state of unemployment . . . unless 
the monetary controllers are ignorant of their jobs’.658  The feeling throughout 
this Treasury criticism of Keynes is that it was rejecting the kind of direct 
government control which Keynes would have adopted in favour of using 
conventional monetary and fiscal levers – the kinds of levers which Hawtrey, as a 
long-standing advocate of the efficacy of Bank rate, would have preferred. 
     Towards the end of Hawtrey’s comments on the Keynes articles he had raised 
the possibility of a depreciation of the currency as a means of preventing the loss 
of gold and foreign exchange (a depreciated pound would have enabled 
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foreigners to obtain more sterling with which to purchase exports from Britain 
whilst, by a contrary argument, discouraging imports), adding the remark that if 
‘in the near future revival is resumed in the united States, this question will not 
arise’.659  Hawtrey’s point being that an American revival would revive exports 
without need for sterling depreciation.  Phillips latched on to this argument: 
 
Mr. Hawtrey’s memorandum is a cogent though concealed plea for not 
maintaining any fixed ratio between the pound and the dollar.  If 
there is renewed recession in the United States, he argues, and if the 
£ is pegged to the dollar it may be that no amount of armaments 
expenditure will improve employment.660
 
 Phillips went along with Keynes’s advocacy of an embargo on foreign investment 
– ‘there will no doubt have to be . . .  a warning that in the event of war we 
intend to requisition British holdings of foreign securities’.661  He concluded that: 
 
Mr. Keynes is over optimistic in thinking unemployment will rapidly 
assume very small proportions, in particular he neglects the fact of the 
somewhat unsatisfactory conditions in the United States. . . . it is 
entirely in our own interests to avoid any measure likely to check . . . 
improvement.  We should avoid further long or medium term 
borrowing until the market holdings of Treasury Bills have been 
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restored to normal . . . But [then] our borrowing needs will be 
gigantic.  Thus we should now be preparing plans for a big war loan 
operation later this year . . .662  
 
On 25 April 1939 Sir John Simon’s second budget was balanced with a small 
number of additional taxes – on large estates, tobacco, imported sugar and 
surtax on high earners – designed to merely raise an extra £34 million in 
revenue.663  By balancing it, he hoped to retain the confidence of business and 
currency dealers.  By leaving the standard rate of income tax at the same level 
he hoped to stimulate the economy with the hope of increasing future revenues 
through taxation.  The great bulk of the estimated defence spending would have 
to be met at some future date by loans amounting to £385 million.   
    In the ensuing parliamentary debate Harold Macmillan, then a Conservative 
back-bencher representing Stockton-on-Tees, had warned that Keynes’s Times 
articles had led people to assume that loan expenditure would automatically 
remove unemployment.664  Macmillan had warned that such a conclusion was 
facile since if armaments were to be the only expenditure they would only 
provide employment for a small minority of skilled workers who would, in all 
probability, have to be drawn from other employment. 
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    After the budget debate Simon asked the Treasury for clarification of certain 
points, and Hawtrey, to whom the task was assigned, responded.  Hawtrey’s 
memorandum reminded his readers that Keynes had in fact said, quite 
emphatically, that large numbers of people would be brought into employment 
as a consequence of the Government borrowing, Keynes’s words being ‘I repeat 
that nothing can prevent this forecast from coming true, except a failure to 
spend the money’.665  Hawtrey perceived Macmillan’s case to be a revival of the 
plea for Government borrowing for public works, as opposed to re-armament, 
since public works would allow programmes to be selected which suited the 
available labour.  Hawtrey’s response to such an idea was a variant of the same 
argument which he had been making over the past two decades. 
The real virtue lies neither in the public works nor the armaments 
themselves but in the resort to inflationary expedients to finance 
them.666   
 
This is still the ‘Treasury View’ of the late 1920s – in essence, if the terms of 
credit are sufficiently attractive then borrowing by government for public works 
merely ‘crowds out’ borrowing by the more efficient private sector.  Before 
returning the memorandum to the Chancellor, Phillips added his own comments 
which support the general thesis that throughout the 1930s, and up until the 
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spring of 1939, Hawtrey had successfully prevented Treasury officials from being 
seduced by Keynesian finance. 
 
I agree with Mr. Hawtrey that the real stimulus comes from 
reflationary finance.  If there were no reflationary finance, the 
Government works would tend merely to replace private works 
without much effect on employment.  But this is the famous or 
infamous ‘Treasury View’, still a most bitter subject of 
controversy which it would be a great mistake to raise.667
 
Meanwhile, the demands of the defence departments continued to increase.  At 
a meeting in Cabinet, on 23 May 1939, Simon, whilst admitting that the country’s 
annual savings could not be much in excess of £450 millions, conceded that the 
borrowing requirement would approach £400 millions.668  Whilst his view was 
that there was no action which the Government could take to increase the total 
volume of savings in the country, he drew the cabinet’s attention to the 
argument currently being propagated by Keynes that spending on a sufficiently 
large scale would create the savings necessary to finance the expenditure.669  
    The arguments which Simon had referred to were those outlined by Keynes in 
his articles in the Times in April.  Keynes took up his previous arguments and 
extended them to explain a mechanism by which the necessary borrowing might 
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be effected without provoking higher interest rates.  He forwarded his arguments 
directly to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, and they were also published as two 
articles in the Times on 24, 25 July 1939.670     
    The argument that Government borrowing necessitated higher interest rates 
was, Keynes suggested, born of two separate propositions which were relics of 
the false thesis that saving was necessary before investment could be carried 
out.  The first false proposition was that high interest rates were necessary to 
divert money away from consumption into savings.  The second was that high 
interest rates were necessary to deter the private investors who would compete 
for the pool of savings. 
    Dealing with the second proposition first, Keynes argued that apart from 
foreign borrowers, the main competitors for savings would be local authorities 
and public boards responsible for major construction works.  An investment 
authority, he suggested, should prioritise the allocation of funds between public 
bodies, whilst he viewed the engineering of steadily rising share and bond values 
at home as the best way of retaining savings.  Since higher interest rates 
generally implied lower capital values for these assets, he suggested that they 
would discourage rather than encourage home investment. 
    Turning to the argument that high interest rates were necessary to build up a 
pool of savings, Keynes once more sought to apply the model of his General 
Theory.  Increased savings would not be forthcoming as a result of higher 
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interest rates, but as a result of the increased incomes resulting from 
Government expenditure.  If the extra savings were not forthcoming as a result 
of the increased earnings, then it was in the Government’s power to ‘conscript’ 
savings in the form of increased taxation.671  
    The latter parts of Keynes’s articles were devoted to the sequence of events 
by which a loan could be raised without prompting higher rates.  They can, in 
part, be seen as a response to Hawtrey’s caustic comment that ‘the idea that the 
Treasury can postpone borrowing in any form till after the expenditure is 
incurred is an absurdity’.672     
    Initial expenditure, Keynes assumed, would be met by issuing Treasury bills 
(short-term loans repayable with interest after six months).  The expenditure of 
these loans would generate incomes and additional savings alongside the 
repayment of the short-term loans.  Keynes then saw the problem as ‘inducing 
the holder to lend them to the Government in some more permanent form’.673  
This inducement would necessarily have to be effective without raising the rate 
of interest.  Keynes turned to the application of the idea of ‘liquidity preference’.  
If the public could be, through the banking system, supplied with a level of 
liquidity in excess of that adequate for its needs, then it should be possible to 
induce it use the surplus liquidity to purchase interest-bearing bonds without the 
Treasury having to resort to higher interest rates to entice it to do so.   
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    Timing was regarded as essential.  Keynes argued that increasing the supply 
of Treasury bills and bankers’ balances at the Bank of England would eventually 
work through to the public holding larger bank balances.  A period of delay was 
then essential before a bond issue in order for a pent-up demand for interest-
bearing securities to develop.  On offering the bonds it was incumbent upon the 
Treasury to make it clear that it would not, in the future, be prepared to increase 
the interest rate on its securities. 
    Keynes scheme was passed back to the Treasury for a response, and Phillips 
passed it on to Hawtrey.  Aware of Hawtrey’s predilection for verbosity, Phillips 
requested that Hawtrey ‘prepare a note, simple short comprehensive and 
conclusive’.674  On 20 June 1939 Hawtrey produced what Phillips had requested 
– a short note.675  But the note was accompanied by a lengthy memorandum of 
over four thousand words which demonstrated the rift that was developing 
between Keynes and Hawtrey. 
    In the short note Hawtrey made two critical comments.  First, that measures 
to curb alternative demands for funds to public bodies would not be adequate 
since increased consumption would generate demands for funds for investment 
by private industry.  Secondly, increased consumption would run down the 
stocks of traders who would be forced to bid up the prices of newly finished 
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goods in order to replenish their stocks.  Keynes’s policy for permanent low 
interest rates showed no means of curbing inflation. 
    In the longer memorandum Hawtrey queried the ability of Keynes’s scheme to 
generate increased incomes without generating inflation.  In the event of 
inflation he suggested that a higher rediscount rate would be necessary and this 
would negate Keynes’s low interest rate plan.     
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                                     Chapter 9 
 
 
                  Reorganisation, War and Retirement 
 
 
                                      1937-1939 
 
 
The years from 1919 to 1939 saw no change in the position of the Financial 
Enquiries Branch within the overall structure of the Treasury.  The Treasury itself 
was divided into three broad sections.  The ‘Finance Divisions’ handled the 
Budget and the preparation and presentation of public accounts, matters related 
to loans and the National Debt, and questions of banking, currency and foreign 
exchange.  The other two sections were the ‘Establishment Divisions’ which dealt 
with the staffing and conditions of the Civil Service, and the ‘Supply Divisions’ 
which supervised public monies devoted to non-civil service bodies.  The Finance 
Divisions were three in number: ‘1D’, the ‘Home Finance Division’, ‘2D’ the 
‘Foreign Finance Division’, with the Financial Enquiries Branch, without code 
name, constituting the third of the three divisions.
 676   
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    An Appendix to the Report of the Treasury Organisation Committee in 
February 1938 listed nine personnel in at, or above the level of ‘Higher Grade 
Clerk’ in ‘1D’, five personnel at corresponding levels in ‘2D’, but only Hawtrey and 
one assistant, a Mrs. Lucas at the level of Assistant Principal, in the Financial 
Enquiries Branch.677
    From time to time questions were asked about the effectiveness of the work 
of the Financial Enquiries Branch.  Responding to questioning by the Public 
Accounts Committee in 1936, Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Secretary, explained 
to the Committee that: 
 
[Hawtrey] works away on metaphysics and writes learned books 
and concerns himself primarily with the theory of higher finance . 
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1919-1939.  Peden’s later work, Keynes and his Critics, contains portraits and pen-
portraits of all the senior Treasury figures of the period.  There is a dearth of 
biographies and diaries of the leading Treasury personalities of the inter-war period.  In 
1968 Sir Frederick Leith-Ross published his autobiography Money Talks; largely an 
exercise in self-justification.  Peden has produced a sympathetic picture of Sir Richard 
Hopkins, the leading Treasury figure of the time.  This tends to concentrate on the 
period after 1939 when Keynes was beginning to become more influential.  A Cambridge 
Ph.D. thesis by E. O’Halpin, ‘Sir Warren Fisher, head of the civil service’ (1982), 
examines the way in which Fisher sought to make the treasury the co-ordinating 
ministry for all other ministries, but it has little to say about the politics of financial 
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the Treasury at this time is a series of three hour-long interviews of Hawtrey by Sir Alec 
Cairncross in 1966 which are held at Churchill College Cambridge (HTRY 13/5).  
Hawtrey, of course, was an old man at this time.  His memory, to Cairncross’s occasional 
frustration, sometimes fails him, and it becomes clear that he was very much a fringe 
figure in Treasury decision-making. 
    Kathleen Burk discusses how the Great War financially enfeebled Britain – with its 
consequential effects upon the importance attached to adequate financial preparation 
for the Second World War. 
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. . he is really continually examining into the theoretical side (at 
least as it seems to me the theoretical side), and we pull a stop 
out when we want something from him . . . . supposing some 
rather delicate exchange issue comes along to the Under-
Secretary . . . he would get hold of Hawtrey and say “you ought 
to know all about this” and he would advise.678
 
In 1937-38 further re-organisation of the Treasury structure was contemplated, 
and a Treasury Organisation Committee took evidence throughout 1937 for its 
Report, presented in February 1938.  The position of Hawtrey’s department was 
once again subjected to scrutiny.  On 15 January 1937 Sir Richard Hopkins, 
Second Secretary to the Treasury, gave evidence to the Treasury Organisation 
Committee and remarked that there was a good deal of duplication between 
various government departments – Treasury, Board of Trade, Department of 
Overseas Trade, Foreign Office – in the collection and study of statistical 
information. 
 
It might be worth considering whether the branches concerned 
with this work (of which our Financial Enquiries Branch was one) 
might not be amalgamated into one general office for collecting 
and arranging statistical information for the use of all 
Departments.679
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 Hopkins went on to ask Mr. W. R. Fraser, Treasury Officer of Accounts and 
Principal Assistant Secretary in the Home Finance Division, if, on the assumption 
that the Treasury was to continue to have its own Statistical Branch, he would 
recommend that the Financial Enquiries Branch be disbanded and amalgamated 
either with 1D (Home Finance Division) or 2D (Foreign Finance Division).  Fraser 
considered that the work of the Financial Enquiries Branch was closely concerned 
with that of the Foreign Finance Division and that amalgamation with that 
Division would be appropriate.680  He twisted the knife that was finding its way 
into the back of the Financial Enquiries Branch by adding that that when he was 
in need of statistics he often asked the Statistical Branch of the Bank of England 
for them.  Hopkins continued that, in that case, it may be worth while to 
establish some formal mechanism by which the Bank’s Statistical Branch supplied 
the Treasury with the most important statistical information which it collected.681
    On 27 January 1939 the Treasury Reorganisation Committee took evidence 
from Mr. S. D. Waley, Principal Assistant Secretary within the Treasury’s Foreign 
Finance Division.  Waley described the work of the Foreign Finance Division in 
collecting financial information from Foreign Missions and added that it needed 
‘someone familiar with the information available and ready to advise quickly on 
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current affairs in any particular country’.682  He suggested that an Assistant 
Direction of Financial Enquiries be appointed with the remit of collating 
information from foreign countries.  The holder of his post should be a member 
of 2D (Foreign Finance Division).  He suggested that if such a person kept in 
close touch with other departments he would be in a position to assess whether 
or not there was duplication of effort between departments and whether any 
measures of amalgamation might be possible.  On the whole, Waley disagreed 
with Hopkins that there might be substantial savings to be made by creating an 
amalgamated statistical information office.683
    On 9 March 1937 the Treasury Organisation Committee sought evidence from 
Sir Frederick Phillips, Under Secretary of the Finance Divisions.  As regards the 
general level of staffing in 1D (Home Finance), Phillips conceded that the past 
few years had been unusually quiet and had not made great demands on current 
staffing levels.  However, he felt that these quiet years were coming to an end, 
and he cited a number of areas where extra demands might be made on the 
Division in the near future.  Two of these areas would involve increased need to 
call upon specialised economic expertise. 
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. . . the Treasury would never now succeed in disinteresting itself 
from the study of currency and credit affairs generally: it might 
be expected perhaps to be more closely concerned . . . .  
. . . the whole range of ideas connected with the control of 
capital expenditure and investment, and with the diversion of 
savings into particular channels might be expected to result in 
additional and important work for 1D.684
 
The first of these concerns was an acknowledgement of the shift of financial 
power away from the Bank of England and towards the Treasury as a result of 
leaving the Gold Standard.  The second was an admission of the growing 
influence on government of Keynesian ideas on public investment and fiscal 
management. 
    Consistent with his theme of the increasing role of the Treasury in economic 
management, Phillips, in discussing the future of the Financial Enquiries Branch, 
said that ‘he regarded the employment in the Treasury of a [sic] economist to 
advise on financial matters as a necessity’.685  He had concerns about the 
situation which might arise on the retirement of Hawtrey. 
 
He [Phillips] had been wondering whether the post of Director of 
Financial Enquiries could be adequately filled, on the retirement 
of the present holder, from within the Civil Service; he had found 
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that field barren and thought that when the time came the 
Treasury would have to look outside for a competent young 
economist and pay him what was necessary; there were not 
more than a dozen men in the country fitted for the post.686
 
Phillips was concerned that if the task of economic advice was taken out of the 
Treasury (and dealt with, for instance, by the Economic Advisory Council’s 
Committee of Economists) then Ministers might come to rely, and act, on 
economic advice of a divers and conflicting nature coming directly from different 
groups of economists rather than on economic advice coming through the filter 
of senior Treasury officers687.688  In taking this view, Phillips seemed to be less 
happy than his immediate superior, Hopkins, about the disbanding of the 
Financial Enquiries Branch and amalgamating its work within a general statistical 
unit.  Moreover Phillips gave his approval to much of the backroom work that 
Hawtrey had been doing by informing the committee that, in his opinion, whilst 
specific advice to senior offices was important, it was of greater importance to 
furnish the Treasury with a constant commentary on the financial and economic 
implications of its work. 
    Sir James Rae, Head of Establishments at the Treasury, and Sir Richard 
Hopkins were present as interrogating members of the Treasury Organisation 
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Committee.  They continued to press Phillips on the importance of having expert 
economic advice available within the Treasury.  Rae suggested that it might be 
difficult for an economist with an established reputation, and perhaps fearful of 
losing his reputation, to maintain the necessary silence and discretion.  Phillips 
suggested that if were a problem then the post need not necessarily be filled for 
more than a few years at a time.  Hopkins anticipated the important work of the 
Treasury in the future to be management of the national debt by the issuing of 
suitable bonds, and management of currency and the exchange rate in co-
operation with the Bank of England.  In his opinion, the advice of an economist 
was hardly necessary for the debt management, and the problems of currency 
management would disappear ‘if we should return to the gold standard’.689   
    Phillips did not accept that the future work of the Treasury could be simplified 
to such an extent.  Again indicating that he was thinking in terms of an enlarged 
role for the Treasury in economic management, he suggested a third future role: 
that of finding a suitable use for the country’s savings.  In any case, the 
changing course of events would always throw up new situations where 
economic advice would be useful.  As regards Waley’s suggestion that an 
Assistant Director of Financial Enquiries be appointed, Phillips would say no more 
than there might be a case for appointing someone to the Branch responsible for 
collating and circulating financial statistics from other countries. 
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    On 19 May 1937 Sir James Rae, Under Secretary for the Establishments 
Divisions, sent a note to Sir Thomas Padmore, Sir Richard Hopkins’s private 
secretary, outlining certain recommendations which the Treasury Organisation 
Committee had a mind to implement. 
 
[The Financial Enquiries Branch] caused us a good deal of 
thought.  Various suggestions have been made . . . . Our 
conclusion is that the right course is to abolish, when an 
opportunity arises, the present post of Director of Financial 
Enquiries, and to make ad hoc arrangements for special reports 
on specific questions as and when they arise.  For the purpose a 
confidential panel of advisers might be prepared . . . . there 
would be nothing to prevent on occasion a report being obtained 
on a specific question from more than one expert on the 
panel.690
 
Rae continued that ‘advice on the more secret aspects of currency policy would, 
of course, continue to be given by the Bank’, but this was pencilled out by 
Padmore.  Rae also perhaps made an implied criticism of Hawtrey by pointing 
out that the disappearance of the post of Director of Financial Enquiries would 
throw more work, ‘but not much’, on 2D, the Foreign Finance Division.   
    The final report of the Treasury Organisation Committee appeared in February 
1938 and included the suggestion that Rae had sent to Padmore that the post of 
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Director of Financial Enquiries be abolished as soon as the opportunity arose and 
economic reports prepared by one or more members of an ad hoc panel.691  The 
principal reason given for abolishing the post was that a difficulty existed in 
supplying a full-time advisor with sufficient work.  It acknowledged that, because 
of questions of secrecy, it might not be able to supply an outside advisor with all 
the relevant information, but it re-inserted the clause that since the question of 
secrecy was most likely to arise in questions relating to currency, such questions 
could be referred to the Bank of England economic unit.  One further possibility 
was mooted, but not with any great degree of seriousness.  This was that an 
outside economist of standing be appointed for a limited period and without the 
offer of a permanent career as a Civil Servant.  In this case it might be possible 
for conditions of secrecy to be imposed for a short time, after which the holder 
might return to full engagement in public discussion. 
    The ‘opportunity’ which the authors of the report awaited was, of course, the 
retirement of Hawtrey.  Having been born on 22 November 1879, Hawtrey would 
have attained the age of sixty in November 1939.  As was Civil service custom, 
on attaining the age of fifty-nine, Hawtrey received a letter from the Civil Service 
Establishments Division explaining that at this particular stage of a Civil Servants 
career it was practice for the extension of an employee’s service beyond the age 
of sixty to be considered.692  Hawtrey was asked if he wished to say anything 
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before a decision was reached.  Hawtrey replied immediately with a short note 
indicating that his ‘personal preference would be to remain in the Treasury after 
reaching the age of 60 . . . up to the age of 65’.693   
   This preference of Hawtrey’s did not accord with that of the Treasury.  On 9 
December 1938 Rae sent a note to the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Sir 
Warren Fisher, indicating how he proposed to respond to Hawtrey’s request for 
extension of service. 
 
Dear Hawtrey 
         Many thanks for your letter of the 7th. Instant [sic].  I am 
authorised to let you know that after very careful consideration 
Their Lordships feel that in order to facilitate a reorganisation of 
the work of “Financial enquiries” [sic] the date of your retirement 
must be fixed as the 31st. December 1939. 
     I am sorry that this does not coincide with your personal 
wishes but you will I am sure appreciate that official 
considerations must prevail. 
                                                                 Yours sincerely694
 
Hand-written on the note was a statement that Sir Richard Hopkins agreed with 
the decision that Hawtrey ought to go at 60.  Also hand-written in the margin 
was a reminder that since Hawtrey attained the age of sixty on 22 November 
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1939, he was, in fact, being given an extension of 5 weeks, which was 
‘generous’.695
    In the event, the Treasury’s generosity to Hawtrey ended up being 
considerably more than five weeks.  Hawtrey first of all pointed out that his time 
on secondment as Visiting Professor at Harvard had not counted for pension 
calculations and asked that, if there was ‘no objection’, he would prefer to 
continue in service until May 1940 since this would enable him to complete one 
more pensionable year.696  This request was immediately acceded to and 
Hawtrey’s retirement date was moved on to 11 May 1940.  
    Returning to 1939; the year which saw the outbreak of war also saw the 
Treasury make the transition to a new pattern of working, calling upon the views 
of a variety of eminent economists.  The new pattern begins to emerge in the 
way Sir Frederick Phillips sought advice on wartime exchange control policy.  The 
economists which Phillips met with regularly on the Cabinet’s Economic Advisory 
Committee were Keynes, Hubert Henderson and Denis Robertson.  From now on 
it was from this trio that Phillips increasingly solicited views.  Hawtrey, as he 
worked out his last months, continued to write his own commentary on events. 
    On September 1939 Phillips approached Keynes to ask him for his ideas about 
exchange control, an approach which seems to have taken Keynes by 
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surprise.697  Keynes spent a few days ‘turning the thing over’ in his mind before 
sending a note to Phillips on 24 September 1939, in which he ‘reduced his 
thoughts to writing’.698  The attached note was anything but condensed since 
Keynes started with a long and uncharacteristic reminiscence.699  Keynes began 
by pointing out that apart from the need for import licenses and restriction on 
foreign investment, there had been no exchange control in the First World War – 
complete control being ‘against the spirit of the age’.700  However, with the 
dollar-exchange rate being pegged for the duration of the war, and the 
authorities being unable, or unwilling, to devalue the pound in order to preserve 
dollar reserves, periodic heavy demand for dollars put the reserves in a 
precarious position.  Apparently, according to Keynes, Chalmers and Bradbury of 
the Treasury were unwilling to reveal the extent of the position to Ministers, 
fearing what they regarded as the even more disastrous outcome of the 
abandonment of the ‘peg’.  After one particularly heavy run in 1916: 
 
Chalmers went over to . . . report to the newly formed War 
Cabinet. 
“Well Chalmers, what is the news” said the goat. 
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“Splendid”, Chalmers replied in his high quavering voice, “two 
days ago we had to pay out $20 million; the next day it was $10 
million; and yesterday only $5 million.”   
He did not add that a continuance at this rate for a week would 
clean us out completely . . . I waited nervously in his room until 
the old fox came back triumphant.701
 
     Ultimately, according to Keynes, the United States’ intervention in the First 
World War only took place to alleviate the British financial position and maintain 
America’s trade position.702  The point of this reminiscence by Keynes [which he 
could not resist telling Phillips any more than I could resist leaving it out of this 
thesis] seems merely have been to point out that ‘we did get through after a 
fashion without blocking the exchanges; and this policy was not without 
considerable advantages of simplicity and efficiency’.703  In general, Keynes felt it 
would be counter-productive too try to impose over-rigid rules on currency 
exchange.  He regarded the most important step being for being the requirement 
that British exporters should hand over their foreign currency earnings, followed 
in importance by the Treasury gaining as much foreign currency as possible from 
invisible exports.  He felt that there was much to be lost by way of goodwill in 
attempting freeze sterling bank accounts in the Dominions and in neutral 
countries. 
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    Just over a week later, on 3 October 1939, Hawtrey passed comment on the 
position of Sterling under war conditions.704  He believed that there was a place 
for exchange controls as a means of regulating the rate of exchange, whose 
value he regarded as of some importance.  Moreover he believed that any 
effective rate of exchange could be achieved. 
 
Any rate of exchange . . .  becomes possible within very wide 
limits, provided the appropriate restriction of imports is imposed.  
If the value of the currency unit is fixed so high as to check 
exports, it can nevertheless be maintained by an equivalent 
restriction of imports.705
 
Hawtrey looked first at the case for a low rate of exchange, suggesting that one 
possible argument was that the maximum export potential needed to be 
achieved in order to import essential foodstuffs and the materials needed for 
prosecuting the war.   
 
In comparing possible levels of the rate of exchange there will be 
found a rate which will secure the exporting industries full 
employment at a normal profit . . . If the foreign exchange value 
of the currency unit falls below this level, an abnormal profit is 
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offered to producers as an inducement to provide goods for 
export.706
 
Hawtrey thought that to adopt ‘profiteering’ might initially have favourable 
consequences, but the long term consequences would be adverse.  Excess 
profits in the exporting industries would provoke demands for higher wages, 
which would then spread to the non-exporting industries.  Higher wages in the 
exporting industries would eliminate the stimulus to export and provoke price 
rises which would reduce the competitiveness of the exported goods.  There 
would be inflationary pressures which would be exacerbated by the low 
exchange rate causing the price of imported food to be high.  Thus Hawtrey 
went back to the notion of finding a rate of exchange which would secure full 
employment in the exporting industries whilst offering ‘normal’ profits.   
    The actual rate of exchange of the pound had been $4.68 in early 1939, but, 
without measures to protect it, it had fallen to $4.03 after the commencement of 
hostilities.  Hawtrey felt that $4.68 had been an overvaluation at the time since 
the export industries were not operating at full capacity, but the recovery in the 
United States over the year was restoring this figure as an appropriate 
equilibrium exchange value – consistent with full employment at normal profits in 
the exporting industries.  However, the dislocations of war, in particular the high 
freight and insurance charges, demanded a lower equilibrium value.  Without 
committing himself to a figure, Hawtrey suggested that the exchange rate should 
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be closely monitored with respect to the export trade, and if ‘it turns out that the 
existing rate of $4.03 is too low, there would be great advantage to the price 
situation in raising it’.707
    Sir Frederick Phillips seemed reasonably impressed by Hawtrey’s point that 
maintaining a fairly high exchange rate might be necessary as a means of 
curbing war-time inflationary forces.  Immediately on receipt of Hawtrey’s 
memorandum he wrote to both Hubert Henderson and Denis Robertson 
enquiring if they had ‘any observations on the rather important point raised in 
Mr. Hawtrey’s memo’.708  Phillips added that he was contemplating a ‘small hoist’ 
of the exchange from $4.03 to $4.10 or $4.15, but as no more than a symbolic 
gesture to potential holders of Treasury Bonds that the British monetary 
authorities would not permit the collapse of sterling.  He acknowledged that a 
substantial exchange-rate rise would assist in keeping prices down, but he didn’t 
feel that the export trades would be able to stand much of a rise.709
    Both Robertson and Henderson replied within the next few days.  Whilst 
neither economist sought to diverge strongly from Hawtrey’s recommendation, 
neither of them seemed impressed by his analysis.  In particular Robertson was 
‘not very much moved the argument that a low rate of exchange will generate 
excess profits and excess wages in the export trades, and thereby set the 
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“vicious circle” in motion’.710  Hawtrey had based his analysis upon the balance 
of payments on current account whilst ignoring movements of capital.  
Robertson thought it unsafe to ignore movements of capital since it would be 
very difficult to make control of such movements water-tight.  He regarded it as 
possibly dangerous to set a too ambitiously high exchange rate for the pound, 
since the more dollars which speculators were able to obtain for their pound, the 
more they would find it attractive to convert their sterling holdings to dollars, 
which would stimulate ingenuity in exploiting holes in the control. 
    Despite the above reservation, Robertson, too, indicated that he would go for 
fairly high rates of exchange.  His reasoning being that to aim for a high export 
volume by setting a low exchange rate would probably be futile, since under 
war-time conditions it was unlikely that the man-power and materials would be 
available in sufficient quantities to maintain a high volume of exports.  Given this 
constraint, Robertson argued for a policy which sought to maximise the value of 
exports by maintaining a high price for them in relation to the price of imports.  
He felt that it would be more convenient to do this by maintaining a high rate of 
exchange than by allowing the pound to fall to a low rate of exchange whilst 
simultaneously attempting to force down the price of imported goods in terms of 
their local currencies.711
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    Henderson endorsed Robertson’s view regarding the importance of selling 
exports at a good price rather at maximum volume, and agreed that, within 
limits, a high exchange rate was the simplest means of achieving this.  But 
Henderson then went on to make the point that, given the protectionism of 
American tariffs, most British goods were not competitive with their American 
equivalents, and that those British goods which were able to make large-scale 
penetration of the American market were goods of a semi-monopoly character; 
he cited whiskey as the most obvious example, but also included raw materials 
such as tin, jute and rubber from the British Empire.  Henderson thought that the 
prices of such goods should be individually and systematically considered from 
the point of view of maximising the country’s foreign exchange resources.712
    As regards a suitable level for the pound, Henderson did not demur from 
Phillips’s own instincts (‘a small hoist . . . . to $4.10 or $4.15’) – ‘a small increase 
at a well chosen moment seems to me exactly the right policy in the 
circumstances’.713
       The story of exchange and trade controls, the balance of payments and the 
exchange-rate during the Second World War is a fascinating one, but takes us 
outside the remit of this thesis, and outside the time when Hawtrey might have 
had any influence in the Treasury.  However the stabilisation of the dollar-
exchange rate at the relatively low value of $4.03 proved more difficult than 
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Phillips and his advisors might have anticipated.  Initially, controls over the ability 
to convert sterling into other currencies were only exerted over British residents; 
foreign holders of sterling were free to convert.  There were other controls – and 
exemptions – but during this period of ‘weak’ exchange control the value of the 
pound fell to as low as $3.44.714  This heavy fall, to a large extent, reflected 
badly on the initial advice of Keynes, who felt that, as in the First World War, the 
country might ‘get through’ without taking exchange controls too seriously.  
Maybe it would have been wiser to heed the advice of Hawtrey who, from the 
start, wished to impose strict controls in order to aim for a high exchange-rate.  
After France had fallen to Germany and the Churchill coalition had been 
established in May 1940, controls were strengthened and the rate of $4.03 was 
established and maintained throughout the war – ‘. . . the view that sterling must 
remain a free currency was finally put aside as a peace-time luxury . . .’.715
    Having already given him one extension as a means of completing a 
pensionable year, in early 1940 the Treasury approached Hawtrey and suggested 
that they would like to keep him ‘for the duration’.716  The Treasury desired that 
a war-time history of its activities be written and Hawtrey seemed the ideal 
candidate for the job.717 As with the First World War, the Treasury may have 
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hoped for a short war and envisaged Hawtrey’s new role as a short-term 
contract.  In November 1944, with Hawtrey coming up to retirement at the age 
of 65, the war still in progress, and the task of writing the Treasury’s history an 
ongoing one, arrangements had to be made to further extend Hawtrey’s 
Treasury career.  Taking into account that he would be eligible for a pension of 
£1000 a year, and that Hawtrey had expressed a desire to ‘be employed part-
time on a basis of five days a week’, it was agreed that he be re-employed within 
the Treasury ‘at the rate of £500 per annum’.718  The Treasury must have 
thought this was a bargain since it was of the opinion that ‘in view of Mr. 
Hawtrey’s acknowledged eminence in the sphere of currency matters, I should 
say that if he were not a Civil Service pensioner and we were employing him as a 
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Sayers paid tribute to Hawtrey’s assistance in the book’s preparation. 
 
Sir Ralph Hawtrey allowed me to draw freely on his massive chronicle, 
prepared for official purposes – I have used some of his phrases.  
Besides commenting on some early drafts, he read the whole book in 
draft and commented at length; even where I have not adopted his 
suggestions, his comments have been illuminating and have, I believe, 
helped me to expound my own point of view more effectively.   
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 460
Narrator we should be lucky to get his services at anything less than the 
maximum of £900’.719   
    Hawtrey’s employment at the Treasury, still nominally Director of Financial 
Enquiries, continued until October 1947.  There is some evidence in his career 
file that between June 1947 and October 1947 Hawtrey served as the United 
Kingdom Representative on the Fiscal Commission of the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations.720  The final irony is that almost eight years after 
the Treasury Establishments had indicated that he should retire, and at the age 
of 67, it was Hawtrey who offered his resignation in order to take up the position 
of Henry Price Professor of International Economics at the Royal Institute of 
International Affairs.721
    Hawtrey’s retirement from active economic comment was long and 
productive.  Of his 99 publications listed at the end of Collison Black’s obituary, 
no less than 50 were published after the outbreak of the Second World War.  In 
addition he was a frequent contributor to the correspondence pages of The 
Times,   Sadly, for this historian, hardly any of his post-retirement writing looked 
backward at his career.  Instead, he continued to comment on and criticise 
current policy.  During, and immediately after the Second World War, whilst 
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official policy was planning for full employment and the avoidance of deflation, 
Hawtrey was writing that the big danger facing the economy would be inflation.  
He gave a cautious welcome to the Bretton Woods agreement, but was scathing 
of the recommendations of the Radcliffe Committee.  His last published article, in 
1970 at the age of 91, was devoted to stopping inflation.  Throughout this long 
period of comment and criticism he remained faithful to the same monetary 
model which he had developed prior to the First World War.     
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                                               Conclusions    
 
Six snapshots, taken from different times, give some justification for the view 
that the career of the Director of Financial Enquiries was one of disappointment 
and declining influence. 
 
[April 1922 – the International Economic Conference called by 
the Supreme Council of Allies].   
In 1922, the Genoa International Conference adopted Hawtrey’s 
proposals to stabilise the value of gold through international 
monetary co-operation.722
                 
 
[August 1928 – with Treasury officials anxious to counter Liberal 
demands for a Public Works programme].   
So far as the Treasury was concerned, Hawtrey was the one man 
who ought to know whether Keynes was talking nonsense.  With 
Keynes’s growing prominence in the economic debates of the 
1920’s Hawtrey found himself in a position where his advice was 
earnestly solicited.723
 
[April, 1930 – before the Macmillan Committee enquiry into 
Finance and Industry].  
Hawtrey’s colleagues had some reason to suspect that their 
economic guru had jumped ship. . . . He called the dear money 
policy ‘the exceptional cause’ of recent unemployment . . . [and] 
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was much closer to Keynes than to the Bank, whose policy he 
criticised as timid in its refusal to make full use of the gold 
reserves in order to reduce interest rates.’724
 
[April, 1936 – Sir Warren Fisher, Permanent Secretary to the 
Treasury, before the Public Accounts Committee]   
. . . he felt that the Committee probably knew of Hawtrey, ‘who 
works away on metaphysics and writes learned books and 
concerns himself with the theory of higher finance . . . . 
continually examining into the theoretical side (at least as it 
seems to me the theoretical side).’725
 
[January 1937 – Mr. Fraser of the Treasury Home Finance 
Division before the Treasury Reorganisation Committee]  
Mr. Fraser said that when in need of statistics he often asked the 
Statistical Branch of the Bank of England for them.726
                                          
[August 1939 – Response from the Treasury to Hawtrey’s 
request to continue in Treasury employment beyond the age of 
60] 
Dear Hawtrey 
    Many thanks for your letter of the 7th Instant.  I am 
authorised to let you know that after very careful consideration 
Their Lordships feel that in order to facilitate a reorganisation of 
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the work of “Financial enquiries [sic]” the date of your retirement 
must be fixed as the 31st December.  
    I am sorry that this does not coincide with your personal 
wishes but you will I am sure appreciate that official 
considerations must prevail.727
 
From being, in 1922 and shortly after his appointment, a man with bright, new 
ideas, and at the forefront of a British delegation to a leading conference called 
to establish a new world monetary order, Hawtrey was reduced to being 
regarded, in 1939, as redundant and surplus to Treasury requirements.  These 
snapshots from his career would also suggest that, on the way, he forfeited the 
confidence of colleagues who had relied on his eminence as an economist to 
justify their policies, and that as his retirement approached, those colleagues 
found it increasingly difficult to justify his position.  Thus, as we have already 
noted, Black has been led to conclude that the Financial Enquiries Branch under 
Hawtrey was ‘something of a backwater’ with his papers ‘not often receiv[ing] 
much attention’.728  Similarly, Howson and Middleton have viewed Hawtrey’s 
career as one of declining influence.729     
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   Of other writers, Deutscher has largely neglected Hawtrey’s Treasury career, 
but his brief assessment of that career is, I believe, perceptive – that while 
‘[Hawtrey’s] ideas were listened to and respected . . . they were discounted on 
account of his relatively strong concern for theory and his tendency to attribute 
outstanding importance to a narrow range of factors’.730  McDonald, too, makes 
a fairly apt summary of Hawtrey’s role within the Treasury; adjudging him to 
have been ‘unimportant in terms of policy making’ and describing him as ‘a 
marginal voice of dissent’ whose ‘approach was akin to that of a rebellious 
academic determined to speak his mind on the issues in which he chose to 
interest himself’.731  In terms of Hawtrey’s independence, apostasy and 
scholasticism, McDonald’s brief pen-portrait is uncannily acute.  In so far as 
McDonald’s study is concerned with public expenditure policy-making, the 
comment on Hawtrey’s importance is also fair.  It would not be fair, I believe, to 
extend this judgement to the importance of Hawtrey’s views on currency, credit 
policy and exchange-rates. 
    A recent study of the politics of monetary policy in Britain has been unusual in 
ascribing much importance to the influence of Hawtrey.732  In the opinion of 
                                                 
 
730 Deutscher, R.G.Hawtrey and the Development of Macroeconomics, p.3. 
 
731 A. McDonald, ‘The Formulation of British Public Expenditure Policy, 1919-1925’. 
Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Bristol, 1988, p.259. 
 
732 M.M.M.Luthje, ‘The Politics of Monetary Policy in Britain from the First World War to 
the World Economic Conference’, Unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, Cambridge University, 2002.  
I am grateful to my external assessor, Professor R.Middleton, for drawing the attention 
of my supervisor, Professor K. Laybourn, to this thesis. 
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Luthje there was in the Treasury, in the 1920s, ‘an important development . . . 
driven by . . . Hawtrey’ towards interpreting and solving the world slump through 
monetary measures.733  Luthje claims that this development was a movement 
towards achieving higher world prices, and stemmed from the memorandum, 
‘The Credit Situation’, written by Hawtrey on 12 July 1928734.  This 
memorandum, written shortly before Hawtrey left for America, was but one of 
many which he produced calling for concerted efforts to bring down interest 
rates in London and New York as a means of raising world prices.  I am not 
convinced that this had such a major influence on Treasury attitudes.  Certainly, 
not on the Deputy Controller of Finance, Leith-Ross, who later felt it necessary to 
caution the MacMillan Enquiry that ‘Hawtrey holds views - not necessarily the 
Treasury’s views’.735   
    Luthje goes on to quote Cassel’s description of Hawtrey as the ‘power behind 
the throne’ in the Treasury.  Such a view could only have been held by a fellow 
theoretical economist.  In general, Luthje’s is a fascinating account of the 
formulation of monetary policy, but one which tends to over-dramatise and over-
personalise – possibly through reliance on the personal diaries of people who 
enjoyed dramatising their own roles.  There is a fondness for dramatic hyperbole 
                                                 
 
733  Ibid., pp. 9-10. 
  
734  Treasury Papers, T 175/26.  The Hopkins Papers.  ‘The Credit Situation’ by 
R.G.Hawtrey, 12 July 1928. 
 
735 Private session of the Enqiry.  Quoted in Clarke, ‘The Keynesian Revolution in theMaking’, 
p.146. 
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in Luthje’s work which leads to dubious, sweeping statements such as ‘Hopkins 
[Treasury Financial Controller from 1927] very quickly accumulated enough 
economic knowledge to hold his ground vis-à-vis such a formidable interrogator 
as John Maynard Keynes when he was questioned for the Macmillan Committee . 
. .’736  This is far from the truth.  Hopkins, I believe, did outmanoeuvre Keynes – 
but not through economic knowledge.  In fact, prior to his appearance, Hopkins 
specifically asked not to be questioned on matters of economic theory, and 
appealed to Macmillan, as Chairman, when he felt Keynes’s questioning was 
drifting towards theoretical economics.  Hopkins outmanoeuvred Keynes by 
taking the issue of public works away from Keynes’s area of expertise – from the 
realm of economic theory to that of public confidence and acceptability.  
Nevertheless, I believe, that Luthje is correct in identifying a close rapport 
between Hawtrey and Phillips as the source of any influence which Hawtrey 
possessed in the early 1930s. 
    Hawtrey’s influence outside the Treasury did not always correspond with his 
influence within the Treasury.  It is almost certainly true to say that outside the 
Treasury Hawtrey’s influence steadily declined throughout his tenure of office.  
Before 1922, and at the time of the Genoa negotiations Hawtrey enjoyed cordial 
relations with Montagu Norman at the Bank of England.  In 1920-21 Hawtrey 
endorsed the Bank’s high interest policy, and Montagu Norman warmed to him 
                                                 
 
736 Luthje, ‘The Politics of Monetary Policy in Britain’, pp. 41-2. 
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as an ally.737   After Genoa there was a cooling of relationships between Hawtrey 
and the Bank as Hawtrey persistently criticised its high interest rate policy.  On 
subsequent occasions, whenever Hawtrey’s work was referred to the Bank, as 
when he produced his ‘Bill Famine’ memorandum in 1929 as an alternative to 
Lloyd-George’s Public Works schemes, his ideas received a frosty reception.  
    Similarly, as time progressed, his abilities received less recognition from 
politicians.  This was, in all probability, not down to the content of his comment, 
but his lengthy, academic prose.  In 1925, as Churchill contemplated returning to 
the Gold Standard, he specifically requested that Hawtrey take part in his 
‘exercise’.  Additionally, he requested further information from Hawtrey regarding 
the effects on sterling of the return to the Gold Standard after the Napoleonic 
wars.  Whilst later requests for comment from Chancellors might have been 
passed his way, it is difficult to find another example of where a Chancellor of 
the Exchequer went out of his way to specifically solicit the view of Hawtrey.  
There were subsequent occasions - occasions when Hawtrey’s advice might have 
been solicited - where Churchill requested that younger non-economists in the 
Treasury such as Alfred Hurst or Bernard Gilbert be invited to respond to his 
queries, but not Hawtrey. 
    If, outside the walls of the Treasury, Hawtrey’s stock faded during this period, 
it is more difficult to assess how his standing within the Treasury changed.  His 
limitations as an administrator were obvious – apart from his tendency to 
                                                 
 
737 HTRY 13/5. 
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frustrate colleagues by losing files, and so on.  These limitations remained 
throughout his career and were probably a large factor in him being appointed to 
the post of Director of Financial Enquiries in the first place.738  His influence 
depended upon the quality of his relationship with his superiors – and that 
relationship, in turn, depended upon the extent to which those superiors felt that 
economic theory could contribute to the effective discharge of the Treasury’s 
duties.  To crudely summarise this matter - Blackett, a fellow member of the 
Royal Statistical Society, fostered and encouraged Hawtrey; Niemeyer believed 
that the Treasury could continue to be run, without any advice from an 
economist, along the lines of strict, nineteenth century finance; Hopkins was 
sceptical about economic theory since it led to outcomes which were ‘repugnant 
to common sense, although his deputy, Phillips, believed that high quality 
economic advice was vital to the work of the Treasury.    
    If indeed, Hawtrey’s influence tended to be less than it might have been, then 
it is possible to put forward three reasons for that lack influence.  First, his 
personality; secondly, prevailing attitudes towards the economic role of the 
state; thirdly, the special focus of Hawtrey’s economics. 
    From the writings of people who knew Hawtrey, it seems that he could be 
charming, cultured, likeable, stubborn and frustrating. Some of the various facets 
of his personality were brought out in a letter which Keynes wrote to his wife, 
                                                 
 
738 Peden, Keynes and his Critics, p.17.  I enquired of Professor Peden his sources for 
comments regarding Hawtrey’s alleged incompetence.  He replied that they were the 
result of his interviews with Treasury officials during the 1970s. 
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Lydia Lopokova, on 30 October 1933, whilst he was in Cambridge working on his 
General Theory.  He wrote to Lydia confessing that he was ‘weak as a rag – 
scribble, scribble, scribble for three and a half hours’ – but that he had taken 
some time off from writing to visit Hawtrey, who was: 
 
. . . very sweet to the last but quite mad.  One can argue with 
him for a long time on a perfectly sane and interesting basis and 
then, suddenly one is in a madhouse. . . . His mind, though 
frightfully ingenious, seems to me to be maliciously perverse.  
Again it is like arguing with a madman.739   
 
Shortly after embarking on this thesis I came across a letter in the Times from a 
‘Dr. Ralph Hawtrey of Cambridge’.  On contacting him I found him to be a retired 
classics teacher whose father had been the cousin of R.G Hawtrey.  He wrote to 
me in February 2004, confirming some of my impressions of Hawtrey’s character.  
 
. . . I used to see him from time to time as a child and a young 
man, the last being I think in 1964.  He came for a drink in my 
room at Trinity in I think 1961, when he presented me an 
ancient and tiny edition of Horace, which he had inscribed “from 
an honorary fellow to a scholar of Trinity”.  He was a very 
charming old man . . . . I fear I am regrettably ignorant about 
his life.740
                                                 
 
739 Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: the Economist as Saviour 1920-1937, p.495. 
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 In an even later meeting, in November 1974, the Bank of England’s historian 
Professor Richard Sayers called on Hawtrey on the occasion of his ninety-fifth 
birthday.  He found him to be ‘still the same charming and interesting man’ that 
he had first met some forty-two years previously.741   
    Hawtrey was held in affection by friends and colleagues not only for his charm 
but also for his loyalty and generosity.  He remained loyal to the ethical precepts 
of Moore, frequently returning to Cambridge, even into his old age, to gatherings 
of Moore’s adherents.  Regarding his generosity, after his Treatise on Money, 
Keynes acknowledged that Hawtrey had taken ‘enormous pains’ over his book, 
and in the prefaces of books by Donald Moggridge and Susan Howson, relatively 
junior academics at the time, there can be found acknowledgements to the help 
and support of ‘Sir Ralph Hawtrey’.742  In contrast to these qualities, it should be 
noted that he was also known for a degree of stubbornness.  Peden has related 
a story in which Hawtrey was chief British delegate at a League of Nations 
conference.  A matter which could fairly easily have been resolved was allowed 
to drag on for a week because Hawtrey refused to make the smallest of 
concessions.  He finally drove the French diplomat, a M. Massigli, to exclaim in 
                                                                                                                                                 
740 Letter from Dr. Ralph Hawtrey of Cambridge, a retired classics teacher, 7 February 
2004. 
 
741 Black, ‘Ralph Hawtrey’, p.369. 
 
742 Moggridge, British Monetary Policy, 1924-31; Howson, Domestic Monetary 
Management in Britain, 1919-38.   Both these works contain acknowledgements to the 
assistance of Hawtrey. 
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exasperation at Hawtrey’s inflexibility, ‘Monsieur Hawtrey, vous etes le logic 
meme!’743  In Hawtrey’s taped interviews Sir Alec Cairncross, I was struck by a 
certain timidity of personality.  Whilst allowance must be made for his age – he 
was in his eighties at the time – many of Hawtrey’s replies were preceded by a 
rather silly, nervous giggle.  This trait may have concealed an incisive mind, but 
did not suggest a strong and incisive personality.  However, any reservations 
regarding Hawtrey’s strength of personality should not detract from the fact that 
he could be a formidable debater who thrived on disagreements.  His attitude to 
theoretical criticism was one of being happy to take on all-comers – even to the 
extent of publishing an entire book to defend his theory of interest-rate 
schedules against that of Keynes.744  Whilst it is generally conceded that he 
came off second-best to Keynes in their ‘MacMillan’ confrontations – even 
Bertrand Russell usually suffered that experience – Hawtrey could still instil fear 
in those who took issue with him.  In the course of a question-and-answer 
session at the end of one meeting of the Royal Statistical Society, a certain 
Professor Jones confessed that it was ‘with great diffidence’, that he ventured to 
criticise Hawtrey’s paper.745    
                                                 
 
743 G.C.Peden, The Treasury and British Public Policy 1906-59, pp. 235-6.  The story was 
related to Peden by Lord Sherfield who was a junior member of the delegation. 
 
744 Hawtrey’s book A Century of Bank Rate was very largely devoted to showing, over a 
far longer period of time than Keynes had been prepared to consider, the relative 
independence of short and long term interest rates. 
 
745 R.G.Hawtrey, ‘Public Expenditure and Trade Depression’, p.470. 
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    Whilst the qualities of kindness, charm and gentleness – and disorganisation - 
which Hawtrey demonstrated, did not necessarily prevent him from being an 
effective policy advocate, they were qualities which lent themselves more readily 
to reflection than to strong persuasion or effective administration.  His 
memoranda were invariably excessively long.  Busy government ministers 
wanted memoranda which spelt out the essential issues in brief, clear fashion.  
Hawtrey could never be brief.  His memoranda stand in stark contrast to those of 
his immediate superior during the 1930s, Sir Frederick Phillips.  Phillips always 
seemed to be capable of going straight to the heart of a problem, clarifying the 
issues, and then assessing the advantages and disadvantages of alternative 
policy options.  His short, clear memoranda gave ministers all the information 
they might want.  The quality and conciseness of Phillips’s work inevitably drew 
attention to the shortcomings of Hawtrey’s, and pointed to another of the 
reasons why Hawtrey failed to advance to higher office in the Treasury.  The 
same failing may partially account for his waning influence with colleagues.  
When, towards the end of the 1930s, the views of Robertson or Henderson were 
sought, their replies, although not necessarily offering better advice, were always 
more concisely expressed than those of Hawtrey. 
    Many of Hawtrey’s memoranda had a pedagogic purpose beyond the advice 
they contained.  As such, they often included lengthy, and extremely ingenious, 
numerical illustrative examples (see Chapter 4).  It is in these memoranda that 
he seems to have revealed his real vocation.  By temperament, he was not an 
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administrator but a teacher - he wanted to inculcate into his colleagues the 
ability to think as economists.  
    The intellectual climate within which he worked could also, partly, explain 
Hawtrey’s lack of influence.  Middleton has introduced a subsection of his book 
dealing with the inter-war relationship between economists and the British 
economy with the following health-warning. 
 
All discussions of interwar economic policy should be prefaced by 
the statement that in 1918 governments did not think of 
themselves as having an economic policy, not at least in the 
sense that we would understand it today.746
 
Laissez-faire, the idea that implied that interference with industry by government 
agencies was disadvantageous to prosperity, was still overwhelmingly accepted 
by the financial authorities – a government economic policy must therefore imply 
interference.  The Treasury and Bank may have been concerned to balance 
Budgets, maintain the external value of sterling, and preserve free trade, but 
these were regarded as essential institutions within which laissez-faire might 
effectively function rather than economic policies.747  Given such denial of the 
                                                 
 
746 Middleton, Charlatans or Saviours: Economists and the British Economy from Marshall 
to Meade, p.178. 
 
747 The minimal balanced budget, the gold standard and free-trade were interlocking 
principles which served, true to the principles of Adam Smith, to be a self-acting system 
which minimised the states role in economic management.  The largest responsibilities 
which state took upon itself were those for national security and order.  The budget 
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validity of the concept of economic policy it is pertinent to enquire about the 
purpose of appointing a Director of Financial Enquiries in 1919.  The role may 
have been envisaged as chiefly one of the gathering and collating of economic 
data rather than proffering economic advice, but the timing of the appointment 
reinforces the suspicion that it was made with a view to making the best possible 
use of a ‘good chap’ with limited administrative ability.   
    If, as Middleton suggests, the government would have denied the concept of 
economic policy in 1918 then by 1939 unemployment, deflation, and the 
enforced withdrawal from the gold standard had forced it into actively adopting 
measures to deal with economic problems – a retreat from laissez-faire.  This 
retreat from laissez-faire did not necessarily imply that government officials gave 
a high value to theoretical economics as a necessary part of their work.  Probably 
one of the most dismissive views of economists was made in the late 1930s - 
that, quoted above, of the Permanent Secretary to the Treasury, Warren Fisher, 
to the Public Accounts Committee in 1936 - when he suggested that they might 
have ‘heard of Hawtrey who works away on metaphysics’.  However dismissive 
                                                                                                                                                 
covered such necessary expenditure, but was intended to be fiscally neutral in not 
favouring or disadvantaging any part of the economy.  Free-trade, too, allowed market 
forces to dictate patterns of production and expenditure.  By maintaining free-trade the 
Government remained neutral from any area of industry.  The Gold Standard, by 
maintaining the convertibility of sterling to gold at a fixed rate, guaranteed the 
soundness of the currency and imposed its discipline upon the spending of Government 
and citizens.  Gold was the medium for international exchange.  If the value of imported 
goods exceeded that of exported goods then the Bank of England lost gold.  Its measure 
for stemming the net outflow of gold was the raising of interest rates – a measure which 
inhibited borrowing for purchasing imports and encouraged foreigners to send gold to 
acquire sterling.  It was believed to be a beautiful self-correcting mechanism free from 
political corruption.   
 476
of the role of Hawtrey this might have been, it was also dismissive of the 
usefulness of economic theory to the functioning of government departments.  
In the same year, 1936, that Fisher was addressing the Public Accounts 
Committee, A.J.Ayer’s Language, Truth and Logic appeared, in which he used 
the term ‘metaphysics’ pejoratively as a indication of the uselessness and 
meaninglessness of much traditional philosophy.  Such sentiments about 
economic theory amongst senior officials were not restricted to Fisher.  In the 
midst of the Macmillan enquiry, where he sat as the Treasury’s observer, 
Frederick Leith-Ross took time out to pen his thoughts on ‘the theory so 
attractively argued by Keynes’.748  He was convinced that Keynes was wrong in 
his approach to remedying unemployment since his approach was based on a 
number of assumptions which were not necessarily true.  However, his final 
comments related to the lack of contact with reality of the economist’s modelling 
process. 
 
The fact is that Keynes, like other economists, lives in a world of 
abstractions.  He speaks of “Industry” “Profits”, “Losses”, “Price 
Level” as if they were realities.  In fact we have no such thing as 
“Industry”.  What we have is a series of different industries, - 
some prosperous, some depressed and a number carrying on 
normally.  The position of each has to be examined separately. 
                                                 
 
748 T.Jones, Whitehall Diary, vol.II, 1926/1930, ed. Middlemas (1969), p. 250.  Copies of 
Leith-Ross’s notes were sent to the Deputy Secretary to the Cabinet, Tom Jones, and to 
Niemeyer at the Bank of England. 
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    . . . the setting on foot of a gigantic programme of public 
works at short notice is impracticable without a great extension 
of bureaucratic power and considerable waste.749     
 
In his ready dismissal of economists, ‘living in a world of abstractions’, Leith-Ross 
was doing no more than might be expected of someone widely regarded as the 
last remaining senior Treasury figure from the era of ‘sound finance’.  But Sir 
Richard Hopkins, a far more pragmatic Controller of Finance and less wedded to 
traditional dogma, was often equally sceptical about the value of professional 
economists.  In the course of the sittings of the Macmillan Committee he shifted 
the ‘Treasury View’ away from a theoretical argument towards one of 
administrative feasibility.  Considering the opposing views of Keynes and those of 
the economists of the London School of Economics on the effects of private 
saving, Hopkins wrote to the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Chamberlain, with 
words of damnation. 
 
          It seems useless to endeavour to follow professional 
economic teaching, for there is no criterion for determining the 
proper economists to follow, and whoever one chooses, one is 
apt to find oneself led into actions which are either repugnant to 
common sense or incapable of practical achievement.750     
                                                 
 
749 Treasury Papers, T175/26.  The Hopkins Papers, ‘The Assumptions of Mr. Keynes’, 
memorandum by  Frederick Leith-Ross, 28 March 1930. 
 
750 Treasury Papers, T 175/70.  The Hopkins Papers.  Memorandum to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer by Sir Richard Hopkins, 20 October 1932. 
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 Hopkins’s view on the value of professional economic advice seemed to change 
little in the next few years as, at the meeting of the Treasury Organisation 
Committee of 9 March 1937, he expressed the opinion that in view of the likely 
course of the Treasury’s work over the coming years, debt management and 
currency management in co-operation with the Bank of England, ‘the advice of 
an economist was hardly necessary and . . . it would not be easy to find full time 
work for an adviser’.  Sir Frederick Phillips, Hopkins’s deputy, made it clear to the 
same committee that he could not do without Hawtrey.  Given Hawtrey’s request 
to continue in his post beyond the age of sixty, it seems unlikely that Phillips 
would have demurred.  In which case, it appears that Hopkins must have been 
instrumental in swinging that particular axe.  In May 1939 Hopkins opposed the 
idea of an ‘economic general staff’ on the grounds that ‘a lot of economists 
operating in vacuo’ would not have sufficient practical experience of 
government.751  It was not until after the war that such a body was created. 
    Given such institutional resistance to advice from theoretical economists 
throughout the period 1919-1939, it is probably not true, as Susan Howson has 
concluded, that after being influential throughout the 1920s (which was not 
entirely true), Hawtrey was supplanted by ‘more influential’ economists in the 
1930s.   
 
                                                 
 
751 Treasury Papers, T160/885/F17545.  Memorandum, Sir Richard Hopkins to Sir 
Warren Fisher, 17 May 1939. 
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Hawtrey, who worked from an official base, had much more 
influence on academic thought than ever he had on Treasury 
policy.  This is partly due, of course, to . . . personality and 
preference, Hawtrey being content for much of his life to remain 
a ‘backroom boy’ in the corridors of power.  But Hawtrey’s lack 
of influence on Treasury policy after 1925 cannot be explained 
solely by the fact that Hawtrey lacked Keynes’s skills of 
propaganda and persuasion. . . . The reasons lie in the content 
of his . . . policy recommendations rather than in their style of 
presentation.752     
     
Howson (alongside her sometime co-author Donald Winch) seems to believe that 
by the mid-1930s Treasury officials, by direct exposure to Keynes’s arguments, 
had been re-educated away from outmoded economics. 
 
. . . by 1937 the macroeconomic position which we associate 
with Keynes’s General Theory had altered the thinking of the 
most important policy-making civil servants in the Treasury.  
These men were prepared to rethink the theoretical basis of the 
policies which they had so far pursued, and to adjust their policy 
recommendations accordingly.753
         
Keynes may, through his charismatic personality, have been able to dominate 
the proceedings of the Economic Advisory Council’s Committee of Economists, 
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but the Treasury representative, Sir Frederick Phillips, would have been aware of 
theoretical differences between Keynes and people such as Henderson, Stamp 
and Robertson, and would have been by no means convinced that Keynes had 
succeeded in peer group review.754  Certainly, there seems to have been no 
indication that Sir Richard Hopkins, during the 1930s, had revised his view on the 
‘uselessness’ of following any one line of professional advice or that following 
that advice might lead to actions ‘repugnant to commonsense’.755  Hopkins, as 
befits a former head of the Inland Revenue, placed a premium upon ideas and 
schemes which lent themselves to effective execution rather than upon whether 
they were consistent with any particular school of economics.  Whatever 
influence Hawtrey may have had in the 1920s and early 1930s may have waned 
during the late 1930s, but there seems little evidence that the ideas of other 
economists took over the control of the Treasury.   
    If Sir Richard Hopkins ‘quietly and without fuss transformed the Treasury 
during the 1930s’,756 it was on the basis of highly competent generalist 
administrators (particularly Phillips) rather than through the use of economists or 
a movement towards any particular economic doctrine.  Middleton, in one 
respect, overestimates Hawtrey’s influence in describing him as someone whose 
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‘major influence was if anything [again, my italics] to convince his generalist 
colleagues that economic theory posed no great intellectual challenge nor had 
any real relevance to the administrative tasks facing the department’.757  
Hawtrey’s generalist colleagues needed no such convincing.  It was Sir Richard 
Hopkins himself, who fostered the cult of the layman and the practical 
administrator.  In following this course he hardly needed convincing by his 
Director of Financial Enquiries. 
    Various studies, including those by Peden, Middleton, Tomlinson and Booth, 
have concluded that there was no conscious decision by policy makers to pursue 
a Keynesian schedule until the very late nineteen-thirties.  My own reading of 
official memoranda is that any Treasury adoption of Keynes’s ideas was done, 
not as part of any attempt to improve economic growth or reduce 
unemployment, but as a means of funding the war effort without burdening 
post-war governments with crippling debt charges.  In pursuing these particular 
policies the Treasury, still wary and suspicious of Keynes, relied upon the 
reassurances of Denis Robertson that such debt management policies could be 
effective, before embarking upon its debt programme.  
    The third reason offered for Hawtrey’s lack of influence in the Treasury relates 
to the kind of advice which he offered.  In many ways, his position within the 
Treasury was an incongruous one.  He believed that the trade cycle, and the 
unemployment which was a concomitant consequence of that cycle, had a 
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monetary cause.  Its cause was the instability of credit, and he believed in the 
effectiveness of monetary measures as means of counteracting that instability 
and thus curing economic ills.  His faith in the power of frequent adjustments to 
Bank Rate to control economic activity through adjustments in the levels of 
dealers’ stocks remained undiminished throughout his career, as did his 
confidence in the superior power of short-term rates over long-term interest 
rates.  He never ceased returning to the issue of dealers’ stocks and their 
responses to movements in short-term interest rates.  In short, he was a 
monetary economist, believing in monetary solutions to economic problems, but 
he worked in an organisation whose responsibilities were largely fiscal.  He 
showed relatively little interest in the structuring of long-term debt, and even 
less in budgetary policy. 
    In 1966 Sir Alec Cairncross queried the many memoranda which Hawtrey had 
written on the subjects of Bank rate, credit, and the movement of gold; asking if 
the Treasury was ‘on firm grounds putting forward arguments related to Bank 
rate’.758  Hawtrey’s reply was that that Treasury had some concern over the level 
of interest rates since it affected the issue of Treasury Bills, and he hoped that 
‘Blackett or Bradbury’ might have passed his memoranda on to the Chancellor of 
the Exchequer.  He admitted that he got ‘very little’ feedback regarding any of 
his proposals.  Probably few of Hawtrey’s lengthy memoranda went beyond the 
confines of senior Treasury officials.  [In his discussion with Cairncross, Hawtrey 
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frequently invoked the names of Blackett and Bradbury.  Hawtrey was appointed 
Director of Financial Enquiries in 1919.  In 1919 Bradbury was replaced by 
Fisher, and in 1922 Blackett was replaced by Niemeyer.  These men were 
Hawtrey’s superiors for only a very short time, and his frequent references to 
them suggest that he enjoyed better working relationships with them than with 
later Treasury officials.] 
    Implicit in Cairncross’s writings is a further reason why Hawtrey’s Treasury 
career was perhaps something of a disappointment.  Hawtrey was too wedded to 
his own theoretical model, and perhaps believed that real-world problems could, 
all too easily, be related to idealised models.  Cairncross has cautioned 
economists to be wary of the relevance of pure economic theory and to 
recognise that ‘economics is by no means the whole story and that there are 
other studies of human behaviour with which economics has to make common 
cause’.759  
    Cairncross was enlisted in the British War Cabinet Secretariat in 1940.  He 
never felt the need to make much use of the more refined parts of economic 
theory.  Both during and after the war he found that he constantly had recourse 
to deploy the basic theory relating supply, demand and price when confronted 
with politicians whose instincts were to deal with economic problems by price-
fixing.760
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    Whilst respecting economic theory, Cairncross believed that economic theory 
was essentially a modelling process and involved abstractions.  It took a limited 
number of variables and assumptions, and then worked through to their logical 
conclusion.  The real world, he suggested, could never be quite so simple; the 
range of variables could never be restricted to those of the economist’s model.  
Even the variables themselves, in the form of economic data, could never be 
located with such precision and confidence as economic modelling assumes.   
    Cairncross believed that economists’ advantage lay in their ‘way of thinking’, 
and the way in which they could bring their particular style of thinking to bear on 
policy decisions.761  Thus they would not be ‘at a loss, like Prime Minister Attlee, 
to understand how . . . when activity [was] so brisk at home, there should be so 
much trouble with the balance of payments’.762  In his belief that economics was 
primarily a way of thinking before being a ‘body of knowledge’ Cairncross was 
being true to the Marshallian tradition in Cambridge economics. 
    Hawtrey placed his own theoretical model at the forefront of all his advice and 
it is probably fair to say that he ignored Cairncross’s stricture, quoted above, that 
‘economics is by no means the whole story’.   However, despite these criticisms 
and reservations, it would be premature, however to conclude that Hawtrey was 
of no importance to the work of the inter-war Treasury.  Much of his value lay in 
his informal contacts. 
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    First, he was respected for the fairness of his criticisms of the work of other 
economists, and he played a role in interpreting advances in economic thinking 
to the Treasury.  Sir Frederick Phillips, the creative architect of the Treasury’s 
policies in the 1930s told the 1937 staffing review body that the reason he could 
not do without Hawtrey because Hawtrey understood other economists in a way 
that he did not, and was capable of making intelligible what other economists 
were saying.  Not only did he clearly, and usually very fairly, interpret the 
implications of what other economists were saying, but he provided something 
which Phillips regarded as equally valuable, furnishing the Treasury with ‘a 
constant commentary on the financial and economic side of Treasury work’.763  
Thus Phillips, as we have previously noted, regarded the presence of an 
economist within the Treasury as ‘a necessity’.764  Anticipating Hawtrey’s 
retirement, Phillips was concerned that the Treasury would not be able to replace 
him with someone of sufficiently high calibre – ‘the Treasury would have to look 
outside for a competent young economist and pay him what was necessary; 
there were not more than about a dozen men in the country fitted for the 
post’.765  There is no doubt that Phillips recognised Hawtrey’s eminence as an 
economist and valued his presence.  
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    Sir Warren Fisher made a somewhat related point in his evidence to the Public 
Accounts Committee in 1936.  He suggested that Hawtrey’s real value to the 
Treasury lay in his foreign currency expertise being readily available and 
accessible through informal contacts.  Thus, according to Fisher, whenever an 
Under-Secretary came across a difficult exchange issue ‘he would get hold of 
Hawtrey . . . and he would advise’.766  Ever since his leading role in the Genoa 
negotiations of 1922 Hawtrey had continued to be regarded as a currency 
expert, and it is in this role, clarifying problems involving currency and exchange 
issues for his colleagues, that senior officials, largely through informal contacts, 
where Hawtrey’s presence in the Treasury would have been valued.  But 
Hawtrey’s influence went beyond that of his expertise; throughout his period of 
office, Hawtrey could be seen to act as the ‘Conscience’ of the British financial 
authorities.767  In this context it is worth revisiting some of Hawtrey’s first 
published words; the beginning of the ‘Introductory’ to his very first book, Good 
and Bad Trade. 
 
In the last hundred years we have learnt to produce wealth on a 
grand scale.  Our command of the necessaries, comforts and 
luxuries of life, so far as the material conditions of production are 
concerned, seems almost boundless.  But in the same period we 
                                                 
 
766 House of Commons Papers 1935-6, 131-48, p.339. 
 
767 I am indebted for this phrase, as for much else, to my principal supervisor, Professor 
Keith Laybourn. 
 487
have become acutely aware of certain imperfections in the 
distributions of all this wealth. 
     The general principle by which the distribution is at present 
governed is that those only are entitled to share in the accruing 
wealth of society who assist in the production of that wealth, 
whether through their personal services or by permitting the use 
of land or capital which is in their control. . . . The principle does 
in fact work imperfectly.  For many people who possess no 
accumulated property find themselves from time to time without 
the opportunity of assisting through their personal services in the 
production of wealth, even though they would be perfectly 
competent to do so if the opportunity offered.768     
 
This is true Hawtreyan prose – but disentangling the convolutions, it is possible 
to see Hawtrey’s concern about the unfairness of the distribution of wealth.  The 
unfairness arose as a consequence of the trade cycle, particularly as it affected 
the working classes.  Moreover, the unfairness arose not only through 
unemployment in the ‘bad’ part of the cycle, but also through inflation in the 
‘good’ part of the cycle.  He believed that whilst the cycle was unavoidable, 
judicious use of short-term interest rates could mitigate the worst consequences 
of each part of the cycle.  His memoranda, whether advocating higher or lower 
rates, were driven by a determination to avoid the excessive unfairness of both 
parts of the trade cycle.  To Hawtrey, it wasn’t sufficient for the authorities to 
balance the budget, safeguard the level of gold stocks, and then assume that ‘in 
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the long run’ all would be well.  Without having Keynes’s facility for the 
memorable aphorism, he believed, no less than its originator, that ‘in the long 
run we are all dead’.  Thus, in the interests of mitigating the worst effects of the 
depression, Hawtrey believed that the Bank of England should have been 
prepared to lower interest rates, expand credit, and ‘let gold go’.   
    The Bank of England, and most of Hawtrey’s Treasury colleagues remained 
sceptical about this policy.  It is also clear from their questioning that the 
members of the Macmillan Committee of Enquiry were sceptical.  The lowest 
point of Hawtrey’s professional career was Keynes’s dismantling of his argument, 
before the Macmillan Committee, concerning the relative effect on British and 
world prices of releasing gold on to the international markets.  However, another 
phrase of Keynes’s, directly addressed to Hawtrey at the time of the Macmillan 
Enquiry – ‘although we always seem to differ . . . ultimately I am joined in 
common agreement with you as against most of the rest of the world’ – applied 
not only to their economic modelling, but also to their concerns for the economy 
and the unemployed.  If, to the financial authorities, Keynes was the irritant from 
outside, then Hawtrey was indeed, the ‘conscience’ from within.  The two men 
may have proposed different means, but their ends were similar, and they both 
played a part in moving Treasury concerns towards internal economic expansion. 
    As Hawtrey’s stock fell at the Macmillan Enquiry, so it rapidly rose again on 
the retreat from gold.  Throughout the discussions on the appropriate target 
level for the pound, Hawtrey’s remained the one voice consistently arguing for 
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£3.40.  His initial paper on the matter was clear that the purpose of devaluation 
should be ‘to [secure] the maximum beneficial effect upon trade and industry’ 
and that ‘[t]he detrimental effect on finance hardly enter[ed] into it’.769  His 
reasoning remained steadfast – that the last time when prices and wages could 
‘tolerably’ be considered in equilibrium was 1925, and the wholesale index of 
prices had fallen by over 30 per cent since then, therefore equilibrium could only 
be restored by an equivalent fall in the value of sterling.  The exchange rate of 
the pound, he concluded ought to be $3.40.  Niemeyer at the Bank, Leith-Ross, 
Hopkins, Phillips, Hubert Henderson and Keynes, all produced analyses or 
recommendations which differed from that of Hawtrey.  In the end, it was 
Hawtrey’s original recommendation which prevailed.    
    For the next couple of years, Hawtrey rode his moment of triumph, and was 
the authority on currency and the exchanges.  Together with Phillips he was 
responsible, as Luthje has recounted, for designing exchange rate policy.  His fall 
from influence came on his repetitive insistence that international agreement be 
sought on credit and interest-rate policy.  
    Peter Clarke has seized upon one particular note of Phillips’s to query whether 
‘Hawtrey’s long years in the dungeon had . . . in the end, given him a more 
subtly insidious influence in the 1930s than has usually been supposed’.770  This 
arose through a request from the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Sir John Simon, 
                                                 
 
769 Treasury Papers, T175/56.  28 September 1931. 
 
770 Ibid., p.319. 
 490
who had asked for material with which to respond to Harold Macmillan, who in a 
parliamentary question, had requested for public works to be targeted towards 
relieving unemployment in the most depressed areas.  Hawtrey had prepared a 
note, and in an addendum, Phillips had added: 
 
I agree with Mr. Hawtrey that the real stimulus comes from 
reflationary finance.  If there were no reflationary finance, the 
government works would tend merely to replace private works 
without much effect on employment.771   
 
Phillips, though, was aware of the history of this particular debate, and went on 
to caution the Chancellor against using this argument of Hawtrey’s in parliament: 
 
. . . this is the famous or infamous ‘Treasury View’, still a most 
bitter subject of controversy which it would be a great mistake to 
raise.772
 
There seems little doubt that within the Treasury some version of Hawtrey’s 
view, that public works without reflationary finance would not alleviate 
unemployment, persisted throughout the 1930s.  A short note from the 
Chancellor’s private secretary, Donald Fergusson, to Neville Chamberlain, on 26 
January 1935, encapsulated the Treasury’s existing thinking on public works.  
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The note arose from discussions at the highest level amongst a group which 
included Fisher, Hopkins and Phillips.773  It indicated that there was pressure 
from the Treasury, particularly from Phillips, for public works schemes around 
London and Birmingham.  The pressure for such schemes came from population 
growth and the resulting strains on the transport infrastructure.  Fergusson made 
two points which probably fairly reflect what, at that time, was the status of the 
‘Treasury View’.  First, that – 
 
[t]he trouble of course is that the money ought to be spent by 
Ashfield and the L.N.E.R. and not by the Government, but these 
people will not get on with their job.774
 
But, having made this particular argument for a public works programme, 
Fergusson hastened to add his second point: 
 
. . . there was of course universal agreement that public works 
as a remedy for unemployment are quite futile.775
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Fergusson elaborated, a little, on this by adding a point which was to become a 
favourite theme of Phillips – that the places where public works schemes were 
needed were the prosperous areas, and not those of high unemployment. 
    In another memorandum at about the same time Phillips revealed his 
continued agnosticism over any kind of ‘multiplier effect’ arising from 
government sponsored works. 
 
. . . advocates of  public works in 1929 e.g. Keynes, based their 
argument largely on the belief that expenditure on public works 
had constant ‘repercussions’ in other directions. . . . [that] 
expenditure of money by these beneficiaries would in turn 
employ other people and so on indefinitely. . . . but it cannot be 
said that there is as yet any practical confirmation of the 
theory.776
 
Moreover, Phillips went on to discuss the financing of public works and 
suggested that whilst: 
 
. . . it might be that under normal conditions a certain amount 
could be raised merely by restricting our external investment . . . 
at a time like the present external investment has shrunk to 
nothing, and it would seem that every pound raised must 
diminish the amount available for private enterprise.777
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If Hawtrey’s original ‘crowding out’ position lived on within the Treasury, then it 
seems to have been largely through his close association with Phillips.   
    There is, of course, another of Hawtrey’s frequent prescriptions which has 
become part of the modern financial structure.  He preached the efficacy of 
frequent changes in Bank rate, and believed that regular adjustments of the rate 
should be considered, using all available data on prices, exchanges and 
employment.  His ghost lives on.  Not in Whitehall, but in Threadneedle Street. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
               
 
 
 
 
 494
                                   Appendix I  
 
                                                    
                    Interpreting Keynes to the Treasury 
 
 
                                        1931, 1936 
 
 
    Upon the publication of each of Keynes’s major works – A Treatise on Money 
and The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money – Hawtrey wrote 
extended critiques for the benefit of the Treasury.  If they read them, his 
colleagues were not sufficiently stimulated to comment. 
    Keynes’s Treatise is a much neglected book in the study of the development 
of economic ideas.  Not the least reason for this being that Keynes, fairly soon 
after its publication, sought to distance himself from it.  It relied on mathematical 
identities more than General Theory, and neither Keynes nor Hawtrey believed 
that economic ideas could be expressed with the kind of precision implied by 
mathematical equations. 
    As noted in an earlier section (The ‘Prelude’), Sir John Hicks believed that 
Keynes wrote his Treatise for the purpose of replying to the parts of Hawtrey’s 
Currency and Credit with which he disagreed.   More overtly, he wrote it in 
response to his dissatisfaction with Irving Fisher’s identity (PT=MV): an identity 
which related the general price level (P) to the number of trade transactions in a 
given time (T), the quantity of money in circulation (M), and the number of 
times, on average, which the stock of money changed hands within that given 
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time (V).  Keynes did not believe that there was anything ‘wrong’ with Fisher’s 
equation; but he regarded it as sterile in that it described a situation, without 
being of use in describing the dynamics of moving between two different 
situations.  Keynes derived his own equations. 
    The theoretical sections of the Treatise revolved around two derived 
Fundamental Equations.  They were similar in form, and because of that 
similarity the first of the two equations will serve to show how Keynes’s thinking 
was revealed in their structure.  Keynes’s First Fundamental Equation was:778
 
                                          P  =  E  +  I’ – S 
                                                  O        R 
      
    The terms involved were the price level of consumption goods (P), the total 
money-income of the community (E), the total volume of output of all goods (O), 
the money-income from the production of investment goods (I’), the net change 
in the community’s savings (S), and the volume of consumer goods purchased 
(R).779    
    The first term describing the price level, (E/O), was the cost per unit of 
production.  But within the term E, Keynes included not only the costs such as 
wages, rent and so on – but the ‘normal remuneration’ or ‘normal’ profit of the 
                                                 
 
778 J.M.Keynes, A Treatise on Money (London, Macmillan, 1930), p.135. 
 
779 Keynes spent no little effort in trying to precisely define these terms.  The brief 
definitions above are adequate for illustrating the thinking that went into the 
construction of the equations. 
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entrepreneur.  What was ‘normal’?  A ‘normal’ profit level was that which just 
satisfied the entrepreneur to the extent that it induced him to neither expand, 
nor cut down on, production.  This was a key point.  If expansion of trade was 
desired, then the entrepreneur would expand if there were the possibility of 
‘above normal’ profits. 
    The second term of the equation related to whether profits were above or 
below ‘normal’.  Keynes showed (within his definitions, of course) that the sign of 
the term (I’ – S) determined the deviation of the entrepreneur’s profits from 
‘normal’ – if it were positive, then profits would exceed the ‘normal’ value and 
business producers of consumption goods would endeavour to expand 
production. 
    Thus, Keynes’s conclusion to this section of the Treatise was that prices would 
rise, and businesses would look to expand if I’ exceeded S – earnings from the 
production of investment goods needed to exceed savings – a conclusion which, 
naturally, led to his support for government investment as a means of expanding 
trade. 
    Keynes also produced a Second Fundamental Equation, of similar form to the 
first, which described the general price level, but he did not produce an equation 
describing the price of investment goods.  Rather, he incorporated the price of 
investment goods (bonds, shares, property etc.) into his equations.  He 
introduced the term ‘bearishness’ to describe the situation where individuals 
believed the values of investment goods were likely to fall.  Under such 
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conditions saving would increase, thus reducing the value of the term (I’ – S) in 
the first fundamental equation, and lowering the price of consumer goods, the 
profit from the manufacture of consumer goods, and employment within the 
consumer goods industries. 
    In Chapter 13 of the Treatise Keynes worked out his own position on interest 
rates – dismissing Hawtrey’s theory in the process.  Generally, an increase in 
bank-rate promoted saving and discouraged investment, therefore reducing the 
term (I’ – S) in the First Fundamental Equation, and so creating a tendency 
towards falling prices.  He felt that this explanation – altering the relative 
attraction of saving and investment - rather than Hawtrey’s explanation in terms 
of the level of dealers’ stocks, more accurately described the transfer mechanism 
between high interest rates and falling prices.  Keynes went as far as citing 
Tooke’s classical criticism of Hume, in 1839, when Hume had laid chief emphasis 
on the effect of plentiful cheap money in stimulating speculation in commodities 
such as cotton and corn.  Tooke’s retort to Hume being that: 
 
[f]ew persons . . . ever speculate but on the confident 
expectation of an advance of price of at least 10 per cent. . . . 
the utmost difference between the rate of discount of 3 per cent. 
and 6 per cent for three months, would on a quarter of wheat 
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amount to only 4.5d. per quarter, a difference which I venture to 
say, never induced or deterred a single speculative purchase.780
 
Keynes was at pains to add that Tooke had also noted that rising interest rates 
are more often associated with rising, rather than falling, commodity prices and 
therefore most unlikely to act as a deterrent to speculation in the purchase of 
stocks.  Rather than emphasising the, somewhat immediate, effect of Bank rate, 
and short-term interest rates in particular, on dealers’ stocks, Keynes’s 
emphasised long-term rates and their effects upon investment spending.  He 
argued that entrepreneurs took a much longer view of the possible profits from 
an investment, and that the effect of changes in short-term rates was realised 
through their effects upon long-term interest rates, and it was at long-term rates 
that businesses borrowed for investment in plant and buildings. 
    Keynes took it as axiomatic that there was a degree of competition for loans 
between providers of long and short-term loans, and that an increase in short-
term rates would have an upward influence on long-term rates.  An increase in 
long-term rates would reduce the net profits from any current investment – or, in 
Keynes’s terms, reduce the discounted future yield of investment goods.  He 
completed his analysis by once more returning to the Fundamental Equations.  
Higher rates leading to falling investment would, under conditions of equilibrium, 
turn the term (I’ – S) negative  and lead to falling prices. 
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    Hawtrey’s criticisms of the Treatise were presented in consolidated form in a 
Treasury memorandum ‘Mr. Keynes’s Treatise on Money’.781
    Hawtrey began by scrutinising the definitions of the terms which Keynes used 
to build up his Fundamental Equations, paying particular attention to his 
somewhat idiosyncratic definitions of income and profit, and also Keynes’s 
definition of ‘investment’.  Keynes, remember, defined the ‘normal’ profit of 
entrepreneurs as income and part of the costs of production.  Any profit above 
this level was not regarded as extra income, nor was it regarded as an additional 
cost of production, but as capital enhancement.  Similarly, any level of profit 
below that of ‘normal’ was not regarded as a diminution of aggregate income, 
nor as a reduction in the cost of production, but as a capital loss.  Hawtrey 
suggested that any level of profit above, or below, that of ‘normal’ might be 
usefully referred to as a windfall gain or windfall loss (in his preface, almost 
certainly influenced by Hawtrey’s arguments, Keynes does suggest that profits in 
excess of ‘normal’ might be thought of as ‘windfalls’). The other definition which 
caused problems for Hawtrey was Keynes’s definition of ‘investment’.  Within 
Hawtrey’s model of the economy, investment over a period of time was 
quantified as the outlay of a defined sum of sum of money over that period.  
Keynes defined the rate of investment as ‘the net increment during a period of 
                                                 
 
781 T 208/153.  Hawtrey revised this commentary for publication.  It subsequently 
appeared, in revised form, as chapter 6 of  R.G.Hawtrey, The Art of Central Banking 
(London, Longmans, 1932).  
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time of the capital of the community’.782  Hawtrey believed that this definition 
made Keynes’s Fundamental Equations sterile since ‘investment’, as the 
‘increment of the community’s capital’, could not be assessed until after any price 
change had taken place.  Given Keynes’s definitions, Hawtrey argued that his 
difference between saving and investment had nothing to do with the decisions 
taken by individuals and businessmen, but was simply another name for the 
divergence between prices and costs.  In effect, Hawtrey pointed out, there was 
a tautology within Keynes’s Fundamental Equations, since he took entrepreneurs 
profits to be dependent upon the difference between investment income and 
savings, whilst he defined entrepreneurs profits as a capital increment.  He took 
Keynes’s terms and related definitions to algebraically prove this point.  Adding, 
 
. . . he is mistaken in treating the discrepancy between 
investment and saving, when it does occur. As the cause 
[Hawtrey’s underlining] of the divergence between prices and 
costs; it is [Hawtrey] the divergence between prices and costs.  
When saving differs from investment, this represents not a 
change in the behaviour of the public in regard to the 
accumulation of unspent sums, but a change in the classification 
of the sums they receive as between earnings and windfalls.  
The occurrence of a divergence between prices and costs brings 
about this change of classification not in virtue of any causal 
relation, but in virtue of a definition; the change is not causal but 
logical. 
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 Hawtrey argued that if anything occurred to affect the demand for goods of any 
kind, the first result was an increase or decrease of sales at existing prices.  
There would always be some interval of time before prices adjusted, and thus 
there would be a disturbance of equilibrium which preceded any disturbance of 
prices, and which therefore precedes any windfall gain or loss and any difference 
between saving and investment as defined by Keynes. 
        Pages 17-20 of Hawtrey’s memorandum are his attempt to clarify the 
relationship between savings and investment.  They contain a remarkable 
numerical example which a number of economists have regarded as an insight 
which amounted to an independent discovery of the multiplier theory.783   
    If the assumption was made, at the outset, that no change in price level takes 
place, then Hawtrey’s position (using Keynes’s definitions) regarding the initial 
effect of an increase in investment was relatively straightforward: 
 
. . . addition to investment . . . is an addition to output and 
therefore to consumers’ income.  A part . . . will presumably be 
spent on (extra) consumption; the remainder is . . . an addition 
to saving.  The additional consumption must be fed from 
accumulated stocks . . . (with) consequent decrement of stocks . 
. . a negative item in the total of investment.  When it is set off 
                                                 
 
783 The most notable article on this theme is N.Cain, ‘Hawtrey and the multiplier theory’, 
Australian Econ. Hist. Rev., 22 (1982), 68-78. 
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against the addition made to investment, the net increment of 
capital (is) the additional saving.784
 
Using another (long) numerical example, Hawtrey pursued this; considering the 
consequences when the stocks of consumer goods were exhausted and 
additional production was called for.785  Additional production would call for extra 
investment – which implied an increase in the consumers’ income.  Hawtrey then 
assumed that a proportion of the extra consumers’ income would be spent on 
consumption, with a proportion saved.  The proportion spent on consumption 
would generate a further secondary increment to the consumers’ income – with 
yet further additions to consumption and saving.  Hawtrey calculated that the 
process would eventually result in a new equilibrium at a higher level of 
consumers’ income and generate sufficient extra savings to cover the initial 
increase in investment. 
    It remains a mystery as to why Hawtrey, having used the concept of the 
multiplier, failed to recognise the novelty of the concept, or develop it further. 
    Hawtrey’s extract undoubtedly incorporated the multiplier principle, albeit 
working on the concept of secondary consumption rather than on Khan’s 
secondary employment (the discovery of the concept of the multiplier generally 
being attributed to Khan).  It incorporated the idea of ‘propensity to consume’.  
It also established two concepts central to Keynesian economics.  First, that 
savings need not precede investment, and that extra investment need not be 
inflationary since an injection of extra investment will, in time, generate 
compensatory extra savings.  Secondly, it demonstrated that an economy is 
capable of moving from one state of equilibrium to another with an increased 
level of consumption output and correspondingly increased employment by the 
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injection of extra investment. Hawtrey revised and extended this memorandum 
for publication, in 1932, as chapter 6 of his book The Art of Central Banking.  
The chief omission from the revised version being the section that incorporated 
the use of the multiplier concept.  There seems to be no indication as to why 
Hawtrey found it necessary to suppress this idea from his subsequent 
publications. 
    The sensitivity of dealers stocks to changes in short-term interest rates was a 
central part of Hawtrey’s theory of the trade cycle and so it was natural that he 
should respond, and at length, to Keynes’s scepticism on this point.  In rejecting 
Keynes’s belittlement of his theory, he used statistics of the Harvard Bureau of 
Business Research, which indicated the relatively high ratio of interest payments 
to net profit of the average trader.  He also took particular exception to Keynes’s 
use of Tooke’s refutation of his theory. 
 
. . . the passage quoted from Tooke applies to “persons who, 
upon imperfect information and on insufficient grounds, or with 
too sanguine a view of contingencies in their favour, speculate 
improvidently.”  . . . . This quotation from Tooke is entirely 
beside the point.  My argument relates not to speculators 
(especially not to ignorant and improvident speculators) but to 
regular dealers and merchants.786
 
After long discussion on Bank-rate, stock markets, short-term and long-term 
rates of interest, and the ways in which they impinged upon investment followed 
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(apparently, when Keynes handed the transcript of Hawtrey’s memorandum to 
his colleague Richard Khan, Khan returned it saying that he had found the 
section the relation between the stock markets and investment ‘hard to 
follow’),787 Hawtrey concluded that: 
 
[i]t will be seen that my difference from Mr. Keynes as to the 
influence of bank rate on investment is not very wide.  He does 
not dispute that there is some effect upon the holding of stocks 
of goods.  I do not dispute that there is some effect upon the 
holding of securities, and through it upon the long-term rate of 
interest, the amount of new issues and the amount of capital 
outlay.  I attach importance to the early response of the holders 
of stocks of goods.  He says that the effect on capital outlay 
occurs with “an appreciable time lag”.788
 
Keynes’s gratitude to Hawtrey is well known – on 16 February 1931 he wrote to 
him saying ‘you have taken amazing pains about my book’, and that ‘it is very 
seldom indeed that an author can expect to get as a criticism anything so 
tremendously useful to himself’.  Keynes added that he was ‘working it out all 
over again’ – a re-working which, of course, eventually lead to the General 
Theory.       
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    On 14 March 1936 Hawtrey circulated a memorandum for the benefit of his 
Treasury colleagues in which he both outlined and criticised the arguments which 
Keynes had put forward in the General Theory.789
    Ignoring what most people would have regarded as the central message of 
General Theory, that in the absence of adequate investment it was possible for 
an economy to be in equilibrium at less than full employment, Hawtrey regarded 
the fundamental thesis of The General Theory to be ‘a revision of the classical 
theory of interest’.  The classical theory assumed that capital outlay would only 
be applied to investments whose yield was not less than the rate of interest.  If 
the rate of interest were to be raised, then fewer investments would meet this 
particular criterion and therefore there would be a lower capital outlay on 
investment goods.  In such circumstances the supply of savings (the money 
which households refrained from spending on consumption goods) might 
temporarily exceed the demand for investment goods, leading to a reduction in 
interest rates in order to discourage saving and stimulate investment.  It was, 
Hawtrey explained, this function of interest rates which Keynes questioned. 
    Keynes, he expounded, regarded the rate of interest as ‘the reward of 
forgoing liquidity.  By tying up their savings in investments people forwent the 
convenience of having ready money, and the extent to which they were willing to 
do so depended on the rate of interest.  Thus if the supply of money were small, 
and people had small cash deposits, it would require a high rate of interest to 
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persuade them to forgo that little liquidity which they possessed.  Thus the 
money supply inversely determined the rate of interest, and the rate of interest, 
so determined, governed the volume of capital investment.  Hawtrey then 
outlined the logical steps by which Keynes showed that, where there was a 
tendency for saving to differ from investment, the total of incomes was always 
adjusted in such a way as to bring them back to equality.  The adjustment of the 
national income in order to restore the equality between saving and investment 
could leave it at such a level that the volume of output was incapable of 
employing the whole of the workforce, with resulting unemployment.  At this 
point Hawtrey argued that there was no justification for Keynes’s proposition that 
investment and saving needed to be equalised since equality arose out of the 
definitions which Keynes had opted for: 
 
[a]n essential step in [his] train of reasoning is the proposition 
that investment and saving are necessarily equal.  That 
proposition Mr. Keynes never really establishes; he evades the 
necessity of doing so by defining investment and saving as 
different names for the same thing.  He so defines income to be 
the same thing as output, and therefore, if investment is the 
excess of output over consumption, and saving is the excess of 
income over consumption, the two are identical.  Identity so 
established cannot prove anything.  The idea that a tendency for 
investment and saving to become different has to be 
counteracted by an expansion or contraction of the total of 
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incomes is an absurdity; such a tendency cannot strain the 
economic system, it can only strain Mr. Keynes’s vocabulary.790
 
Hawtrey’s criticism of Keynes’s focussed on his definition of ‘investment’ as the 
‘excess of output over consumption’.791  Hawtrey argued that the excess of 
output over consumption amounted to ‘unconsumed wealth’, and the holding of 
this ‘unconsumed wealth’ did not necessarily constitute an ‘active’ investment 
decision.  Hawtrey is, quite clearly, alluding to his concerns over the situation of 
dealers’ unsold stocks, which come under Keynes’s definition of ‘investment’ but 
which do not count as capital assets with a prospective yield.  Hawtrey deemed 
that such accumulation of stocks should be deemed ‘undesigned’ or ‘passive’ 
investment.792  Thus, Hawtrey argued, whilst under Keynes’s definitions of 
‘savings’ and ‘investment’ the two terms might necessarily be equal, ‘active’ 
investment, the acquisition of capital goods for the purpose of future yield, need 
not be equal to savings.  According to Hawtrey, it was necessary that ‘active’ 
investment be sufficient to maintain the difference between incomes and 
consumption, and, if this were not sufficient to bridge the gap, the result would 
                                                 
 
790 Ibid., pp. 3-4. 
 
791 On p.63 of The General Theory Keynes wrote as follows – ‘Provided it is agreed that 
income is equal to the value of current output, that current investment is equal to the 
value of that part of current output which is not consumed, and that saving is equal to 
the excess of income over consumption – all of which is conformable both to common 
sense and to the traditional usage of the great majority of economists – the equality of 
saving and investment necessarily follows’.   
 
792 Treasury Paper T208/195 (Hawtrey Papers).  ‘Mr. Keynes’s General Theory of 
Employment Interest and Money’, 14 March 1936. P.4. 
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be an accumulation of unsold goods which, whilst adding to investment under 
Keynes’s definition, would ultimately lead to a growth in unemployment.   
    As for measures to reduce unemployment, Hawtrey believed that Keynes was 
too easily convinced that unemployment could not be solved by monetary 
expansion.  Keynes had argued that an increase in the quantity of money might 
lead the public choosing to hold larger sums of money, and the need to 
overcome their liquidity preference would cause interest rates to rise.  This 
would inhibit investment.  Hawtrey, however, thought that such cautions were 
not very relevant. 
 
. . . all that is required is a continuous growth in the quantity of 
money just sufficient to satisfy the liquidity preferences 
corresponding to the desired rate of interest.  That should do no 
more than maintain stable prices, and no sudden or spectacular 
monetary expansion need be involved.  If in any period of time 
there has on the whole been no deflationary tendency, then we 
can conclude that enough money has been created to satisfy the 
liquidity preference.793
 
After critically considering a number of Keynes’s measures for reducing 
unemployment – reducing wages, embargoes on foreign investment, increases in 
direct taxation, ‘communal saving’ in which the state acted as an agent of capital 
                                                 
 
793 Ibid., P.7. 
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acquisition – Hawtrey turned back to a consideration of the Keynesian concept of 
‘liquidity preference’. 
 
. . . the magnitude of the pool of idle savings is a vital matter.  
For example, for all we know, the existing level of direct taxation 
may be enough or more than enough, with existing rates of 
interest, to reduce the pool to zero. . . . Mr. Keynes . . . does not 
throw much light on its possible magnitude.794
 
Hawtrey queried Keynes’s view that low interest rates might encourage people, 
fearing increased interest rates might involve them in a capital loss, holding on 
to cash.  He thought most investors would be more anxious to avoid loss of 
income than a reduction of capital value, and found it difficult to see how any 
investor who was not ‘dominated by the primitive instincts of the miser should be 
driven to hold his money idle for any considerable length of time’.795
    Hawtrey did not entirely dismiss Keynesian liquidity preference – ‘the state of 
mind of the intending investor who holds back his money because the price of 
securities is too high is . . . possible’,796  and ‘there may actually be a minimum 
rate of interest below which no active investment would in practice be 
                                                 
 
794 Ibid., p.13. 
 
795 Ibid. 
 
796 Ibid. 
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undertaken’.797  But he suggested that since liquidity preference was playing 
such a prominent role in Keynes’s theory, then Keynes might be postulating that 
the current rate of interest was very near to that minimum value.  Hawtrey 
pointed out that whilst that might be so, the ‘rate of interest, low as it [wa]s, 
[wa]s still higher than it was forty years ago, and no lower than it was in 
1750’.798
    Hawtrey thought that people were guided by their experience on the level of 
liquidity which they chose; ‘they expected the future to resemble the past’,799  If 
a rate of interest which appeared low persisted, then people would become 
accustomed to it, accept it, and the pool of idle savings would gradually 
disappear.  The period of liquidity preference would be a transitory phenomenon 
leading to a ‘slight lag in the adjustment of active investment to savings’.800  In 
picking away at Keynes’s concepts in this way, it is hardly surprising that 
Skidelsky should describe Keynes as a ‘saint’ for continuing to maintain a patient 
dialogue with Hawtrey.801
        It was inevitable that Hawtrey should use this memorandum to return to a 
major theoretical difference between Keynes and himself, the relative 
                                                 
 
797 Ibid. 
 
798 Ibid., p.16. 
 
799 Ibid., p.17. 
 
800 Ibid., p.18. 
 
801 Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: the Economist as Saviour, p.586. 
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effectiveness of short and long-term interest rates.  Hawtrey recalled that, in his 
Treatise on Money, Keynes had expressed the view that ‘investment in working 
capital and stocks of goods is not sensitive to changes in the short-term rate of 
interest’.802  If that were so, Hawtrey deduced, the regulation of credit by the 
banks could only work through the effect of the short-term rate of interest on 
the long-term rate.  However, he remained unconvinced by Keynes’s claim for 
the importance of the long-term rate. 
 
If credit regulation can take effect through short-term 
investment, if, that is, traders’ purchases of goods can be 
accelerated by credit relaxation or retarded by credit restrictions, 
then an expansion or contraction of demand can be brought 
about by these means far more quickly than by the expansion or 
contraction of long-term investment. . . . And an expansion or 
contraction of a demand for goods in general has a much more 
potent effect on long-term investment itself than the rate of 
interest.803  
 
Their views seemed irreconcilable.  Whereas Keynes saw very low interest rates 
during a depression as leading to liquidity preference and the worsening of the 
depression, Hawtrey saw them as a means of enticing traders to expand their 
inventories, stimulating the demand for finished goods from the factories, who in 
                                                 
 
802 Ibid., p.19. 
 
803 Ibid. 
 512
turn would be encouraged to increase their levels of investment. Hawtrey seems 
to have ignored the level of demand from the public for the traders’ stocks – a 
problem which the greater part of Keynes’s book was directed towards 
addressing.  Pages 20-24 of the memorandum continued to criticise Keynes’s 
concept of liquidity preference as a determinant of the level of interest rates. 
    Hawtrey forwarded a copy of his memorandum to Keynes on 14 March 1936.  
Keynes was, unsurprisingly, disappointed with the Treasury paper; feeling that 
Hawtrey had focussed narrowly on the difference between their two theories of 
interest whilst ignoring the greater part of the book devoted to showing how 
equilibrium could be established at less than full employment, and to which 
Keynes attached the greatest value.804  To Keynes, the effect of General Theory 
on Hawtrey had been like ‘water off a duck’s back’ and he was driven to suggest, 
at one point, that they should discontinue all correspondence on the matter.805  
But the correspondences continued.      
    The 1976 Nobel Prize winner, Milton Friedman, has claimed that his monetary 
economics stemmed from a ‘Chicago Tradition’.  Friedman’s theory offered a 
monetary explanation of the Great Depression which was applicable to the 
general trade cycle.  It also provided for a monetary means of controlling the 
economy by strict rules and allowing no part to government discretion.  
Friedman’s work influenced the economic policies of Margaret Thatcher in Britain 
                                                 
 
804 G.C.Peden, Keynes and his Critics; Treasury Responses to the Keynesian Revolution 
1925-1946 (Oxford, O.U.P., 2004), p.154. 
 
805 Skidelsky, John Maynard Keynes: The Economist as Saviour, pp. 586-7. 
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and Ronald Reagan in the United States.  David Laidler of the University of 
Western Ontario, but formerly Professor of Economics at the University of 
Manchester, has argued convincingly that there is a direct line of influence 
running backwards from the ‘Chicago School’ to Harvard, and the period of 
Hawtrey’s temporary tenure as Professor of Economics there.806
     Previous studies of the origins of the ‘Chicago Tradition’ had subscribed to 
the view that it was largely influenced by the work of the Yale professor, Irving 
Fisher.  However, Laidler notes that most of the characteristics of Chicago 
monetary economics can be found in the work of two Harvard economists, Allyn 
Young and Lauchlin Currie.  Moreover the same characteristics could be ‘found in 
the writings of the British economist Ralph Hawtrey, who . . . provided a far 
richer description of the phenomenon . . . than Irving Fisher ever produced’.807  
Young was instrumental in arranging Hawtrey’s secondment to Harvard in 1928-
29, and Currie sat in on Hawtrey’s graduate lectures. 
    During the period 1922-28 Young acted as consultant to the New York Bank 
during which period he produced his Analysis of Bank Statistics for the United 
States (1928); a work in which he analysed sources of instability in the American 
banking system and in which he added that ‘I know of no better analysis of the 
essential instability of bank credit than is to be found in R. G. Hawtrey’s work, 
                                                 
 
806  D. Laidler, ‘Hawtrey, Harvard and the Origins of the Chicago Tradition’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 1993, vol. 101, no.6. pp. 1068-1101. 
 
807 Ibid., p.1069. 
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Currency and Credit’ .808  Currie built on the work of Hawtrey and Young, and his 
work led to his book The Supply and Control of Money in the United States 
(1934); a book in which he cited Hawtrey as a monetary authority. 
    In considering the extent to which the Chicago tradition was a simultaneous 
and independent development from Harvard, Laidler considers the question of 
‘rules versus discretion’.  Friedman and the Chicago school placed great 
emphasis upon a commitment to the governing of monetary policy by strict rules 
rather than discretion.  Conversely, such rigidity is rejected in the writings of 
Hawtrey, Young and Currie.  Hawtrey, in particular, described central banking as 
an ‘art’ in which there was considerable scope for discretion.     
    Nevertheless, Laidler gives sufficient instances of links between Chicago and 
Lauchlin Currie to justify his assertion of a link.  He gives particular prominence 
to the Harris Foundation Conference on Gold and Monetary Stabilisation, held at 
the University of Chicago in 1932, from which came a manifesto sent to Herbert 
Hoover, recommending that ‘the Federal Reserve banks systematically pursue 
open-market operations with the double aim of facilitating necessary government 
financing and increasing the liquidity of the banking structure’.809  In his Art of 
Central Banking (1932) the major distinguishing feature of Hawtrey’s policy 
recommendations had been its emphasis on the controlling power of open-
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market operations by central banks.  Laidler concluded that the circumstantial 
evidence of Hawtrey’s influence was compelling.810
   An essential building block in Keynes’s transition from his Treatise on Money to 
his General Theory was the discovery of the mechanism of the ‘multiplier’ – a 
discovery generally attributed to Richard Khan.  In the multiplier mechanism an 
initial injection of investment into the economy generates further secondary, 
tertiary and higher level injections in such a way that the total boost to economic 
production exceeds that of the initial injection.  Khan was not the first economist 
to consider a multiplier effect.  In 1922 Frederick Lavington had described a 
mechanism of cyclical fluctuations that made use of multiplier effects to explain 
enhanced magnitudes of departures from normality.811  But Hawtrey had also 
worked out a theory of the multiplier in his criticisms of Keynes’s Treatise.  In the 
paper which Hawtrey prepared for the Macmillan Committee after his appearance 
                                                 
 
810 Ibid., p. 1099. 
     
    The steps by which Keynes made the transition from the Treatise to the General 
Theory are examined in Clarke (1988), Moggridge (1992; 1993) [D.E.Moggridge, 
Maynard Keynes; An Economists Biography (London, Routledge, 1992); Keynes 
(London, Macmillan, 1993)] and Patinkin (1976a) [D.Patinkin, Keynes’ Monetary 
Thought: A Study of its Development (Durham N.C., Duke University Press, 1976)].   
Richard Khan, generally accredited with discovering the ‘multiplier’ principle, was a 
member of the Cambridge ‘circus’ of younger academics who held regular meetings back 
in Cambridge to discuss the developments of Keynes’s ideas (with Khan as its secretary) 
and reported the findings of their discussions back to Keynes.  The intense atmosphere 
in Cambridge at this time has been recorded by Marcuzzo and Rosselli [M.C.Marcuzzo 
and A.Rosselli, Economists in Cambridge: a study through their correspondence, 1907-
1946 (London, Routledge, 2005)]. 
 
811  F. Lavington, The English Capital Market (London, Methuen, 1921). 
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there, there were a number of numerical examples.812  One was on the role of 
investment.  His example assumed investment to increase by £5 million per 
month, with the extra investment working its way through into consumers’ 
incomes.  On the assumption that £2 million of this would be saved, a further £3 
million would be spent, and so feed through into extra consumers’ incomes.  
Hawtrey went on to argue that the limit would be reached ‘when income had 
been increased by £12.5 million per month and consumption by £7.5 million a 
month; leaving £5 million saved to balance the £5 million of additional 
investment’.813   
    This remarkable section not only outlines the mechanism of the multiplier but 
anticipates Keynes’s thesis that investment generates its own savings.  It was of 
limited importance to Hawtrey because, to him, the extra investment would be 
forthcoming, anyway, through the extension of credit, whereas Keynes was to 
use the multiplier as part of his argument for the extension of public investment.  
Clarke has claimed that after so successfully outlining the multiplier principle 
Hawtrey suppressed it in his further work.814  Dimand has pointed out that far 
from suppressing the idea, Hawtrey went on to restate the principle in an 
                                                 
812  Committee on Finance and Industry, Minutes of Evidence (H.M.S.O., 1931). 
 
813 Ibid. 
 
814
  P. Clarke, The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, 1924-1936 (Oxford, Clarendon, 
1988). p. 243. 
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‘elegant algebraic form’ in his Art of Central Banking.815  There seems to be no 
evidence that Khan had been aware of Hawtrey’s work.   
 
     
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
             
 
 
 
 
 
      
                                                 
815 R.W.Dimand, ‘Mr. Meade’s Relation, Khan’s Multiplier and the Chronology of the 
General Theory’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 104, No. 426 (Sept. 1994), pp.1139-1142. 
 518
                                              Bibliography 
 
                                    Primary Sources 
 
 
Government Records 
 
Cabinet Office Records.  Cab. 27/462 
 
House of Commons Debates, Vol.227, 1928-29. 
 
Macmillan Report.  Committee on Finance and Industry, Report, Cmd. 3897 
(1931). 
 
Macmillan Evidence.  Committee on Finance and Industry, Minutes of Evidence, 2 
vols. (1931). 
 
Cunliffe Committee (Interim Report).   First Interim Report of the Committee on 
Currency and Foreign Exchanges after the War, Cd. 9182, Parliamentary Papers 
1918, VII. 
 
House of Commons Papers 1935-6.    
 
Treasury Papers, T 160.  The World Economic Conference 1933. 
 
Treasury Papers, T 172.  The Chancellor of the Exchequer’s Office; miscellaneous 
papers. 
 
Treasury Papers, T 175.  Sir Richard Hopkins’ Papers. 
 
Treasury Papers, T 176.  Sir Otto Niemeyer’s Papers. 
 
Treasury Papers, T 177.  Sir Frederick Phillips’s Papers. 
 
Treasury Papers, T 188.  Sir Frederick Leith-Ross’s Papers. 
 
Treasury Papers, T 208.  The Financial Enquiries Branch (The ‘Hawtrey Papers’) 
 
Treasury Papers, T 268.  Treasury Career Files. 
 
Treasury Papers, T 163.  
 
Treasury Papers, T 199.  Treasury Organisation. 
 
 519
Journals and Newspapers 
 
The Evening Standard 
The Manchester Guardian 
The Nation and Athenaeum 
The Times 
The Daily Express 
 
Private records, autobiographies and archives 
 
Barnes, J. and Nicholson, D. (Eds.), The Empire at Bay: The Leo Amery Diaries 
1929-1945 (London, 1988)   
 
Hawtrey Papers, The.  Churchill College, Cambridge (HTRY).  
 
Grigg, P.J., Prejudice and Judgement (London, Jonathan cape, 1948) 
 
Leith-Ross, F., Money Talks: Fifty Years of International Finance (London, 
Hutchinson, 1968). 
 
Snowden, P., An Autobiography, vol. ii, 1919-1934 (London, Ivor Nicholson and 
Watson, 1934) 
 
Woolf, V., The Flight of the Mind.  The Letters of Virginia Woolf, Vol I, 1888-1912 
(Virginia Stephen), ed. Nigel Nicholson, (London, Hogarth Press, 1975). 
 
Woolf, V., The Question of Things Happening.  The Letters of Virginia Woolf, Vol. 
II:1912-1922, ed. Nigel Nicholson, (London, Hogarth Press, 1976). 
 
Contemporary Books, Articles and Pamphlets 
 
Hayek, F. A. von, ‘Review of Trade Depression and the way Out by R.G.Hawtrey’, 
Economica, No. 35. (Feb., 1932) 126-7. 
 
Harrod, R., ‘Review of Trade Depression and the Way Out by R.G.Hawtrey’, The 
Economic Journal Vol. 44, No. 174. (June 1934) 279-282. 
 
Hawtrey, R.G.,  Good and Bad Trade: An enquiry into the Causes of Trade 
Fluctuations (London, Constable, 1913). 
 
Hawtrey, R.G.,  Monetary Reconstruction (London, Longmans, 1923) 
 
Hawtrey,  R.G., Currency and Credit (London, Longmans, 1919). 
 
 520
Hawtrey, R.G., The Gold Standard in Theory and Practice (London, Longmans 
Green, 1947). 
 
Hawtrey, R.G., A Century of Bank Rate (London, Frank Cass, 1962). 
 
Hawtrey, R. G., ‘Public Expenditure and the Demand for Labour’, Economica, 
March 1925, 38-48. 
 
Hawtrey, R. G., The Art of Central Banking (London, Longmans, 1932) 
 
Hawtrey, R. G., ‘Review of A Tract on Monetary Reform by J.M.Keynes’, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 34, No. 134. (Jun. 1924), 227-235. 
 
Hawtrey, R. G., ‘Public Expenditure and Trade Depression’, Journal of the Royal 
Statistical Society, Vol. 96, No. 3. (1933), 438-477. 
 
Hawtrey, R. G., Trade Depression and the Way Out (London, Longmans, 1931).  
 
Hawtrey, R.G., ‘Light on Montagu Norman’s Policy’, The Bankers’ Magazine, 188 
(1957). 
 
Hawtrey, R.G., ‘The return to Gold in 1925’, The Bankers’ Magazine, 208 (1969). 
 
Keynes, J.M., A Treatise on Money (London, Macmillan, 1930).  
 
Keynes, J.M., The General Theory of Employment Interest and Money (London, 
Macmillan, 1957). 
 
Keynes, J. M., ‘The General Theory of Employment’, The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 51, No. 2. (Feb., 1937), 209-223.  
 
Keynes, J.M., ‘Review of Currency and Credit by R.G.Hawtrey’, The Economic 
Journal, Vol30, No. 119. (Sep., 1920) 362-365. 
 
Keynes, J.M., The collected Writings of John Maynard Keynes vol. XIV (ed. 
Moggridge) (Cambridge, Macmillan, 1973) 
 
Keynes, J.M., and Henderson, H. Can Lloyd George Do It? (London, 1929) 
 
Liberal Party, Britain’s Industrial Future: being the Report of the Liberal Industrial 
Enquiry of 1928 (London, Ernest Benn, 1928). 
 
Liberal Party, We Can Conquer Unemployment (1929). 
 
 521
Pigou, A.C., ‘Review of Good and Bad Trade: An Enquiry into the Causes of 
Trade Fluctuations. by R.G.Hawtrey’, The Economic Journal, Vol. 23, No. 92. 
(Dec., 1913), 580-583. 
 
Robertson, D.H., ‘Review of Monetary Reconstruction by R.G.Hawtrey’, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 33, No. 130. (June 1923), 204. 
 
Robertson, D. H., ‘Review of A Century of Bank Rate by R.G.Hawtrey’, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 49, No. 193. (Mar., 1939), 94. 
 
                               Secondary Sources 
 
Articles and Reviews 
 
Black, R. D. C., ‘Ralph George Hawtrey 1879-1975’, Proceedings of the British 
Academy, vol. 63, 1977, 363-98.  
 
Booth, A.E. and Glynn, S., ‘The Public Records and Recent British Historiography’, 
Economic History Review, 32 (3), 1979), pp. 303-15.  
 
Cairncross, A., ‘In Praise of Economic History’, The Economic History Review, 
New Series, Vol. 42, No. 2. (May, 1989), 173-185. 
 
Cairncross, A.K., ‘The Work of an Economic Advisor’, Public Administratiion, 46(1) 
(1968), pp1-11. 
 
Davis, E.G., ‘The Correspondence between R.G.Hawtrey and J.M.Keynes on the 
Treatise: The Genesis of Output Adjustment Models’, The Canadian Journal of 
Economics, Vol. 13, No. 4, (Nov., 1980) 716-724. 
 
Dimand, R.W., ‘Hawtrey and the Keynesian Multiplier: a Response to Akiakpor’, 
History of Political Economy, 32(4), (2000), pp. 909-13. 
  
Eichengreen, B.J., and Sachs, J., ‘Exchange rates and Economic Recovery in the 
1930s’, Journal of Economic History, 45(4) (2000). 
 
Hicks, J., ‘Automatists, Hawtreyans, and Keynesians’, Journal of Money, Credit 
and Banking, Vol. 1, No. 3, Conference of University Professors.  (Aug., 1969),  
307-317. 
 
Howson, S.K., ‘The Origins of Dear Money, 1919-20’, The Economic History 
Review, New Series, Vol. 27, No. 1. (Feb., 1974), 88-107. 
 
 522
Howson, S.K., ‘ “A Dear Money Man”?: Keynes on Monetary Policy, 1920’, The 
Economic Journal, Vol. 83, No. 330. (Jun., 1973) 456-464. 
 
Kaldor, N., ‘Mr. Hawtrey on Short and Long Term Investment’, Economica, new 
Series, Vol. 5, No. 20. (Nov., 1938) 461-467. 
 
Laidler, D., ‘Hawtrey, Harvard and the Origins of the Chicago Tradition’ Journal of 
Political Economy 101 (Dec. 1993) 1068-1103. 
 
Laidler, D., ‘More on Hawtrey, Harvard and Chicago’ Journal of Economic Studies 
25, (1998a) 1: 4-16. 
 
Laidler, D., ‘Hawtrey, Harvard and Chicago: a final comment’ Journal of 
Economic Studies 25, (1998b) 1: 22-24. 
 
McDonald, A., ‘The Geddes Committee and the Formulation of Public Expenditure 
Policy, 1921-22’, Historical Journal, 32(3), (1989), pp. 643-74. 
 
Middleton, R., ‘Britain in the 1930s: A Managed Economy? A Comment’, The 
Economic History Review, New Series, Vol. 42, No. 4. (Nov., 1989), 544-547. 
 
Moggridge, D.E., ‘From the Treatise to the General Theory: an Exercise in 
Chronology’ History of Political Economy 5(1), (1973). 
 
Moggridge, D.E., and Howson, S.K., ‘Keynes on Monetary Policy, 1910-1946’  
Oxford Economic Papers, 26(2) (1974), pp.226-47. 
 
Peden, G.C., ‘Keynes, the Treasury and Unemployment in the Later Nineteen-
Thirties’, Oxford Economic Papers, New Series, Vol. 32, No. 1. (Mar. 1980), 1-18.  
 
Peden, G.C., ‘Sir Richard Hopkins and the “Keynesian Revolution” in Employment 
Policy, 1929 – 1945’ The Economic History Review, New Series, Vol.36, No.2. 
(May, 1983) 281-296. 
 
Robbins, L., ‘Mr. Hawtrey on the Scope of Economics’, Economica, No. 20. (Jun., 
1927), 172-178.  
 
Thomas, M., ‘Rearmament and Economic Recovery in the late 1930s’, Economic 
History Review, 36(4), (1983), pp.552-79. 
 
Theses 
 
 523
Luthje, M. M. M., ‘The Politics of Monetary Policy in Britain from the First World 
War to the World Economic Conference of 1933’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Cambridge University, 2002. 
 
McDonald, A., ‘The Formulation of British Public Expenditure Policy, 1919-1925’ 
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Bristol University, 1988. 
 
O’Halpin, E., ‘Sir Warren Fisher, Head of the Civil Service’, unpublished Ph.D. 
thesis, Cambridge University, 1982.  
 
Short, M., ‘The Politics of Personal Taxation 1917-31’, unpublished Ph.D. thesis, 
Cambridge University, 1985. 
 
Books 
 
Backhouse, R.E., Truth and Progress in Economic Knowledge (Cheltenham, 
Edward Elgar, 1997). 
 
Bantock, G., Baxter, R.E., Davis, E., The Penguin Dictionary of Economics 
(London, Penguin, 2003).  
 
Booth, A., British Economic Policy 1931-49: was there a Keynesian Revolution 
(Hemel Hempstead, Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1989) 
 
Bullock, A., The Life and Times of Ernest Bevin: Trade Union Leader 1881-1940 
(London, Heinemann, 1960). 
 
Buchholz, T.D., New Ideas from Dead Economists: an Introduction to Modern 
Economic Thought (London, Penguin, 1999). 
 
Burk, K., Britain, America and the Sinews of War, 1914-18 (London, Allen and 
Unwin, 1985). 
 
Cairncross, A., Introduction to Economics (London, Butterworth, 1955). 
 
Cairncross, A. and Eichengreen, B., Sterling in Decline: The devaluations of 1931, 
1949 and 1967 (Oxford, basil Blackwell, 1983). 
 
Cairncross, A.K., Economics and Economic Policy (Aldershot, Gregg, 1993). 
 
Capie, F., Depression and Protection: Britain between the Wars (Aldershot, 
Gregg, 1994). 
 
 524
Campbell, J., Lloyd-George: the Goat in the Wilderness (London, Jonathan Cape, 
1977). 
 
Clarke, P., The Keynesian Revolution in the Making, 1924-1936 (Oxford, 
Clarendon, 1988) 
 
Clarke, P., Hope and Glory: Britain 1900-1990 (London, Penguin, 1996). 
 
Clarke, P., ‘The Treasury’s analytical model of the British economy between the 
wars’ in Furner, M. and Supple, B., The State and Economic Knowledge: the 
American and British Experiences (Cambridge, CUP, 1990). 
 
Clarke, P., A Question of Leadership: from Gladstone to Margaret Thatcher 
(London, Penguin, 1992). 
 
Clavin, P., The Failure of Economic Diplomacy: Britain, France, Germany and the 
United States 1931-36 (London, Macmillan, 1996).  
 
De Marchi N.B., and Blaug, M., Appraising Economic Theories: Studies in the 
Methodology of Research Programmes ((Aldershot, Edward Elgar, 1991). 
 
Deutscher, P., R. G. Hawtrey and the Development of Macroeconomics (London, 
Macmillan, 1990) 
 
Drummond, I. M., Imperial Economic Policy, 1917-1939 (London, George Allen 
and Unwin, 1974)   
 
Drummond, I.M., The Gold Standard and the International Monetary System 
1900-39 (London, Macmillan, 1987). 
 
Eichengreen, B., Golden Fetters (Oxford, O. U. P.,1992). 
 
Enzig, P.  Montagu Norman (London, Hutchinson, 1932). 
 
Galbraith, J.K., Money (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1975) 
 
Galbraith, J.K., Economics and the Public Purpose (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1967). 
 
Galbraith, J.K., Economics, Peace and Laughter (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 
1971). 
 
Grigg, P.J., Prejudice and Judgement (London, Jonathan Cape, 1947). 
 
 525
Harrod, R.F., Money (London, Macmillan, 1969). 
 
Harrod, R.F., The Life of John Maynard Keynes (London, Macmillan, 1951). 
 
Heclo, H. and Wildavsky, A., The Private Government of Public Money: 
Community and Policy inside British Politics (London, Macmillan, 1974). 
 
Hobsbawn, E.J., Industry and Empire (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969). 
 
Howson, S., ‘Hawtrey and the Real World’ in Harcourt, G.C., Keynes and his 
Contemporaries (London, Macmillan, 1985) pp. 142-187. 
 
Howson, S.K., Domestic Monetary Management in Britain 1919-1938 
(Cambridge, C.U.P., 1975). 
 
Howson, S.K., and Winch, D., The Economic Advisory Council 1930-39 
(Cambridge, C.U.P., 1977).  
 
Laidler, D., The Golden Age of the Quantity Theory (Hemel Hempstead, Philip 
Allen, 1991).  
 
Lavington, F., The British Capital Market (London, Methuen, 1921). 
 
Laybourn, K., Philip Snowden: A Biography (Aldershot, Temple Smith, 1988). 
 
Laybourn, K. and James, D. (eds.), Philip Snowden: The First Labour Chancellor 
(Bradford, Bradford Libraries and Information Service, 1987).   
 
Macleod, J., The Sisters D’Aranyi (London, Allen & Unwin, 1969). 
 
Marcuzzo, M.C., and Rosselli, A., Economists in Cambridge: a Study through their 
Correspondence, 1907 – 1946  (London, Routledge, 2005). 
 
Middleton, R., Towards the Managed Economy: Keynes, the Treasury and the 
Fiscal Policy of the 1930s (London, Methuen, 1985) 
 
Middleton, R., Government versus the Market: The Growth of the Public Sector, 
Economic Management and British Economic Performance c.1890-1979 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1996) 
 
Middleton, R., Charlatans or Saviours? Economists and the British Economy from 
Marshall to Meade (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 1998) 
 
 526
Moggridge, D.E., British Monetary Policy, 1924-1931:  the Norman Conquest of 
£4.86 (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1972). 
 
Moggridge, D.E., The Return to Gold 1925: the Formulation of Economic Policy 
and its Critics (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1969). 
 
Moggridge, D.E., Maynard Keynes: An Economists Biography (London, 
Routledge, 1992). 
 
O’Brien, D.P., and Presley, J.R., Pioneers of Modern Economics in Britain 
(London, Macmillan, 1981). 
 
Nevin, E.T., The Mechanism of Cheap Money: A Study of British Monetary Policy, 
1931-39 (Cardiff, University of Wales Press, 1955). 
 
Peden, G.C., Keynes, the Treasury and British Economic Policy (London, 
Macmillan, 1988) 
 
Peden, G.C., British Economic and Social Policy: Lloyd-George to Margaret 
Thatcher (Oxford, Phillip Allan, 1985). 
 
Peden, G.C., The Treasury and British Public Policy 1906-59 (Oxford, O.U.P., 
2000).  
 
Peden, G.C., Keynes and his Critics: Treasury Responses to the Keynesian 
Revolution 1925-1946 (Oxford, O.U.P.,2004). 
 
Peden, G.C., British Rearmament and the Treasury 1932-1939 (Edinburgh, 
Scottish Academic Press, 1979).  
 
Pigou, A.C., Aspects of British Economic History 1918-25 (London, Frank Cass, 
1947). 
 
Pollard, S., The Gold Standard and Employment Policies between the Wars 
(London, Methuen, 1970). 
 
Robinson, J., Economic Philosophy (London, C.A.Watts, 1962). 
 
Sayers, R.S., The Bank of England 1891-1944, 3 vols. (Cambridge, C.U.P., 1976). 
 
Skidelsky, R., John Maynard Keynes, vol. ii, The Economist as Saviour 1920-1937 
(London, Macmillan, 1992). 
 
 527
Skidelsky, R., Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929-31 
(London, Macmillan, 1967). 
 
Skidelsky, R., Oswald Mosley (London, Macmillan, 1975). 
 
Stewart, M., Keynes and After (Harmondsworth, Penguin, 1969). 
 
Stone, J.R.N., Inland Revenue Report on National Income, 1929 (Cambridge, 
C.U.P., 1977). 
 
Taylor, A.J.P., English History 1914-45 (Oxford, O.U.P., 1965). 
 
Tomlinson, J. D., Public Policy and the Economy since 1900 (Oxford, O.U.P., 
1990). 
 
Tomlinson, J.D., Problems of British Economic Policy 1870-1945 (London, 
Methuen, 1981). 
 
Winch, D., Economics and Policy: A Historical Study (London, Hodder and 
Stoughton, 1969). 
 
Wrigley, C.G., David Lloyd-George and the British Labour Movement (Brighton, 
Harvester, 1976). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 528
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 529
